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# **Chinese Educational 'Aid' to Africa: A Different 'Donor Logic'?**

**Tingting Yuan**

A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the  
requirements for award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in  
Graduate School of Education, Faculty of Social Science and Law  
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# Abstract

Since the 2006 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation announced a strengthened relationship between China and Africa, there has been increasing interest about what that may mean for the forms and consequences of Chinese educational aid. This thesis aims to contribute to that discussion by comparing the Chinese approach to educational aid with the traditional Western model. These differences are investigated theoretically and empirically. The first part of the thesis compares the approaches at the level of 'donor logic', the assemblage of assumptions, histories, relationships, practices and motives that characterise and distinguish them. These are broadly summarised as the traditional logic (from the West) of 'enabling catch up' and China emphasising 'win-win'. This is done through systematic reviews of the literature, with particular emphasis on the Chinese literature.

The second part of the thesis consists of reports on a series of empirical investigations into how the forms of aid were experienced by their recipients, and particularly whether differences in 'donor logic' were recognised. These include periods of field work in Tanzania and China, involving interviews with Chinese and Tanzanian officials, administrators in higher education, and Tanzanian students returning from China. Reports on Chinese training programmes for African educationalists were analysed using Critical Discourse Analysis.

The thesis concludes that there are differences between Western and Chinese donor logics and practices of educational aid, and that these are recognised 'on the ground', and it speculates on the possibility of the emergence of a Chinese model as an alternative to the Western model of educational aid.

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## Author's declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

SIGNED: Justin Yuen DATE: 04/07/2011

# Contents

<b>CHAPTER ONE</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1. Research background</b>		<b>1</b>
1.1 How I became interested in this topic		1
1.2 How have aid and educational aid been understood?		3
1.2.1 The place of 'aid' in this study: 'donor logic' and its essential elements		5
<b>2. Structure and outline of the research</b>		<b>11</b>
2.1 Research questions and outline of Part One		11
2.1.1 Western context		13
2.1.2 Chinese context		15
2.2 Research questions and outline of Part Two		17

## PART ONE

<b>CHAPTER TWO</b>	<b>WESTERN CONTEXT: CHANGING DISCOURSES AND LOGICS OF INTERNATIONAL AID</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>Introduction</b>		<b>21</b>
<b>1. Changing logics and discourses: from modernisation to globalisation</b>		<b>22</b>
1.1 Modernisation: decolonisation and the beginning of aid		22
1.2 Cold War: two eras and the changing motivations of aid		24
1.3 Washington Consensus: neo-liberalism and economic globalisation		26
1.4 Post Washington Consensus: PRSPs replacing SAPs mechanisms		29
Summary		31
<b>2. Conceptualising the global context and contemporary aid</b>		<b>33</b>
2.1 Globalisation		33
2.1.1 Globalisation as a process of neo-liberalism		34
2.1.2 Globalisation as a politicization process		36
2.2 International aid in the new century		38
2.2.1 The development of aid 'discourses'		39
2.2.1.1 Changing discourse according to changing motives		39
2.2.1.2 EFA, MDGs and Paris Declaration		41
2.2.1.3 Educational aid in the knowledge economy discourse		43
2.2.1.3.1 World Bank: Investing in education for KE		45
2.2.2 The development of aid 'mechanisms'		50
2.2.2.1 Conditionality and changing conditionality		50
2.2.2.2 'New architecture' of aid		53
2.2.3 Aid, education and Africa		55
<b>Conclusion</b>		<b>56</b>

<b>CHAPTER THREE</b>	<b>CHINESE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT AND</b>	
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2.1.1 The fieldwork plan: who are interviewed and why	129
2.1.2 Pilot interview	133
2.1.3 How to access and how to talk	135
2.1.3.1 Flexibility and the accesses	135
2.1.3.2 'Tailored' questions with diverse talking forms	136
2.1.4 What happened on the ground: the fieldwork 'stories'	138
2.1.4.1 Stories in Tanzania	138
2.1.4.2 Stories in China	144
2.1.4.3 Critical ethnographic work	146
2.1.5 Analysing the interview data	147
2.2 Documentary data: a critical perspective	148
2.2.1 Collection of documents: gaining 'grey literature' from fieldwork	148
2.2.2 Analysis of documents: Critical discourse analysis	150
<b>3. Critical review</b>	<b>154</b>
3.1 Validity and reliability	154
3.2 Ethics	156
3.3 Potential problems	157

## **PART TWO**

### **INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 159**

### **CHAPTER SIX EXPLORING IN TANZANIA: HISTORY AND VOICES ---- FROM 'SOCIALIST BROTHERS' TO 'MARKET AND MUTUAL BENEFIT'? 163**

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>163</b>
<b>1. Before and within the field work: a personal 'ethnographic' perception</b>	<b>165</b>
1.1 Before and after arrival- from imagination to the reality	166
1.2 Talking and living with local people	168
1.3 Chinese people in Dar es Salaam	170
<b>2. Different donor, one meeting table</b>	<b>172</b>
2.1 Tanzania: a recipient country in new era	172
2.1.1 Highly aid-dependent country: a historical development with foreign aid	172
2.1.2 Reformed aid relations between Tanzania and the DPs	174
2.2 JAST - 'It is our Bible'	176
2.3 JAST's implication for China: opportunity or obstruction?	182
2.4 Educational sector of Tanzania	185
2.4.1 A brief history	185
2.4.2 Western educational aid to Tanzania	187
2.4.2.1 SWAp in Tanzania and PEDP	190
2.4.2.2 PEDP II and the trend for GBS	194
2.4.3 Contemporary need in education and an invitation for China	197
<b>3. A distinctive historical link between China and Tanzania</b>	<b>199</b>
<b>4. Different from the West: from socialism friendship to agreement in the global era</b>	<b>203</b>
4.1 Nyerere's time and influence	203
4.2 The TAZARA railway	206
4.3 The Cultural Agreement	208

4.4 New world, new era	210
5. Perceptions of China's motive/logic	213
Conclusion	215

## **CHAPTER SEVEN DONOR LOGIC IN ACTION: A FOCUS ON HIGHER EDUCATION ---- TRANSLATING POLICY WORDS INTO PRACTICE 218**

Introduction	218
1. Overview of China-Tanzania educational practice under the FOCAC pledges	220
2. General situation of Chinese government scholarship: A translation of rhetoric into practice	227
2.1 Summary	232
3. The case of DIT	233
3.1 Interview with vice principal of DIT	235
4. Students feeling	239
4.1 An ambivalent feeling about the degree length, funding amount, teaching quality and communication	239
4.2 A different feeling between older and younger graduates	243
4.3 A historical influence on the understanding about East and West	245
Conclusion	247

## **CHAPTER EIGHT DONOR LOGIC IN ACTION: TRANSFORMING EXPERIENCE AND CULTURAL HERITAGE 250**

Introduction	250
1. Three cases of Chinese higher institutions affording educational support to Africa	252
1.1 Tianjin Normal University	253
1.2 Zhejiang Normal University	254
1.3 Tianjin University of Technology and Education	256
2. Practical idea: Short term training	258
2.1 General situation	258
2.2 The case of ZJNU's short term training	260
3. CDA of four pieces of 'Work summary of training for university presidents' by ZJNU: a statement rather than technical report	263
3.1 Text (style, genre)	264
3.2 Roles- discursive practice of discourse	267
3.3 Social relations	270
4. Cultural route: culture centre and Confucius Institute	271
4.1 Chinese Cultural Centre in Mkapa High School: a small place with a big name	272



4.2 Confucius Institute (CI)	274
Conclusion	279
<b>CONCLUSION OF PART TWO</b>	<b>282</b>
1. Summary	282
2. An important part of 'donor logic': understanding modality differences	284

## **CONCLUSION**

<b>CHAPTER NINE CONCLUSION</b>	<b>288</b>
1. A summary of the findings	288
2. A different logic in a set of dimensions	292
3. What China is thinking?	294
4. Contribution and Limitations	297

<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>301</b>
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<b>APPENDIX 1 KEY INTERVIEWS</b>	<b>338</b>
----------------------------------	------------

<b>APPENDIX 2 FIELD WORK INTERVIEW QUESTIONS BY GROUPS</b>	<b>342</b>
--	------------

<b>APPENDIX 3 CONSENT LETTER</b>	<b>345</b>
----------------------------------	------------

<b>APPENDIX 4 RESEARCH CLEARANCE LETTERS</b>	<b>346</b>
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**Figures and tables**

Table 1.1 The dimensions for examining ‘donor logic’.....7

Table 2.1 Western aid: changing international situations and the aid discourses, mechanisms and logic of intervention.....31

Table 3.1 A comparison design between the Western and Chinese aid: changing international situations and the aid discourses, mechanisms and logic of intervention.....60

Table 3.2 The concept framework of the Peace Dove Strategy (PDS).....71

Table 3.3 Categories of Chinese Government Scholarship recipients in 2009...74

Table 4.1 Changing domestic job and China-Africa relations.....106

Table 4.2 Chinese aid within changing international situations (Western context) and the related aid discourses, mechanisms and logic of intervention.....109

Table 5.1 Research framework of the thesis.....121

Table 5.2 Key informants in groups of the fieldwork.....131

Table 5.3 CDA diagrammatic representation .....152

Table 6.1 Alignment of Development Partners’ assistance with national development goals under JAST in Tanzania .....178

Table 6.2 Trends of projections and actual disbursement by countries for FY 2002/03 -2006/07.....182

Table 6.3 Aid at a glance chart – Tanzania.....188

Table 6.4 Aid to education and aid to basic education in Tanzania.....189

Table 6.5 Main harmonised aid arrangements in Tanzania.....193

Table 6.6 A brief historical review of political, economic and cultural/educational relation between China and Tanzania.....200

Table 7.1 China's current educational aid to Tanzania related to FOCAC pledges.....222

Table 8.1 Three training sessions held in ZJNU in 2004-2006.....262

## Acronyms and abbreviations

BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BFs	Basket Funds
BNU	Beijing Normal University
BERA	British Educational Research Association
CAS	Chinese Academy of Sciences
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CDF	Comprehensive Development Frameworks
CI	Confucius Institute
CPC	Communist Party of China, or called Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CSC	China Scholarship Council
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DIT	Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology
DP	Development Partner
DPG	Development Partners Group
DTC	Dar es Salaam Technical College
DUCE	Dar es Salaam University College of Education
ECNU	East China Normal University
EFA	Education for All
EKE	Education for Knowledge Economy
EU	European Union
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
FY	Fiscal Year
GBS	General Budget support
GoT	Government of Tanzania
IDA	International Development Association
IDS	International Development Statistics
IFIs	International financial institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JAST	Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania
KAM	Knowledge Assessment Methodology
KE	Knowledge Economy
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MKUKUTA	Mkakatiwa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania (Swahili of NSGRP)
MKUZA	Mkakatiwa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Zanzibar (Swahili of ZSGRP)
NSGRP	Nation Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA)
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PDS	Peace Dove Strategy
PEDP	Primary Education Development Programme
PKUCAS	Centre for African Studies of Peking University
PRBS	Poverty Reduction Budget Support
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRSC	Poverty Reduction Support Credits
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes

SAPs	Structural Adjustment Policies
SEDP	Secondary Education Development Program
SWAp	Sector-wide approaches
TAS	Tanzania Assistance Strategy
TAZARA	Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority
TJNU	Tianjin Normal University
TUTE	Tianjin University of Technology and Education
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UN-NGLS	United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service
UPE	Universal Primary Education
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
ZJNU	Zhejiang Normal University
ZSGRP	Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUZA)



# **Chapter One     Introduction**

## **1. Research background**

### **1.1 How I became interested in this topic**

Although I was a student of comparative education at Beijing Normal University for some years, I didn't start to think about 'aid' until the China-Africa relationship became a hot topic from 2006, when the Chinese government invited leaders from 48 African countries to Beijing in November to build up a new strategic partnership and economic 'win-win' (mutual beneficial) relation with Africa. This was the third Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (also called Beijing Summit), the largest international summit ever held within China. The summit called for the establishment of 'a new type of strategic partnership' between China and Africa, which features 'political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 11/16/2006a). This issue inevitably caused a huge amount of discussion from West to East, with several sceptical and critical comments and analysis about China's aid approaches and motives. Crucially, though, the existence and the nature of the summit did represent a clear contrast with, and possible challenge to, both the Western conception and practices of aid. According to Glosny (2006: 9),

Although China may still be a net recipient of aid and may not think of itself as a donor nation, the PRC government has become more actively involved in emergency and development aid and has indicated it will focus even more on assisting the developing world to meet its economic and social challenges. As it continues to play this more active role in the donor community, China, the other members of the donor community, and the rest of the developing world will be better served by increased exchanges and interaction and the opportunity for donors to learn from each other.



This stimulated me to develop a comparative study on China's educational aid to Africa and compare it with the Western aid, in terms of their different discourses and practice.

As a researcher in the field of education, I found that during the Beijing Summit, in contrast to the Western donors who were emphasizing universal primary education (UPE), the Chinese government decided to focus more on government scholarships, teacher secondment, vocational and applicable technological education (FOCAC, 2006b), and these educational actions are closely related with other principles on China's policy - as 'China has a view of human resource and social development that covers education, health, culture and people-to-people exchange and collaboration' (King, 2007: 338).<sup>1</sup> Although there is now growing evidence and concern about 'China in Africa', and this is extended to education, there was at that time still very little academic work about educational practice between China and Africa compared with the vast amount of literature regarding their economic relations. In particular, most of the discussion on China's action and motives in Africa was based on the assumption that China and the West were both operating on a similar logic, albeit in different ways; this means they assume that the rationale of Chinese intervention in Africa is similar to that followed by the West, though with a more overt emphasis on 'benefits' to China, in exchange for 'aid'.

This gradually inspired me at a deeper and more ambitious level to reflect upon the term 'aid', especially international aid to education, and to consider the possibility that there are deeper and more profound differences between the logic of Western and Chinese aid in an era of neo-liberal globalisation. This became even more interesting when I took into account the ambiguity of 'aid' in Chinese - the term '*yuan zhu*'. Though China translated it in English as 'aid' in a lot of official resources, the Chinese characters '*yuan zhu*' (means 'assistant', 'help', 'support') doesn't contain any Western context (such as 'aid' as foreign aid, for international development especially economic development after Second World

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<sup>1</sup> The goal for primary education is from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of United Nations (see MDGs table in Robertson et al., 2007: 88). Aiming for poverty reduction, as a central agenda for the new century by United Nations, MDGs will be discussed more in the following parts.

War). At one level, this means that we cannot assume that what China might mean by educational aid has the same scope and intention as we have become used to in thinking about educational aid from the West to developing countries. It seemed that there may be wider issues involved, such as whether China is developing as a new model of aid to Africa, or a new hegemony, or even a repetition of the old colonist in contemporary international relations? Does China want to be a donor, a friend, an exploiter, or an example for African countries? How do the recipients and the other donor countries respond? Can China offer a different style of aid from the Western way in this new era? With these inquiries, I started my journey on exploring aid, donors and aid logics.

## 1.2 How have aid and educational aid been understood?

Though there has been a very large literature on educational aid from Western developed countries to developing countries, the fundamental logic of that aid has been largely taken for granted. Most of the work on aid to education is concerned with the Western model, and an assumption that a basically similar logic of the donor-recipient relationship continues across the whole period of aid development. China-Africa relations have quickly come to the attention of global academic work, as well as a 'new frontier' in China.<sup>2</sup> However there has been little empirical research on educational practice between China and Africa (especially regarding China as a donor). Apart from some official data from the Chinese government, many unanswered questions remain regarding Chinese educational

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<sup>2</sup> There have been a number of scholars commenting on China and Africa's recent cooperation since 2006, such as Allen and Davies (2006), Gountin (2006), Li, A.S. (2006) and Li, B.P. (2007). Compared with Western countries, China is late in recognising African culture, history and art, and has only started its African studies 50 years ago (Liu, 2009: 7). In recent years, African studies have gradually become a 'new frontier' in China's academic domain. Liu (2009: 4) notes, 'as China continuously moves to integrate itself with the outside world and strives to build itself into a strong nation with global influence in order to keep tempo with the accelerating pace of globalisation, opening of the new frontier of African studies has become all the more important for improvement of China's modern academic attributes such as expansion of global horizon, fostering of universal values, awakening of subjective consciousness and development of Chinese characteristics'. Besides the studies on 'Western knowledge and culture', 'Japanese reform' and the 'Russian revolution', an 'Africology' with Chinese characteristics could be created in the future. Liu (2009: 13) believes that as China's academic circles try to build theoretical systems with Chinese characteristics for the science of international relations and foreign affairs, the China-Africa relationship will offer an important showcase of China's practice with its own approaches and mechanisms; this will also have implications on how the world studies international relations. These opinions are from the recent edited book, written in English by Chinese scholars, entitled 'Fifty Years of Sino-African Cooperation: Background, Progress and Significance--- Chinese Perspectives on Sino-African Relations', was published in 2009 by Yunnan University.



aid to African countries.<sup>3</sup>

To make some contribution to understanding international aid to education in this study, it was necessary to look closely at the related conceptions of aid, education, development, globalisation. They all seem related, but individually and collectively they are complicated. 'Aid' can be seen as a word which is aiming for equity, because theoretically when we aid others, the fact is that resources flow from a rich place to a poor place. But, why make this flow? What is the motivation of aid? It varies from country to country and from actor to actor, and its forms have also changed significantly during the last fifty years (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003: 7). The definition of aid is not as neutral as helping and redistribution; it carries clear strategies and motives, and contains complex relations. When we regard aid as a kind of activity by a country, an organisation, or an individual, under different historical contexts, aid has different explanations. This becomes even more complex when 'new' donors are emerging.

This then led me to the crucial recognition that the issue is not about the definition of the term, 'aid', but about *the nature of the relationships between donors and recipients*. Thus, the perspective on educational aid adopted in this thesis focuses on its inner mechanisms and causal relations rather than its contribution to economic performance, or pedagogic issues. Most important, aid is not a single thing to be understood. It is a multi-dimensional complex. The term embraces the ways that donors justify their strategies and actions to both the recipients and their sponsors (e.g. foundations, enterprises, governments, etc.). It also contains donor ideologies, philosophies, motives and rationales, and how they legitimate their actions. In the next section, we start to clarify the aim of the study and the key terms involved in talking about 'donor logic' as a complex assemblage of components.

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<sup>3</sup> See the official website of the Beijing Summit (<http://english.focacsummit.org/>), and the book 'China-Africa education cooperation' (in Chinese) by Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China. The noticeable literature on this topic are the papers from Kenneth King who has researched Africa, aid and education for many years, and given a series of comments on China-Africa relationship particularly in the educational field since Beijing summit (King, 2006; 2007).

### 1.2.1 The place of ‘aid’ in this study: ‘donor logic’ and its essential elements

As noted above, aid is a complex rather than a simple concept. In enquiring into the meanings of ‘aid’, we start from a critical look at the donors’ logic. We can sense the differences here, but it is more difficult to capture them in ways that can be researched. So, while it may be possible to point to some broad differences between the West and China in the ‘logic’ of aid, such as ‘catch up’ and ‘win-win’, if we are to be able to investigate empirically the nature of that difference, we need to deconstruct these broad labels somewhat. Terms like ‘catch up’ and ‘win-win’ are very evocative and useful labels, but to be analytically useful they have to be operationalised, through the identification of their component parts and dimensions. This involves seeing ‘donor logics’ as assemblages of components involved in aid policy and aid practice. What are these complex components which are continually considered and amended by donors and hold the whole ‘architecture’ of aid?

In the course of the theoretical investigation of the two models, a number of dimensions of the difference became evident. These can be reduced to six main elements.

The first concerns the ‘what’ of aid, which refers to ‘what is given’ to the recipients. In the educational field, we can see broadly that China’s main focus is on offering higher education and vocational training to Africa, which contrasts with the focus on primary education which now dominant the Western educational aid ‘offer’, following the goal of UPE emphasised in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).<sup>4</sup>

The second difference concerns the ‘motives’ of aid, ‘why’ ‘aid’ is given. Although ‘catching up to the developed countries’ was the fundamental basis of Western aid, there were also some specific changes according to particular historical stages; such as aid for two superpowers’ client states, and aid particularly for security after September 11, 2001. With motives more focused on ‘partners’, China was doing aid from building political alignment to achieving

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<sup>4</sup> MDGs and its goal of UPE will be talked later in chapter two.



economic mutual benefit.

The third is the economic and political ‘condition’ of aid. Conditionality could be seen as the core mechanism of the Western aid (especially as structured through the Washington Consensus), although it is under a changing modification by Western donors and one of the trends is that ‘conditionality’ may not happen under some aid reforms. UK Department for International Development (DFID)’s white paper in 2009 stated that, ‘the old Washington Consensus – with its advocacy of structural adjustment and a one size fits all approach to policy making – failed because it was imposed from the outside and was not tailored to country circumstances.’<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, it is notable that China has declared that it will ‘never attach conditions’ and is committed to ‘non-intervention’ (Naidu and Mbazima, 2008: 752) in its aid policies.<sup>6</sup>

The fourth is the ‘logic of intervention of aid’ which refers to the aspect of the ‘how’ of ‘aid’. ‘Logic of intervention’ has a clear resemblance with the more commonly used conception ‘aid paradigm’, which typically refers to the ‘modalities’ of aid (King and Buchert eds., 1999), or architecture of aid, the structures and processes through which it is delivered. Western aid, for instance, moved from Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) to Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSPs), normally in a top-down way, while China, with less structured aid modality, always insisted on self-help and a two-way cultural and educational exchange.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> In May 2009 DFID issued a new guidance note to staff on implementing its conditionality policy which appears to be backtracking on their 2005 commitment not to use economic policy conditionality. The note is not supposed to change the 2005 policy which stated that DFID ‘will not make our aid conditional on specific policy decisions by partner governments’. (DFID, 13/08/2009)

<sup>6</sup> ‘Never attach conditions’ was stated in China’s ‘Eight principles of Chinese economic and technological aid’ in 1964. ‘Non-intervention’ was stated in China’s ‘Five Point Proposal’ for China-Africa relationship by President Jiang in 1996. These terms will be elaborated in Part one of this study. However, China’s relation with Taiwan is sometimes argued as a kind of condition within the China-Africa relationship. According to China’s African policy (2006), ‘the one-China principle is the political foundation for the establishment and development of China’s relations with African countries and regional organizations’.

<sup>7</sup> Buchert (2000: 406) talked about the ‘new modality’ for overcoming the deficiencies of the previous project assistance mode. Buchert (ibid: 407) gives suggestions on the ‘new modality’: that governments and agencies work according to objectives, goals and targets stipulated in a government policy programme which is based on a clear vision for development; that there has to be policy dialogue in order to agree on the specific objectives, goals and targets; that there has to be co-ordination of the agencies by the government; that there has to be ownership of the development process and its outcomes by the government; that there has to be accountability to the stakeholders and transparency throughout the process; that the government has to lead and the agencies have to follow on terms agreed upon in negotiation between two equal parties; and that there has to be partnership between government and agencies and, preferably, other civil society institutions, including the private sector.



The fifth element is the basic pattern and principles of aid delivery practices that characterise the two paradigms. In what has been described as its ‘technocratic frame’ (Kothari, 2005: 443), Western aid is typically delivered through bureaucratised and professionalised consultants and specialist agencies and organisation, often competitive between NGOs, and between countries, and prone to corruption. This is one of the main reasons for negative views of Western aid.<sup>8</sup> Differently, China has little delegation to, or participation/ involvement of local actors, and puts considerable emphasis on direct constructions by Chinese engineers, or direct transferring and sharing its own experience as a developing country. This has been subject to other criticisms, referring to the limiting of learning opportunities for developing countries.

And finally the different logics are characterised by the historically different aid relationship the West and China have had with developing countries. This involved on the one hand a colonial relation between West and Africa, and on the other, a shared experience of being ‘underdeveloped’, and a ‘brothers’ (including socialist brothers) connection between China and Africa. These histories have produced what are seen as a contemporary paternal and hierarchical relationship between West and Africa, and a fraternal and reciprocal relationship between China and Africa.

So, ‘donor logic’ may be seen as an overarching category that emerges as a kind of summary of the possible considerations of aid differences between the two sets of components. We can see a list of dimensions of ‘donor logic’ and a comparison between China and the West in terms of these components in the following table:

Table 1.1 The dimensions for examining ‘donor logic’

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<sup>8</sup> Through looking at the ‘development experts’, Kothari (2005) argues that ‘increasing professionalisation within the development industry supports the neoliberal development agenda’, and she particularly concerns ‘the limitations of spaces available to locate development outside this technocratic frame’. Kothari quoted Crush (1995: 6)’s words that, to move outside of the managerial, technical, professionalised and expert-led field and frame of development, however, has become increasingly difficult as ‘the (development) machine is global in its reach, encompassing departments and bureaucracies in colonial and post-colonial states throughout the world, Western aid agencies, multilateral organisations, the sprawling global network of NGOs, experts and private consultants, private sector organisations such as banks and companies that marshal the rhetoric of development, and the plethora of development studies programmes in institutes of learning worldwide’.

<i>Dimensions of 'donor Logic' (educational aid)</i>	<i>WEST</i>	<i>CHINA</i>
What is given/ aid approaches	Firstly primary education, also including secondary and higher education – by giving money and programmes	University scholarships and trainings, teacher secondment, cultural activities, school building and small number of donation
Why aid/ aid motives	Western economies, Cold War struggles; security, etc.	Political alignment to economic cooperation
Any condition attached (economic or political)	Yes	No; principle of 'non-interference'
How aid/ Logic of intervention/ aid modalities/ aid paradigms	From intensive economic adjustment to 'softer' governmental advice; from project to budget support; modifying conditionalities; Top-down planning/ coordination; Accountability regime; etc.	Mutually beneficial; two-way exchange/cooperation; Chinese pragmatism; Trade-based aid
Technocratic frame of aid practice	Aid delivered by professional, bureaucratised specialist and agencies and workers	Donor carries out work with its own labour and resources; little involvement of local labour
Aid relationships (donor and recipient)	Paternal, hierarchical, top-down, colonial legacy	Reciprocity/ win-win, fraternal, equality

The term 'Donor logic' is not often directly mentioned in the research literatures,

but we do find evidence of similar identifications of aid components. For instance, similar contrasts are well exemplified in a comparison of Nordic and Chinese aid to Tanzania by Sandvand (2008). She examines the differences between the Nordic and Chinese aid in terms of ‘policy’ and ‘practice’, and the contrastive terms she makes can resonate clearly with our components for ‘donor logic’. She points out that,

In *policy*, Nordic aid is poverty-oriented, principled and rights-based, while Chinese aid is growth-oriented, practical, and frictionless.<sup>9</sup> In *practice*, Nordic aid to Tanzania is evolving, it is politically conditional, predominantly grants-based, un-tied, poverty-oriented, influenced by international trends, advocating an equitable and integrated development strategy, whereas Chinese aid to Tanzania is consistent, it is politically un-conditional, sporadic, predominantly loans-based, tied, growth-oriented, determined mainly by own experience and philosophy, advocating a centralist, mercantilist development strategy, where aid is but one integrated element of China’s Africa strategy. (Sandvand, 2008 : 5)

We see a very similar contrast in Welle-Strand (2010: 11)’s conclusion on ‘emerging donors’ (and China is the main one in her article) - ‘the emerging donors provide foreign aid on different terms, in different sectors, through different organisational structures, and with different goals than do the traditional donors’. She looks at ‘four main ways’ China challenges the current foreign aid paradigm:

The *donor-recipient relationship* is challenged by a partnership of equals; The *modes of provision* are challenged by China’s focus on aid that is mutually beneficial; The *use of conditionalities* is challenged by China’s insistence on sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs; *Multilateralism* is challenged by China’s preference of going the major

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<sup>9</sup> This is similar to the Chinese donor logic we conclude from this study. This similar donor logic also has been mentioned by He (2008; 2010: 138) when she considers the changes of China from ‘a more ideologically driven orientation’ to ‘a more pragmatic and economically motivated one’. These changes of China will be illustrated in chapter three to four.



foreign aid projects alone (Welle-Strand 2010: 3).

Steiner-Khamsi (2008: 3) mentions 'donor logic' in her paper 'Donor logic in the era of Gates, Buffett, and Soros'. In her study of Mongolia's educational 'imports', the support from the lender was driven more by what they had to offer than by what the borrower actually needed. She also looked at the logic of NGOs, and encouraged us to put more interest on the 'unruly' and 'very generous private funders' rather than the 'rule-abiding and rule-enforcing multilaterals' aid practice, in order to make some effort to change the aid environment (2008: 6). The paper indicates how some lenders' logic may be 'illogical' to the recipients. Similarly, Cammack (2007: 600) observed a number of 'neopatrimonial' practices in Africa and attempts to explain the 'logic' that underpins them. He argues that certain political logics, under 'much centralisation of power' and 'little accountability and transparency' in some poor performing and fragile African countries, 'undermine economic development and democratic consolidation' (2007: 61), and these lead the author to suggest that recipient governments should be driven by the needs and desires of their people, not by donors. King (1992) earlier examined external aid agenda and internal educational reform, calling for clearer definition of foreign aid policies. As he pointed out, 'if therefore the new aid paradigm is more invasive of national policies and politics than ever before, it looks as if the logic of the new approach should lead to as much rethinking of the aid process in the donor countries as of reform in the recipients' (1992: 262). Here, he could be seen to be suggesting that a shift in the logic of intervention may require a more profound reappraisal of the fundamental donor logic. From those discussions we can say that there seems usually a gap between what donors think about, and claim for, 'aid', and what recipients need and how they perceive 'aid'.

Drawing on literatures that operate at the level of aid paradigms and modalities, rather than providing evaluations of the effectiveness of aid, for instance, this study attempts a more systematic exploration of essential factors within 'aid' which structure the 'donor logic', before going on to examine empirically how these are expressed and perceived. The core of the thesis, then, is a theoretical and empirical comparison between the Western and Chinese 'donor logic' of educational aid. We will now outline the structure of the thesis and the ways that

these issues and questions will be addressed.

## **2. Structure and outline of the research**

The thesis is divided into two parts. Part One reviews and compares the literatures on the two models, and Part Two examines donors' action empirically, investigating whether the different aid logic result in practices that are recognised as different, based upon how people on ground recognise the educational aid from China.

### **2.1 Research questions and outline of Part One**

This thesis aims to address two main questions; (1) Are there different logics behind 'Western' and Chinese educational 'aid'?; (2) If so, are these differences recognised 'on the ground' and what are the consequence?

Research question (1) is addressed in Part One, which is mainly based on literature, and provides broad evidence through a documentary and historical research approach. It includes a series of summaries of the aid models and related theories (which are presented in both of my texts and the tables), and makes some arguments considering the different conceptions of aid and development (e.g. the Chinese pragmatism). One of the difficulties in dealing with these literatures is the large range of both English and Chinese texts.<sup>10</sup>

Part One consists of Chapters two to four. These chapters are based on:

Q1A. General context- How can we understand international aid to education in the context of globalisation? What are the main features of the orthodox Western model?

\* What are the changing logics of intervention for development since the 50s until

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<sup>10</sup> The citations of two Chinese documents are translated from Chinese into English by myself. One is the book 'China Africa Education Cooperation' by Ministry of Education and Beijing University, and another is the Zhejiang Normal University training reports used for a critical discourse analysis in Part Two. The other Chinese references are noted in the bibliography.



today, as well as the changing motives and features of international aid?<sup>11</sup>

\* What is educational aid about, and what is its contemporary global situation?

\* What are the supporting theories, main approaches and typical donors in the Western model?

Q1B. Chinese model, compared with the Western model

(a) What are the main features of the Chinese model?

\* What are the Chinese conceptions of foreign relations and development? How does China consider the role of education?

\* What is the historical development of the China-Africa relation and their relation in the educational field?

\* What are the main approaches of Chinese aid compared with the Western model?

(b) What is the logic of the Chinese model?

\* What is the distinctive meaning of the Chinese 'win-win' model?

\* What are the changing drivers, positions and power dynamics of educational cooperation by China to Africa?

(c) Is there any distinctive difference between the Chinese model and the Western model, in theories (economically and politically), approaches and historical relations?

The three chapters in Part One: chapter two is about the Western context of aid, while chapter three and four are about the Chinese context of aid. To improve the possibilities of comparison, the three chapters share the common framework set out above. In other words, both the Western and Chinese context are theoretically explored by these indicators

On the grounds that the Western background is well known and well discussed in Western academic work, this study puts more focus on the Chinese model, where I am able to draw on both English language and Chinese sources. This enables me to give a fuller picture than is possible on the basis of English texts only. Two chapters are designed to address the theoretical basis and assumptions of Chinese

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<sup>11</sup> The questions with \* are sub-questions.

logic of intervention and donor logic. Chapter three is about the ‘broader context’ of China’s donor logic, including the changing foreign policies of China, and chapter four looks at the ‘specific context’ of China’s relationship with Africa, as well as the educational cooperation between them. With a similar framework to chapter two, chapter three gives a historical review of China’s changing motives in international relations: from a politically oriented diplomatic logic, to an economically based diplomatic logic. The last section of chapter three concludes that it is ‘Chinese pragmatism’ that is directing the conception of development by China. Chapter four goes further to talk about the China-Africa relationship. It includes three sections: how China’s logic for Africa has been changed since the PRC was founded; how this relation is currently based upon, and how this is represented in the field of education. Finally in tabular form the different periods of China’s strategies and logics are compared with the Western aid.

### **2.1.1 Western context**

Firstly, the Western context is divided into a historical review of international aid from several key milestones - post-colonial, Cold War, Washington Consensus and the Post Washington Consensus, and a discussion of the current conception of aid and its characteristics (conditionality and the ‘new aid architecture’) in the era of globalisation. In this study chapter two generally shows how ‘orthodox’ aid has developed, and how donors adjust the aid discourse.

‘Aid’ as an international concept emerged in the West towards the end of the Second World War and the establishment at Bretton Woods, in 1944, of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, more commonly known as the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These organisations were designed to provide a more stable economic situation and create freer trading conditions throughout the world (Garrett, 1994: 1). From this emergence it is not difficult to understand why ‘aid’ is also called development assistance, and this indicates that aid means ‘help’ for economic development. Thus, several questions should be asked: is ‘development’ a normative term and if yes, who set this norm? Is there a model of development?



In the Western context, the fundamental logic of aid has been the logic of 'catching up', which has set a paternal and hierarchical donor-recipient relation since 1950s. Although it has taken various forms, this underlying logic of Western donors has been quite consistent, assuming that developing countries need 'help', including the area of education. This 'help' is to enable them to 'catch up' with the developed countries which represent the model to be attained – 'developing' to 'developed' is the process, and this goal is supported by aid, including educational aid.

Aid has been operating within a changing global situation from the colonial time to the era of globalisation; it has operated under the struggle between two super powers, and also under a series of adjustments from Washington Consensus to Post Washington Consensus. During this process of change, globalisation has had a large impact on aid discourse and mechanisms. Even though 'aid' has been around for much longer than 'globalisation', this global transformation has added more complexity within a 'dynamic and open-ended' process (Mann, 1997; Held, 1999) and thus added more meaning and possibilities for 'aid'.<sup>12</sup> One key aspect of the economic and structural influences of neo-liberal globalisation, is the increasing importance of a 'knowledge based economy'; education is becoming one of the most crucial contributors to economic growth. At the same time, with the increasing South-South cooperation and the faster economic development of some developing countries, the norm of Western aid has come under re-consideration, and this has been increasingly recognised. In very recent discussions of 'challenging the aid paradigm', Sørensen (2010: 3) points out the challenge to Western aid clearly:

However, although there is, with some variation, a general Western consensus, which is also the international mainstream operating through the major institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the World Trade Organisation, there has now for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union emerged an *actually existing* alternative in what is

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<sup>12</sup> The term of 'globalisation' has been used by economists since the 1980s, however its concepts did not permeate popular consciousness until the latter half of the 1990s (Robertson et al., 2007: 9).



sometimes called South-South cooperation. This is especially the case with Chinese aid and investment, in Asia, Africa and, to a growing extent, Latin America.

### **2.1.2 Chinese context**

Within Southern cooperation, China is playing an increasingly important role on the world stage, with its rapid economic development and domestic reforms, and its increasing cooperation with the other developing countries. For example, China became the largest foreign investor in Cambodia in 2005 and its foreign aid is double that of the United States in Indonesia, three times as large in Laos, and four times as large in the Philippines (Kurlantzick, 2006: 3). In addition, the Sino-Africa relationship has caught attention in recent years, although it is still on a lower scale when compared with the Western donations (Gu et al, 2008: 13).

From the Western perspectives, critics argue that China is simply joining the modern scramble for Africa, usually ignoring human rights and environmental standards, and failing to attach demands for transparency to aid, loans and investment (International Herald Tribune, 2006). It is trying to expand its political influence on African countries by employing 'neo-liberalism with Chinese characteristics' (Sautman, 2006). Many works stress this relationship with trade and oil. Some scholars argue that these economic relations, to some extent, could have mixed effects, and that the political influence was considered as 'deleterious' (Tull, 2006: 468).

However, Mawdsley (2008: 511) argues that 'the main determiner of Western images of China is the West itself (Mackerras: 1989).' In terms of aid to Africa, her observations show that, although newspapers tend to report a range of problematic Chinese engagement in Africa, the reality is that the West and China both have more complex relations with different parts of Africa and with each other (Mawdsley, 2008: 525). Within this complexity, some scholars discuss the two-side effect of China-Africa issues. Breslin (2007: 132) suggests that people who would like to engage are the 'cultural relativists', or those interested in

Chinese philosophical, cultural and historical traditions. Moreover, the 'material relativists' are those who believe that China is still a poor country where socio-economic rights must take the priority over political rights for some time. Finally there are those who think 'engagement' is a special opportunity which is not be missed; in other words that it is an opportunity to engage and promote certain political influences and social changes in China, and to promote their own security. From the sceptical point of view on the other hand, people who prefer to contain Chinese activities in the world are worried about the human right issues within China, and they believe this situation is worsening as China engages more with the international economy. Sceptical opinions are also drawn from anxieties relating to weapon and environment reasons. Zafar (2007: 125) argues that this relationship may help accelerate economic growth in Africa and bring a Chinese 'low-transactions-cost' (2007: 126) way of doing business and its non-interference in countries' internal affairs, on the other hand this is based on capital-intensive natural resource extraction and may lead to an increase in energy prices. Thus as Zafar says Chinese economic boom is 'a mixed blessing' (2007: 125).

Quite a number of scholars have pointed to the distinctiveness of China. They find a growing realisation that, 'poor nations might find appropriate, low-cost and sustainable solutions to their problems in other developing countries rather than in the rich north' (Owen and Melville, 2005: 1). They notice that the role of China is different from the Western donors - 'unique, has one foot in the developing world and another in the developed one, with a seat on the UN Security Council', and this dual status gives it a considerable political and diplomatic advantage in the pursuit of its interest (Muekalia, 2004: 5). During the Beijing Summit, King (2006: 4) found, 'what is absolutely clear today, four decades later, is how China's discourse about common economic benefit, common political exchange, and common cultural cooperation appears to have been fully accepted by its African partners', and he found two-way trade was 'one of the key messages of the Beijing Summit' (King, 2006:12). Zafar believes that the Chinese way of aid will influence both Africa and Western donors, and thus the West should creatively bring the Chinese model into the broader development platform (2007: 126).

Furthermore, some scholars apply special terms or 'names' to define the Chinese



model, such as Gu and Messner (2007: 7) who note the mixture of three elements including 'interdependence, identity dilemma and pragmatism', and China's 'developmental evangelism' in Africa, named by Owen and Melville (2005: 2) who worry that, with increasing commercial relations between China and Africa, there will be increasing strain on the 'non-interference' declaration. Alden et al. (2008) argued that the Chinese government's distinctive mode of conducting relations with the continent, which might be broadly labelled Chinese 'exceptionalism', is characterised in the official language as being fundamentally different from all previous external powers; this difference is related to China's 'win-win' and 'mutual beneficial' discourse.

Here, three reasons can be advanced for China's distinctiveness: firstly, China has never been colonised, although it has a 'Century of Humiliation' -1840-1949- with the West's expansion in nineteenth century (Scott, 2008: 1), while Hong Kong was a special case, colonised by Britain during 1843-1997 (Liu, 1997); secondly, China itself is a developing country even when it plays a role as a 'donor'; thirdly, China, has never been attached to Western theories of modernity and has found a Chinese way to modernisation since the People's Republic of China was founded. China has been pursuing a way of 'Chinese style socialism' and a 'Chinese style market economy' based on its own 'Four Modernisations' (in 1975), followed by the opening-up policy (in 1978). By contrast, firstly the West were colonisers; secondly, Western aid flows from developed to developing countries; and thirdly the West is rooted in the philosophy of the Western modernity.

## **2.2 Research questions and outline of Part Two**

Part Two of the thesis presents the results of the empirical investigations carried out in Tanzania and China. It is structured around the following questions:

(a) How are Western and Chinese models understood and experienced in Tanzania and in China?

\* What is the historical relationship between Tanzania and China, especially in the



field of education and cultural cooperation?

- \* What is the contemporary practice between Tanzania and China for educational development?
- \* What are the Tanzanian officials' and scholars' opinions and experiences of China-Africa cooperation?
- \* What are the viewpoints and experience of African students who are receiving Chinese scholarships and studying in the universities in China?
- \* What are the official explanations of the Chinese model and its future prospects?
- \* What are the differences between the two models as they are experienced by recipients?

(b) How can we understand Chinese discourse about their practice in Africa?

- \* What do the report texts represent?
- \* What are the aims of the writers, and who are the audiences supposed to be?
- \* What kind of the social relations and logics are behind the texts?

Part Two analyses the findings from empirical work done by field interviews and by textual data collection in Tanzania and China. Tanzania, the biggest aid recipient of China in Africa (Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, 2008b) (chosen with both historical and practical reasons), and Chinese cities - Beijing, Tianjin and Jinhua (in Zhejiang) - are the main places for field work. The interview data was collected from different groups of people, mainly Chinese and Tanzanian officials, Tanzanian returning students who have studied in China, principals of Tanzanian institutions, and Chinese university scholars who are doing related research.

In terms of the research procedures, it is useful to borrow Wengraf's (2001: 55) 'Rose - Wengraf model of the research process':

- (A) Theory: a descriptive or an explanatory statement about social phenomena (here the theory about globalisation, education and aid);
- (B) Theoretical propositions: specific propositions to be investigated in the study (here the argument about 'is Chinese model of educational aid distinctive, and with what kind of logic?');
- (C) Operationalization/instrumentation: decisions made as to how to carry out

empirical work- design of indicators for concepts, choices of units, sampling, technique of data collection (i.e. the empirical questions discussed before, with mixed methods of documentary analysis and field work by interview);

(D) Fieldwork: collecting interview and other data;

(E) Results: data-processing and analysis through strategies and procedures of interpretation lead to findings; their interpretation leads back to (C), (B), (A) as well as, sometimes, to modifications of central research question and conceptual framework (this will be discussed in the following part).

Thus chapter five outlines the methodology of this study. It contains the design of the empirical research and the related reasons; the methods and processes of the data collection and analysis, and some reflective thinking of the reliability, validity and other consideration of the research. It decides to use a qualitative, semi-structural interview to conduct the fieldwork study, triangulated with some discourse analysis for texts gained from the ground. Particularly, it discusses the fieldwork plan, from the reason of choosing Tanzania and China, to the details of the field 'stories'.

Following the methodology, Part Two of the thesis outlines and presents, as we designed, the findings of the empirical work carried out in Tanzania and China. Chapter six looks at China's relation with Tanzania (China's biggest recipient in Africa), and how Tanzanian and Chinese people (particularly the officials) compare aid from the West and China. This includes firstly my personal perception; secondly the Tanzanian situation as a recipient country, especially the officials' introduction of their 'bible'- Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) (which helps engage a new relationship between donor and recipient); thirdly a review on the distinctive China-Tanzania relationship, and fourthly the perception of China's motives.

Chapter seven shows the most important approach of China. It is the Chinese government scholarships to Africa. This chapter also provides the case of Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT). It reveals both the DIT principal's perception of how the institution cooperates with China, and the voice of returning Tanzanian students about their personal experience and view of study in



China.

Chapter eight goes on to introduce more variance of China's aid action. In terms of short term training, the chapter takes Zhejiang Normal University (ZJNU) as an example of an organiser of the training practice. This is analysed by critical discourse analysis through four pieces of ZJNU training reports, that show how while the 'words' may be the same as we might find in the West, their meaning may be different. In terms of cultural activities, this chapter gives two examples - the Culture Centre in Mkapa High School and the planning of the Confucius Institute in Dar es Salaam. All of these cases are presented and analysed to reveal China's action in Africa, how officials translate this action, and how recipient institutions and individuals see and understand the action.

Finally is chapter nine which is the conclusion of the thesis.

Above all, it is hoped that, this study can achieve the following contributions:

- (a) The theoretical framework of a comparison between the Western model and Chinese model of development and international cooperation/foreign aid in the field of education (changing discourse, mechanisms and logic of intervention);
- ( b) The historical review and summary of China's foreign policies and changing relation with Africa (I summarised it as 'Chinese pragmatism');
- (c) The empirical findings of people's voice towards China-Africa relations and China's action in Africa (with the Tanzania case), including both of official people (who present more for their department or institution) and individual person (who present about their own experience);
- (d) The findings from particular institutions (such as DIT in Tanzania, ZJNU in China) which offers much evidence of the progress of China-Africa educational cooperation;
- (e) The first hand data (from officials and scholars) on China's educational cooperation approaches, including governmental scholarships, short term training, and the Confucius Institute.



## **Chapter Two    Western context: changing discourses and logics of international aid**

### **Introduction**

This chapter gives an overview of the international aid in the West, termed in this thesis, the orthodox model of aid. In order to talk about educational aid to Africa in this study, it is first necessary to understand who is playing the main role in international aid discourse, and also what the features of their approaches are. The Western discourses and mechanisms of aid remain dominant in this global era, and this Western ideology has been developed under a changing international situation since the post-colonial period.

The meaning of ‘development’ has been dominated by the theory of modernisation, which has been a central part of academic literature since the 1950s. Rostow proposed ‘stages of economic growth’ (1960), wherein he theorised that ‘traditional societies’ could achieve development in the same manner as more developed countries with mature economies. Development assistance is needed for realizing the aims of modernisation. Following this logic, theoretically every country must experience an economic take-off towards a more developed system similar to their Western donors. With developments in international relations and the reforms of Southern countries however, there is some evidence which indicates that economic development may be realised via different models and ideologies. Therefore the logic of ‘catching up’ with Western developed economies, has come into question.

In this study, a variety of terms are used to describe development assistance for developing countries including: foreign aid, international assistance, international aid, and international cooperation. Development assistance, as referred to here, is complex in its paradigms and architecture. The history of development assistance spans from modernisation to globalisation, from the Washington Consensus to post Washington Consensus, from before to after the Cold War. Over this history,

with its changing logics of intervention, the discourse of aid also has changed. Today, most donors claim that aid is a tool to reduce poverty. Orthodox donors (traditional Western donors) are attempting to change aid conditionalities by insisting that more social factors and effectiveness measures are tied to their aid approaches. Aid to education is of increasing importance given the call for 'Education for All' (EFA) and the 'Knowledge Economy' (KE). The world's biggest multilateral donor to education, the World Bank (UNESCO, 2009), is evidently driven by the neo-liberal agenda which, in turn, drives Western aid logic (Robertson et al., 2007). Yet aid practice in developing areas, especially in Africa, has sparked criticism by either recipient or academic work as to its motives and the conditions it imposes (Jones, 1992; Easterly, 2003; Easterly et al., 2004; Woods, 2008). New understandings of international aid are arriving in the global political economy, driven chiefly by the rising Third World; collaborative activities among developing countries, such as China-Africa cooperation, have introduced a new aid model which is not in line with the West-oriented discourse.

This chapter provides an in depth historical background focusing upon the changing logics and strategies of global donors (i.e. not just the sequence of 'events', but the changing discourse and motives behind these events) in section 1. At the end of this background part, a table is formed to give a framework of what we discuss about 'aid'. Next is an exploration of the contemporary international aid and aid to education, specifically how it has been developed and criticised, is provided in section 2.

## **1. Changing logics and discourses: from modernisation to globalisation**

### **1.1 Modernisation: decolonisation and the beginning of aid**

The 1960s were labelled the 'development decade' by the United Nations, and such a label corresponded with the 'departing of colonialism' (United Nations, 1961: 17). The concept 'decolonisation' refers to the achievement of independence by former Western colonies in Africa and protectorates in Asia



following the Second World War (United Nations, 1961; Laenui, 1999). During these transitions from colony to nation-state, the theory of modernisation began to play a key role (Berger, 2003).

Originating from Western countries, modernisation theory contends that 'low-income countries could improve the living condition of their populations by a set of prescriptive policies to encourage economic 'taking off' (Robertson et al., 2007: 11). The American economist, Rostow, introduced five stages of economic growth experienced by countries with investment, consumption and social trends at each stage, during the process of modernisation; he argued that the most important stage is centred upon the 'taking off' stage.<sup>13</sup> This has been called the 'Rostovian take-off model', and certain concepts developed by him have been become central to modernisation theory (Rostow, 1960). The idea that all countries could become 'modern' and 'catch up' with the West, if they followed the same stages as Western countries, can be seen as a theory and a prescription (Dale, 1982). This logic has set the basis of the Western model of development.

It is noticeable that education is important within the context of modernisation theory (Robertson et al., 2007: 19); this is evident in Schultz's (1961:3) human capital theory ---- capital produced by investing in knowledge.<sup>14</sup> Human capital theory suggests that education or training raises the productivity of workers by imparting useful knowledge and skills, and thereafter raises workers' future income by increasing their lifetime earnings (Becker, 1964). Education, therefore, plays the role of creating 'modern' individuals and 'unlocks the door to modernisation' (Harbison and Myers, 1964: 3).

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<sup>13</sup> The five stages are: Traditional societies (which have pre-scientific understandings of gadgets and no norm of economic growth), Preconditions to Take-off (which are a degree of capital mobilization, especially through the establishment of banks and currency), Take-off (that occurs when sector led growth becomes common and society is driven more by economic processes than traditions, and the norms of economic growth are well established), Drive to Maturity (which is a process with regular growth of economy to extend the modern technology, including the increasing new industries, international economy and the diversity of economy), Age of High Mass Consumption (which has a mature economy: the leading sectors shift towards durable consumers' goods and services. It is as Rostow says, 'a phase from which Americans are beginning to emerge... Western Europe and Japan are beginning energetically to probe; and with which Soviet society is engaged in an uneasy flirtation'). (Rostow, 1990: 4-11)

<sup>14</sup> Schultz (1961) inquired as to why post-World War II Germany and Japan recovered at near miraculous speeds from the widespread devastation, as contrasted with the United Kingdom which rationed food long after the war. His conclusion was that the speed of recovery was due to a healthy and highly educated population; education makes people productive and good healthcare means the education investment is able to produce for a long time. Schultz's contribution was later termed Human Capital Theory, and significantly influenced work in international development.



With the principal aim of catching up with developed countries, aid during this time meant the West helping low-income countries follow the same path to modernisation that the West had followed; this included the aid of education being regarded as a key promoter for economic growth (Robertson et al., 2007: 19). This conception, therefore, is the traditional logic of aid, accurately termed the Western logic of aid.

## **1.2 Cold War: two eras and the changing motivations of aid**

The motives of aid shifted significantly during the Cold War time (1945-1991), when significant changes occurred in regards to the intention, content and direction of aid by both multinational and national agencies (Buchert, 1995). Yet as the Cold War came to its dramatic end with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, more changes happened in the donors' motivation with the changing nature of international relations.

We can identify two eras in aid, during and after the Cold War. Although the phenomenon of some global activities started hundreds of years before the Cold War, the most impressive period of the globalisation of international relations is the post Cold War era. A central reason for this is the tremendous global development which occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and an associated reason being the reconstruction of the world structure. More specifically, with the disappearance of the struggle between the two superpowers the bi-polar world structure featured during the Cold War was replaced by one built in a global era; a structure featuring international dependency, international inequality and international organisations (Yan, 2001: 17).

The end of the Cold War and a short period of large fiscal deficits in leading donor countries led directly to a dramatic fall-off in aid-giving by official development assistance (ODA) (Riddell, 2007: 38). During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union had client countries which were backed and influenced significantly by the policies by either power. Both sides supported

regimes in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to secure their power. Western governments, especially the USA, supported several repressive and authoritarian regimes in return for alliance and help against communist expansion. With the end of the Cold War however, aid from the two super powers to their client states declined (Robertson et al., 2007: 56). Perhaps Griffin (1991) best shows what the Cold War brings to international aid from what he says,

Foreign aid as it is understood today has its origins in the Cold War. It is largely a product of the ideological confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union which dominated international politics for forty-five years between 1945 and 1990 (Griffin, 1991: 645). ... for without the Cold War it would have been impossible to generate the domestic political support in the donor countries necessary to sustain foreign assistance for more than four decades (Griffin, 1991: 647)...

Moreover, Eastern European countries had been important for a small group of developing countries for many years, even though they have not given as much aid as DAC countries.<sup>15</sup> Yet these donor countries disappeared with the end of Cold War, and transformed to a group of recipient countries since the early 1990s (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003: 23). In short, the donors reduced, but the recipients increased.

In the Cold War context, national security played a significant role in maintaining the level of foreign aid given the rivalry between the Eastern and Western countries, especially the USA. Thus with the end of Cold War, many DAC countries lost motivation for giving aid because of the reduced importance of national security interests (ibid, 2003: 23). Yet this attitude quickly changed when the new structure created national and ethical conflicts in areas which were once under the control of two superpowers. As Novelli and Robertson (2007: 250) described, there was 'an increase in conflict in many low-income countries, which predates the events of September 11, 2001' which 'appear to be radically altering

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<sup>15</sup> The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the principal body through which the OECD deals with issues related to co-operation with developing countries. The Western donors to African countries mentioned in this study refer mostly to DAC countries such as Germany, France, Japan, UK, US, Switzerland, etc. These compare with the new donors to Africa such as China.



the geopolitical and geostrategic activities of the dominant Western powers and posing a challenge to the global consensus that emerged towards the end of the last century around the United Nations MDGs'. Aid thereafter turned to focus more on the international security and development.

Boyce (2002: 62) talks about the geopolitical aims of aid: aid was not just aiming for peace since Cold War. He notes, 'far from promoting the peaceful resolution of social tensions, the Cold War rivalry between the industrial democracies and the Soviet bloc helped to fuel violent conflicts across Asia, Africa and Latin America. Official aid donors on both sides readily embraced conditionality- not for peace, but for Cold War aims. Aid was one weapon in the global contest'.

### **1.3 Washington Consensus: neo-liberalism and economic globalisation**

Since the 1990s there has been an increase in analysts who use the word 'neo-liberalism' to describe the global market, liberalism and free-trade policies. The 'Washington Consensus' can be seen as significant issue for the world's transition to an economic, neo-liberal style of globalisation. A key milestone in the spread of neo-liberalism to low-income countries was the 1982 Mexico debt crisis (Branford and Kucinski, 1988) which created 'a dramatic shift in the policies of the World Bank and the IMF who developed a set of policies (now referred to as neo-liberalism) that were known as Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs)' (Berg, 1994; Walton and Seddon, 1994). As Robertson et al. (2007: 37) introduced,

These policies included a range of measures related to fiscal austerity, deregulating the economy and opening it up to international competition that later became known as the Washington Consensus.

John Williamson, an economist from the Institute for International Economics, first presented the concept of a 'Washington Consensus' in 1989, listing ten broad sets of recommendations for aid, including financial liberalization, trade



liberalization, and privatisation to globally promote a market-based economy.<sup>16</sup> The key points are liberalization, privatization and marketisation, which are come from the Western liberalism tradition (Williamson, 2004: 3).

Compared with modernisation theory, a theory based on the economic development of nation states and state intervention which was a form of protection against the workings of the market, neo-liberalism arose within the contemporary economic globalisation context based upon the philosophy of free capital market, and thus having ‘a strong preference for markets as the mechanism through which production, distribution and consumption within an international economy should be efficiency managed’ (Robertson et al., 2007: 13). As King and McGrath (2004: 18) described it, the neo-liberal account highlights ‘the effects that globalisation has on the relative roles of market and state, confirming the ascendancy of the market and the inevitable demise of the nation state’.

Washington Consensus set the rules by which low-income countries could catch up with their developed donors, and simultaneously involve these countries in the global neo-liberal market. Robertson et al. (2007: 37) drew particular attention to the significance of the Washington Consensus in relation to aid. It was the time when ‘conditionality’ which required a ‘radical form’ (Woods, 2008; 1216) of economic adjustment to recipients started to be a core idea of international aid, and when some low-income countries were left with little choice but to accept SAPs.<sup>17</sup>

The policy measures were linked, through conditionality clause with low-income debtor nations, to loan agreements issued by the IMF in agreement with the World Bank. Conditionality clause thus became the key mechanism through which neo-liberal economic policies became

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<sup>16</sup> The ten recommendations are as follows: fiscal policy discipline; Redirection of public spending from indiscriminate (and often regressive) subsidies towards broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services like primary education, primary health care and infrastructure investment; Tax reform; Interest rates that are market determined and positive (but moderate) in real terms; Competitive exchange rates; Trade liberalization – liberalization of imports, with particular emphasis on elimination of quantitative restrictions; Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment; Privatization of state enterprises; Deregulation; Legal security for property rights. (Williamson, 1989)

<sup>17</sup> ‘Conditionality’ will be talked about more in the following sections on ‘international aid in the new century’.

globalised (Robertson et al., 2007: 37).

Between 1980 and 1998, the World Bank and IMF made 958 adjustment loans across the world with the attached strings of their economic policies, but performances have been 'disappointing' in terms of economic growth (Easterly, 2001: 3; Kimber, 2005; Sindzingre, 2008). Krugman (1995: 41) noted that 'the real economic performance of countries that had recently adopted Washington consensus policies...was distinctly disappointing.' In the 1980s, those Latin American and African countries which had begun SAPs were hit by the worst economic recessions since the 1930s (Cheru, 1989; Green, 1995). The Latin American failure suggested the West a reflection of their 'aid' attached with neo-liberal policy conditions, while some South countries were trying to develop by alternative choices. As Robertson et al. (2007: 39) indicated:

...the two continents most affected by the debt crisis and who had subsequently entered into SAPs programmes also suffered the most during the 1980s and 1990s.<sup>18</sup> Meanwhile there were alternative policies being followed by countries in South and East Asia- Tiger Economies - (including China and India particularly in the 1980s).<sup>19</sup> ...a number of these Tigers pursued a more strategic approach towards its role in the development project, retaining a strong role for the state (Wade, 1990; Harvey, 2005).

The strong, even authoritarian, governments of the 'Tiger economies' obviously impressed, and even frightened, developed Western countries and the rule of Washington Consensus. According to Krugman (1994: 62), although those economies were still poorer and smaller than those of the West, 'the speed with which they had transformed themselves from peasant societies into industrial powerhouses, their continuing ability to achieve growth rates several times higher

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<sup>18</sup> The two continents refer to Latin America and Africa.

<sup>19</sup> There are Four East Asian Tigers (Four Tigers), Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore. 'Asian Tigers' also includes the southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. These economies are known for their phenomenal growth between the early 1960s and 1990s, and are of interest to developmental economies because they were able to move from third world status to first world status in a few decades and moreover, were able to progress past other developing areas such as Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. However, the image of the Asian Tigers was heavily diminished by the Asian Economic Crisis, which affected each Tiger to varying degrees.



than the advanced nations, and their increasing ability to challenge or even surpass American and European technology in certain areas seemed to call into question the dominance not only of Western power but of Western ideology’.

#### **1.4 Post Washington Consensus: PRSPs replacing SAPs mechanisms**

With growing criticisms of the Washington Consensus reforms and its SAPs (Cornia et al., 1987; Walton and Seddon, 1994), the World Bank and other international financial institutions came under pressure to make changes to their existing methods aimed at the developing world. At this time the agenda of ‘good governance’ emerged, an agenda firstly used by World Bank in a report on Africa in 1989 (World Bank, 1989). The failure of previous SAPs and some other aid projects were regarded as a consequence of ‘poor governance’ by the report.

The idea of ‘good governance’, according to Robertson et al. (2007: 55), embraced the notion of ‘an efficient public service; respect for human rights; an independent judiciary and legal framework; economic liberalism; protection of private property; political pluralism; participation, administrative accountability; transparency and respect for the law’ (Leftwich, 1993: 610; Osborne, 1993: 67). However as Robertson et al. (2007: 57) went on to argue, the concept of ‘good governance’ did not actually completely break from the Washington Consensus, as it still emphasised a minimal state role and market liberalisation, though it acknowledged the non-economic factors for economic success. Thus the overall logic of SAPs remained largely unchanged within this ‘good governance’ agenda, as macroeconomic policies such as market liberalization, export-oriented free markets, the removal of trade barriers and tariffs all remained paramount.

SAPs were not replaced until the emergence of the Post-Washington Consensus (Stiglitz, 1998; 2002) which sought an alternative strategy ‘in which state intervention is greater in depth and breadth’ (Fine, 2001: 139) yet still able to work with the market. It was seeking to ‘establish the appropriate role of state in view of market imperfections’, and ‘potentially correcting, market imperfections – rather than simply creating them as for the Washington Consensus for which the



world would be a better place if it were made more and more, if not completely, like the market' (ibid).

According to Robertson et al. (2007: 59), if the 1980s represented a period wherein the dominant logic of development focused upon markets, and the early 1990s focused upon both markets and states, then the late 1990s can be seen as 'a re/turn to the social but always with a focus on the primacy of markets'. At this time the concept of social capital (Fine, 2001) was increasingly seen as 'one of the key non-market externalities that could promote growth through social cohesion' (Robertson et al., 2007: 19). Such ideas were also reflected in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSPs) developed in 1999 by the IMF/World Bank, instead of the previously favoured SAPs. According to the World Bank:

Social capital refers to the internal social and cultural coherence of society, the norms and values that govern interactions among people and the institutions in which they are embedded. Social capital is the glue that holds societies together and without which there can be no economic growth or human well-being. Without social capital, society at large will collapse, and today's world represents some very sad examples of this (Fine, 2001: 158).

In terms of PRSPs, the transformation represented a shift in donor logic to a greater consideration of the recipients and the aid relationship:

According to the IMF (2005) PRSPs were 'country-driven' and thus would promote strong national ownership of development strategies including broad and active involvement of civil society. They were also 'result orientated' with a clear focus on benefiting the poor, 'comprehensive' in their understanding of the multidimensional nature of poverty, 'partnership oriented' involving careful coordination between all the different stakeholders and donors and 'long term' with a view to addressing poverty reduction (Robertson et al., 2007: 60).

Despite criticisms and sceptical views, certain ideas relating to social capital (i.e. benefiting the poor, searching for a more participatory, bottom-up model of development, as well as the equity issues from the Post-Washington Consensus ‘paradigm’) had important effects on the strategy of aid and the goals for educational development globally. The poverty agenda had taken centre stage.

In September 2000, building upon a decade of major United Nations conferences and summits, world leaders gathered in New York to adopt the United Nations Millennium Declaration, ‘committing their nations to a new global partnership to reduce extreme poverty and setting out a series of time-bound targets - with a deadline of 2015 - that have become known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)’ (United Nations website).<sup>20</sup> The goals are eight international development goals that all 192 United Nations member states and at least 23 international organisations have agreed to achieve by the year 2015, including the focus on poverty reduction and universal primary education (UPE).<sup>21</sup>

## Summary

According to the time line we tracked back historically, the key features of international aid are summarised in the table below. Aid, is not a single homogeneous category, but can be broken down into these four areas (shown horizontally).

We divide the stages of international aid into three periods: the decolonisation period, the Cold War and Washington Consensus period and the post-Washington Consensus period. We can see that, in accordance with these changing international situations, discourse, mechanisms and the logic of intervention also changed.

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<sup>20</sup> See <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml>.

<sup>21</sup> These eight goals of MDGs are: 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2. Achieve universal primary education; 3. Promote gender equality and empower women; 4. Reduce child mortality; 5. Improve maternal health; 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; 7. Ensure environmental sustainability; 8. Develop a Global Partnership for Development. (see The World Bank website, <http://go.worldbank.org/9NL8YAY0E0>)



Table 2.1 Western aid: changing international situations, aid discourses, mechanisms and logic of intervention

	<b>International situation</b>	<b>Discourse</b>	<b>Aid Mechanism</b>	<b>Logic of intervention</b>
<b>1950s - 1960s</b>	Decolonisation and the beginning of aid	Decolonisation, modernisation, stages of economic growth and economic taking-off	Imitating the West	Help low-income countries to catch up to developed ones and to be 'modern'
<b>1970s - 1990s</b>	two superpowers and their client states in the Cold War time, world economic crisis in the 1970s	Globalisation, neo-liberal market, Washington Consensus, human capital, Good governance	Conditionality clauses, SAPs, top-down model	From support for client states to the consideration for international security and human rights, making economic influence
<b>2000-</b>	Non-economic factors and development, diverse cooperation in North and South	post-Washington consensus, market imperfection, role of state, social capital	PRSPs, bottom-up model	Participatory intervention , aid on policy reform

In the first instance, from this summary it is necessary to emphasise that the development of foreign aid during the past decades has been related to the intervention of dominant Western countries into the developing world. To elaborate, following the Second World War there were two significant events which dictated the intervention into the developing South by 'powerful states from the North and their allies': decolonisation and the Cold War (Blakeley, 2009: 80). In other words, aid was tied to changing international situations among different powers. Earlier colonial relations were replaced by donor-recipient relationships with the aim being to help former colonies catch up with the West. Cold War era assistance for client states was replaced by a neoliberal global



market, thus continuing and solidifying Western models. Secondly from the donors' perspective, the mechanisms of aid transformed from setting the Western models to reforming the Western models. To elaborate, upon realizing the unsatisfactory performance of the Washington Consensus, donors fashioned a more diverse and harmonious way to consider the role of states in the market, the role of recipient governments in aid relations, and the role donors play in creating a more participatory donor group to give aid.

After historically talking about the international background of aid, the next section, is mainly about aid in the current globalisation era, namely, the period in the last row of the above table and especially the situation in the new century.

## **2. Conceptualising the global context and contemporary aid**

### **2.1 Globalisation**

According to the table we summarised in section one, we notice that the donors' logic has been moving from setting an aim (or a model/ giving prescription) of modernisation, to a participatory (collaborative) intervention; and this intervention is more on policy reform rather than on the projects investment. We now move to talk about 'aid' mainly under the contemporary global political economy.

To explore this, it is necessary to know 'globalisation', a general background setting which is normally introduced in contemporary studies of international aid, including studies of educational aid. As mentioned in the introduction, although the term 'globalisation' became popular after 'aid' policy began, we cannot deny that this global era, which features knowledge economies, an on-going global market, advancing technology and so on, is increasing the forms of 'aid'. Contemporary roles within the framework of international aid are changing in both the global North and South. Thus, when we place international aid to education into the context of globalisation, we will obtain a comprehensive background to the transformation in the practice of aid.

There is a mass of academic literature considering globalisation. As Robertson et al. (2007: 2) noted, since the 1980s there has been an explosion of interest in the idea of globalisation; the surge in interest has been partly caused by the significant progress of technology and communication reform during last three decades, as well as the emergence of neo-liberal policies and programmes. A typical definition from Giddens (1990) describes globalisation as ‘a central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order’ (cited in Held, 1999: 7). The world is in a transformation that means there is ‘no longer a clear distinction between international and domestic, external and internal affairs’ (Rosenau, 1990, cited in Held, 1999: 7).

It is worthwhile to summarise Held’s (1999) opinion of the transformationists, who claim that we are seeking the interaction of powers and their causal relationships within a ‘highly differentiated’ transformation.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore the transformationists believe that globalisation is a historically unprecedented process requiring governments and societies to make transformations to cope with this new global situation; however we are not sure about the directions and the trajectory of this process given that the effects are always uneven and contradictory. Therefore the most important point for understanding globalisation is to focus on its ‘multicentric, multiscalar, multitemporal, multiform, and multicausal’ features (Jessop, 2008:178).

Thus it can be seen that with different research implications, there are different definitions and focal points. I will seek my topic by considering globalisation from a political economic perspective.

### **2.1.1 Globalisation as a process of neo-liberalism**

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<sup>22</sup> Held (1999: 3) introduced three thesis about the globalisation process. The first is the hyperglobalist thesis which ‘privileges an economic logic and, in its neoliberal variant, celebrates the emergence of a single global market and principle of global competition as the harbingers of human progress’. Such a position is exemplified by Ohmae (1995: 149), believing ‘a transnational mode of organisation for managing economic affairs’. By comparison the second thesis is the skeptical view, and argues that contemporary globalisation is ‘wholly exaggerated’ (Hirst, 1997), and it is actually less integrated than it once was in the classic Gold Standard era (1870-1914) (Boyer and Drache, 1996). The third group is for transformationalists such as Giddens (1990), Rosenau (1990), Scholte (1993) and Castells (1996), who claim that globalisation is historically unprecedented, meaning that governments and societies have to adjust themselves to this new era.



McMichael (2004: 152) noted, 'development, once a public project, started to become redefined as a private, global project'. He also argues that modernity under the globalisation project is 'less a national property expressed in citizenship and more a global property expressed in consumption' (2004: 154).

The most significant feature of the global era is the neo-liberal global market based within the context of economic globalisation. While the economic philosophy of neo-liberalism has become widespread during the last 25 years or so, with the rapid globalisation of the capitalist economy we are now seeing neo-liberalism on a global scale (Martinez and García, 2000). Globalisation is increasingly becoming akin to a neo-liberal process.

Neo-liberal globalisation is presented as the antidote to the problem of poverty. Mittelman explained:

Neo-liberalism provides the rationale for measures that propel globalisation, such as structural adjustment policies. From this perspective, a commitment to reducing poverty can only be displayed by integration into the international capitalist economy (Mittelman, 2000: 78).

Within this 'international capitalist economy', the neo-liberal ideology, which promotes the expansion of the self-regulating markets and is considered as a mechanism to realise some social developmental goals, cannot in reality solve these problems very well. Critics claim that the Washington Consensus and its 'structural adjustment policies' are not necessary for the development of the poor countries, saying instead that the international economic organisation is setting unequal game regulations which 'impose some unsuccessful policies to the developing countries' who rely on suggestions from these policies (Stiglitz, 2005). Scholars such as Mittelman argued that, 'there is good reason to feel less than confident about neo-liberal models of economic and social development' (Robertson et al., 2007: 13); and 'the result is new winners and new losers, with some segments of the labor force adjusting speedily into poverty' (Mittelman, 2000: 78).



Here, by introducing the concept of the neo-liberal model, I want to establish this as the theoretical basis of my future discussion about the Western model of the international aid to education. Around the world, neo-liberalism has been promoted by powerful financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. The World Bank is the largest lender of educational aid all over the world, and is thus discussed in more detail subsequently. Since economic globalisation is taking the form of a 'knowledge economy', the function of education is thereby getting more attention from those international organisations.

### **2.1.2 Globalisation as a politicization process**

In fact, the concept of globalisation cannot be easily divided into economic and political realms, as the economy is becoming a 'political economy' and politics is becoming 'economic politics' in this global era. In terms of 'political economy', O'Neil (2007: 77) explains this as the interactions between political institutions and economic institutions and how this relationship shapes the balance of freedom and equality. In other words, it is describing how economy cannot be as free and equal as people suppose given that economy relies upon an array of institutions which are related with certain politics.

Originally defined as an economic process, globalisation contains increasingly complex relationships today, including the use of economic conditions to give policy influence among countries, especially from North to South. Here, globalisation is going to be considered in its wider political meaning, as mentioned by Campbell (1998):

Most economists argue that globalisation is the outcome of unavoidable adjustments to the new rules of international competition and to the laws of the market-place which supposedly ensure the optimum distribution of resources around the world. But globalisation should be seen more as an eminently political process involving negotiations and struggles for

influence and power engineered and institutionalized by players such as governments, transnational corporations and multilateral financial institutions (1998: 25).

The liberalization underway goes hand-in-hand with a programmed withdrawal by the state from certain areas such as planning, production and social reform and a re-orientation of its involvement in others, like redistribution, regulation and mediation. The aim is to encourage special economic growth strategies based on the promotion of private interests (1998: 27).

Looking into globalisation politically can help us capture ‘the stretching of political relations across space and time; the extension of political power and political activity across the boundaries of the modern nation-state’ (Held, 1999: 49). Employing the concept ‘politicization’ here refers especially to making the economic process political. Economic development is becoming both a pressure and a motivation for developing countries. To obtain economic development faster, developing countries are receiving support from international or national institutions; this receipt of aid is always alongside some compliance of the policy adjustment on the part of the recipient. That means the less-developed ‘partners’ within the global market will have to accept the rules of this global political economy in order to overcome poverty (Mittelman, 2000).

To introduce the context of the political issues and international relationships as well as how this relates with the politicization and conditionality of aid approaches is the basis of my research. The international demand for politicization has two significant milestones, the Cold War and September 11th, 2001. Aid has always been related with the complex international relations and this is increasing. This is especially true for when aid is given with political conditions, for example within the new strategies to prevent terrorism and improve international security. When we talk about the Southern cooperation between China and Africa in the following chapters, there will be more logic embedded within a political economic picture.



To sum up, the introduction on globalisation from both economic and political perspectives is the theoretical basis of the relationship between educational aid and the totality of international aid, which relates to how donors consider the contribution of education to their aid activities.

## **2.2 International aid in the new century**

What does international aid look like in this global era? It is firstly necessary to introduce the contemporary international aid system.

According to Tilak (2002: 302-303), the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, amongst others, are primarily lending organisations. For these institutions, lending is not an instrument of learning; learning cannot be an objective of their lending. On the other hand, other organisations are not primarily lending organisations. This latter type may provide various types of assistance—monetary or technical, including research—to developing countries. For example, UNICEF, UNDP and UNESCO are considered to have relatively more interest in learning and building a knowledge base.

The third group of organisations, mostly bilateral and may try to balance their interests in aid and learning, depending upon their own requirements.<sup>23</sup> Thus depending on context, they may sometimes take more interest in lending and other times more interest in research, development, and thereby, in learning.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also constitute an important donor group. According to Chege (1999: 6), there has been a shift of donors from governments to NGOs in 1990s, meaning that cooperation between governments and NGOs is critical for greater effectiveness; interestingly, ‘some African governments remain critical of certain NGOs’. As Chege said, ‘NGOs are likely to better understand people's needs, but despite what some donors seem to think,

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<sup>23</sup> This include the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the Swiss Development Corporation (SDC), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Department for International Development (DFID of UK), and Deutsche Kultur International (DKI), etc.



governments cannot be pushed to the periphery'. On the other hand, in the year of the Paris Declaration (3<sup>rd</sup> of February in 2005), 26 NGOs from the North and South met to discuss aid effectiveness.<sup>24</sup> In their statement, while they expressed a belief that 'this declaration is important and much needed', in somewhat contradictory fashion they noted that NGOs consider that 'a number of important issues in the declaration have no indicator to match them and a number of the existing indicators are very weak and vague.' Therefore 'the good principles in the Paris draft Declaration cannot really be put into practice without a profound reform of the aid regime' (UN-NGLS, 2005).

What, then, is the job and logic of these institutions and organisations, for MDGs, for global capitalism, for global democratization, for business, or in the words of this research, for what kind of logic? To address this question, this section will explore contemporary 'aid' according to the aforementioned elements involved in discussing 'donor logic' – the changes in aid motives, aid relationships, aid conditionalities, and aid architectures.

## **2.2.1 The development of aid 'discourses'**

### **2.2.1.1 Changing discourse according to changing motives**

Aid discourses are always various with the changing aid motives, so firstly it is necessary to trace back again on how aid motives changed since it emerged. From George C. Marshall's plan to provide massive aid to European countries in order to rebuild their economies after the Second World War, to the US oriented aid policy for strengthening national security, and the other Western countries' considerations based more upon moral principles and 'a kind of veneration of their own former colonies' (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003: 9), the motives of the donors are changing. Generally, the main types relate to 'moral and humanitarian principles, political and national security considerations, and economic and trade

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<sup>24</sup> The NGOs signed on this 'NGO statement on aid effectiveness' are including organisations such as Afrodad of Zimbabwe, Action Aid International of UK, Cordaid of Netherlands, Oxfam International, World Vision of Germany and so on.

considerations'. In recent years, donors have also emphasised environmental plans and the war on terror (ibid: 9).

While there are some variances, the core meaning of 'aid' is the assistance of economic development. As previously stated, from Rostow's stages of economic growth (aid for an economic take-off) to the Washington Consensus (where aid is attached to conditions relating to neo-liberal globalisation), all donors have 'emphasised the promotion of specific forms of development in recipient countries' (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003: 25). To reiterate a previous point, there are some changes in motivation of donor countries after the Cold War and in the beginning of the 90s. The end of the Cold War has caused the disappearance of a group of donor countries since some Eastern Europe countries transformed into recipient countries at that time. This also has reduced the motivation of many DAC countries, especially the USA (ibid: 23). Moreover, the end of Cold War has indirectly caused more frequent outbreaks of national and ethnic conflicts, thus 'national security' became one of the more important conditions of foreign aid policies since September 11, 2001.

Motives of the recipient countries are generally about promoting their economic and social development. Yet we highlight here that this does not mean that recipient countries welcome all donor countries' aid plans. Especially with the development of the policy-based aid approaches, there are an increasing number of Southern countries which have sceptical opinions towards to foreign aid (ibid: 21). As mentioned before, some criticisms focus on the gap between foreign aid approaches and domestic reform, whereas others argue about the conditionality of aid.

Following the Cold War, with evidence continuing to show the aid reduction from the North, a new trend has emerged that 'expresses desire to develop more symmetrical interrelations or partnerships between the North and the South' (King, 1998: 4). As King pointed out, both bilateral and multilateral aid relationships have been transformed to 'new directions' within the 'new global context'. In this new context, multilateral agencies and organisations



have adopted a partnership discourse, as exemplified by the World Bank's 'New Directions and New Partnerships' (Wolfensohn, 1995) and DAC's 'Development Partnership in the New Global Context' (OECD, 1996). Bilateral aid, for instance the UK's prospect of a 'brave new situation' with 'genuine' partnerships' and Sweden's 'a more equal and respectful relationship', have been praised highly on the world stage (King, 1999: 15).

Therefore the character of foreign aid seems have been changed from instructional to collaborative, and the partnership discourse became one of the main trends in the late 1990s. Despite how this 'partnership' formed (namely, who is the senior partner of the partnership, both or one side?), the appearing of many partnerships in policy language is a sign of increasing demanding of equal position between donors and recipients. It seems the donors have noticed that one of the solutions to make effort on aid, could be a two-side way rather than one-side way. Following what King (1999: 16) addressed, in the late 1990s there was an emergence of a 'New Africa' with 'a new generation of leaders and policy-makers determined to engage with the world on equal terms (Olukoshi, 1997)'. There has been a trend of a 'Southern insistence on a new relationship' with donor countries. However, King (1999: 16) argued, 'the new partnership paradigm may not remove selectivity or indirect conditionality':<sup>25</sup>

It could merely shift the conditionality from the macro-economic terms associated with structural adjustment era to a situation where the North chooses partners according to whether they fulfill certain other essential criteria (ibid).

#### 2.2.1.2 EFA, MDGs and Paris Declaration

All these above various changes came to a head of EFA in 1990 (and the Dakar Framework for Action in 2000), MDGs in 2000 (aforementioned in this chapter) and Paris Declaration in 2005. Within these series of world agendas, an emphasis on partnership and collaboration has been made

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<sup>25</sup> There will be more talk about aid conditionality and selectivity in the following section.



frequently. According to Dakar Framework for Action in 2000, ‘partner members of the international community undertake to work in a consistent, co-ordinated and coherent manner’, and ‘each partner will contribute according to its comparative advantage in support of the National EFA Plans to ensure that resource gaps are filled’ (UNESCO, 2000). The eighth goal of MDGs called for ‘a global partnership for development’ between developing and developed countries, public and private sectors, governments and companies, etc., in order to make aid continue to help the least developed areas (United Nations, 2007).

In order to gain a ‘new’ aid discourse and better relations in the new era, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, endorsed on 2 March 2005, is ‘an international agreement to which over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials adhered and committed their countries and organisations to continue to increase efforts in harmonisation, alignment and managing aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators’.<sup>26</sup> In addition, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) was drawn up in 2008 and builds upon the commitments agreed in the Paris Declaration (OECD website).<sup>27</sup> However, the question remains whether this new agenda can make any difference on orthodox aid logic.

Like many other elements of the new aid architecture, the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) have become part of the stock-in-trade of donor discourse. A nod in the direction of the Paris Declaration or the AAA has become mandatory, even when some aid donors may be continuing business-as-usual. The Paris Declaration has become a shorthand term for a whole series of proposed reforms in the aid industry, including greater country ownership, aid alignment with national policies, and more harmonisation amongst the multitude of

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<sup>26</sup> According to Paris Declaration, five principles broken down into specific indicators and targets are to guide future aid relationships between donors and recipients: Ownership – donors are to base their overall support on partner countries’ own national development plans etc; Alignment – partner countries are to exercise leadership over their policies and donors are to respect their leadership; Harmonisation – donors are to harmonise actions so as to lower transaction costs for the recipients; Managing for results – more results oriented decision making etc; Mutual accountability—including promoting transparency and participation. (Davies, 2007: 62)

<sup>27</sup> See [http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en\\_2649\\_3236398\\_35401554\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html)

‘development partners’. This is a particularly critical moment to see where the reform of aid has reached. Many traditional donors have a very large domestic financial crisis on their hands, whose scale dwarfs the sums they have allocated to foreign aid in the past. This global financial crisis is also a direct threat to the many promises of rich nations dramatically to increase their foreign aid. On the other hand, many so-called emerging economies, such as China, India and Brazil, are considering the ways they can use their very large foreign exchange reserves; and development assistance is one option for the strategic use of some of their resources (King ed., 2009: 1).

Above all, facts show that there has been a series of changing discourses from traditional donor groups, and also indicate the emergence of ‘developing economies’, and a changing relationship between North and South as well as among North or South countries themselves. Aid although within those changes, is still predominantly given by orthodox donors. Yet more and more challenges from the increasing voices from recipient countries, and even a special case such as China, has come to play a double role in the aid practice.

Within these so-called new aid architectures, what is the role of education, and what is the educational aid discourse focusing on? Certainly education is linked closely with the poverty reduction agenda and closely with the economic growth especially when knowledge economy (KE) has been focused on as simultaneously an increasingly common component of the discourses around globalisation and education (Dale, 2005: 117). We now move to discuss this.

#### 2.2.1.2 Educational aid in the knowledge economy discourse

Educational aid is always embedded in a complex historical background and involved in the changing ‘logic of intervention’. It is longitudinally located within history from the post-colonial period to the contemporary global era, and horizontally correlated with the roles of the developed Western countries and



international organisations. Thus aid to education is an economic and political issue rather than only an educational question. This is well illustrated by Dale:

Very simply, Education was seen as central to modernisation theory; it was a key means through which individuals in developing societies would become 'modern', i.e. like the West, and the logic of intervention was to construct programmes of development assistance to education. Under the Washington Consensus the assumption was that progress would be achieved if all developing countries followed a harsh regime of economic orthodoxy, and this was later followed by a rather 'softer' regime emphasising the need for stakeholder participation (2010: 2).

Economic globalisation is increasingly linked to education with the term 'knowledge economy' (KE) - where 'knowledge' takes over from 'production' as the key driver and basis of economic prosperity (Dale, 2005: 146).

Globalisation enters the education sector on an ideological horse, and its effects on education and the production of knowledge are largely a product of that financially-driven, free-market ideology, not of a clear conception for improving education (Carnoy, 1999: 59).<sup>28</sup>

Tilak (2002: 298) states that by the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s, the critical relevance of knowledge – including its production, distribution and utilization – in the process of economic growth had been widely acknowledged; moreover knowledge has come to be the most important factor of economic growth. Furthermore Tilak (2002: 299) argued that 'the nature of the emerging knowledge society is also to be understood in the overall international context of globalisation, marketisation and technology explosion, e.g. "knowledge society", "global(ised) society", and "technology society" or "information technology (IT) society" are closely related with implications for each other, and it may not be proper to view them as separate systems, though they are also not the same.'

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<sup>28</sup> The similarity is emphasised by Carnoy again in 2002: 'Globalisation is a force reorganizing the world's economy, and the main resources for that economy are increasingly knowledge and information....To complicate the situation further, global economics and ideology are increasingly intertwined in international institutions that promulgate particular strategies for educational change'. (Carnoy and Rhoten, 2002: 2)



In this context, the proportion of educational aid in the total aid contents is increasing. According to the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2005, 'in 2002, ODA commitments to education exceeded US\$4 billion for the first time since 1999 and represented about 9% of total commitments.'<sup>29</sup> It is expected that further increases will follow' (UNESCO, 2005: 18). From this it can be ascertained that educational aid will continue to be an important component of the aid system all over the world.

#### 2.2.1.2.1 World Bank: Investing in education for KE

It is necessary to mention the frequency of aid from the World Bank (the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and its KE discourse. As it introduces itself, the Bank has been helping advance learning in developing countries since 1963 and today remains the world's single largest provider of external funding for education (World Bank, 2007).<sup>30</sup>

The World Bank is argued to be the representative of neo-liberal theories, with evidence provided by the Washington consensus (Woods, 2006: 180).<sup>31</sup> However, there have been some new agendas appearing during the post-Washington Consensus time (e.g. the 'good governance' agenda and the MDGs), which reflect 'a more consensual and social-market approach that took seriously the inequalities produced by the Washington Consensus' (Robertson et al., 2007: 55). With the transition towards a post-Washington paradigm, a movement towards a new agenda may be seen in the World Bank, as well as in Jomtien conference on EFA in 1990 (ibid: 61). In 2000 the Bank moved itself from a financial bank to a 'knowledge bank'. According to Nath (2000: 9), 'by doing so it has ideologically

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<sup>29</sup> Each year, the EFA Global Monitoring Report analyses the level and distribution of international aid to education, particularly basic education; it draws mostly on the international database of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

<sup>30</sup> The International Development Association (IDA), established in 1960, is the part of the World Bank which 'helps the world's poorest countries' by 'providing interest-free credits and grants for programs that boost economic growth, reduce inequalities and improve people's living conditions'. As we mentioned before, bilateral aid donors are mostly members of the IDA.

<sup>31</sup> According to Woods (2006: 180), one of the World Bank's driving forces is economic ideas, fashions, and orthodoxies, as shaped by the needs of each institution. For the World Bank, the Washington consensus on adjustment 'offered a conditionality-heavy but relatively resource-light way to deal with a large number of member countries in crisis' at that time.

moved ahead - as knowledge is incubated in all human minds and is a factor of growth and development.'

This brings us to the field of education, in which the World Bank is promoting its approaches in a political economic way, although highly claims the targets such as universal human rights and poverty reduction. As Jones and Coleman (2005: 94) describes, 'although a UN specialized agency, in functional terms the World Bank is better understood as a bank, as a borrowing and lending financial institution dedicated, above all, to its own survival in the volatile financial world'.<sup>32</sup> This begs two questions: what is the World Bank's perception of 'education'? and, what is the role of educational development according to the bank? As one of the institutions of the United Nations, the World Bank is supporting the achievement of MDGs by putting education into the discourse of Knowledge Economy. As its introduction of its central discourse in education:

The World Bank's strategic thrust is to help countries integrate education into national economic strategies and develop holistic education systems responsive to national socio economic needs. The World Bank is committed to help countries achieve Education for All (EFA) and, through Education for the Knowledge Economy (EKE), build dynamic knowledge societies (World Bank, n.d.).<sup>33</sup>

This description begs the question, is it truly as simple as giving more educational investment to low-income countries in hopes that the development of education will reduce poverty? Obviously there are more complex factors with which people should be concerned. Firstly there is still an issue with selectivity. As Jones argues,

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<sup>32</sup> Jones (1992)'s earlier work, which talks mainly about the pre-1989's aid system, has systematically illustrated the World Bank's financing of education and its 'policy conditionality', and ultimately notes that the Bank's view of education has been a 'stunted one' in need of additional effort to contribute to the world's equity and freedom through education.

<sup>33</sup> See this quotation on World Bank website: <http://go.worldbank.org/A3MWX9WAM0>.

In detailing the EKE approach for educational development, the World Bank describes its job as follows: World Bank assistance is aimed at helping developing countries equip themselves with the highly skilled and flexible human capital needed to compete effectively in today's dynamic global markets. Such assistance recognizes first and foremost that the ability to produce and use knowledge has become a major factor in development and is critical to a nation's comparative advantage. It also recognizes that surging demand for secondary education in many parts of the world creates an invaluable opportunity to develop a workforce that is well-trained and capable of generating knowledge-driven economic growth. (World Bank, <http://go.worldbank.org/TJAXOI2A50>)



in countries where World Bank educational lending is substantial, it must be ensured that costs are consistent with the above policy note- and that, at a minimum, they are implemented in Bank supported institutions (Jones, 1992: 248). Furthermore, in the supporting process, the bank's KE procedure of giving more financial aid to education must also be seen as a political process. To elaborate, the bank's support is in the form of repayable loans joined with freely given technical assistance; Jones and Coleman (2005: 94) argue this to be a 'purveyor of ideas'. According to Jones and Coleman, the World Bank is consistently promoting firm views of how education policy should relate to the fiscal, economic and social dimensions of public policy. Seen in this light, the bank is both lender and persuader:

The covenants attached to an educational loan, for example, may well have little to do with educational matters directly, but might rather address broader questions of governmental economic and social policy...More influential are the covenants that address directly a government's fiscal position, its development priorities, and the contents of its economic and social policy framework. (Jones and Coleman, 2005: 104)

Thus, the two basic purposes of the World Bank's educational policies are, according to Jones (2006: 99): as a Bank it needs to set the terms of its own lending, specifically the basis and reasons for its financial support; secondly, the Bank is keen to influence and shape educational policies worldwide, and expand and promote its neo-liberal views of how to achieve economic stability and growth.

With regard to the recent KE discourse, and taking the example of the bank's Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM), Robertson (2008: 20) argues that, through a tool such as KAM, the interests of developed countries (particular the US) are being advanced and reinforced at regional, national and institutional scales of policymaking and practice.<sup>34</sup> Therefore a critical question may be posed

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<sup>34</sup> According to Robertson's introduction, KAM is the centerpiece and underpinning architecture of the Bank's Knowledge for development (K4D) programme. There are 81 structural and qualitative variables for



towards to the bank's KE discourse: whose knowledge it is? To elaborate, when the bank highlights the importance of knowledge and celebrates its contribution to global development, it is potentially embracing a particular bank area, that being a 'very particular kind of economy- a globally-oriented, market-based economy and society' (Robertson, 2008: 11).

Therefore it can be argued that the World Bank's point of view towards education is coming from an economic perspective, seeing 'investment in education as the basis for growth and for the realization of a so called knowledge-based economy' (Robertson and Dale, 2008). Within its 'education for KE' slogan, the World Bank actually leaves us with some questions, for instance, what kind of knowledge and what kind of economy is education contributing towards? Namely, as donors, how do they use the relation between knowledge and economy when they are giving educational aid?

For the World Bank, Africa is one of the most urgent areas in need of aid: in 2007 the bank stated 'Africa is a priority for the development community and the World Bank' (World Bank, 2007). The World Bank has provided 20-25 percent of external aid to Africa (Ridker, 1994), including financial support, and the interrelated forum, project and policy discussion (World Bank, 2001: 60). According to the 2001 educational report on sub-Saharan Africa, which reviewed some past inefficiencies and shortcomings, the bank called upon itself to 'do more' and that it 'must do it better' in Africa during the new century.

Supporting accelerated education development in Africa is pivotal to the World Bank mission of eliminating poverty. The Bank has two comparative advantages for education sector development: a strong macroeconomic and public expenditure perspective and an unusual depth and breadth of international knowledge and expertise. (World Bank, 2001)

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132 countries to measure their performance on the four KE pillars, including education. The mechanism of the program is: the World Bank is using an 'emulation' way rather than the earlier 'structural adjustment' approach to stimulate member countries in the program.

Based on the bank's 2001 report, and the review and redefinition of conditionality in its 2005 report, the World Bank is trying to make some changes to its the educational aid to Africa in accordance with the following points:

- \* Expanded lending service, especially more effort on primary education. The proportion of lending to primary education is from 29% during 1985-1989 to 46% during 1995-1999. (2001: 62)

- \* Greater emphasis on nonlending services through seminars and workshops. (2001: 64)

- \* Promoting partnerships: working together with other donors and governments toward common goals, such as the African Development Bank, the European Commission, or the European Investment Band (World Bank, 2001, 2005)

From declaring of giving more 'nonlending' services and the calling for 'partnerships', we can see a trend that the bank is making changes on being an 'assertive' bank (Jones, 2007: 242). However, Easterly (2003: 35-36) listed a series of discourses by the World Bank from 1984 to 2002, in the reports about its effort on aid, and pointed out (2003: 36), the World Bank's discourse only showed an increasing growth of aid disbursements which can only give more comfort, rather than showing a excellent performance on aid. Jones (2007: 259) argued that the Bank officers may be more interested in the pace of aid disbursement than in the quality of projects.

Above all, we may conclude the bank's logic of aid as below:

- (a) Giving aid is also giving intervention (especially neo-liberal influence) to the less developed countries on certain social policies.

- (b) From a lending institution's perspective, aid is never 'free', just like you need to pay interest when you get loans. Moreover, bank can select to whom they want to lend.

- (c) As the relation between education (gaining knowledge) and the economic growth is getting increasingly closer, thus investing in education in poor countries is an important way to influence their social/governmental structures.

- (d) Practising as a purveyor of ideas, as well as of funds.



To conclude, the role of education in the contemporary world gives the bank more possibilities to shape the world by its mechanisms (if the bank wants to continue to make neo-liberal influence). Therefore, the bank's view/logic towards knowledge, maybe can only be interpreted as 'the bankable aspects of education, given it cannot afford too wide a gap between its policy rhetoric and what it is prepared to' (Jones, 2007: 260). Indeed, this gap is a big challenge for the bank, just as King and McGrath (2004) pointed out, knowledge clearly is important to development, but in a highly complex and contested way. Indeed, perhaps the greatest benefit of the 'discovery' of knowledge by agencies is its effect of opening up their activities to a new form of scrutiny, which challenges them to follow the fuller logic of what they profess to believe in and do as a result of their belief in knowledge for development (King and McGrath, 2004: 52-53).

## **2.2.2 The development of aid 'mechanisms'**

### **2.2.2.1 Conditionality and changing conditionality**

We have talked about the background of aid conditionality in previous sections, yet there are still a lot of discussions which have arisen given the conditionality of aid. Conditionality is one of the most distinctive mechanisms of orthodox aid, although it has been amended in many ways since the 90s. As Mosley et al. (2003:1) introduce it, the nature of conditionality, particularly as applied by the World Bank and the IMF, is changing in response to perceived failings in enforcement (World Bank, 2000). Several donor agencies are moving towards a model of 'new conditionality' in which only a part of the aid programme is subjected to conditionality. In this new system, NGOs and the private sector are used as alternative agents of programme implementation (Mosley et al., 2004).

The definition of the conditionality by the World Bank is stated as:

The Bank makes its resources available if the borrower (a) maintains an adequate macroeconomic framework, (b) implements its overall program in a manner satisfactory to the Bank, and (c) complies with the policy and institutional actions that are deemed critical for the implementation and

expected results of the supported program. (World Bank, 2005b: 1)

Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen (2003: 27) summarised the two generations of conditionalities based on World Bank's structural adjustment programmes. The 'Washington Consensus' can be seen as the first generation of donor conditionalities, and the second, democratization and good governance, came in 1990s. As they observed, during the last fifteen to twenty years these conditionalities have become more widespread and far-reaching (2003: 269).

Whereas earlier conditionalities were limited to demands for a specific economic policy, they now include demands for good governance, political-administrative reforms, and the division of labour between state and private sector more generally. The aim of such a package of conditionalities is to influence the entire policy process from structuring decision-making, to policy formulation, to implementation (Raffer and Singer, 1996). This is similar to what Mosse (2005a: 3-4) has mentioned regarding the two trends of aid. First, aid is framed by an international commitment to poverty reduction, and in particular, many donors have pinned their goals to internationally agreed development targets; this meant that during the 1980s, structural adjustment lending was replaced by debt-relief initiatives linked to pro-poor policy reform as part of new aid packages resulting from Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The second trend is that reform agendas go beyond economic and financial management to 'governance' more generally, this includes aid packages for public sector management, the support of civil society, and the promotion of consultative and participatory mechanisms for development planning.

Conditionality has given rise to numerous critiques and has been the central topic of the negative part of the World Bank model of aid. As Dreher (2002: 7) summarised, 'with the evolution of the IFIs (International financial institutions), conditionality gradually increased and became inseparably associated with their loans. This evolution was never without critics' (Payer, 1974; Dell, 1983; Williamson, 1983; Stiglitz, 1999; etc.).<sup>35</sup> This model is often perceived as

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<sup>35</sup> As Dreher (2002: 7) mentioned, it was argued that the IMF has put too much emphasis on internal adjustment and neglects development (Payer, 1974). Its intrusiveness has been criticised (Williamson 1983)



excessive or overly intrusive (World Bank, 2005b: 1). Morrissey's (2004: 153) discussion about effectiveness of aid demonstrates that if a country is unwilling to implement policy reforms, attaching conditions to aid will not ensure sustained reform; in this sense conditionality does not work. Therefore there was a rethinking of 'conditionality' by both multilateral and bilateral donors in recent years.

In 2004 British Department for International Development (DFID) in its report 'Partnerships for poverty reduction: changing aid "conditionality"', attempted to set up a kind of new model of Western bilateral aid approach, focusing more on the accountability of both sides. With regards to conditions of aid, it clarifies the continuing 'process conditions' to improve the quality and effectiveness of aid, and offers some new explanations (DFID, 2004).<sup>36</sup> According to the review of its conditionality, the World Bank (2005b) emphasised its 'evolution of conditionality', and called for a decrease in their conditions and an increase of the benchmarks; furthermore it called for a shift away from traditional short-term macroeconomic adjustment and to remove major economic distortions in favour of more support for medium-term institutional changes that are complex and often inherently unpredictable (ibid, 2005b: 11). As mentioned previously, along with the above changes in aid at this time, the building of a new strategic relationship between donors and recipients came to be important, with hopes to work on equal terms. The Council of the EU claimed on its meeting on the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> December in 2005 that they would build a 'strategic partnership' with Africa based on international law and human rights, equality and mutual accountability, with a philosophy of African ownership and responsibility, including working through African institutions (Council of the European Union, 2005: 2).

Yet in following King (1999: 16) aforementioned argument, these changes 'may not remove selectivity or indirect conditionality', because 'aid and adjustment lending are only provided to those countries that, on the basis of certain

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as well as its devaluation policy (Dell 1982). Some have claimed that its programs focus too narrowly on reducing demand, which jeopardises growth (Allen 1984). With respect to the World Bank, Stiglitz (1999) argued that its conditionality has been flawed and may have undermined democracy in recipient countries.

<sup>36</sup> For example, DFID notes that the condition will 'be strongly linked to benchmarks, which both partners agree are critical for tracking progress on poverty reduction', and 'each will be committed to transparency, and will make public their decisions and the evidence on which they are based'

characteristics, are more likely to implement policy reforms' (Mosley et al., 2003:1).

Even if these criteria are powerfully shared by the South, there remains a danger that the North is seen to be doing the choosing. Graphically illustrated in President Clinton's choice of six African countries to visit in 1998, this tendency could result in a new set of divisions among developing countries and their relationships to the North (King, 1999: 17).<sup>37</sup>

Similarly, Mosse (2005b) also noted that, in some cases, loans and grants are 'made to states on the basis of demonstrable commitment and past performance on the reform agenda- that is "aid selectivity" rather than "conditionality"- and outcomes known through state-level poverty monitoring' (2005b: 3).

#### 2.2.2.2 'New architecture' of aid

From the new century, there has been increased use of the term 'new aid architecture' (Farrington and Lomax, 2001) which refers primarily to 'from donorship to ownership', from 'SAPs to PRSP', 'from project funding to Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAPs), and with some focus on 'sustainable livelihoods approaches' and 'right-based approaches' (Farrington, 2001).<sup>38</sup>

Mosse (2005b: 3) notes that the 'new architecture of aid' refers to 'the focus of aid on policy reform rather than conventional investment projects'. This 'reform' is 'neoliberal' in the sense of promoting 'economic liberalization, privatization and market mechanisms as the instruments of growth and efficiency' (ibid). In practice,

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<sup>37</sup> From March 22 to April 2, Clinton visited six African countries, Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa, Botswana and Senegal. It was the first visit by an American president to Africa in nearly 20 years, and the longest ever. Choosing these African countries was linked to Clinton's 'trade not aid' policy. Clinton claimed it was the beginning of 'a new African renaissance', and the tour emphasized improved trade and investment ties between the US and Africa (Africa Recovery, United nations, 1998: 10).

<sup>38</sup> According to Farrington ed. (October 2001), A SWAp is the process by which funding for a sector – whether internal or from donors – supports a single policy and expenditure programme under government leadership, and thereafter adopts common approaches across the sector. It is generally accompanied by efforts to strengthen government procedures for disbursement and accountability. 'A SWAp should ideally involve broad stakeholder consultation in the design of a coherent sector programme at micro, meso and macro levels, and strong co-ordination among donors and between donors and government'.



instead of funding individual projects, donors start to ‘collaborate (in principle) to make concessional finance available (in the short term through budgetary support) to assist governments to develop their own overall strategies for economic growth and poverty reduction (through Comprehensive Development Framework, sector-wide approaches (SWAPs), and the like) or finance the cost of fiscal, governance or pro-poor reforms that would make these strategies sustainable in the long run (such as privatizing loss-making public sector operations, cutting civil service, decentralization and anti-corruption measures)’ (ibid).<sup>39</sup> This can be seen as a step followed by the ‘good governance’ agenda in the post-Washington Consensus era, which intends to give more concerns on the capacity of recipients’ governments, rather than giving details on each project. The subjectivity of the recipient side is increasingly considered, under the emerging ‘partnership’ discourse. This change in aid, just as Eyben (2005) suggests, can be regarded as a shift from ‘gift’ to ‘contract’.

Mosse concludes that the two characteristics of the new aid framework are neoliberalism and institutionalism. ‘Following the collapse of communism, international aid became underpinned conceptually by a neoliberalist confidence in market exchange, the doctrine of comparative advantage and the framing of development goals not in terms of national economic development (through the administered economy) but rather in terms of establishing the conditions for successful participation in (production for) world markets’ (Mosse, 2005b: 4). It seems that aid in the new era, although certainly featuring some new approaches and declarations, nonetheless still has some potential problems which existed in previous eras, chiefly inequality, which is always a hazard in neo-liberal globalisation. As Storm and Rao (2004: 571) note:

International aid policy frameworks continue to endorse globalisation as a process of economic and political freedom (democracy) and poverty reduction, despite the fact that free trade seems more clearly linked to

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<sup>39</sup> According to Wolfensohn and Fischer (2000), Comprehensive Development Frameworks (CDF) were proposed by the World Bank in early 1999 as a means ‘by which countries can manage knowledge and resources to design and implement effective strategies for economic development and poverty reduction’. As they claimed, ‘In order to ensure the most effective use of human and financial resources, the CDF emphasizes partnerships between government (at the national, and local levels), civil society, the private sector, and external assistance agencies’; PRSP is based on CDF principles.

growing inequality than gains in income or welfare for the poor.

### **2.2.3 Aid, education and Africa**

African nations constitute a large part of the total recipient members which suffered from a lack of international aid following the end of the Cold War. The West and East, previously dealing with different ideologies, were no longer interested in Africa but instead in Eastern European countries. The nature of the donors' political influence has changed, as African countries supported by different Western powers are no longer client states aided for their support or opposition to one of the dominant ideologies. The new context, that being economic globalisation, is now one of the key mechanisms driving aid to Africa. However, according to Easterly (2001: 135), developing country growth should have increased instead of decreased according to the standard growth regression determinants of growth. The stagnation seems to represent a disappointing outcome to the movement towards the 'Washington Consensus' by developing countries. Easterly critiques that Western donors have been promising that better times are 'just around the corner' for over two decades but the per capita growth in Africa has still been showing poor performance (especially compared with an increasing of aid as percentage of GDP in Easterly's figure) (2003: 35). In the post-Washington Consensus era, the reason for helping African development is presented by Western powers as a way 'to reach as many of the Millennium Development Goals as possible by 2015' (World Bank, 2005a), and by the South (i.e. the Chinese) as a way to foster 'mutual beneficial cooperation' (FOCAC, 2006a) (the southern way will be discussed later in the following chapters).

According to Wohlgemuth (1999: 153) there have been three eras for Africa. Firstly the 1950s to the early 1970s was recognised as an era of optimism wherein a number of newly liberated countries in Africa were eagerly targeted for development goals; as Tanzania's first President Julius Nyerere said, 'we must run, while others walk' (ibid). This period ended with the oil shocks in the early and mid-1970s, and followed with prolonged crises throughout the 1980s when SAPs were established for development. In the 1990s, the history entered into an era of



‘realism’, or ‘an era of political and economic reforms’ in Africa (Wohlgemuth, 1999: 157). In conjunction, internal reforms and a new century of international relations can represent a new opportunity for Africa, in regards to its opening up and for a changing situation of being recipient.

Until now, it may be seen that the complex colonial history and the contemporary lower development level of Africa determine that the continent has less autonomy of judgement, or at least must still rely heavily on external support. How to promote development of Africa and African education more efficiently and practically and more properly for its urgent need? How, then, can donors let African people have less hierarchical feeling when they receive aid? The global political economy has obviously added more complexities to answer how aid works (or why aid cannot perform better to help Africa), from which we can see ‘aid’ is always related with donors’ interventions.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter gives an overview historically on the changing aid discourses and mechanisms by the Western donors. In the summary of the first section in this chapter, a table showed the changing aid discourse and mechanisms, as well as the logic of intervention, according to a time line from 1950s to the 21st century with the changing international situations. This form gives a background of our further exploration on the contemporary Western aid. It shows the logic of aid has been moving from a one way intervention (donor setting models- recipient imitating models), to a trend toward collaboration with more concern on the interaction between donors and recipient governments.

In the second section, this picture of the Western aid can be seen more clearly in the contemporary world, especially under the complexity of globalisation, and with the discourses from EFA (Jomtien conference), MDGs and Paris Declaration. Despite decades of adjustments to make aid more effective, it nonetheless seems that international aid, especially aid from Western donors, has always attached political and economic factors to aid. Regardless of the PRSPs (which replaced

SAPs), the Western neo-liberal theory and the pursuit of modernisation remains the dominant logic of international aid.

Therefore it can be concluded in three points as below:

- (a) Aid, has never been a neutral concept. In the Western context, aid emerged for achieving modernisation, and attached the Western-oriented idea of how this world should be. This orthodox aid means the less developed countries receive foreign assistance to catch up with their donors.
- (b) The orthodox aid has not been very successful, although with increasing disbursement by donors and a series changing international agendas.
- (c) Although it has caused sceptical views by critics, the Western countries including diverse types of organisations are still the main donors of the foreign aid in the contemporary world (such as the World Bank as the biggest donor of educational aid). Their influence to the world especially to Africa is significant.

Within the general aid practice, aid to education is increasingly considered a key part given the development of the 'knowledge economy' discourse. When we consider educational aid as a kind of educational practice in the global context, we also need to consider it as a part of donor practice with logics not only related with transferring knowledge, but also to intervention (or giving influence) (Baldwin, 1969) in the global political economy (namely, tied to the changing situations issued in the summary table in the first section).<sup>40</sup> Just as Dale (2010: 2) stated, 'the initial logic of intervention involved attempting to implement modernisation theory through education', and later, 'the logic of educational intervention was tied to structural adjustment and good governance agendas, and this shaped the aims of and the forms to be taken by "education"'.

Look at these global 'promoters' of education. When educational resources flow from a richer area to a poorer area, do they improve education mainly for the purpose of enhancing 'human dignity' according to the UN policies, and

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<sup>40</sup> In Baldwin's paper 'foreign aid, intervention, and influence', he argued some advantages of equating 'intervention' with 'influence' (1969: 426). He uses Robert Dahl's (1963) definition in *Modern Political Analysis* which states that 'influence' is 'the ability of A to get B to do something he would not otherwise do'.



for reducing poverty, or as Carnoy (1999) mentioned, taking education as social investment for economic growth; and as mentioned in terms of the World Bank, for shaping the world in a neo-liberal way, or moreover, for exchanging for certain types of benefits? We will talk about the last possibility in the next chapters.

In the following chapters, we will see a different perspective from the Western logic, China, as an atypical donor, is using 'cooperation' instead of 'aid' and has practised this actively in Africa. Is the Chinese model different in the ways of giving assistance from Western countries? Is it creating another way of international aid? We will start from seeing how China understands itself and the global era.

## **Chapter Three      Chinese context of development and education**

### **Introduction**

In chapter two we discussed the tradition of Western aid from the post-colonial period onward. In doing so, we flagged that, with the development of aid discourse, donors are proclaiming that aid is critical for reducing poverty in this global era. Africa, the world's poorest and most undeveloped continent, has been provided diverse forms of aid by both multilateral and bilateral donors, though the dominant donors are from Western world. However in recent years, with increasing South-South cooperation, developing countries have begun to play a role. In this study, we take the China-Africa relationship as a distinctive case which appears to be different from the traditional Western-Africa aid relationship; following this assumption, we seek to examine if there is another way/model of international aid, with particular focus on education.

Towards this end, chapter three and four discuss China's conception of development and education, as well as China's history of cooperation with Africa. As a 'direct' comparison of the Western model and the China model is not possible given the fundamentally different assumptions, it is necessary to first look at a bit deeper features of the Chinese model (i.e. theoretical roots, development stages and experience, and internal needs). To do so, in these two chapters, chapter three provides a conceptual basis of China's understanding of its role in the world, how China seeks to develop itself in the world, and a historical understanding of China's changing foreign policy, economic development, and the impact of 'opening-up'. Chapter four offers us understanding of how China deals with its relations with African countries and its practice of educational cooperation with Africa. Discussion in chapter four will be directly related to the empirical work of this study.

The table framework in the summary of section one in chapter one can be borrowed for the following discussion in chapter three and four. We also want to seek the changing discourses and mechanisms, as well as the inner logic of China



within different historical periods, linked with Western histories of aid. We want to look at questions in these blocks shown in table below:

Table 3.1 A comparison design between the Western and Chinese aid: changing international situations and the aid discourses, mechanisms and logic of intervention

Western periods (see chapter one)	Similar periods of China	Discourse	Aid Mechanism	Logic of intervention
1950s - 1960s (Decolonisation and the beginning of aid)	1949- early 70s (From the founding of the PRC)	Look at in different historical period:	Look at in different historical period:	Look at in different historical period:  China's ontology of China-Africa relation, and of educational aid (what this relation and educational aid mean for China, according to its own logic)
1970s - early 1990s (Cold War, two superpowers and their client states, world economic crisis in the 1970s)	1978-1990s (Since the opening-up policy)	China's discourse on development, foreign policy, and China-Africa relation;	China's different focus, motives and approaches on aid, especially aid to Africa	
Mid 1990s- the 21 <sup>st</sup> century (Non-economic factors and development, diverse cooperation in North and South)	1990s-2000-21 <sup>st</sup> century (Fast economic growth and stronger links with Africa particularly since the new century)	China's discourse on educational development and educational cooperation with African countries		

Educational cooperation between China and Africa is, to a certain degree, an issue within the field of international relations. Education, within this context, is included in the study of international affairs and global political economy given that it is considered to be one of the driving forces in the relations between

countries. Thus one cannot discuss this educational cooperation without knowledge of China's understanding of foreign relations. Understanding of the Chinese context is important, moreover, because there is a close relation between China's experience of economic development and its view towards the role of education. Therefore, in chapter three, we will explore how China perceives education, and in chapter four we will specifically examine how China develops educational support for Africa.

Here then, we begin discussion with the rising up of Southern countries, especially China. After providing a conceptual and historical picture, we demonstrate that, in this study, China's behaviour features a 'Chinese pragmatism' for development. Such understanding will help us understand China's logic of aid and its educational cooperation with Africa.

## **1. South cooperation and the rising role of China**

According to Forster (1999: 37), the perception of the West proposed a development model to the rest of the world has profoundly changed from 1970s to 1990s:

On the one hand, countries in other areas of the world have established their own models which demonstrate an impressive ability to promote rapid economic growth... on the other hand, the Western model is confronted with a set of very difficult and far-reaching questions and challenges (ibid).

King (1999: 16) also mentioned a partnership discourse from the South itself, and argued that this Southern relationship would be very meaningful for the concept of development partnership. When human history entered into the new century, it is even clearer that developing countries have turned to 'aid' each other.

On the 19th of December 2007 in New York, the 4th United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation was celebrated, highlighting the theme of 'Innovative



Financing for South-South Development Cooperation' (UNDP, 2007). The administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, Kemal Dervis, called to celebrate 'the dramatic economic, social and political energy the South is increasingly demonstrating and which is changing the very nature of the international community'. As he said, 'developing countries are now the largest contributors to global growth. In 2006, the GDP of developing countries grew at twice the rate of high income countries. The South is capturing ever larger shares of global trade and capital flows, becoming not only a destination, but a source of global finance, skills, and technology' (Dervis, 19/12/2007). The conference actively encouraged Southern countries' independent development and South-South cooperation for contribution to global public goods. From this event we may see that the conference not only highlights the economic rising of Southern countries, but also the increasing internal (own state's) and external (global) responsibilities Southern countries should undertake.

Resonating with what King pointed out on the Paris Declaration in chapter two (about 'some so-called emerging economies' using their large foreign exchange reserves in the practice of international aid), the Chinese government is a signatory to the Paris Declaration. Many questions followed from this: is China planning to implement the Paris agenda in its capacity as an aid recipient, as an aid provider, or both (Wilks, 2007)? Davies (2007: 67) argues that China has signed up to the Paris Declaration and thereby committed to follow the Declaration's five main principles, including strengthening the ownership of recipient countries, aligning aid to their systems and priorities, and cooperating with other donors so as to increase the harmonisation of aid. Yet according to donors to China, China most likely signed up in its capacity as a recipient rather than as a donor country (Davies, 2007: 13).

As a developing country, China's rise on the world's stage has been discussed in both developed and developing countries. Despite the critics (aforementioned in chapter one), there has not been adequate attention paid to the Chinese context as of yet, and it is especially rare to combine the Chinese historical and contemporary perspectives. After 2006's Beijing Summit, cooperation between the two sides attracted even more interest, especially the interest on considering

China as a distinctive donor.

Jacques (2009: 100) notes that, East Asian modernity is a unique past, present, and future combination of social and economic realities, attitudes and consciousness. The contemporary Chinese model has been influenced by both traditional Western and Chinese theories. Throughout its thousands of years of civilization, China has developed a system of discourse and rules for confronting 'modernisation'. Since the PRC's founding, China has developed 'Chinese style socialism', Marxism, and Deng Xiaoping theory (Dengist), all of which followed a series of principles by the Communist Party of China (CPC).<sup>41</sup>

China's foreign policy developed predominantly from the foundation of PRC through until today. During this time, the nation's policy was shaped by the changing relations between the two super powers before the Cold War, and the alignment with the Third World as an essential element for diplomacy. The opening-up policy has helped China to gain relationships with the Western world, and also helped China join the global market. The aim of modernisation drove China to harmonize with partners all over the world, and take education as a key factor in development. In a few decades, China's practical policies and flexible ideologies have made its behaviour understandable as a kind of pragmatism.

## **2. China's conception of development and foreign relation**

At its most basic, China's contemporary theory for directing its international relations is still borrowed from Marxism, yet China's clearly has a new version of Marxism. This version does not see the world as two opposite parts, socialism and capitalism, which characterized classical Marxism. They still believe the two parts are those who own the means of production and those who are selling the labour to the owners, but they do not think the way to resolve it is the struggling and completely revolution. Cooperation, as liberalism always emphasises, has become one of the key words in Chinese contemporary policy.

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<sup>41</sup> The statement of 'Chinese style socialism' was issued firstly by Deng Xiaoping in 1982, and was developed systematically in late 1980s and in 1990s.



Describing the background to the Chinese way of dealing with other countries during the last century, especially in the last 30 years since the opening-up and reform policies of 1978, is essential for this study as it will help us to explore China's 'donor logic' in their relation with Africa. Our main aim, to see how China interprets 'aid' and educational aid, requires us firstly to explore how China understand the relations with other countries, and how China understands the role of education in the world. Thus to explore these areas, we need a historical and theoretical review of China's foreign policy.

## **2.1 Foreign policy of China: a brief history**

Chinese foreign policy has developed in accordance with the changing of political leaders. To complete a picture of China's own development, it is necessary to give a brief overview of the China's domestic political evolution and specific individuals contributions to the country's development.

From the time of Mao Zedong through to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's fourth generation of leadership, China has witnessed a series of transformations in its theories for development. As Gabriel (2006: 160) summarised, Mao Zedong's thought was grounded in class struggle and contradiction, whereas Deng Xiaoping theory was grounded in the modernist vision of technologically driven transcendence and experimentation. The third generation of leadership, characterized by Jiang Zemin's 'Three Represents', is a blueprint for 'modernising' the communist party by combining Deng's pragmatism, Marxism theories and the contemporaneous global environment.<sup>42</sup> Under this 'blueprint', there is also a transformation from the previous focus on political language to more pragmatic, cooperative voice in regards to Sino-African relationships. In accordance with this evolution, China inevitably becomes interlinked with global capitalism and, to some extent, is learning from the experience of developed countries. Yet China also doesn't want to lose the 'Chinese political characteristics'

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<sup>42</sup> The thought of 'Three represents' means the party (CPC) must always represent the requirements for the development of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of the development of China's advanced culture, and the fundamental interest of the overwhelming majority of people in China.

and moreover, seeks to avoid the failure experienced by the other socialist states.

So under these leading – and evolving – principles, just what is the development of China's foreign policy? To describe a complete history is a huge work as one can look back to Chairman Mao's time or even to ancient China; such a task is beyond the scope of this chapter. To narrow this scope then, this research will talk mainly about China in the post Cold War world, with particular focus on the fast development and reforms since 1978.

From the establishment of PRC to the fast economic development since 1978, China has experienced a changing foreign policy. Harding (1984: 179) summarised four dimensions of China's foreign relations:

- (1) the degree of China's involvement with the rest of the world; (2) the extent of China's alignment with either of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union; (3) the economic, military, and political resources China brings to the conduct of its foreign policy; and (4) China's objectives in international affairs, particularly with regard to the preservation or transformation of the prevailing international order.

In the time of two superpowers, China's experience may be divided into three periods: for most of 50s China was allied with the Soviet Union and under threat from the United States; from the late 50s until the late 60s China was in dispute with the Soviet Union while seeking alignment with the Third World when threat from the United States remained; and from the early 70s China was under threat from the Soviet Union and in alignment with the United States (Yahuda, 1983: 95). Therefore during these years China was trying to find a right place for itself internationally. As a socialist country, China did not want to be identical to the Soviet Union, but rather a unique country with unique ideology; China did not want to be completely at odds with all Western countries. For its own development then, China changed its relationship with the superpowers.



### 2.1.1 Opening-up period since 1978

Since 1978 China found its way of developing economy by the intervention both from government and the rules of market:

During the first three decades of the People's Republic (1949-79), China's domestic policy shifted between an ideological emphasis on class struggle and a more pragmatic emphasis on constructing an economically strong, modern nation. By 1979, the pragmatic forces in the person of Deng Xiaoping had won the leadership, and China embarked on a policy of shifting the economy gradually toward the market, while trying to contain the pressures inherent in openness to foreign investment and trade and global markets, and maintaining the Chinese Communist Party at the helm of government (Brautigam, 2008: 7).

After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, an alteration in China's economic system was introduced. The decision to begin reform and opening up, which was made at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC in December 1978, has helped the Chinese people navigate through hard times and toward prosperity and rejuvenation in the past three decades; its successes meant that the PRC joined the World Trade Organisation in December 2001 (Lee ed., 2008). The economic reforms during this time, also called the Chinese economic reform, refer primarily to the program of 'Socialism with Chinese characteristics'. The program was started in 1978 by pragmatists within the CPC and led by Deng Xiaoping; they continued through the early 21st century. The goal of Chinese economic reforms was to generate sufficient surplus value to finance the modernisation of the mainland Chinese economy. Neither the socialist command economy, favoured by CPC conservatives, nor the Maoist attempt at a Great Leap Forward from socialism to communism in China's agriculture (with the commune system), had generated sufficient surplus value for these purposes.<sup>43</sup> Economic opening-up has helped lift millions of people out of poverty. Between 1981 and

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<sup>43</sup> According to Yang (2008: 2), the Great Leap Forward of the PRC was an economic and social plan used from 1958 to 1961 which, based on Mao's decision, aimed to use China's vast population to rapidly transform China from a primarily agrarian economy of peasant farmers into a modern communist society through the process of agriculturalization and industrialization. It ended in economic failure after weather disaster led to widespread famine.

2001, the proportion of population living in poverty in China fell from 53% to 8% (Ravallion and Chen, 2007: 2). During this period, the spiritual and cultural life of the people has been enriched and diversified thinking has been promoted. Discussion of such concepts as competition, efficiency, democracy and rule of law had not been encouraged before reform and opening up. The PRC began to accept Western ideas and opinions more easily than before (Lee ed., 2008).

Steadfastly opening wider to the outside world and actively participating in international economic and technological cooperation and competition...As economic globalisation is gathering momentum and international competition is becoming increasingly fierce, we can make better use of domestic and foreign markets and resources and accelerate our development only if we follow the tide of world development and open ourselves still wider to the outside world. Despite the grim international economic environment, we have created a new situation in our opening up by responding positively, striving to seek advantages and avoid disadvantages, and turning challenges into opportunities (Zhu, Government work report, 21/03/2003).

While at this time China was aiming for modernisation, it should be clarified that China has its own specific aim of modernisation, the 'Four Modernisations'. These include the modernisation of agriculture, industry, technology and defence (Cannon and Jenkins, 1990: 12). This slogan was first received from a speech by Zhou Enlai in 1964. The attitude it embodies was curtailed in the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) (ibid). After his death and Mao's soon thereafter, Deng Xiaoping assumed control of the party in late 1978. In December 1978 at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping announced the official launch of the 'Four Modernisations', formally marking the beginning of the reform era. The Four Modernisations were designed in hopes of making China a great economic power by the early 21st century. These reforms stressed economic self-reliance, and that learning and engaging with global trends were essential to realizing this. Thus China decided to accelerate the modernisation process by stepping up the volume of foreign trade by opening up its markets, especially through the purchase of machinery from Japan and the West. By



engaging with export-led growth, China was able to speed up its economic development through foreign investment, a more open market, access to advanced technologies, and management experience (Evans, 1995; Hsu, 2000).

### **2.1.2 Foreign policy since opening-up**

With the change from Maoist radicalism to Dengist pragmatic moderation, and the corresponding shift from the primacy of politics to that of economics, the mixed model economic system required that China (or we can say let China) begin to open the door for foreign economic investment, technology transfer, trade, and training. China's foreign policy was summed up by twin goals of peace and security during this time. For fast development, China needed to foster this type of international atmosphere given that the opposite atmosphere, war and threat, would destroy China's best chance to catch up with the developed world. Learning from the West and gaining access to markets, goods, technology and expertise also meant that China needed to take out security insurance in Washington against Soviet military threats (Robinson, 1994: 569).

In addition to dealing its relationships with the US, the Soviet Union, and its Asian neighbours, China wished to continue to regard the Third World (countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America) as an essential element of its foreign policy.<sup>44</sup> While Chinese ideology always believed that the 'masses' of the downtrodden nations held the key to the future of the international system (Robinson, 1994: 576), it is apparent why such a sentiment remained. Politically, such countries would support China's position in international affairs once friendly cooperation was established. Another important reason for sustained interest in the third world was economic. Many developing countries represented markets for Chinese goods and skills. Deng Xiaoping's noted speech in 1974 stated, 'China is a country, and a developing country as well. China belongs to the Third World... China is not a

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<sup>44</sup> The term 'Third World' has a diverse definition, though it normally refers to 'less developed countries that belonged to neither the advanced industrial capitalist West (First World) nor the Soviet socialist bloc'. Ness (1991) questioned if China is a Third World country and if Chinese leaders regard it as a Third World country. This research will not discuss much regarding a definition of Third World, but will talk generally about how China deals with others, no matter from the so-called First World or Third World; it should be noted that these terms show a kind of hierarchical, and also a potential basis, for 'catching up with West by Western help' aid logic.

superpower, nor will she ever seek to be one...' (Deng, speech at the UN General Assembly, 10/04/1974).

The opening-up policy and the two items of peace and security have continued until today. During the process for modernisation, the Cold War directly affected China's foreign policy; Robinson has illustrated five specific aspects (1994: 594). First, the Sino-Soviet-American strategic triangle (1960s to 1980s), as the base of the global political-military affairs, was replaced with a looser, more informal set of arrangements among five power centres: North America, Europe, Russia, China and Japan. Therefore China actually had to make decision to transfer its foreign policy to a more multi-polar diplomacy. Second, the world transitioned into a period which strongly valued democratization, marketization and interdependence, and thus no nation, including China, could escape this transformation and it was pressed into accepting the use of high technology and the knowledge economy. Third was the need for a growing number of countries to devote increasing resources to solving an array of domestic problems. All of the five power centres turned to devote attention to their domestic development and less attention to foreign affairs; this also gave influence and space to China. Fourth was the tendency towards accelerated technological change which was considered as a 'driving force' of history. This trend meant that those who did not follow would soon fall behind, and therefore China had to become one of the former for both domestic and international reasons. Finally, there was the emergence of global problem solving, such as environment issues. Within this context, China became more engaged in the global society by giving more attention to international organisations and trade markets.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, with the emerging international issues and increasing cooperation with developing countries, the Chinese government received countless critical comments centred upon its approaches to the contemporary world; comments ranged from China as arising developing leader, a rising hegemony, a rising competitor for West, and so on (Alden, 2007). The Chinese diplomatic strategy in this very recent stage, when facing the international spotlights after the Wenchuan earthquake (in May 2008) and the Beijing Olympic Games (in August 2008), has called for 'media diplomacy (International Herald



Leader, 2009). This strategy was employed in order to build a modern Chinese image in the global world, instead of a traditional 'cultural China', 'historical China' and 'political China' (ibid).

China attaches its own modernisation closely to the international atmosphere in the new century. The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), the country's leading academic institution which features a Centre on China's Modernisation Study, drafted and published its eighth annual report of modernisation progress in China and in it, introduced the concept of the 'Peace Dove Strategy' (PDS) in January of 2008 (He ed., 2008). Before this report, there were yearly Modernisation reports: 'Districts' Modernisation' in 2004 (He ed., 2004); 'Economic Modernisation' in 2005 (He ed., 2005); 'Social Modernisation' in 2006 (He ed., 2006) and 'Ecological Modernisation' in 2007 (He ed., 2007). The development of modernisation reports in China revealed a picture of an increasingly powerful and international China, progressing from a low level developing country to having an important role in the global village. The country began to consider more and more international factors and dimensions in its developmental framework (e.g. environmental issues). In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the country's modernisation plan is focused more on a systematic work of international strategy, including the fields of economy, politics, culture, society and ecology.

China's 2008 report of modernisation is entitled 'International Modernisation', which means 'an interaction between national modernisation and international environment, an international interaction during the course of modernisation', and includes two stages- 'international modernisation at the Industrial Age and the international modernisation at the Information/knowledge Age' (He ed., 2008).<sup>45</sup> The Peace Dove Strategy highlights the principle of 'Follow the UN Charter and Promote World Peace', and calls for building a 'favourable international environment for China's modernisation'. The strategy is expressed by the


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<sup>45</sup> According to Chuanqi He, the head of the CAS's Center on the Study of China's Modernization and creator of the conceptual framework of 'international modernisation', the modernisation process can be divided into two stages: 'The First Modernisation is the process and great changes of the transformation from Agricultural Society to Industrial Society, Agricultural Economy to Industrial Economy, Agricultural Civilization to Industrial Civilization, Agricultural Age to Industrial Age. The Second Modernisation is the process and great changes of the transformation from Industrial Society to Knowledge Society, Industrial Economy to Knowledge Economy, Industrial Civilization to Knowledge Civilization, Industrial Age to Knowledge Age.' (He, 1998: 3-4)



following graph:

Table 3.2 The concept framework of the Peace Dove Strategy (PDS)



Source: He ed. (2008)

It is interesting to note that, on the above strategy picture, the United Nations is drawn as the head of the Dove; Asian nations are the foreside; the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is the eastern wing and the proposed ‘Asia-Europe Economic Cooperation’ (AEEC), which is upgraded from the existing Asia-Europe Meeting, is the Western wing; South America, Oceania and Africa bring up the rear. The strategy, which centres on Asia and faces the world, is underpinned by a basic concept: ‘to comply with the charter and promote peace; to be based in Asia yet open to the world; to balance the Western and Eastern on cooperation and collaborate with Southern; to be mutually beneficial and progressive’ (ibid). Chuanqi He noted that ‘under the strategy, China will optimize the structure of its international modernisation strategy, increase its national capacity in international modernisation, and improve the international environment for the country’ (China Daily, 29/01/2008).

## 2.2 Education and development

During last four decades, education has always been a conspicuous part of Chinese policy. The strategy of ‘invigorating the country through science, technology and education’, was issued in 1977 when Deng Xiaoping stressed that progress in science, technology and education is essential to economic



development and modernisation. He emphasised the importance of education for the aim of catching up with the developed world, and for the aim of 'Four Modernisations'.

In 1995, President Jiang Zemin pointed out that progress in science and technology was the primary engine for improving the productive work force. He said the country should work to boost education and enhance its ability to commercialize the fruits of scientific and technological research. Consequently, the State has earmarked funding for this strategy ever since it was included in the five-year plan for 1996-2000 (Xinhuanet, 02/09/2003).

Since knowledge economy with high-tech at the core will dominate, the comprehensive strength and international competitiveness of the nation will increasingly depend on the level of educational development and innovation in science and technology and knowledge, and educational development will remain a strategic priority. The extensive use of modern information technology in education will engender profound changes in the educational sector, and lifelong education will be a requisite condition for both educational development and social progress. At present, the governments of many countries have made educational invigoration one of their basic policies towards the 21st century. These trends indicate profound changes in the scenario of education in the future. We should lose no time in preparing to meet the new challenges. (Ministry of Education of the PRC, 24/12/1998)

In the new century, under one of the aforementioned 'Three Represents' by Jiang Zemin, the developing orientation of China's advanced culture indicated an increasing status of intellects. China called this the 'talents work'. In a 2006 'Report on the Work of the Government', Premier Wen addressed 'the strategy of reinvigorating China through human resource development':

We must attach more strategic significance to accelerating scientific and technological development. We will fully implement the Outline of the National Program for Long- and Medium-Term Scientific and

Technological Development to build an innovation-oriented country....We will follow the strategy of reinvigorating the country through human resources and intensify development of a well-trained workforce. We will increase funding for human resource development through various sources, strengthen the role of market forces in allocating human resources, and standardize management of the human resource market (Wen, 2006).

Education is an essential factor for Chinese development, both domestically and internationally. When we look at the internal and external meaning of education in the Chinese context, it can be seen that education is not only seen as the key tool for enhancing national productivity and a quality society in the age of the knowledge economy, but also as the key tool for the cultural exchange, enhancing the Chinese image, and spreading Chinese human resources worldwide. China highlighted these points in the 2006 report (ibid):

We will intensify development of socialist culture. We need to do a good job cultivating ideals and ethics, particularly among young people. We will carry out extensive public activities to promote cultural and ethical progress. We will deepen reform of the cultural system and develop cultural undertakings and cultural industries.... We will vigorously support folk culture and art and increase cultural exchanges with other countries. We will improve management of the culture market and steadfastly fight against pornography and illegal publications

Student exchange is one of the Chinese approaches for modernity. Since the founding of PRC in 1949, the 60 years overseas education of China has experienced the rush for studying in the Soviet Union, the interruption of studying abroad during the cultural revolution, the study-abroad by public expense since the opening-up, public overseas education since the late 1980s and returning home in the new period (Zhang, 2010). The 18,000 students, technicians and skilled workers trained or guided by Russian experts in China during the 1950s have played key roles in the operation of the Chinese economy through to the present day (Yahuda, 1983: 160). Until 1980s there were a large number of Chinese



students studying in America (ibid).<sup>46</sup> It seems then, that student exchange is not a new thing for China but rather has an extended history wherein exploring culture exchange and gaining new knowledge from other states was the norm.

During this student exchange development, the China Scholarship Council (CSC) is playing a key role for receiving and sending students into and out from China. In 1996, on the basis of further development of opening-up policy and with a purpose to ‘promote international exchanges and cooperation in education, culture and science and technology’, CSC was established by endorsement of Chinese government and lead by Ministry of Education, which was described by CSC, ‘a very significant landmark in the administration of Chinese citizens study abroad’ (CSC, 1999: 4).<sup>47</sup> It is an increasing line during decade’s development: in 2000, CSC awarded 2,025 international students Chinese Government Scholarship for academic year 2000/2001 (CSC, 2000: 12) and in 2009 (according to CSC’s latest report), the number rose to 8,141 (CSC, 2009: 12).<sup>48</sup> Moreover, it can be seen from the following chart that over half of the recipients in 2009 were studying for post-graduate level (including scholar level).

Table 3.3: Categories of Chinese Government Scholarship recipients in 2009


<sup>46</sup> The 1978 plan (part of the opening-up policy) envisaged sending as many as 20,000 students abroad. But this plan was rescinded because of other considerations. By the end of 1981, there were some 7,000 Chinese students enrolled in various American universities and colleges, and about half that number in other foreign countries. (Yahuda, 1983: 159)

<sup>47</sup> CSC’s predecessor was the Department of Studying Abroad (established in 1989) in Ministry of Education of PRC before 1996. Before 1989, in 1978 the Department of Administration of Student Abroad was established in State Education Commission (now Ministry of Education); in 1980 this department was merged with Department of Foreign Affairs as Foreign Affairs Bureau in Ministry of Education; in 1981 government included the self-funding studying abroad into their management. (See REDNET.CN, 2008, <http://gaige.rednet.cn/c/2008/01/16/1420801.htm>)

Studying abroad by government scholarships was issued by Deng since 1978 opening-up, but was planned directly by the political instructions, lacking of professional and effective management (ibid). The Ministry then reformed on this and adopted approaches for institutionalization - established the CSC as the ‘non-profit institution with legal person status affiliated with the Ministry of Education’ (CSC, n.d.). (See CSC website, <http://en.csc.edu.cn/About/c309df7fb3fa40b3a179a7ad93f11988.shtml>)

<sup>48</sup> 8, 141 is the number of international students admitted by CSC, but not the whole number enrolled by Ministry of Education. However this is the main source of the recipients, compared the total number of 8,413 new recruitments in 2009/2010 academic year (CSC Annual Report, 2009: 12).





**2009 Chinese Government Scholarship Recipients (By Student Category)**

Source: CSC (2009: 11)

This can be seen as a historical basis for the China-Africa educational cooperation, which aims at continuing student exchanges (especially the postgraduate study) and teachers dispatch (this will be discussed in detail in the next chapter related to China-Africa relations, and will also be examined by field work in Tanzania and China- in Part Two)..

### **2.3 Chinese discourse on development: pragmatism**

Overall, it may be argued that the new China is using a comprehensive understanding of its specific situation and international environment, of its development experience and borrowed theories to resolve its international relations; more specifically, China is trying to build itself as an independent developing country while also being interdependent with other countries through the global market. Compared with the development process forwarded by Western countries (which is more step by step), it seems that China's process is a mixed-stages one. To elaborate, the country is trying to achieve modern domestic performance in such a large geographical territory, and in such a relatively short time. What is more is that many inequities and imbalances exist in China's various social sectors, and this requires a modern international performance facilitated by refreshed political manifestoes, economic reforms, high technology and increasing intellectuals. Given the huge difficulty which faces Chinese attempts to realise these goals, one of China's main strategies for economic development is a



pragmatically based one. We call it 'Chinese pragmatism' in this study, and it encapsulates the way China is pursuing economic success and international integration, or the position China is standing on in this regard.

Building on this Chinese pragmatism, nowadays China is tending not to place much emphasis on specific ideological discourse towards the rest of the world. Instead China is focusing on economic development, and therefore gaining as many developmental partners as they need for mutual benefits. In this way, China gains access to partners and relations who have different religions, languages, ideologies, as China points to the prominence of modernisation. This study wants to argue that China's theory (or developmental philosophy) is a new type of 'Chinese pragmatism' which is different from the classical pragmatism, and thus suitable for Chinese development demands. Central to this new 'Chinese pragmatism' is how the Chinese government reshaped the Marxist theory of political economy and tied this into its modernisation process.

One important distinction should be emphasised is that: some conceptions of the Chinese 'modernisation' is distinct from the Western one. To elaborate, even though Chinese scholars have learnt many theories and discourses from the Western modernisation framework, and additionally talked extensively about philosophical modernity, Chinese modernisation still maintains its own meaning. According to Chinese scholar Chuanqi He (2003:13), classic Modernisation theory mainly refers to catching up to the developed countries in an industrialization process which is like Westernization, Europeanisation or Americanisation. According to this meaning, developing countries should borrow the ideas, theories, knowledge, political patterns and so forth, from the West. Yet according to He (ibid: 13), modernisation in the contemporary knowledge society is a job for both developed and developing countries, as they should seek new ways for synthetic development. Therefore we can see that modernisation in the Chinese context, as related to its latest 'Peace Dove' strategy and 'international modernisation' (talked earlier in this chapter), has greater emphasis on the whole country's economy and technology development as the means to achieve prosperity in an international integration. Importantly, this does not mean the same as the West, USA or Europe. Yet another term however, that is 'modernity', may

be understood and used more similarly by both Western and Chinese on the philosophical level. Some terms such as individualization are also talked about by Chinese, but less on a governmental strategy range.

It should be highlighted that China had opposed this type of pragmatism for a long period, that being during the early construction of socialism, during which the government put more effort into creating a national ideology. Pragmatism has been criticised as a sort of capitalist individualism, 'just seeing the practical results but not the intrinsic essence of the world' (Yang and Wang, 2002: 14). Later, especially in the new century, China shifted and started to redefine pragmatism as a new philosophy; it was even suggested pragmatism be used as some of the principles behind the country's practice. Therefore, with a greater understanding of pragmatism in China today, particularly within the academic field, people have started to accept pragmatism as a type of Chinese practical philosophy (Yang and Wang, 2001).

Before giving a summary of Chinese pragmatism, we should firstly introduce an understanding of the Chinese ideology. If we use ideology to analyse Chinese international relations, it is actually quite difficult to give a specific 'ideology' for Chinese foreign policy. However Levine (1994)'s exploration of the formal and informal ideologies probably best provide a view, with a particular emphasis on Chinese pragmatism. Levine gives three major sources of the complexities of Chinese leaders' thoughts (Levine, 1994: 33):

First is their socialization into a specific culture at a particular period in time; second, their unique experiences as individuals and their shared experiences as members of groups; third, their conscious choices as thinking political actors from the menu of values, systems of thought, and so forth that are available to them...Through this creation and self-creation, then, foreign policy actors acquire a particular *weltanschauung* or ideologically based world-view.

Undoubtedly Marxism-Leninism, and its Chinese variant Mao Zedong Thought, is the dominant ideology shaping and informing the views, preferences, expectations,



and assumptions of Chinese Communists who work in foreign affairs. This is the 'formal ideology' which Levine referred to. It is an explicit and systematic body of thought which gives foundation and a framework for the country's main direction (ibid). On the other hand, the 'informal ideology' is also a useful tool for thinking about foreign policy. It is the complex mix of cultural values, preferences, prejudices, predispositions, habits, and unstated but widely shared propositions about reality that condition the way in which political actors behave (ibid). He mentioned Lucian Pye's (1988: 76) notes on Chinese pragmatism which could also be a central term in this research. Pye says it is the 'anthropologist's notion of culture as ideology, and consider ideology as the thought more from a historical-cultural inheritance. Thus, Levine concludes that the informal ideology is 'implicit, unconscious, or only partly conscious, and intuitive rather than cerebral' (Levine, 1994: 34).

Levine's idea provides a means to answer why China is practising a Chinese style Marxism. His two perspectives on China's ideologies can be seen as the difference between Chinese pragmatism and the general pragmatic philosophy. That means China actually does not give up its formal aim of seeking communism, but rather tries different approaches and theories to solve its social, cultural, and developmental problems. Those problems are what China prefers to call 'highest outlines' and 'latest outlines,' which mean the final goal and the current demanding respectively, and they are always discussed in a specific historical period for development. Keeping the highest outline, which is more like a belief, helps the Party lead the huge population as one in attempt to solve current developmental problems. If the highest outline was threatened by too many branch ideologies, the society, and a large number of Party members, would be difficult to be controlled and administrated. With diverse approaches and principles, and with the stability of a one-Party system and one formal ideology based in the aims of communism, Chinese pragmatism has a large number of critics, especially since the new century. Despite this, it is emerged as suitable way for China.

Overall, the Chinese pragmatism can be summarised as follows:<sup>49</sup>

Firstly, Chinese pragmatism is a dialectic materialism based on Marxism, and this is related to the ontology of Chinese pragmatism. The materialism, especially the dialectic materialism ontology, has never been changed for the contemporary Chinese ideology. The materialists believe matter precedes thought, just as Marx's classical statement 'the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought' (Marx, 1976: 25). With dialectic materialism, there are three laws: the law of opposites, the law of negation and the law of transformation. The evolution of Chinese theories for development has largely absorbed these laws, for instance the idea that development is a process whereby insignificant and imperceptible quantitative changes lead to fundamental, qualitative changes; just as Marx (Capital, Vol.1) (1976) says, 'merely quantitative differences, beyond a certain point, pass into qualitative changes'. By keeping this kind of ontology for a nation's development, China actually gives itself ideas and methods to deal with the conflicts between different ideas, religions, and ideologies. Specifically, when it is not a qualitative transformation, the quantitative changes can be allowed to some extent. This helps China reflect on some of its previous pitfalls which went to some extreme because of their inability to control the quantitative changes and the qualitative points.

Secondly, Chinese pragmatism does not simply mean 'foreign policy is driven by core national interests' (Gu et al., 2008 281), though this can be seen as one level of meaning. Yet it also has experimental approaches (Zhao, 2009: 25) which helps China seek a Chinese model different from any one else in the world. It is as Deng said, 'the problems in the world cannot be solved by one model, and China has Chinese model' (Deng, 1993: 261). The Chinese philosophy based on dialectic materialism, Leninism and Maoism teaches people to solve the specific problem with specific analysis in accordance with the specific situation (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, 1972: 290 ). Thus when China discovered that Russian socialism could not solve the problems of the Chinese circumstance, the Chinese changed their policy and reformed in accordance with their realities. Thus we can say that China's foreign policy is driven by its national interests, and

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<sup>49</sup> To be noticed here, what the paper here concludes, does not mean China has realised or stated they are Chinese pragmatism. The term of 'Chinese pragmatism' is produced in this thesis.



designed specifically to fit its developmental situation. It is intrinsically about China's understanding and the usage of Marxism and dialectic materialism.

Historically speaking, China revised the way of practicing its Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology when the Party prioritized social and economic development in the late 1970s. Before the decision was taken, the Party used anti-imperialist and anti-Westernism content drawn from the Russian Revolution, and thus at that time the conceptual base for China's CPC still remained mostly a mystery; Robinson writes 'very few Party members could, for instance, tell the difference between a force and a relation of production or discuss the linkages between economic base and political-social superstructure' (Robinson, 1994: 570). Under Deng, the view of Marxism changed. Marx's legacy as a whole was still studied but its pragmatic aspect was emphasised, for instance phrases such as 'seek truth from facts' and 'practice is the only criterion of truth' were stressed. Marxism was officially 'downgraded to only one- albeit still allegedly the most important- ideological determinant of modern thought' (which means 'Marxism cannot resolve all of our problems') (Brugger and Kelly, 1990).

Thirdly, Chinese pragmatism is growing period by period. This means the government does not put emphasis on pragmatism all the time, and moreover pragmatic action is not obvious and stable all the time. Indeed, it is only of use when the country is on a turning point (or shifting period) and needs some flexible approaches rather than the traditional guidelines. At this kind of turning point, or during a shifting period, the country usually tries to make its 'formal ideology' more practical for the particular situation (i.e. to collaborate with 'informal ideologies'). For example, historically Chinese pragmatism usually has been prominent during reflexive thinking periods. At Mao's time, the pro-Soviet system failed to promote society development. As such China went into a period of reforms, with an amended understanding towards Soviet socialism. This also occurred during the opening-up reform period which introduced full foreign-owned enterprises into the country and let joint ventures, Chinese state-owned enterprises and private firms develop together in the country. This also happened during a series of transformations when China entered the new era of globalisation in 21<sup>st</sup> century; specifically the country took pragmatic steps to

promote further development, such as building the China-Africa relationship devoid of ideological and political strings. Looking back into Chinese history, we find that generally a series of conservative guidelines were used to maintain a stable and peaceful period of development, yet when internal reforms and new external environment necessitate change, a more pragmatic (or we can say more creative/experimental) way of dealing with relations between base and superstructure would emerge to keep progress.

Although we define ‘Chinese pragmatism’ in the aforementioned manner in this study, a similar idea can be seen in other scholar’s works. According to Zhao (2009: 25), China’s economic progress and modernisation process is not motivated by any ideological doctrine, but by pragmatism for economic success. China employs the reform approach in certain area and generalizes it in a larger range if it proves successful. China is selectively learning Western models, and the state understands when and how to use external ideas and strategies to solve their problems (2009: 26).

‘Especially when Chinese government has already adopted a lot of macro-economic principles from Washington Consensus, the country avoided or amended the neoliberal factors which can reduce the role of government. For example, although the internal market is opened for international competition, the key sectors are still under protection by the state’ (ibid).

Zhao also highlighted the limitations of the Chinese model, defined as a non-ideological, pragmatic and experimental reform with emphasis on economic growth and political stability (2009: 34). The clear pursuit of economic and political benefit will lack moral attraction power; in other words, it will most likely damage the image of China, with evidence for such a claim found in the issue of human rights and environment pollution (2009: 38). Therefore in following Zhao (2009: 39), in this study we assume that ‘Chinese pragmatism’ will only be a model for transition, and will be replaced by other forms for development when the high economic growth can be achieved.



### 3. Summary

As has been mentioned from the beginning of this chapter, when we are discussing the contemporary Chinese approaches to development, it is necessary to see how China has formulated and changed its development strategies in relation to foreign policy. We now have a brief discussion of the changing focus and flexibilities of China's foreign policies, as well as how the country sees development and the power of education. Finally we introduced the term 'Chinese pragmatism' to summarise China's unique understanding and practice of development. Let us summarise some points here.

Firstly since the founding of the PRC, China has always made an effort to accelerate domestic economic development and aimed to achieve its 'Four Modernisations,' agriculture, industry, technological and defence. One of the choices made by the country was 'opening wider to the outside world and actively participating in the international economic and technological cooperation and competition (Zhu, 2003)'. From the development history, especially the last 30 years, we can see that China has a long history of international relations, whether it be seeking political alliance or looking for business partners. This trend has become increasingly obvious since the 1978 opening-up policy. In the course of this evolution, China has pragmatically chosen a 'Chinese style socialism' which combines the classical Marxism and Mao-Deng's ideas. Within the anticipated means of achieving economic modernisation, the country attaches importance to the discourse of the 'knowledge economy', and considers education an important tool for long term development and as a way to integrate into international societies (such as student exchanges).

Secondly, as China became increasingly closer with the global society, they, on the one hand, tried to avoid previous socialist pitfalls based on Soviet experience and its own experience. On the other hand, they tried to absorb Western experience which was of potential benefit for the Chinese situation, and to also integrate the Western ideas and theories into Chinese context, and even develop them. In this study this ongoing process is called Chinese pragmatism, as the country has managed to control the 'quantitative changes' within the certain

‘qualitative’ range, and these ‘quantitative changes’ can help the development but won’t change the core of its politics. With this principle the CPC has more flexibility to make economic development.

Ultimately, we now have foundational knowledge by which to explore the China-Africa relationship, and more specifically, educational cooperation. First of all, according to China’s foreign policy in this new era (especially the Peace Dove Strategy), we can see that one of the next focuses for China is Africa (more accurately, China is getting closer relations with Africa). Second, China has been developing in a different way from Western countries and is not targeting a West-oriented modernisation, but is nonetheless increasingly communicating with the West and opening to the world. Thus when we look at Chinese approaches, we can both find some traditional Chinese solutions and also some Western-borrowed conceptions; in practice this is evident in China calling for both the UN’s EFA in educational assistance, and a special model not from either SAPs or PRSPs. Third, China’s Africa policy seems to be different from the West, or we can say, does not borrow the entirety of Western rules for foreign aid; Chinese pragmatism usually considers its own situation carefully when it collaborates with the external agenda. Therefore as being a recipient country and with a lot of needs for national development, we assume that China cannot spend much on financial assistance for Africa but may approach in another way.

Based on this, in the next chapter we explore how China develops its relation with African countries. It will provide a broad view of how Western and Chinese scholars see this relationship. After that, the distinctive Chinese model will become even clearer.



## **Chapter Four    Chinese context of its cooperation with Africa**

### **Introduction**

Given our focus on the emerging China-Africa model within the framework of contemporary international aid, it is necessary to provide background of the China-Africa relationship and its contemporary manifestation. To this point we have discussed the traditional model of international aid, namely the Western model, as well as the growing trend of South-South cooperation on the global stage. We have noted that China, as a developing country, has been rising quickly to engage actively and pragmatically in the global political economy. With a general background in China's conception of development and its transition of foreign policy established in last chapter, this chapter will specifically discuss how China deals with its foreign relations with African countries.

As demonstrated in last chapter, since the 1980s China has focused on building its domestic economy and attracting foreign investment, and this trend has been strengthened by additional reforms in the new century. According to Brautigam (2008: 8), in China's tenth Five Year Plan (2001-2005), these reforms were deepened in the strategy of 'Going Global'; one feature of this strategy was an increase in regional cooperation. This strategy is visualized in the 2008 picture of the Peace Dove Strategy. By revisiting the picture, we can see that Africa is part of China's international modernisation plan. Indeed China-Africa (Sino-Africa) relations are a distinctive example within this changing Chinese foreign relations framework. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is a concrete example of China's global strategy.

The China-Africa relationship has a long history beginning with the PRC's founding, when relations were shaped by a strong anti-imperialism principle, to the more contemporary focus on economic mutual exchange (win-win). Since the new century, the relationship has entered a new stage characterized by its Forums of China and Africa (FOCAC), which are held every three years and feature, within the economic win-win context, diverse cooperation which includes

educational support for Africa.

Educational cooperation within this new framework includes an increase in cultural and human resource exchange. In addition Chinese ‘aid’ is focusing more on higher education and vocational training. The empirical work of this study will examine how this type of ‘aid’ is conducted by the Chinese and perceived in the African field. Yet firstly, this chapter discusses how, historically, China increased its attention towards educational cooperation with Africa, how China declared educational cooperation with Africa in its policies, and how the main approaches are described in documents.

## **1. Changing discourses and mechanisms of a China-Africa relation**

China and Africa are geographically distant, separated by immense land masses with mountains and stretching deserts, as well as by vast oceans. The opinions regarding the relations between the two areas have long differed. According to Chinese historical records (‘Shi Ji’), specifically one written by Si Maqian circa 100 BC, the Emperor Wuti of the Han Dynasty sent envoys to the far West in hopes of making a friendly alliance with tribes there. Among the areas Chinese envoys visited was a place called ‘Likan’, which historians argue was most likely Egypt (Gao, 1984: 241).<sup>50</sup> As Gao notes, this evidence means that, as early as two thousand years ago, Chinese officials visited Africa. Thus beginning in 100 BC, Chinese goods reached to the far away continent by sea (ibid).

During the Tang Dynasty (618-907), the Tang and Arab empires conquered large areas of West Asia and North Africa and at that time, established friendly relations with many groups. Within about 150 years, the Arab Empire sent envoys to Tang’s imperial court no less than 36 times. China’s knowledge of Africa took a leap forward during the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368). In about 1315, a cartographer named Ju Siben drew a map with Africa shaped like a triangle pointing southward which resembles the actual shape of the continent. Importantly, during the Ming

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<sup>50</sup> As Gao noted there was also a different interpretation, for instance the German Sinologist Friedrich Hirth that Likan was a part of the Roman Empire.



Dynasty (1368-1644), in the 29 years between 1405 and 1433, the famous eunuch admiral Zheng He made 7 voyages in which he visited Southwest Asia around the Indian Ocean. In at least 2 or 3 of his voyages, he and his fleet reached the East African coast and visited several areas in contemporary Somalia and Kenya (Gao, 1984: 242). Zheng He's voyages are still made reference to today, when Chinese officials state their long history with Africa.

Even though Zheng He's voyages were so important for developing relations throughout China-African history, relations were cooled down, and nearly came to a stop following the invasion of European colonialists in both areas, and the subsequent closed-door policy of the Manchu rulers during the Ching Dynasty (1644-1912). As Gao stated, 'if there were any subsequent contacts worth mentioning, these were the Chinese labourers (70,000 to 100,000) or coolies recruited by the white colonialists to work in mines in South Africa during the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century (1904-1907)' (1982: 247). The relations were negligible until the foundation of the PRC and the emergence of an independent Africa.

### **1.1 The time from foundation of PRC**

Beyond the variety of historical relations between China and Africa which took place hundreds of years ago, this thesis is talking about the current form of China's engagement with Africa, politically and formally, and how it began to take shape after the 1949 revolution which brought Mao's Communist Party to power (Obiorah, 2007: 35). There have been three stages of relations since the foundation of PRC. The first period was the 50s to the 70s. The Bandung Conference (also called the Asian-African conference) was held in April 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia, and was a milestone conference for Asian and African states. The conference's stated aims were to promote Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation and to oppose colonialism or neocolonialism by the United States, the Soviet Union, or any other 'imperialistic' nation. Not long after the conference, in 1956, China set up formal diplomatic relations with Egypt, the first African country to engage in such relations.

During most of the Maoist period (1949-1976), China's development assistance was managed by the Ministry of Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries (now the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries within the Ministry of Commerce). With the emergence of independent African countries, Premier Zhou Enlai visited Africa three times during the 1960s. Between 1963 and 1964, Premier Zhou and Vice-Premier Chen Yi toured ten African countries and declared 'Five principles of China and Africa' in Algeria (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 17/11/2000).<sup>51</sup> In Ghana and Mali, the Premier put forward 'Eight principles of Chinese economic and technological aid' on 15 January 1964 (Yu, 1988: 853). An outline of the principles are (Chin and Frolic, 2007: 4):

1. Emphasise equality and mutual benefit
2. Respect sovereignty and never attach conditions
3. Provide interest-free or low-interest loans
4. Help recipient countries develop independence and self-reliance
5. Build projects that require little investment and can be accomplished quickly
6. Provide quality equipment and material at market prices
7. Ensure effective technical assistance
8. Pay experts according to local standards

The five principles, as developed in the Bandung spirit, include the support for anti-imperialism, anti-old and new colonialism and anti-alignment, support for African people to achieve 'solidarity by their own choice' and a respect for African sovereignty. The eight principles of aid, most likely the earliest policy and guideline of Chinese aid to Africa, declared that the relationship was 'mutual' --- thus China has never regarded aid as one-sided, but as being based on equality and mutual benefit:

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<sup>51</sup> In brief, the five principles guiding China's relations with the Arab and African countries were as follows: a. China supports the Arab and African peoples in their struggle to oppose imperialism and old and new colonialism and to win and safeguard national independence. b. It supports the pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment by the Governments of Arab and African countries. c. It supports the desire of the Arab and African peoples to achieve unity and solidarity in the manner of their own choice. d. It supports the Arab and African countries in their efforts to settle their disputes through peaceful consultations. e. It holds that the sovereignty of the Arab and African countries should be respected by all other countries and that encroachment and interference from any quarter should be opposed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 17/11/2000).



‘The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual’. (The first principle of the eight) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17/11/2000)

Within the eight principles, the chief method of economic aid was offering long term, low interest or interest-free loans, technology transformations, and expert dispatch, which featured the provision that Chinese technicians should accept the same salaries and living standard as their African colleagues (Yahuda, 1978: 160). The principles were aimed to assure that African countries were not ‘relying on China’, but were being helped to ‘seek their own way of development and economic independence’ (China.org.cn, 14/11/2003).

The Eight Principles obviously stressed China’s contributive role to Africa’s development (Yu, 1988: 853), and what is most distinctive is that this role had a different logic from the West at that time. Compared with the Western logic of intervention which was more like a prescription or target setting for Africa based on the theory of modernisation and Rostovian taking-off model, China’s aid policy in 1964 focused more on what China could offer, and how this offering could be mutually beneficial and related to anti-imperialism. Thus China at this time stood like a comrade-in-arms with African countries to work for an independent future of the development; it was more like establishing alignment rather than forming a donor-recipient relationship.

As Snow (1994: 288) described it, Maoist China showed the South a lot of what the North could not do, so that it became a champion of the Third World and ultimately did win African support on a range of collective economic issues. Thus by the 1980s 150,000 Chinese aid workers, including skilled engineers and doctors, had been sent to Africa. China volunteered to embark on projects such as the Tan-zam (TAZARA) railway, which started in 1970 and finished in 1976; it was one of the monuments of the period.<sup>52</sup> The building of the railway was both

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<sup>52</sup> The TAZARA Railway (also called the Uhuru Railway, from the Swahili word for Freedom, and the Tanzam Railway) was built between 1970 and 1976 by the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (abbreviated

politically and psychologically important to African governments during difficult times, during which more profit-minded donors rejected such projects on economic grounds, and Western donors were unwilling to work in inhospitable bush or desert postings. Because of this, China then got the mutual support back from Africa: 'We are aware', said Nyerere who was the Tanzanian president during the Tan-Zam railway project, 'that this capital is not surplus to your requirements, nor are your technicians otherwise unemployed'; President Bongo of Gabon called China 'the tabernacle of justice' (Snow, 1994: 289). In 1971 at the 26th United Nation conference, 26 African countries voted to support China in 78 total supportive votes; Mao proclaimed 'it was our black brothers who lifted us into the United Nation' (He, 04/11/2006). African people believed, at least till the early 70s, that Chinese assistance was given to them for wholly altruistic reasons and no strings whatsoever were attached (Yu, 1974: 86).

## 1.2 The 80s to 90s

The 1980s featured the second aforementioned stage of China-African relations which transformed relations from political to economic and commercial. China announced the opening-up reform in 1978, and this reform extended Chinese foreign relations in the economic field. Plugging into what we talked about in chapter three (Chinese pragmatism), the end of the Cultural Revolution marked a shift in China's policy toward Africa from one based almost exclusively on ideological alliance, to one with a far more pragmatic and diversified approach. In 1982 the 12th CPC National Assembly officially marked a shift from a policy that emphasised 'war and revolution' to one that emphasised 'peace and development' (Li, 2007b: 72). Likewise, China shifted from policies that emphasised 'economy serves diplomacy' to policies based on 'diplomacy serves the economy' (ibid). During his visit to eleven African countries between 1982-83, Premier Zhao Ziyang called for promoting 'south-south cooperation' and announced that China was adding a new principle to its foreign aid- 'diversity in form' (Brautigam, 2008: 10). Thereafter China issued 'Four Principles on Economic and Technological

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to 'TAZARA') to provide landlocked Zambia an alternative rail lines via Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), South Africa, and Mozambique. The railroad was a turnkey project financed and executed by PRC. Total costs were about US \$500 million, making it the largest foreign-aid project ever undertaken by China. This will be illustrated in Part two of the thesis.



Cooperation with Africa' in 1983, namely, (a) equality and mutual benefit, (b) efficiency, (c) diversity and (d) mutual development (People's Daily, 15/01/1983); this was announced by Premier Zhao on 13 January 1983 in Tanzania. The new four principles marked a significant reform, the impacts of which are still being felt today.

Compared with the Eight Principles of 1964, which governed Chinese foreign aid and technical assistance programmes through the early 1980s, Zhao's Four Principles of 1983 had a different orientation. The 1964 principles emphasised the contributive role of China, a respect for the 'sovereignty of the recipient countries,' and no request for the privileges of Chinese aid (Yu, 1988: 857). On the other hand the 1983 principles focused firstly on mutual economic benefits rather than mutual political support, and also emphasised economic efficiency. Secondly it emphasised the actual needs of the two sides in accordance with China's internal development situation, which meant China would not over estimate its ability to provide aid. Thirdly it shifted focus onto diverse aid forms, including doing construction for African countries, and cooperation of labour service and investment (Li, 2006a: 6).

During the same period (1980s to 1990s), the Western agenda was dictated by the Washington Consensus. Comparatively then, what China did was not make a standard model (such as SAPs) for the development of Africa, but rather made cooperation central for mutual economic development. One of the important differences is the consideration of the 'actual needs' of both sides, and in relation to this, the fact that China did not want to make internal changes to African countries' political-economic structures. The chief reason for China's position is that, when African countries were put under pressure to make structural changes oriented by Western donors, China, at the same time, was making changes in its own domestic economic structure by seeking an alternative way from Western countries' routes (i.e. the opening up policy, Chinese style socialism with a socialism market economy, and the other characteristics we talked about last chapter). Thus maybe we can say that, during this time, China's aid was focusing on how to make a mutually beneficial relation on common aims of development, whereas the West was putting much more attention on how to change Africa.

The most important progress, and the time during which China got the most attention, was the period after the Cold War from 1989. With the disappearance of the struggle between two super powers, African geopolitical status changed. As a result, Western attention to Africa has been constantly on the decline, while China went on to make more reforms of its foreign policy in order to engage more with the new global world. Thus, based on the 1980s development of economic relations with Africa, China saw great value in fostering an across-the-board relationship with Africa by forging closer political, cultural and educational links (He, 2008). In 1996, President Jiang Zemin toured Africa and presented a 'Five Point Proposal' which established the terms of a new China-Africa relationship; this relationship emphasised reliable friendship, sovereign equality, non-intervention, mutually beneficial development and international cooperation (Naidu and Mbazima, 2008: 752) for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The proposal has become the foundation of China's policy toward Africa. The new Chinese leadership is carrying forward the cause of the old leadership, as well as forging ahead into the future. In this way they are adhering to and building upon China's established policy toward Africa, and paying attention to strengthening unity and cooperation between the two (China.org.cn, 2008). If we accept that the 80s principles were a series of strategies for Africa, then the 90s was a time for enriching the previous plans with more practice.

Looking back to the Western agenda during the 90s, the Washington Consensus was argued that SAPs were undermining the capacity of low-income countries to ensure stability and social cohesion, and provide for the most vulnerable sections of society (Robertson et al., 2007: 55). It can be seen that, from the 80s through the 90s, Western donors were trying to change strategies for low-income countries, but in terms of results, not much good was seen in areas such as Africa. The 90s 'good governance' strategy, though it introduced more non-economic factors into economic processes, did not actually represent a complete break from the Washington Consensus (ibid, 2007: 57). China on the other hand, made African countries see another way towards economic success; this different way was seen because China did not minimize African state's roles and ownership, called for no attachment, and increased trade agreements and other types of cooperation. Such a



model was strengthened by China's experience of opening-up.

### 1.3 New century and FOCAC

*'2006 marked the 50th anniversary of the inauguration of diplomatic relations between China and African countries. 2006, dubbed by China as its 'Year of Africa', was also a historical year in China-Africa relations in terms of political achievements (Davies, 2007: 23).*

*'The advice that the African leaders received from their Chinese counterparts was sound, and much more practical than what they typically get from the World Bank.'* (Sachs, 2007).

Since 2000, a new period emerged which may be called the FOCAC (Forum on China -Africa Cooperation) years. The first Ministerial Conference of FOCAC was in October 2000, where African and Chinese representatives met in Beijing to discuss the direction of long term relations between the two (FOCAC, 2000). The Forums are held every three years. The latest one, the 4th FOCAC was held in Egypt, in November of 2009, and it decided to hold the Fifth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC in Beijing in 2012 (Xinhuanet, 09/11/2009d). In June 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao stressed that the Chinese Government would endeavour to shape a new Sino-African partnership based on long-term stability, equality and mutual benefit.

The year 2006 was declared 'the year of Africa' in Chinese diplomatic history. On 12 January 2006, the Chinese government released China's African Policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2006a) which declared the country's future aims and practice plans in Africa, and also made the specific field of practice clearer. Before the policy was released, China had been having formal diplomatic relations with 47 of the total 53 African countries. To be highlighted here, this represented the first time that the Chinese government released its policy for Africa (Xinhuanet, 12/01/2006). The policy emphasises mutual supportive relations based on the long history between the two continents:

China-Africa friendship is embedded in the long history of interchange. Sharing similar historical experience, China and Africa have all along sympathized with and supported each other in the struggle for national liberation and forged a profound friendship....For over half a century, the two sides have enjoyed close political ties and frequent exchanges ... Bilateral trade and economic cooperation have grown rapidly; cooperation in other fields has yielded good results; and consultation and coordination in international affairs have been intensified. China has provided assistance to the best of its ability to African countries, while African countries have also rendered strong support to China on many occasions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2006b: Part II).

The 2006 Policy is framed by the following points:

Sincerity, friendship and equality. -- Mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity. -- Mutual support and close coordination. -- Learning from each other and seeking common development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2006b: Part III).

Between the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> of November 2006, the Beijing Summit and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC was held in Beijing. The 'Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation' was signed by the end of the conference (FOCAC, 2006a). The declaration proclaims establishment of 'a new type of strategic partnership' between China and Africa, which features 'political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges', adopted by Chinese leaders and 48 African countries. 'The China-Africa cooperation on Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)' was also issued at the forum, and offered more details about China-Africa cooperation in the field of politics, economics, international affairs, and social development (FOCAC, 2006b).

Throughout the declaration, China stands actively in the developing world and calls for collaboration among developing countries, for the aim of their common



interests, through beneficial exchange and cooperation. Such statements remind us that, as both a lender and recipient in the world of aid, 'China's goal is not to overturn the world order but instead to participate in this order and to reinforce it and even to profit from it' (Kirchgaessner, 2006), and in this vein to play a role as 'a significant player in a liberalising global trading environment based upon market principles' (Alden and Davies, 2006: 9).<sup>53</sup> Generally speaking, the declaration informs a new pattern of China-Africa cooperation based on the principle of economic 'win-win'. This new pattern is facilitated by the political and economic position of contemporary China. Since then, the 'mutual relations' emphasised in Chinese policies has been upgraded to a terminology which is more market-oriented, and even clearer: 'win-win' (Chinese pinyin: shuang ying).

The Beijing Summit and its Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) have significant changes from the discourses of the previous FOCAC (in 2000 and 2003). Compared with the 2000 conference which put a lot of attention on the political slogan level (e.g. a common view about UN regulations, human rights, and anti-terrorism) (FOCAC, 2000), the Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) has more content and more details regarding the practice of the two sides, and particularly focuses on economic cooperation.

Trade between Africa and China has been developing rapidly since the mid-90s. Apart from pure trade/business, China also committed itself to a series of supporting aims, such as training plans and educational aid.

On President Hu's 2009 tour to Mali, Senegal, Tanzania, and Mauritius, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that this visiting was not primarily commercial in nature, but rather a sign of 'good and profound traditional friendship with African countries', and gave 'fresh impetus to traditional friendship' (Xinhuanet, 18/02/2009c). The visit aimed to consolidate friendship, deepen cooperation, deal with challenges, and seek common development, as Hu said (Xinhuanet, 12/02/2009a). In an important comment by Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun at a press briefing regarding this visit, he noted that these four countries

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<sup>53</sup> Kirchgaessner's words were from Fu Chuanyu who was CEO of Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (2003-2010). These words were also cited in Alden and Davies' paper (2006: 1).

were actually not rich with natural resources, a point which refuted Western media claims that China only cared about energy; Chinese media claimed energy was just a part of a more comprehensive cooperation with Africa (Embassy of the PRC in the USA, 06/02/2009).

‘The year 2009 is an important year for China-Africa relations to continue to move forward and will create new development opportunities for the bilateral ties. The Chinese leaders will continue to take the development of relations with Africa as a top priority of Chinese diplomacy’, Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Yang said (Lu and Shi, 14/12/2009). President Hu, from his days of being a vice-president through to the president of PRC, has formally visited various African countries six times in the past decade, and five of the six visits were the first political tour by Hu in each calendar year. It seems China is increasingly putting Africa in an important position (Qi, 13/02/2009).

## **2. Logic of intervention: Win-win policy based relation**

The contemporary Chinese approach to Africa (always called ‘cooperation’ rather than ‘aid’ by the government) is based on their ‘win-win’ policy theory. The concept ‘win-win’ is mainly about economic strategy; from the description given by the Chinese government: ‘a new type of strategic partnership with Africa that features political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 12/01/2006b). Therefore, the ‘win-win’ policy is centred upon a mutually beneficial economic process. However, since the word ‘win-win’ has been used increasingly in Chinese policy discourse recently, the meaning of win-win has been extended to different fields.

We may further illustrate the win-win policy through the discourse of Chinese political leaders. President Hu’s speech at University of Pretoria, South Africa on 7 February 2007 highlighted the need to ‘deepen cooperation and expand economic and technological exchanges to achieve mutual benefit and win-win progress’ (Hu, 07/02 2007). At length, Hu noted:



Economic and technological cooperation is an important foundation for growing China-Africa relations. ... In addition to trade, we should expand our cooperation to other areas, including investment, technology and project contracting. Priority should be given to agriculture, infrastructure, manufacturing and public welfare projects that are vital to people's livelihood. The Chinese Government will fully implement the policy steps announced at the Beijing Summit for strengthening pragmatic cooperation with Africa and supporting its development to help Africa expedite socio-economic development, enhance capacity-building and improve people's livelihood, thus bringing real benefit to the African people. (ibid)

The above speech describes that the win-win relation is applicable to many areas between China and Africa. Politically it is a sign that the China-Africa relationship is moving towards a more diverse and flexible level, that is, from a traditional domestic political-based relationship focused on the similarities of the political culture and dialogues, towards a multi-fields' performance based upon cooperation in economics, political parties, culture, education, medical treatment, and more. This multi-layered cooperation includes both the leaders and the public, both the national and private companies, both practical and research levels, and both political and commercial aims.

Similarly Yang (2009: 57) talks about the 'conditions for sustainable strategic partnership' which includes 'mutual political trust', 'mutual beneficial partnership', 'interdepartmental coordination', 'mutual understanding of civil societies' and 'opening to international involvement' (ibid: 62-64). Yang argues that, 'to realise a win-win outcome, it is necessary to strengthen the dynamic framework and mechanism to guide and implement the cooperation programme and action plans adjusting to the changing situation with the time' (ibid: 63).

Contemporary China prefers a 'harmonisation' discourse for explaining its win-win policy. According to Zhang (2009: 67), China-Africa relations are based on building a harmonious world wherein African countries can decide African

affairs by themselves, give effective assistance to each other, and establish fair and just multilateral trade and financial systems to gear economic globalisation. For the Chinese government, in regards to maintaining a win-win relationship with Africa, they firstly 'forge friendship, maintain close political dialogue and increase mutual trust' (ibid: 68), secondly 'deepen cooperation and expand economic and technological exchanges to achieve mutual benefit' (ibid: 69), thirdly 'strengthen exchanges of civilizations', fourthly 'strengthen consultation and cooperation in security affairs', and finally 'uphold each other's legitimate rights in the international affairs'.

Thus China wants to claim that, for the two sides' roles within the win-win framework, each will win diverse benefits in a harmonious atmosphere, and work for sustainability in the long run. Yet, what is the basis of win-win? And what is the logic of win-win?

This diverse win-win policy is based on a 'sharing' platform which could be unique to China. Since the 60s through the 70s, the China-Africa political relationship has shifted from 'striving for political liberation and national independence', to 'striving for interests of sovereignty, security and development' (Wang, 2009: 324) in the 80s and 90s (ibid: 328). Xiao and Zhang (2009: 153) also mention 'the disadvantages in the same boat'. An (2009:183-186) compares the poverty issues between China and Africa, and notes that they 'face different situation of poverty issues; however, they have much in common on fighting poverty; this makes anti-poverty cooperation possible for China and Africa' (An, 2009: 186). Possible areas of similarities also include the development of rural areas.

According to Davies (2007: 34), apart from economic cooperation China and Africa could also share experiences on common challenges such as rural development, labour migration, urbanization and population growth, regional imbalances in development, and the development of the domestic market and integration with the international market. The two could also learn together to safeguard national interest in the face of the globalisation of markets, and could together promote the interests of developing countries in world affairs.



### **3. Cooperation in the field of education**

The Chinese win-win policy has opened a window for future cooperation in cultural and educational fields. As opposed to short term economic benefits, educational aid and cooperation is a method by which development for both sides will be achieved in the long run. China has noticed this latter point in the new policy, as they increased the expected number of aid students in Africa over the coming years. The Chinese also use an ancient saying to describe educational assistance to Africa- 'give me a fish and I will eat today, while teach me to fish and I will eat for a lifetime' (An, 2009: 190).

As a developing country, China is not able to give a significant amount of financial aid. Therefore, based on the win-win theory, the educational aid approach from China is to help people to learn rather than give people money to go to school. For instance China is active in professional training and the dispatch of volunteers, researchers or teachers. Compared with financial aid from the West, China has never been a 'rich' donor and is thus trying a different way by using its human resources to help develop the human capacities in Africa; this is 'teaching how to fish'.

In the new century and the global era, educational development is more than a process by which to produce skilled personnel, it is a process of learning about each other's strengths, to facilitate international understanding, promote cultural integration, and even a process to influence each other and promote cooperation in other fields. For these reasons, the win-win theory considers the role of education.

#### **3.1 Increasing attention in educational cooperation**

According to Li Baoping (2007), in the last 50 years China has forged cooperative relations in the field of education with 50 African countries. This cooperation has expanded from a simple exchange of students initially, to the current multi-level educational cooperation which covers various fields and takes many forms.

There are three stages of the development in the educational field between China and Africa. The first one began from the 1950s. As a new developing country at this time, China began to dispatch teachers and students to some African countries such as Egypt and Morocco.<sup>54</sup> In the mid-60s, there were 164 students from 14 African countries who went to China for study, while China kept on dispatching teachers to Africa; this process was not carried out during the Cultural Revolution. Until the end of the 80s, 43 African countries' sent 2245 students to China. There was also some extra development in cooperation among universities (PKUCAS, 2005: 2-3).

The second stage was from the 90s. After the Cold War and the resultant international changes, cooperation between China and Africa was strengthened. Government groups from the Education Ministry of China visited about 20 African countries and the number of African students coming to China increased; within all the educational aid projects, 5660 students from 43 countries, and 238 teachers were going to over 30 African countries. Moreover at this time, the cooperation field was extended to the scholarships for master and doctoral levels. It was noticeable that training classes were held by the Chinese ministries in Africa from the end of 90s, and covered the fields of educational administration, agriculture, computer skills, medical application and more (PKUCAS, 2005: 4).<sup>55</sup>

From 50s to the end of 2005, China offered governmental scholarships to 19,000 students from 50 African countries, and no less than 530 teachers have been dispatched to Africa (King, 2007: 342). The contemporary stage began with the FOCAC (as aforementioned).

While the FOCAC which dictated general cooperation between China and Africa, the education ministers from China and 17 African countries actually jointly

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<sup>54</sup> The information from this part is drawn mostly from 'China Africa Education Cooperation' (2005) (in Chinese) which reviews China-Africa cooperation on education, its history, performance, problems and prospects. It is edited and written by the Centre for African Studies of Beijing University (PKUCAS), entrusted by the Department of International Cooperation and Exchanges, the Ministry of Education of PRC.

<sup>55</sup> In my field work, I interviewed Tanzanians who have attended training in China. I also visited some Chinese universities that organised training courses for African countries. There will be discourse analysis on short term training course reports by Zhejiang Normal University in the following chapter.



signed a Beijing Declaration on 27 November 2005. The Declaration declared that the education ministers exchanged views on the current situation and the existing problems in educational development. These exchanges were followed by in-depth discussions focused upon the formulation and implementation of educational strategies for developing countries. The ministers reaffirmed that education is the cornerstone of social development, and that promoting the development of education is a national priority and a prerequisite for achieving national prosperity. Some of the agreements in the declaration are as follows:

- Regard free and compulsory primary education as a basic human right;
- Prioritizing the development of education, providing sufficient and equal opportunities to education and accomplishing lifelong education and education for all, are essential elements in formulating national development strategies for developing countries.
- To improve the equality of education and to offer more opportunities for access to education, we will need to facilitate the application of information and communication technology in education.
- The relevance of education to economic development is more significant in the process of pursuing economic development and eliminating poverty.
- In order to confront the challenges of unemployment, structural adjustment of our economies as well as the demands of technology, developing countries need to establish prudent vocational education policies.
- developing higher education, enlarging enrollment and improving educational quality and training high-quality talents to meet economic development demands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 29/11/2005).

‘The Sino-African Education Minister's Forum is an important platform for exchange and cooperation between China and Africa on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, and a significant move for developing countries to seek educational development’, the declaration said.

The ministers held dialogues on the topic of 'China-Africa strategy on the development of education and international exchanges and cooperation'. It is notable that the first consensus of the declaration is very similar to the UN's MDGs, which calls for UPE. Moreover the following consensuses about lifelong learning and EFA, as well as reducing poverty through education, are using a very similar discourse when compared with the UN aims. Furthermore the discourse about 'the relevance of education to economic development' even seems to absorb the World Bank's language. However it seems that some different actions are taken despite the similar discourse with the West, specifically with the last two consensuses which mentioned vocational and higher education. Those are probably China's focus, as compared to its devotion in primary educational range. According to King (2007: 343), although this forum was 'piggy-backed on the High Level Meeting on EFA, it struck out on its own', focusing more on the 'prudent policies for vocational education and technical education, as well as to encourage higher education and cultural diversity'.

Training and assisting foreign countries is an important component of Chinese aid. Until the end of 2006, China held 2500 training classes for 150 countries (African countries and other developing countries and areas), and 80,000 people were trained in over 150 subjects including economy, management, agriculture, law, and education. More than 150 Chinese universities, research centres and professional training institutions contributed to the training (Department of Aid for Foreign Countries, Ministry of Commerce, 26/07/2007). As a special way of educating people in professional fields and in short term fields, training offers opportunities for understanding of Chinese culture and learning the Chinese developmental experience; this has efficiently promoted good relationships between China and other developing countries.

Some training courses are specially held for African university leaders. On 3 October 2006, the Sino-African University Presidents Forum, authorized by Ministry of Education and Ministry of Commerce, was held at Zhejiang Normal University. 30 university presidents and senior educational administrators from 14 African countries (such as Kenya, Tanzania, and South Africa) met with Chinese experts on African research and Chinese university presidents and officials; in



total 120 people attended the forum. The main topic of the forum was ‘reform, cooperation and development’ in the issues of ‘capacity building of universities in developing countries’, ‘management reforms in the universities’, and ‘international partner relationship’. This was the first forum designed for university administrators between China and Africa, and demonstrates a trend to focus on higher education cooperation in the future (People’s Daily, 09/10/2006).

One month after the university president forum, the largest conference between China and Africa, the Beijing Summit as part of the FOCAC series, was held in Beijing in November 2006. In the part designed to discuss human development between the two sides, the summit declared to expand educational cooperation in its Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009). In this plan they increasingly recognize ‘the importance of education as the foundation and key for achieving sustainable social and economic development’ (in Beijing Action Plan 5.4.1) (FOCAC, 2006b). This ‘Education’ part of the 2007-2009 Action Plan is built on the previous forum for educational ministers in 2005, as the plan indicated:

Taking note of the success of the China-Africa Forum of Ministers of Education last November, the two sides expressed the view that holding this Forum on a regular basis will help promote their cooperation and dialogue in education (in Beijing Action Plan, 5.4.2) (FOCAC, 2006b).<sup>56</sup>

The two sides resolved to encourage more exchanges and closer cooperation between institutions of higher learning of the two sides, take steps to ensure the effectiveness of the bilateral student exchange programs, and carry out consultation on concluding agreements on mutual accreditation of academic degrees (in Beijing Action Plan, 5.4.3) (FOCAC, 2006b).

This plan, passed on the roundtable meeting (on 5 November, 2006) chaired by President Hu, aimed that in the subsequent three years, namely, by 2009, it would:

- Help African countries set up 100 rural schools;

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<sup>56</sup> China-Africa Forum of Ministers of Education is the forum we introduced earlier in this section, held in November of 2005.

- Increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to African students from the current 2,000 to 4,000 by 2009;
- Provide annual training for a number of educational officials as well as heads and leading teachers of universities, primary, secondary and vocational schools in Africa;
- Establish Confucius Institutes in African countries to meet their needs in the teaching of the Chinese language and encourage the teaching of African languages in relevant Chinese universities and colleges (in Beijing Action Plan, 5.4.4) (FOCAC, 2006b).

In this plan, higher education cooperation included scholarships, training and Chinese language teaching; in this regard, specific figures were given thus indicating a more systematic cooperation between the two sides for future evaluations.

### **3.2 Main approaches to educational cooperation**

So how is the Chinese educational cooperation with Africa made up? What are their distinctive characteristics? Different from the Western donors, China's approach to Africa is more about the cultural integration and skill transformation. These approaches can be summarised as follows (PKUCAS, 2005: 8-70):<sup>57</sup>

Firstly, there is exchange and cooperation between educational and academic institutions on both sides, including visits from top-level officials in the education sector (PKUCAS, 2005: 8). As Li (2006a: 4) notes, 'up to now, China has sent more than 100 education delegations to visit Africa while receiving as many delegations from African countries...Communications in the education sector were carried out not only through irregular mutual contacts, but also through mutual and multilateral high level talks and negotiation mechanisms'.

Secondly, as the data shown in the previous paragraphs indicates, students exchanges, which has more than 50 years history, is one of the important aspects

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<sup>57</sup> Main contents of these approaches are originally from the book: 'China Africa education cooperation' (2005: 8-70).



of this cooperation (PKUCAS, 2005: 13). From 1956 to 2006, 18,000 African youths received Chinese government sponsorship to study in China. From 1956 to the end of 2003, China sent 523 teachers to 35 African countries who gave courses in more than 10 subjects and specialized fields, including science, engineering, agriculture, arts and physical training, in order to help African countries develop the weaker disciplines, train technological talents, and develop middle school and university education (Xinhuanet, 04/02/2007). Some of the earlier graduates have been given important governmental posts in Africa, contributing to and improving Sino-African relations.

The third way is dispatching teachers to Africa. Dispatched teachers gave courses in more than 10 subjects and specialties, including science, engineering, agriculture, arts and physical training, in order to assist African countries in developing the weak disciplines, train talents in technological fields, develop education in middle schools and universities (PKUCAS, 2005: 23). China's Zhejiang Agricultural University, which has been merged into Zhejiang University, sent 12 teachers to work in Cameroon in eight years since 1991 (Li, 2007a: 5). After eight years, an advanced microbiology laboratory was set up in the University of Yaounde I, in which China invested 2 million yuan (about 286,000 US dollars). From 1995 to 2003, China administered 43 sessions of the 'Advanced Education and Scientific Research Program' in 21 African countries, and under the program, 21 comparatively advanced laboratories in biology, micro-biology, computer science, physics, analytical chemistry, food refreshment and processing were set up in universities in those countries (Xinhuanet, 04/02/2007).

Another approach is cooperation between universities on research projects in order to improve the research quality of African universities; one method was to edit a series of research training books by Chinese and African lectures (PKUCAS, 2005: 27). By the end of 2003, Chinese universities had cooperative agreements with 21 African countries on 43 higher educational projects (ibid: 29). The agreements included seminars and conferences, research visits, and research projects.

There are also some other aid approaches, such as funding or donating teaching

materials to schools directly. From mid-1980s to the end of 2002, China had donated teaching and learning tools, computers and lab equipments to 24 African countries (PKUCAS, 2005: 41). However, thus far the Chinese aid in Africa is still a small proportion of the total international aid in Africa.

We now have developed a view of Chinese educational practice in Africa. Through more than 50 years of development, China has established a series of approaches on educational cooperation with Africa, especially on higher level of education. Therefore the question must be asked, how does this relatively small amount of educational aid by China effect and influence Africa? How is this perceived by donors (Chinese officials and people whose jobs are related to Chinese aid) and recipients? These are the questions being asked again and again in this study.

#### **4. Summary**

Above all, it is now necessary to grasp some historical features of China-Africa relationship and their educational cooperation, related with China's changing developmental tasks. The three categories of time '1950s-1960s', '1970s-1990s' and '2000-' were divided in chapter two to show the history of Western aid. However, considering China experienced a fast economic growth with huge changes just in a very short time, we prefer to divide the time line more specifically. Thus, four stages of China's African action are shown in the table below:<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Most of the Chinese and English literatures divide this relation into three periods, 1949-1978, 80's and 90's until now. The time from 90s to the 21st century has always been put together. This study made this new one and tried to give each of the stage a 'name', in order to show the changes more clearly.



Table 4.1: Changing domestic jobs and China-Africa relations

Year		Domestic task for development	Aim of China-Africa relation	Educational field	A period of...
1950s-1960s		Build a new China systematically	Ideology based solidarity against colonialism and imperialism	Learning from each other and cultural exchange, to get friends for the new China	Revolution
1970s - 1990s	1970s - 1980s	Develop China economically by Chinese style pragmatism	Third World alliance; A shift from economy serves diplomacy to diplomacy serves economy	Increasing exchanges with increasing demand of the technological society	Creation
	1990s	Format a pluralistic society in order to accelerate realizing modernisation	Economic based cooperation to adapt themselves into the post Cold War time	More types of cooperation emerged especially in the field of higher education	Diversification
2000-		Engage more into the global issue and figure a modern and democratic image of China	Strategic and more organised win-win relation aiming for long-run mutual development in the global era	More specific policy details confirmed for Chinese support of education and human resource to Africa	Consolidation

First was a time of ‘revolution’, as the new country was founded and the new China eagerly wanted to have political friends in the Third World and escape its ‘dark’ history (being colonised, or being divided by imperialist powers’ control). During this time China’s foreign policy was heavily influenced by ideology, and was deeply impacted by the unique international environment of the time (Li,

2007a: 70). China placed itself on the front line of the struggle against colonialism, imperialism and revisionism in the Third World. Thus, the summary word 'revolution' means it was the time for China to 'stand up'. It was a time when China wanted to be independent, a desire shared together with a number of the emerging independent African countries, especially the countries with the pro-Soviet ideological traditions. At this stage, educational practices between the two sides were simple, taking the form of exchange visiting and studying mainly for language and literature learning, and aimed to understand and strengthen the friendship among the countries.

Secondly, since the 1970s nation states have involved themselves into the global market, and national politics have been interlocked with the market economy. Given there is always a tension between the market and political authority for territorially-bounded nation states (Strange, 1994), in China's case there was a time when politics needed to change to adapt to market rules. As Liu (2008: 82) said, at the end of the 70s the 'passion' between China and Africa had already decreased, and the material foundation which maintained the relations between them also got weaker. The relations began when both of the two sides were at a low development level, and as the times changed, the two of them were under pressure for national development. For these reasons, the importance of national emancipation was no longer prioritized instead of the very urgent aim of domestic economic development. The 12th CPC National Assembly in 1982 officially marked a shift from a policy that emphasised 'war and revolution' to one emphasizing 'peace and development'. Likewise, China shifted from policies that emphasised that 'economy serves diplomacy' to policies based on 'diplomacy serves the economy' (Li, 2007a: 72). China began to seek a new way which fitted itself better into the world, a new way which would not only use ideological standards to decide whether to be closer to, or further from, the African countries. China started to use 'cooperation' rather than the term 'aid' from the 80s, which meant that China did away with the ideological eras one-side support, and began to develop a kind of two-sides beneficial relations (Liu, 2008: 84). This process, which included the development of Chinese pragmatism and a fresh relationship with Africa, could be called a sort of 'creation' period which was a time of shift and also an important time in the history of China and Africa. Education during



this time, especially following the opening-up policy, had been improved significantly in China, which gave the international cooperation of education between China and Africa a better and broader circumstance. Thus we can say, a real educational exchange which benefited thousands African students and influenced education itself, to a degree, started from this time.

Thirdly, when China started an 'economic cooperation' relationship with Africa, the windows opened even more widely than before; during this time the estrangement based upon different ideologies was weakened significantly. This was the time of diversification. Another obvious reason for this diversification was the end of Cold War. During the previous period, China started to make a shift from strong declaration on against imperialism to more flexibilities on economic cooperation with Africa, and thus from the 90s we can see more specific practice between China and Africa in these diverse fields. The diversification meant cooperation in the fields of politics, economy and social life, and also meant this would happen in different social sectors and at different levels. These changes were embodied in the field of education, when the government added some new forms of educational cooperation, including extending the academic degree levels including not only undergraduate but also postgraduate (master and PhD level) and increasing research cooperation in higher education. At the same time, the recipient countries and the subject of studying and training became more diverse as well.

Fourthly, until the new century China-Africa relations had changed from the original ideological relation. The period is named 'consolidation' in this study, because, based on FOCAC, China consolidated its relations with African countries, and provided more details in policy and forum documents. Especially after the 2006 Beijing Summit, with the 2007-2009 Beijing Action and declaration, it is obvious that China is attempting to make this relationship longitudinal, and is also trying to strengthen it through closer cooperation. China, as a fast rising state in the contemporary world, demonstrates that it is now making a serious effort to solidify ties with African countries via economic win-win relations, and by keeping relations running regularly and effectively. Educational policy follows the same approach as general cooperation, as demonstrated by clearer figures of

scholarship, training and school numbers for supporting Africa. Importantly, education at this time is becoming increasingly important given the knowledge economy atmosphere. Education will help integrate human resource exchange between China and Africa in the future.

In this table, each period of China-Africa relations is actually placed under a certain international background, and is also related to the country's own logic of intervention. To respond to the questions in the introduction of this chapter, the next table offers a glance on the changing ontology of China-Africa educational practice, as put into context by the changing international social projects since aid started.

Table 4.2 Chinese aid within changing international situations (Western context) and the related aid discourses, mechanisms and logic of intervention



	Background	Changing Discourses		Mechanisms	Logic of Intervention
	<i>International aid to education (main project by West)</i>	<i>Chinese development goals (economic)</i>	<i>Political directing theories</i>	<i>Relationship with Africa in educational field</i>	<i>Ontology of educational aid project (China-Africa)</i>
1950s-1960s	Decolonisation and modernisation; economic 'taking off'	Socialism reconstruction and industrialisation	Mao Zedong thought: class struggle	Political visiting and teachers dispatch, student exchange	Urgent human resource demanding after independence
1970s-1990s	Super power time and the Cold War; Washington consensus and market rules	Social stability and national economic development	Deng Xiaoping theory: modernist, technological determinism	More in higher education sectors (student scholarships) and professional training	Adapting to the changing international situation and adjusting the cooperation forms
2000-	Post-W.C. ; Global knowledge economy	Joining into the global political economy, increasingly modernising	Three Presents for modernising the party, economic win-win in the world	Regular forums and promoting technological training	Stable mutually beneficial process; promoting South's role in the world

Time in above table is divided according to the different main project of international aid, and this division is similar to the period division in the last table. The periods are divided into decolonisation, Washington Consensus and Post-Washington Consensus. The main difference from the last table is that, in the

following one, we combine the time from mid 1970s to 1990 and 1990 to 2000 into one period given that it was Washington Consensus time, and that the Post-Washington Consensus time began in 2000. Borrowed from Dale's table (2008) about 'Social projects of education, their ontologies and implications for education governance, 1945-2008', this table is driven by a desire to understand the ontology of educational aid for the China-Africa relation together with the economic and political focuses in each period. To be flagged at this point, this is ontology of the two sides' relation and not just of China. In the following five parts of table content, the first one gives the international background of Western projects (namely, main projects from orthodox donors), the middle two parts tells us the economic and political background of China, followed with the focus of educational practice by China in each period. Finally is the deeper sight of the educational aid by China. We may also see that, during the Washington Consensus period wherein Western developmental strategies were demonstrating many shortcomings, China was focused on internal economic reforms. Through the economic transformation and the establishment of a stable political environment, China-Africa educational cooperation has begun to play a role as a promoter for mutual beneficial development in the long run.

To conclude, after exploring a set of elements we mentioned in chapter one – aid approaches, motives, conditions, modalities, relationships, by looking historically at Western and Chinese context of aid, we can see that the Chinese win-win model of educational aid to Africa is a new type which adds to the orthodox Western model, as represented by the World Bank and some of the ODA countries; this new model is probably attractive to some African people. According to King's summary, the majority of African presidents are interested in the Chinese cooperation and the Beijing Summit because they are actually interested in 'trade' not 'aid' (King, 2007: 346). This conclusion offers a very important clue towards telling us the difference, and King elaborates by saying that China never used the word 'aid' but instead used 'cooperation'. Moreover China did not use 'development cooperation', which is another name for aid, but instead used it separately in the title of the Summit, 'development and cooperation'. We can see the Chinese model from the following points:



--This position cannot be imitated by the other Western donors, as it is a South-South model which is based upon two-sided, mutually beneficial, 'all-around relations'(He, W., 2009: 110) without political strings attached, and based on a history without colonialism but with some common developmental goals instead. Moreover, China is not offering approaches which confront the Western rules and thus pose little diplomatic risk (Gu et al., 2008: 11).

--The main approach of educational aid to Africa is not financing but is 'soft power construction' (He, W., 2009: 110) - human development, especially the transformation of the skills such as short-term training in certain subjects urgent for development.

--Contemporary China is influenced by both Western and Chinese theories such as the human capital theory and neo-liberalism theory, but is trying to get a unique way well settled in its national conditions (Dong, 2009: 124).

--The Chinese model in the Western viewpoints has several kinds of images: a new type of hegemony, or competitor of the West, or partner of Africa and other countries (Alden and Davies, 2006).

However as King (2007: 346) says, there may well be ways in which its aid pledges can be implemented based on mutuality and equal benefit and avoid the many pitfalls of the traditional donor-recipient relations, if the Chinese government continue to conduct their principles based on their policy. King (2006) stated, focusing on the cooperation, 'China's approach seems to differ substantially from many Western donors' preoccupation with poverty reduction, and with meeting the MDGs' (2006: 11). It is very clear from the MDGs statement that the Western aid to education should help the recipient country overcome poverty and realise the goal for UPE. This calls specifically for that 'by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling' (United Nations, 2000: 5). In a marked difference from the Western goals, Chinese policy is not quoting MDGs' statement but is still using its terms of 'cooperation', emphasizing dialogue between the two continents, considering education as one of the promoters of sustainable social and economic development. Davies (2007: 34) expressed a similar opinion to King, 'China's development model offers an alternative to African countries to the structural adjustment policies prescribed by the World Bank and the IMF, a view for

instance expressed in a speech by the Chinese ambassador to South Africa. China has not followed the standardised policy prescription of these institutions. Whether the China model will play out differently remains to be seen’.

Western donors always give us an image that they have responsibilities to help Africa. This is a link from the colonial history, despite the fact that the world has now entered a new era. Nonetheless a kind of hierarchical relationship between them exists and remains from before. China does not have this link with Africa, and what is more, they have common goals to pursue with Africa, that being to join in the global era. On the contrary, the model from the West, DAC countries, and the UN’s goals seems like the model of the world, based on the DAC’s developed economy and preponderant position in the world. They are making prescriptions to cure low-income countries’ problems, in hope they can catch up with the standards of modernisation. With increasing developing countries wanting to be independent and developed, this kind of hierarchy perhaps makes the recipients feel uncomfortable and feel as though they are losing. At the same time, Chinese discourse and approaches satisfied parts of developing countries, emphasizing equal status and friendly words. Although with a relatively small amount of aid to education, what China doing is to establish very pragmatic aims from Africa; perhaps more accurately, China cannot change the whole situation of education in Africa, but they are using this as a way of promoting a closer relationship with Africa. Thus as King and Davies’s previous words predicted, the China-Africa model, which is focusing on a different relationship from the ‘aid relationship’, may create a new way to think about aid and the relationship to Africa. Perhaps this may help Africa up to a new position in the world order.



## Conclusion of Part One

As stated in the beginning, we divide the thesis into two parts. At their most basic, Part One gives us a background and conceptualization of the study, and Part Two tells us the empirical work of the study and its result and implications. Until now, what we know from Part One is, firstly, the dominant position and the changing discourse of Western aid. The Western model of aid has experienced a changing history, from a strong intervention of economic structures of recipient countries, to more consideration given to governance and social capital. However the core of aid has never changed. The core is based on the theory of modernisation and for Western donors, international aid is for helping low-income countries get rid of poverty and catch up with developed countries.

Given that American global hegemony has held sway for almost a lifetime, and that Western supremacy transcends many lifetimes, this is not surprising. We are so used to the world being Western, even American, that we have little idea what it would be like if it was not.

The West, moreover, has a strong vested interest in the world being cast in its image, because this brings multifarious benefits.

For reasons of both mindset and interest, therefore, the United States, and the West more generally, finds it difficult to visualize, or accept, a world that involves a major and continuing diminution in its influence (Jacques, 2009: 8).

It can be seen from Jacques' words that the dominant influence from the West is decreasing, or at least gaining critics. What is more, we may begin to imagine what it would be like when new models emerge, that is those which are different or will even replace the orthodox ones on the world stage. In this study we are interested in the difference between the orthodox and the new models of educational aid to Africa. We are interested in seeing this possibility of these differences. Before we make a comparison, we needed to introduce the dominant model, that is Western donors and their logic; we also needed to show some

evidence (from documents and media) that new donors are rising. We can see the traditional aid architectures feature conditionality as well as selectivity. We can see a series reforms have been conducted on aid by international donors, but that aid is still embedded tightly in this global neoliberal market. We can also see aid to education, in this knowledge-based economy, cannot be considered as simply as a way of distributing global public goods, but a kind of practice related strongly with the global political economy.

In addition to the traditional donors' logic, some new forms of 'aid' which has been called such as 'mutual exchange', 'international cooperation' have been emerging in the global era, especially among Southern countries.

As the largest developing country in the world, China has been considered as a new type of 'donor', in this sense contrasting with the orthodox donors. This inspires us to think about if this can be a new model of aid in the contemporary world. The international relations among China and African countries have been of increasing interest since the 2006 Beijing Summit. People started to review the historical relations between China and Africa, and wonder about the motives behind Chinese policies and practice for Africa. The stories can be cast back to the relation between ancient China and Africa, but here we focus on the time since the foundation of the PRC and especially the time since the 1978 opening-up. This time period can show us a political economic picture of how China has developed itself, and how it used foreign relations to benefit its self-development (i.e. through 'win-win').

In the field of education, with the increasing voices in the world discussing the knowledge economy and the power of technology, developing countries now take education as a key tool for rising up. China is increasing its support in diverse areas of education in Africa, and in an effort to be different from the Western donors, focuses on higher and vocational education as well as teacher dispatch and short term training.

Based on the understanding of the Chinese conception of international relations, development and education, we may obtain the Chinese context from a theoretical



and historical perspective. China has a different developmental history with completely different ideology from the West, thus it is easier to understand why the Chinese model is distinctive now. As a developing country without any colonial relations with other developing countries and one which pursues a self-revised socialism, China has a different foundational basis from the West. To organize a vast population and stand steadily in the world, China has to produce new ideas which, on one hand can be ideologically supporting of the Chinese government and the leading CPC, and on the other hand can be flexibly promoted in the globalisation process via socialist China globalisation.

It will be meaningful to look at whether China brings the world a different model of development. In this study, since we assume that countries such as China have introduced a new route to achieve ‘modernity’, we want to know if the world can feel this difference in our main focus – educational aid. That means, our next question is, how do different people perceive it? As scholars talk about it in different languages and opinions, how do people involved in the aid practice think about it? That is what we want to do in the empirical work in Part Two.

## **Chapter Five     Methodology**

### **Introduction**

In Part one of this study, we looked at the philosophical and political differences between the Western and Chinese models of development and international aid. Now, we move to look at how these differences are perceived in practice. Part two will contain all of the empirical work done in the field. Before this analysis, this chapter will clearly address the research questions (especially the questions for empirical work) and the process (from the planning to the conducting) of the fieldwork and documentary work.

This chapter is divided into three parts. It is firstly important to let readers know the characteristics of this qualitative study; as well as its aims, that is the questions and the design of the study. The second part concerns data collection and analysis, including the necessities of certain methods which have been chosen, and how they relate to this study, as well as the necessities of the fieldwork locations and the ethnographic process during the fieldwork. Following this, a critical understanding of the methodology will finally come, wherein a discussion of the generalisation, reliability and validity, ethics and other potential problems of the empirical work will become clear.

This research is qualitative, based on an in-depth critical understanding of both the orthodox and new conception of development and international aid. To seek the difference between the traditional Western donors and the rising-up China in Africa, particularly in the educational field, this study features fieldwork in Tanzania and China; fieldwork mainly features semi-structured interviews aiming to hear both donors' and recipients' voices on how aid is practised on the ground. Some documentary analysis follows the interview work through Critical Discourse Analysis, done specifically on the documents obtained on ground. Based on all of the data, the study seeks to find out different donor logic, and how China (as an emerging power in the new century) is practising its cooperative educational aid to Africa.



## **1. Structure the empirical research**

As mentioned, the research is basically wondering: is educational aid in the global era a part of the general strategy to influence developing countries? Is Chinese educational aid a threat or a promise for Africa? What are the differences between the Chinese and traditional Western models? How is the word ‘aid’ being understood? These questions fit into the following five main questions:

- a. Is there a different model from the traditional Western model? (argued ‘yes’ in Part one)
- b. If yes, then is there a different logic between them in how they approach and deliver educational aid?
- c. How is it perceived by the recipients, and can they recognise any difference between Chinese and Western models, and if so, what differences do they see?
- d. How is it presented by the donors (official people from Chinese government, as well as people working for aid practice)?
- e. What can we conclude about the different model of educational aid and its donor logic?

In this chapter, we move on to transfer these questions into concrete empirical realities, or questions which are accessible and practical for data collection and analysis. In terms of Wengraf (2001: 55)’s ‘Rose-Wengraf model of the research process’ aforementioned in chapter one, this study, after giving a theoretical description which is the first Wengraf’s step- ‘theory’ and the second step ‘theoretical propositions’ which in this study is our assumption of a different model and donor logic of aid (which has been generated from the Part one), we are going on to conduct the next three steps: ‘operationalization/instrumentation’ (which is based on questions in chapter one and will be talked more in details in this chapter), ‘fieldwork’ and ‘results’ (which are in the Part two of this thesis).

### **1.1 Research design**

#### **1.1.1 Empirical questions and the research framework**

The documentary work of the Western and Chinese context (Chapter 2 to 4 set out the theoretical basis of understanding the differences between the two models, including their main features and mechanisms, as well as the criticisms of them. In other words, we have answered some of the questions theoretically. Further work is needed, however, to examine these theoretical answers. Therefore, the above research questions need to be turned into empirically researchable questions, and need to be answered by implementing certain research methods. This is the task of a sound research design.

Thus, the next stage in this thesis consists of empirical studies designed to discover the perceptions of those involved in the educational aid practice, and the textual meanings of reports related to educational aid practice. The first stage of this was conducted through field work to collect information and opinions from the people involved in Africa (Tanzania) and China, mainly through semi-structured interview and documentary analysis. Throughout the research, we want to know if there is a perception of different models of aid and their features. That leads us to question (1) shown below- which has been partly addressed in the previous chapters by a review of the related literatures, and was again asked and examined during the field work and the discourse analysis. Basically, there are two ways for us to look at the difference between the models— first is to find out what differences people ‘perceive’ or ‘experience’ about them - question (2) and (3) - which were addressed by the field work in Tanzania and China, supplemented by what is ‘written’ in and about the models - question (4) – which is tackled through critical discourse analysis. The specific questions are as follows:

- (1) What are the main features of the donors (West and China) by comparing different components of ‘donor logic’?
- (2) How is it perceived by different groups such as people from Chinese embassy, different governmental ministries, and scholars?
- (3) How do recipients including individuals and institutions respond?
- (4) How can we see the motives and power relations through the languages used in donor’s discourse?




Specifically, this study locates the empirical work in some cases for analysis: one case for field work - Tanzania (which is the largest recipient country from China in Africa), and supplemented by a case for discourse analysis – the Zhejiang Normal University training reports (the training for African university presidents).

Through the analysis of interview and documentary data, the study looks at what official people, returning students, institutional principals, as well as scholars are saying about Chinese assistance and its difference from traditional aid; the study also looks at how the Chinese practice and its aims, principles and performance are represented in writing. The outcome of the research tries to construct a new series of insights (not completely but systematically and logically) about the contemporary international aid to education in Africa. The very distinct contribution to the theoretical work could be the characterising of, and the understanding about, the logic of the new roles- China-Africa cooperation.

We can see the research framework more clearly in the graph below:

Table 5.1 Research framework of the thesis





### 1.1.2 Why Tanzania: historical and practical reasons

One of the key points in this research is the design of field work (which will be discussed more in details later in this chapter). Here, first of all, the main area of field work was both Tanzania and China. It is understandable that China should be part of the researching place, as China is the main actor of this study as a different 'donor', and not much work has been done on China's practice in the educational field. On the other hand, why do we choose Tanzania as a case of the African side?

Tanzania is the first choice in this study, and there are both practical and theoretical reasons for this.

Firstly, Tanzania is China's largest aid recipient in Africa. Since 1964, China has provided various types of assistance to Tanzania. The Chinese government discusses the relationship as follows:

China and Tanzania signed the Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania on Cultural Cooperation in 1962 and 1992 respectively. Since the 1960s, China has begun to receive Tanzanian students.<sup>59</sup> At present, there are 80 Tanzanian students studying in China. Since 1964, China has begun sending medical teams to Tanzania. In 1967, the two countries signed the Agreement on Dispatching Chinese Medical Teams to Tanzania. There are 46 Chinese medical personnel working in Tanzania. (Ministry of foreign affairs of the PRC, 06/02/2009)

Not only through diplomatic experience beginning in the late 60s, but also through a regular systematic process, the educational practice between the two countries makes Tanzania a remarkable case of China's engagement in Africa. Furthermore, the case is especially representative of China's historical political link with Africa with the building of Tazara Railway.

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<sup>59</sup> There will be a separate discussion about the Cultural Agreement later in this chapter.

Educational cooperation is not a new thing for Tanzania and China. As mentioned above, the implementation of the Cultural Agreement programme has been signed every four years since 1992. It is stated by Chinese government that under the agreement:

...the Chinese side offers Government Full Scholarships to Tanzania each year. Meanwhile, the Chinese Government also offers unilateral scholarships to Tanzania as a follow-up of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Chinese government has set up a series of scholarship schemes to sponsor Tanzanian students and scholars to undertake studies and research in Chinese institutions of higher education, to further strengthen mutual understanding and friendship between the Chinese people and Tanzanian people, and to further develop cooperation and exchange in fields of education, science, culture, economy and trade between China and Tanzania (Embassy of the PRC in the United Republic of Tanzania, 12/08/2009a).

One year after my fieldwork, continuing activities in the educational field between the two countries increased the relevance of this fieldwork. In 2009, 'fifty-five Tanzanians have been awarded Chinese Government Scholarships for the academic year of 2009/2010, among them, nine for Doctoral studies, thirty-two for Master studies, ten for Undergraduate studies, and four as Scholars' (ibid). Also in 2009, in November Ambassador Liu Xinsheng met with Professor Mbwette, Vice Chancellor of the Open University of Tanzania. As the embassy noted, Ambassador Liu commended the Open University of Tanzania for its contributions to Tanzanian education. They both believed that the cooperation between China and Tanzania in all areas, including education would continue to be strengthened (Embassy of the PRC in the United Republic of Tanzania, 01/12/2009b).

There is an impressive historical project of Chinese assistance in Africa in Tanzania, the Tanzania-Zambia railway, the biggest Chinese aid project in Africa. It has a very important influence for the other cooperation between China and Africa. According to King (2007: 340):



In a first stage, from 1956, educational cooperation essentially meant some exchange of students and of staff between Africa and China. Somewhat later, in the era of support for the great TAZARA railway project in the late 1960s, aid policy for education could be said to have covered a large-scale attempt to transfer skills to thousands of workers and supervisors in Zambia and Tanzania. Despite the successful completion of the project, there were major concerns about the sustainability of the skilled training in this project.

Secondly there were practical reasons why Tanzania was my first choice for field work. The decision to go to Tanzania was confirmed when I was able to make contact with Dr. Hillary A. Dachi, the head of the Department of the Educational Planning and Administration of the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. He was a visiting scholar in Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol and was introduced to me by my supervisor. Hillary was in contact with me and told me he would give me support for my field work in Tanzania. Finally, with the help by Hillary I got the research permit from the Ministry of Education in Tanzania, and a reference letter to other educational institutions in Dar es Salaam. Therefore there were practical as well as theoretical reasons to choose Tanzania for field research.

Moreover, although specific interviewees were not decided before my travel, evidence of other educational researchers (for example, two researchers from my department in university: Angeline Barrett (2005) had done research on Tanzanian primary education of English and teacher's identity; Jeanette Kuder (2004) had been interrogating the formulation of primary education policy in Tanzania under the global governance approach of aid) also gave me a range of knowledge about the educational situation in Tanzania as well as how Tanzania has been an aid recipient for many years by Western donors.

## 1.2 A qualitative approach

The main aim of this study is to analyse the Chinese model of educational aid in comparison to the Western model. Thus the study requires a deep insight into the issues, the discourse, and the practice, to formulate a system of new knowledge on international aid to education, a cross-disciplinary understanding of the relationship between development and education, and critical and reflective thought on the roles within the aid framework.

There are some studies which use quantitative methods to examine aid effectiveness and aid flows, usually economic. The quantitative studies normally employ numerical indicators to ascertain the relative size of a particular phenomenon (Matveev, 2002: 59), and involves the counting and measuring of events and then performing statistical analysis in a body of numerical data (Smith, 1988). This is good for a large range test of performance, for example a survey by questionnaires. The assumption behind this positivist paradigm is that there is an objective truth existing in the world which can be measured and explained scientifically (Cassell and Symon, 1994). However, methods such as questionnaires are standardised so critics argue it is not possible to explain any points in the questions that participants might misinterpret, and respondents may answer questions superficially, especially if the questionnaire takes a long time to complete. Moreover, a quantitative study may obtain answers to more questions and more generalisation, but it will be difficult to get sufficiently detailed knowledge and the results will lack depth and variability. In other words, the quantitative approaches may be good for a broad overview, but not for the kind of enquiry which requires more flexible, interactive and in-depth content.

The most important reason for choosing and defining the empirical parts of this study is still related to what we want and how much we can do practically for the study. What we need in this study finally is not some fixed answers, but stimulating more in-depth understandings. We cannot use a generalised approach to do it, not only because of the focus, but also because of the difficulty for a single researcher to cover a continental area. And it is also difficult to put something like mechanisms, motives, and logics into statistical methods.



Therefore a suitable choice may be talking about key points and cases in depth. In terms of the case, given the pragmatic needs for field work such as the need for safe living and to contact people, ultimately a single country case study of Tanzania has been chosen. This individual country case is not intended to represent all the African countries' situation (generalising), but for showing the aid practice in this area and stimulating more understanding by the field visits and interviews.

This study chooses a single country rather than a single project or programme, or any organisation between China and Africa, because the main relation in educational practice between China and African countries is bilateral relations. This is under the general framework of China's foreign policy, which means everything about educational cooperation between China and an African country is firstly a diplomatic issue, and secondly a cultural or educational issue. China is not doing too much on educational practice by any single national or private organisation, but mainly through the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Education. As King (2007) mentioned, although we always look at China and Africa as two terms, actually China is engaged in bilateral practice with each African country. Therefore we try to choose a country with both practical and historical reasons for field work, to look at how China's action happened and how it is perceived on the ground.

Above all, the research finally was decided to be better done with a qualitative approach. Generally, qualitative research can be characterised as the attempt to obtain an in-depth understanding of the meanings and 'definitions of the situation' presented by informants, rather than the production of a quantitative 'measurement' of their characteristics or behaviour (Wainwright, 1997). We can see some characteristics of qualitative researches as highlighted by Mason (2002: 3). Qualitative research is always:

- Grounded in a philosophical position which is broadly 'interpretivist' in the sense that it is concerned with how the social world is interpreted, understood, experienced, produced or constituted;
- Based on methods of data generation which are both flexible and

sensitive to the social context in which data are produced; (rather than rigidly standardized)

- Aims to produce rounded and contextual understandings on the basis of rich, nuanced and detailed data.

Therefore, qualitative research is always considered as a site of multiple methodologies and practices, and it does not belong to a single discipline (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 3). It is many things at the same time, within an inter-disciplinary, trans-disciplinary, and sometimes counter-disciplinary field (Nelson and Treichler, 1992: 4).

Within this qualitative work, the research resources come mainly from people's viewpoints and official documents. The viewpoints in the field work examine the facts in an empirical manner. The interview questions cover topics about the governmental officials (both from China and Tanzania), the Tanzanian students' experiences and feelings during the aid process, and the government approaches, motives and expected aims in the educational field. The policy discourse used in Part one offer a general understanding and a wider coverage of the knowledge, and the documents processed particularly by the critical documents analysis in Part two can be seen as the basis of the fieldwork data. We will talk about these more in detail in following section.

## **2. Data collection and analysis**

### **2.1 Qualitative interview data**

As explained above, the research needs different people's voices; thus the method of a qualitative interview has been chosen. However in addition to the face-to-face interview, questionnaires are also a method for questioning people in research. The chief advantage of questionnaires is that they are cheap and group-administered (Wilson and Sapsford, 2006: 102). However, quantitative methods are not used in my research. It is firstly because questionnaires are often used where large numbers of informants are involved (Cuber and Gerberich, 1946)



and it is very difficult to identify large groups in this research project; Secondly, questionnaires often give highly structured and broad questions to the objects (Wilson and Sapsford, 2006: 102), but the information this research wants from the informants is quite specific; therefore I need the ability to follow up on answers which cannot be done in questionnaires.

Therefore the qualitative interview, which features a conversational, flexible and fluid style, is more suitable for this research. This purpose is realised through active engagement by both interviewer and interviewee around relevant issues, topics and experiences during the interview. It has roots in the theoretical and epistemological traditions which assume or emphasise the centrality of talk and text in our ways of knowing about the social world (Mason, 2002: 225). As for the open extent of the interview, this research chooses semi-structured interviews. As Wilson and Sapsford (2006: 112) explain, 'the attempt to study the attitudes, beliefs and perceptions of the respondents, using artificial, highly structured procedures, is held to entail an unacceptably high degree of reactivity, no matter how well it is done'.

According to Wengraf (2001: 205), the most outstanding distinction of interviews was that they involve human experience in their totality. Unlike quantitative research, qualitative interviews are not dispassionate, disembodied, or removed from the context, nor is the content rated or substituted with score(s). Experiential subjectivity and emotion are the hallmarks of qualitative inquiry, and it is because of this that the researcher's assessment of risk evolves. Indeed, one of the main aims in this study is to listen to different people's voice/experience and obtain a changing idea/implications while the interview is going on. How these people describe 'China's educational aid to Africa' (not only Chinese themselves, but also African people), are valuable for this study to examine the theoretical and documentary background we have in outlined in Chapters two through four.

For Wilson and Sapsford (2006: 95), the three dimensions of data collection by interviews are procedural, structural, and contextual factors. The first two factors are related to the organisation of the interview questions. A strict procedure is always used in 'the positivist methods of investigation which seek to reproduce

the controls over variables that the exact or natural sciences hold to be their particular strength'. But less structured methods of data collection are not asking questions 'in an invariant order and the phasing of each question can be varied according to what has gone before'. In this research, we need to make the conversation focused on some key points, but can be very flexible when conversation happens, thus a semi-structured interview is chosen here because it offers interviewees the freedom to talk about 'what is of central significance on the topic and express their opinions freely' (Bell, 1993: 94). On the other hand, it provides interviewers both with the opportunity to 'explore in-depth information' (Seliger and Shohamy, 1989: 166) and a degree of power and control to ensure what should come out of the interview (Nunan, 1992: 149).

Following the first two factors, the contextual factor in this research is important, as Wilson and Sapsford (2006: 96) note 'the context of interviewing affects response rates greatly', and 'the effect of context on response is sometimes a critical one' (ibid: 95). The critical characteristic of the research requires me to consider the effect of power relationships, the national context, the political and cultural influence on the respondents, and the interaction process between the respondents and the interviewer. As a Chinese student, I try to not give bias on the questions I ask, and encourage the interviewees to answer the question as openly as possible.

### **2.1.1 The fieldwork plan: who are interviewed and why**

It is important to emphasise the qualitative interview as a key informant interview which is seen as a standard anthropological method widely used in inquiry within social science. The term 'key informant' refers to anyone who can provide detailed information and opinion based on his or her knowledge of a particular issue. Key informant interviews seek qualitative information that can be narrated and cross checked with quantitative data, a method which is 'triangulation' (Woods, L. N., 2006). It is important that the informant be someone who has personal knowledge or experience with a particular problem, or has professional training in that area. It also should be sure to have a mix of people -- different ages, ethnicity, religious affiliation, educational level, etc. The informant must



also be able to express themselves clearly.

The key empirical work in this study is the field work in Tanzania and China, and the important procedure behind this work was to find the right people and talk to them properly to obtain answers relevant to the research topic. The research questions cover a large range of knowledge, from the official opinion towards international aid to the personal experience from local students. Therefore the informants should also include a number of people who are fit for the research questions, and from different backgrounds. It is not like in a quantitative study in which a large number of participants are selected, as the plan is to talk to each informant in a personalized way.

As Hammersley and Atkinson (1983: 20) note, field research can provide a broader version of theory than simply a relationship between variables: ‘a theory must include reference to mechanisms or processes by which the relationship among the variables identified is generated’. This point relates to Mills’(1953) early critique of the atheoretical nature of much quantitative research, or what he referred to as ‘abstracted empiricism’(Silverman, 1993: 27). To get the opinions on the front line of educational aid practice, field work is necessary.

The whole fieldwork of this study includes two periods of work: 28 July to 8 September 2008 in Tanzania, and 8 October to 31 November 2008 in China. Finally through the interview process, mainly face to face and very few by phone, I obtained data from different groups of people related with this research topic.

As we know, the research needs to grasp how people understand and experience ‘educational aid’ in Tanzania. What this study want to obtain in Tanzania is different people’s voices, from a donor’s as well as a recipient’s perspective. These people’s voices can also be divided into people working within the aid practice, and people who have received some forms of educational aid. Informants from only one side cannot provide a comprehensive view. The people working within aid practice include Tanzanian officials and Chinese officials, especially those from the embassy in Tanzania. The people who have received aid include individual students (now back in Tanzania, and especially those in DIT) and

institutions. Through this division, we can get information from both donors and recipients.

To see where the informants are from, we can summarise through having a glance to the table below:

Table 5.2 Key informants in groups of the fieldwork

	<i>China (donor side)</i>	<i>Tanzania (recipient side)</i>
<i>Governments</i>	Chinese Embassy in Tanzania; Chinese Ministry of Education	Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance
<i>Institutions</i>	TJNU, ZJNU, TUTE, BNU <sup>60</sup>	Benjamin Mkapa High School, Higher institutions (DIT, DUCE)
<i>Individuals</i>	Educational staff, Scholars	Graduated students now--- As teachers (DIT); with other jobs

Group division and rational----

\*Governmental institutions and departments (Chinese Embassy in Tanzania; Department of Aid Coordination of Tanzanian Ministry of Education; Department of Higher Education of Tanzanian Ministry of Education; Tanzanian Ministry of Finance)

*Reason:* Educational practice between the two countries is under an international relations framework, which means it is political rather than cultural or economic. Therefore, officials from both governments are important for the research. Although many official documents are accessible through the web, official people can offer the latest information, and more importantly, through face to face interview we can get their opinion on those policies. On one hand, their opinions can be representative of government’s trends or interests, and the other hand, their

<sup>60</sup> The full name of these abbreviations are introduced below - ‘group division and rational’.



personal opinions are also typical, as they are directly involved in, or very close to, the aid practice.

\*Institutional recipients of China (Mkapa High School; Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology; Dar es Salaam University College of Education)

\*Individual recipients (Returning Tanzanian students)

*Reason:* Recipients' viewpoints towards to the aid practice- whether they feel like it, how they get it, and what kind of experience they have with it - are key to this research. As we have already obtained comments on China-Africa relations on paper, especially from Western scholars, the opinion on the ground can help test those theoretical arguments and hypotheses.

Mkapa High School has been one of the typical cases of China-Tanzania friendship in the educational field. It appeared on a lot on Chinese news media to show the cultural exchange between China and Tanzania.<sup>61</sup> So it is meaningful to do a 'site-visit' the school and its 'cultural centre' built by China.

Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT) is the only case in Tanzania which has its own agreement with the Chinese embassy for student scholarships, which is the main method of Chinese educational cooperation with Africa (it means that quite a few lecturers in DIT are returning students from China). Dar es Salaam University College of Education (DUCE) is planning to establish a Confucius Institute with the Chinese government in Dar es Salaam. Both of these higher institutes offer very important information regarding Chinese activities in Tanzania in the human resource field.

\*Chinese higher institutions (Zhejiang Normal University, Tianjin Normal University, Tianjin University of Technology and Education)

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<sup>61</sup> For example, Chinaculture website (see [http://www.chinaculture.org/gb/cn\\_world/2005-02/28/content\\_66474.htm](http://www.chinaculture.org/gb/cn_world/2005-02/28/content_66474.htm)) showed the donation of pianos and computers to Mkapa high school; and website of FOCAC (2005) (see <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/chn/zfyhj/t197867.htm>) reported the establishment of a 'Chinese culture centre' in Mkapa, the first Chinese culture base for high school students in Tanzania.

*Reason:* They are three of the main education and training bases for African students in China. The Ministry of Education in China authorizes these universities to perform the educational activities with African countries, such as offering student scholarships and short term training, as well as some research project cooperation. So beside the opinion from officials, the points from the university chancellors and people who are accountable for these activities represent the information on the front line.

#### **\*Chinese scholars**

*Reason:* Standing on a different position, and with more understanding of Chinese philosophy and traditional theories, what Chinese scholars understand about China-Africa relation is different from Western academics. The lecturers of universities' Africa research centres are particularly important to offer comments on this topic.

Within these diverse types of informants, each one gives to this study a 'story' about their jobs/practice, experience and viewpoints (this will be elaborated in the following part about field work stories). Each person's opinion is also important and should be asked for as specifically and deep as possible. Finally through these 'personalized' approaches to my informants, their answers are generated into a synthetic analysis to pursue the main aims of this research.

### **2.1.2 Pilot interview**

Wengraf (2001: 187) mentions 'pilot the design', which means a researcher should pilot their 'design purpose' and the 'fitness of your design for those purposes' on somebody, or a couple of somebodies, before you 'go for real' on the 1, the 10, or the 100 people you have as your sample.

The field work in Tanzania is challenging. As a student researcher who has never been to Africa with an educational topic related with the study on international relations and policy discourse, I decided to get some advice before the field work started. About five months before going to Tanzania, there were small range pilot



telephone interviews conducted in China. The aim was to get some advice for this study, such as the value of it, and gather some useful opinions and information from scholars and officials in order to be more pertinent to the research questions.

The interview objectives include the informants as follows:

deputy minister of education (Yuan)

head of department of society and politics, ministry of education (Gu)

president of Anhui University (Lu)

head of institution of higher education, Anhui University (Chen)

deputy dean of education department, Beijing Normal University (Li)

The most important reason to select these people for advice is the diverse position they have in the educational field in China, and the pragmatic reason was to find somebody I could have access to in China. The deputy minister could give me an overview of the governmental interest in this field; the scholars in different universities could give some suggestion from different perspectives, for example as the Chinese approaches focus more on higher education, the suggestion from a scholar in this field is useful. They were firstly informed through a brief introduction of the research, followed with some questions about their opinions on the China-Africa issue, and lastly, their opinions on the research about educational 'aid' by China especially in Tanzania.

There are some points I received from these short interviews. Firstly, the research about China and Africa cooperation in the educational field generated interest. Both officials and scholars showed interest in this topic personally or officially. As they said to me, it would be worth going there, and this would be at the forefront of this kind of research, especially the empirical study. 'It is very new to study educational aid when you consider China as a donor'; 'It is a hot topic, and your field work will be very meaningful'... Secondly, I obtained some brief information about the main mechanism of the ministries and sectors in regards to this issue. As they suggested, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce are both working for the aid practice to Africa. Thirdly, I got the idea that Tanzania would be a good choice as a place to study, as the country had a long history with the Chinese government and many Chinese were working there

in the past and at present, for either business or aid. Although I didn't get direct information about Chinese officials in Tanzania, the information I got from China showed that my field work plan seemed to be possible.

### **2.1.3 How to access and how to talk**

#### **2.1.3.1 Flexibility and the accesses**

After the plan of informant categories and the related reason, it is also important to think about the access to these people. In other words, it is still a question that, if it can be conducted as planned? Will it be altered because of the difficulties of access and easier ways to other informants who are not in plan? Firstly it is to be noticed that, one of the main characteristics of field research is its flexibility which is giving more difficulties to the research, but also brings more interesting and exciting points. The flexibility of field research 'allows theory development to be pursued in a highly effective and economical manner' (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 24). Such studies do not 'regard theorising as restricted to social scientists' (ibid: 20). Unlike other research which usually shares a common model, field research depends on a variety of theoretical positions with very different implications (Silverman, 1993: 28). The arrangement of the interview has many unstable factors actually. It is hard to anticipate whether the next interviewee who probably has a high position in the government and is busy with his job, cannot attend the interview on time, and it is also hard to anticipate what their open answer will focus on. So the result of the research has been open to me, depending on whether I can get the access to the informants, and whether the informants like to answer my questions.

Therefore, although the informants groups have been planned before fieldwork, the thing that you decide to choose someone is not equal to that you can get the access to them. So it is crucial of getting access to the expected place and talk to people there. There are people from different offices in Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance as well as some higher institutes in Tanzania, and people from government and universities in China. It is always depending on the specific



situation of field work, and requires you make changes on your interview schedule and content flexibly. A list of the interviewees I finally accessed and the key contents of the each interview are attached in Appendix 1. The next two sections about detailed ‘fieldwork stories’ in Tanzania and China will tell more about each access and the interview process of the informants.

#### 2.1.3.2 ‘Tailored’ questions with diverse talking forms

After a successful access, the most important issue is how to talk effectively with them. The questions should be ‘tailored’. Within the interview, it is necessary to give different groups of participant different questions, in order to capture diverse individual’s point of view. For example: the officials in the office of aid coordination were asked that if the urgent need of education in Tanzania can be helped by external donors, and officials in higher education department were asked about the Chinese governmental scholarship for Tanzanian university students. Also because of this ‘tailored questions’, it is getting difficult to manage large numbers of participants. Sometimes it is necessary to talk with one person more than once to get in-depth idea.

Therefore, question groups can be divided into questions for Tanzanian institutions, Chinese universities, Chinese officials, Tanzanian officials, returning Tanzanian students. The main areas includes (see detailed questions in Appendix 2):

- (a) The information they know about what their office/department/institute is doing related with the educational cooperation between China and Tanzania, especially the latest progress and changes;
- (b) The advantages and disadvantages of the activities they are working for;
- (c) The personal experience involved in the educational cooperation between two countries;
- (d) The motives/purpose of the donors and the recipients according to their own knowledge and experience, and the difference between Chinese and Western aid;
- (e) Suggestion or demands for this cooperation, or comments on this research;

- (f) Data and other resource including documents and contacts they can possibly offer to help my research.

Every interview was conducted by these steps: (a) when I started to set up the interview, I introduced myself and briefly my research, to be sure the informant understands the purpose of the study, and what I intend to do with their talk. (b) asked them if I could use the recorder. (c) asked questions from general questions about their position, to the specific questions related with their roles within the aid practice, especially their personal opinions. By the same time I kept track of what they told. (d) thanked them for giving time and information, and asked for contact information for further questions by email or telephone.

These steps of asking and answering include different styles of talking. The interviews happened in the governmental office, in the restaurant, in the university meeting room, in the embassy meeting room (very formal), in the school/college, and so on. It is also happened on the way of a journey, during a lunch time, or even accidentally. The numbers of people involved into one interview also different. This partly depends on the questions and partly depends on how many people you can meet at one time. For example, two returning students were interviewed in a restaurant by me, because they had similarities on their ages and experience, and they knew each other.

To make the conversation between the interviewees more actively and get more reflection and reaction, a focus-group approach can be used when the several interviewees can be invited at the same time, as it is an opinion-developing-process, during which the individual 'listen, reflect on what is said, and in the light of this consider their own standpoint further', and then the whole discussion 'moves to a deeper and more considered level' (Finch and Lewis, 2003: 171). This helps the interviewees have more 'spontaneity' and also helps the researcher make the atmosphere more relaxed and get more critical opinions. Normally, when we use this method, the data 'are generated by interaction between group participants' (ibid). During the study in Tanzania, with the help of the principal and his assistant, I organised a group meeting at Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT). 4 DIT lecturers attended the meeting, which could



be seen as a practice of ‘focus group’.<sup>62</sup> This helped develop some integrated opinions and ideas, and also made the atmosphere more relaxed than one-to-one talk.

The group interview has been criticised sometimes for the disadvantage of being less under-control (Babbie, 2008: 339). The interaction among the informants may help get to deeper opinions, but it also can lead to some similarities, so that some individuals cannot tell their true thinking. Therefore the interview style I chose is mainly one-to-one interview, though depends on situation, small group talking including 2-4 people can also be conducted. In addition to the meeting in DIT which was more formally like a focus group, a meeting in the Chinese embassy, a meeting in the aid coordination office of Tanzanian MoE, a meeting with returning students as aforementioned, were all conducted with 2 interviewees.

#### **2.1.4 What happened on the ground: the fieldwork ‘stories’**

We have now explained the informants chosen for this study, how to meet them, what to ask, as well as in what forms. The next task is to talk directly about what has happened on the ground. The field work included the work in Tanzania and China. The work in Tanzania was quite challenging for me, however the performance in Tanzania was better than expected.

##### **2.1.4.1 Stories in Tanzania**

Totally, the field work in Tanzania had three routes: the Chinese embassy, Tanzanian governmental departments, and non-governmental people in Tanzania.

The work started from the interview in the Chinese embassy in Tanzania. Followed by that, after getting research clearance and following the recommendation by the Chinese embassy, I got accesses to people in the Tanzanian Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance. Then, as recommended by a former interviewee, I went to the Dar es Salaam Institute of

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<sup>62</sup> Details of the focus group in DIT are in the following part of data analysis.

Technology (DIT) for further information of their specific cooperation with the Chinese government, and Dar es Salaam University College of Education (DUCE). During my spare time I visited the Mkapa High School, which received donation from the Chinese embassy, following a reference letter from Dr. Dachi.

#### \*Chinese embassy

The Chinese embassy played a key role in my data collection, as the people there not only accepted my interview request, but also gave me a lot of suggestions and recommendations. The interviews in the Chinese Embassy in Tanzania included two parts, one with the Secretary of Cultural Counsellor, and the other one with the Chinese ambassador in Tanzania.

The first person I met in the Chinese embassy in Tanzania was the Cultural Counsellor, Sun. The location of the embassy, in the city of Dar es Salaam, was not difficult to be found, and the people there were friendly with me. I got the chance to have an appointment with the Cultural Counsellor and his secretary on Tuesday, 5 August 2008. He and his secretary, Chen, received me for my interview. Two weeks after that, the ambassador of the Chinese government in Tanzania, Liu, asked Chen to arrange a formal meeting with me in the embassy, on Monday 18 August.

The two meetings were done separately during my stay in Dar es Salaam. The first interview was focusing mainly on the details of educational cooperation between the two countries and the contemporary situation, such as the practice procedure and the persons involved. The second interview was more like an official meeting with the other two participants, Culture Counsellor Sun, and his secretary Chen, attending. The interview was more focusing on the ambassador's own introduction and personal opinion about the two countries' relationship in the global world. Both of the interviews were well done with the participants, friendly and easily, with not too much official language but rather more personal understanding and interpretation. It was quite meaningful to talk with the ambassador for over one hour, who had critical personal viewpoints.

Through talking with people in the embassy, I got some suggestions and



information for Tanzanian officials in the Ministry of Education. Some of the information was very similar, or even the same as, the information given from Tanzanian ministries later, which could be a kind of double check of 'what was happening in fact'. The embassy also introduced me to some Chinese individuals who are working or staying in Tanzania, for example some people working in Chinese companies in Tanzania. Knowing these people was a great help for me to find interviews, as well as my staying alone in Dar es Salaam.

During the stay in Dar es Salaam, I visited the embassy several times; the Cultural Counsellor and his wife were always very friendly and helpful for me. Those things actually changed my image towards to the official department. I thought it could take me a long time to get access to those people, but in fact it was not that difficult.

#### \*Tanzanian ministries and institutions

We can say all of the access of Tanzanian officials mainly started from the research clearance, which can be applied for according to the guidelines found on the website of the Tanzanian Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH).<sup>63</sup> With this permission, I had the authority to do interviews within the Tanzanian government offices. This is a permission which all foreign researchers need to apply for if they want to do research in the country. In order to save time in the field work and arrange activities efficiently, the application documents were mailed to the University of Dar es Salaam before I went to Tanzania, and after I arrived, the University proved that I was a doctoral research student from abroad and stayed temporarily in the university, and then sent my application to the Ministry of Education. It took me around ten days to wait for the result of the application, which was a bit time consuming. However, after negotiated with the staff about my timeframe in the research office of the ministry, I finally got the research permit from the research office which authorized me to get my interview data from the office of higher education. After I got the access to the ministries for academic research, the officials were all happy to cooperate with

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<sup>63</sup> Three research clearance letters by Tanzanian Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (introducing me to two key departments in Ministry of Education and to Ministry of Finance), and a letter by University of Dar es Salaam (introducing me to DUCE) are attached in Appendix 4.

my questions. The interviews were from the Department of higher education and the Department of aid coordination in the Ministry of Education, and the Department of aid administration in the Ministry of Finance. For some other institute or university offices, I also asked for reference letters from the University of Dar es Salaam, with the help from Hillary, as my status there was that of visiting research student of the University of Dar es Salaam.

With the introduction of my research, I met the head of the department of higher education and received his reference to more departments which were responsible for more detail work related to my research. Then, I got the chance to meet the officer Kim and her colleagues, who work in the office dealing with student scholarships; the meeting was on 19 August. Kim, the principal education officer of the higher education department, was a very nice lady who knew and worked with many Chinese student scholarships, was a very important informant for my research because we talked at least three times. She advised me not only as to offices, but also individuals, for interview. For example, officer John and the three Tanzanian girls all met with me through Kim.

On the day I had my first meeting with Kim, I was introduced to her colleague John, who had a rich experience in China as a Tanzanian student leader. I also had a nice talk with John about his study in China. Since John was an older returning student, I met with another three young ladies who just graduated from China universities in Kim's office, as they were representatives for a new Tanzanian generation. Two of them, Kath and Race, then had lunch with me, and we did an interview on 4 September, discussing their opinions towards Chinese education for African students in the new era.

Since successfully interviewing Kim, from her I then got information regarding the cooperation between DIT and the Chinese embassy. In terms of the institutional recipients, the Tanzanian DIT plays an important role between the two countries. The reason we choose DIT was originally because the institute is mentioned several times by both Chinese and Tanzanian officials, as well as in policy and media documents. From another route- the Chinese embassy- I also got the same information. The double proof of the value of the DIT case helped me



decide to visit the institution as soon as possible. Just after meeting Kim, with a guide by the head of the higher education department of the ministry, I then found the way to DIT and made an appointment with the vice principal, Dr. Seka. In the afternoon of 25 August, I did an interview with him in his office. After the interview, he introduced me to some of his staff, and I made a second appointment with him and a group discussion with his staff. On 28 August, with the help of the principal's assistant Kakana, I organised the group meeting with four lecturers in DIT in their meeting room. All the staff studied in China with scholarships, and each of them talked of their opinions and experience. Just as in smaller scale focus groups, we developed some opinions and discussed together, critically and happily, which was valuable. Thus the DIT offered us both institutional and individual perspective of recipients.

Both the head of the higher education department and Kim suggested me to ask for information from DUCE as well. I did an interview with DUCE's two principals soon after I found the location of this college, on 26 August with the vice principal and 5 September with the principal.

The head of the department of higher education also suggested I meet with the office for aid coordination. This was another important route for my interview. The head of the office, Maggie, and her colleague Sehe met me on 25 August, and we had a very good talk for two hours in her office; discussing everything from the current urgent needs of Tanzanian education, to their desire for cooperation with different donors and their opinions on aid's advantage and disadvantage. She advised me to go to the Ministry of Finance for more information of JAST, since both of us thought this document could be important for the general aid situation in Tanzania. As she said, JAST is their Bible. The access to the Ministry of Finance is not difficult. With the research permit and the note by Maggie, I met a lady who is responsible for the management of aid resource in MoF. She arranged an interview for me with her colleague, Nancy. From Nancy, I received quite helpful documents about JAST and aid flow in Tanzania, as well as the opportunity to talk about their job and opinions.

\*Other informants

The above is one way of field work data collection, which is similar to snowball rolling (snowball sampling), or getting one informant from one already known to me. This is the main method of collection for the maximum range of interviewees. In addition to that, I was also trying to get interviewees in different institutes through different routes. For example, getting interview information from the documents I already have, or getting to know people working in Chinese companies through the Chinese living or working in Dar es Salaam, or getting to know returning Tanzanian students (from China) in the university I stayed at, or even getting to know some interviewees on my journey.

There is a high school which has close relationship with the Chinese embassy in Dar es Salaam, and it is also the biggest middle school in Tanzania. After I talked with Dr. Hillary in University of Dar es Salaam, he told me that he knew the principal of the school. He then drafted me an official reference letter for the principal, and gave me the address. The school, called Benjamin Mkapa Middle School, has a Chinese Cultural Centre and has received some donations from China in recent years. I had an interview with principal Mero and his secretary at his office on 8 August. They showed me the centre room with Chinese pictures and books, and told me about their situation for external aid.

During the stay in Dar es Salaam, I sometimes found the informants accidentally. During my stay in another city, Arusha, I met a manager in a transformer company called Tanelec. The manager, named Moti, did his undergraduate study in China during the 1970s. He was another older returning students' representative. He met me, very friendly, in his factory and participated in an interview on 29 August. It was very interesting that he still kept his Chinese textbooks on the shelf in his office from when he did his study in China.

There were some other individuals I heard or met in Tanzania. For example, I met a man called Robert on the trip to Zanzibar, and I found he could speak Chinese. He had been studying in China with a Chinese scholarship during the 1960s. As shipman working at the dock, he talked happily about his experience in China on the ship to Zanzibar.



The individual recipients varied in age. So this study tried to select graduates from different age groups. Those individuals have different jobs, from the low levels of the society such as a worker at the dock, to officers in government, and also some working in private or national companies. The age and job variance is very useful to get quite different opinions.

#### 2.1.4.2 Stories in China

The field work in China was conducted during October and November 2008, and focused more in higher education institutions rather than in official departments. The access to government was much more complex than getting a permit into governmental departments in Tanzania. Just as one of the interviewees in the Department of Education, Beijing Normal University, professor Zeng explained when I asked about the problems of access, 'it is a huge system which has a complexity of administration, so it is not easy to get access to the governmental people, and they normally not offering this service for students'. Since there is nothing like a research clearance in China, I made some phone calls to officials. But not much information was obtained in talking. The better thing is, however, that Chinese cooperation with Africa in the educational field is focusing on higher education, and it is much easier to get access to university staff. Therefore, administrators and lecturers were interviewed in two universities in Beijing, two universities in Tianjin, as well as one university in Zhejiang province. The universities which are doing a job for the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce gave me quite good ground information regarding their practice. The scholars in the universities for African studies also offered a number of viewpoints on related issues. They were much more likely to talk than governmental people, and liked to share personal opinions. It could be meaningful to hear their voice, as they are the people carrying out what the policy says about educational aid in Africa.

I visited Tianjing Normal University and Tianjin University of Technology and Education on 19 of October. Yan, the deputy director and vice dean of the office of international programmes in the college of international education and

exchange, Tianjing Normal University, interviewed with me in her office. After that I interviewed Wang, a lecturer in the international exchange office, centre for African vocational education studies, Tianjing University of Technology and Education. Both of the universities are located in the city of Tianjing, and both of the interviewees were friendly and talked with me about their duties and the practise of educational cooperation with African countries, especially the establishment of Confucius Institute.

Another important place is the Zhejiang Normal University in Jinhua city, Zhejiang province. There is a centre for African research in the university, called the Institute of African Studies, which does work such as African studies, short term trainings and workshops for African universities, as well as national or international conferences about China-Africa relations. The notable thing is the short term training held by ZJNU, where they collaborate with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce. So ZJNU could be seen as an important practice base for Chinese governmental cooperation with Africa in the field of higher education. I interviewed the dean, professor Liu, the vice dean, professor Jian, as well as lecturer Zhou and lecturer Chang, in their institute offices, on 22 and 23 November. They gave me very valuable documents about their institute and about a series of conferences they held, and also some literature about China-Africa educational cooperation. Especially recently, they still keep in contact with me, and sent me helpful literature about Chinese scholars' comments on China-Africa relations, all of which could be useful for my research.

There were three interviews I conducted in Beijing Normal University. One of them whom I mentioned before was Professor Zeng. She had collaboration work with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce. Another professor I talked with was Hong, in the Department of Educational Administration. Both of these professors gave me a general idea of the situation, and provided comments on Chinese educational aid. Professor Hong suggested me to go to ZJNU for more investigation, and also helped me contact official people in the Department of International Cooperation and Exchanges, in the Ministry of Education. The third person I interviewed was a staff member in the office of international communication and cooperation, named Wang. As a staff member mainly dealing



with the affairs of foreign students, Wang answered my questions very carefully and told me she would also like to write a paper about educational cooperation between China and Africa, focusing on her years of work experience dealing with international students, especially African.

A general feeling from the fieldwork in China was that university scholars were very friendly and talked to me more openly than officials in ministries. After knowing more about them, their studies and their work which related to Chinese educational assistant to Africa, I felt an increasing value of my research because more and more Chinese institutes and academics have gotten involved in this topic, and even involved with the cooperation with the government in order to promote the assistant practice more efficiently and scientifically.

#### 2.1.4.3 Critical ethnographic work

The ethnographer's concern to avoid imposing a theoretical framework of meanings and definitions perhaps originates from the anthropological study of low technology tribal cultures in the third world, where the intention was mainly to describe cross-cultural variations in social behaviour and beliefs before they disappeared. Methodologically this entailed detailed observation and interaction by the researcher, in order to see the world 'through the eyes' of the people being studied (Wainwright, 1997).

The interviews are conducted in a period of field work in my research, so it has some relation with ethnographical work. I define it as an ethnographic interview, which firstly implies a meaning that the research questions are developing on the ground. In fieldwork, sometimes the next moment of data-collection is informed by the information and patterns discovered from preceding sources, and 'the original problems are transformed or even completely abandoned in favor of others' (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 33).

Not only an ethnographic, but a critical ethnographic attitude, was useful to link the field work data to the theoretical background of my research. Although not a

systematical ethnographic work, I only stayed in Africa for around one and half months and another one month in China to gather the opinions from different people, this is not a long term investigation into the area. However, the critical ethnographic perspective stimulated the fieldwork. What ethnography can do is reveal discursive worlds and try to make links with the non-discursive world on the basis of theory, which is consequently elaborated and refined in engagement with the concrete empirical world (Burawoy, 1998).

In this research, the interviews in Africa and China are attempting to reveal people's perception, which will be part of the data, and this will motivate more critical thinking; this is combined with documentary data which seeks to extend the knowledge about the Chinese model. Moreover, it is not about thinking whether one is biased, but rather, whose interests are served by one's work (Simon and Dippo, 1986: 196). That means we do not want to find out who is intervening more, the West or China, but we want to find out some of the mechanisms, motives, or logics behind the discourse and practice. The study needs to be critical of itself during the fieldwork, knowing how much my role will influence the conversation.

### **2.1.5 Analysing the interview data**

The analysis of the interview data are conducted through transcription to coding, and then the interpretation. The coding process is significant before the final interpretation. It can be thought about in terms of data simplification or reduction, as well as conceptualized as data complication, which opens up more diverse analytical possibilities (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 28). In my research, the coding procedure will be conducted as a mixture of the data reduction and complication, and as Seidel and Kelle (1995: 58) mentioned, this has a heuristic function for the other parts of data understanding and interpretation.

Interpreting the interview data is a process by which we deal with the relation between interviewee's accounts and the world they describe (Silverman, 1993: 90). Silverman sets two different ways of viewing the interview data: by a positivist view, considering interview data giving access to 'facts' about the world,



generating data which is valid and reliable, independently of the research setting. Positivists are normally using a random selection of the interview sample, and using the administration of standardised questions with multiple-choice answers which can be readily tabulated. On the other hand is interactionism. Interviewees are viewed as experiencing subjects who actively construct their social worlds; the primary issue is to generate data which give an authentic insight into people's experiences; the main ways to achieve this are unstructured, open-ended interviews (ibid: 90-91). Interactionism seems fit for our study. Even the former one informs us that the standard information will be considered by the different informants, which means the same things/facts can be different when they are talked about by different people. It is important to know: when we talk with someone else about the world, we take into account who the other is, what that other person could be presumed to know, 'where' that other is in relation to ourselves and the world we talk about (Baker, 1982:109).

Wengraf (2001: 208) tells us that the analytic process of the interview data is a process of indexing-copying-transcribing. The system of 'indexing' can help the researcher find the original talk again, by labelling the tapes according to time, date, place and informant. Here, a list of the interviewees and brief contents are attached in the appendix. Another important preparation is a copy of the interview tape, even two copies, in order to keep safe of what we record. Wengraf (2001:209) suggests: do not think that, if you first transcribe your interview tape into written form and then you start to think about it. What we shall do is to transcribe directly what the informants said, and then review it, making notes and select the important information. It is a process from raw materials to processed data (ibid: 232).

## **2.2 Documentary data: a critical perspective**

### **2.2.1 Collection of documents: gaining 'grey literature' from fieldwork**

Compared with observation, interview, and narrative methods which are becoming more and more attractive today, documentary analysis is a basic qualitative

method which catches less attention, but offers the researchers insight into lots of information through ‘reading’. It is ‘the study of existing documents, either to understand their substantive content or to illuminate deeper meanings which may be revealed by their style and coverage’ (Ritchie, 2003: 35).

The documents can be text-based or non-text-based, including public documents like media reports or government papers, procedural documents like minutes of meetings or financial accounts, or personal documents like diaries (ibid: 35). The majority of these documents are text-based, including ‘written text’ as well as ‘electronic text’. The non-text-based documents have attracted the researchers’ attention in recent years, such as photography, video, film, and television, and these are regarded as ‘visual data’. In this research, the documentary data is mainly textual data, including ‘written text’ as well as ‘electronic text’. This textual data contains the policies from the government, ministries and international organisations, also the news from website or newspapers, and the papers and reports of the aid projects or programmes.

To collect the documentary data, selection, classification and evaluation are the key steps for it. Firstly, the documents can be sorted based on Scott’s two-dimension-classification. It divides the documents into four categories according to their ‘access’: closed, restricted, open-archival and open-published; and on another dimension, there are personal documents and official documents, both of which can be divided into the four categories mentioned. Moreover, official documents include private and state spheres (Scott, 1990: 13-18).

In my case, apart from the conversation we can obtain from the field work interviews, some documents also can be given by the interviewees. These papers may support the field interview by giving fuller picture about the context, or describing specific practice by donors.

As the topic is closely related to official policies, those documents are more flexible and more difficult to be accessed by normal articles in journals. Those documents also are called ‘grey’ literatures. The ‘grey’ literature refers to the documents which are produced on all levels of government, academics, business



and industry in print and electronic formats, but which is not controlled by commercial publishers (Burnard, 2004: 177). The U.S. Interagency Gray literature Working Group, 'Gray Information Functional Plan', defines gray literature (US English, the same as 'grey literature') as 'foreign or domestic open source material that usually is available through specialized channels and may not enter normal channels or systems of publication, distribution, bibliographic control, or acquisition by booksellers or subscription agents' (Interagency Gray Literature Working Group, 18/01/1995 cited in Soule and Ryan, 1999: 1). It includes the documents from governments, conference proceedings, and even lunch menus and handwritten notes (Siegel, 2004). Generally, grey literature lacks strict bibliographic control, meaning that basic information such as author, publication date or publishing body may not be easily discerned. Similarly, non-professional layouts and formats and low print runs of grey literature make the organised collection of such publications challenging compared to more traditionally published media, such as journals and books (Auger, 1989: 3).

Therefore in my study, there are a number of 'grey literatures' used from government or governmental institutions, and from conference and institutional reports. For example, I obtained documents about aid management and coordination from two Tanzanian officials (their personal reports and official reports), and also university reports on training for African university presidents from Chinese university administrators.

Moreover, in this research the flexibility of the documentary data analysis also means that the documents are not 'stable' materials. The documents may have already been there, or may be accessed by asking 'people or bodies you are researching to generate them for or with you' through the research process (Mason, 2002: 102), especially while doing field work. So we may find more data and change our knowledge about the existing material when we are developing analysis of the documents.

### **2.2.2 Analysis of documents: Critical discourse analysis**

The use of document analysis not only has a long story, but is also flexible and has

been used in historical researches. From Marx, to Durkheim, to the Chicago school sociology, documents were used to gain insight into social reality by employing statistical data or exploring the meaning of written work (Scott, 1990: 1). Documentary analysis can be a single method in research, and also can help the main method in the research as a supplement. In many social science research projects, a mix of research methods is applied. In that case, documentary analysis serves as a good assistant to the research process and to the final report.

The 'analysis' of documents can mean content analysis or discourse analysis. The difference can be seen as the 'subject' of the document itself or the idea behind the resources; or we can say, we are going to use documents 'as resource or as topics' (Scott, 1990: 36). With more complex roles emerging in the global network, the relations and interactions within the texts become more attractive than the texts themselves. The trend was led by scholars such as Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, and Teun van Dijk (Blommaert, 2005: 21), with a critical perspective for discourse analysis, or Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). According to Fairclough (1992: 12), the approaches of discourse analysis can be divided into two groups according to the nature of their social orientation to discourse, distinguishing 'non-critical' and 'critical' approaches.<sup>64</sup> Critical approaches differ from non-critical approaches not just in describing discursive practice, but also in 'showing how discourse is shaped by relations of power and ideologies, and the constructive effects discourse has upon social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief, neither of which is normally apparent to discourse participants'. Also addressed by Van Dijk (2001: 354), 'a central notion in most critical work on discourse is that of power, and more specifically the social power of groups or institutions.' Therefore CDA is considered as an interdisciplinary approach to the study of discourse, which 'views language as a form of social practice and focuses on the ways social and political domination is reproduced by text and talk' (Fairclough, 1995).


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<sup>64</sup> As Fairclough (1992: 12) designated, the 'non-critical' approach to be the framework for describing classroom discourse in Sinclair and Coulthard (1975); ethnomethodological work in 'Conversation analysis'; the model for therapeutic discourse in Labov and Fanshel (1977); and the approach developed by social psychologists Potter and Wetherell (1987). The critical approaches Fairclough has included are: the 'critical linguistics' of Fowler et al. (1979), and the French approach to discourse analysis developed on the basis of Althusser's theory of ideology by Pecheux (1982).



In terms of the method of CDA, Fairclough (1995: 98) illustrated this very well in his diagrammatic representation as follows:

Table 5.3 CDA diagrammatic representation



Source: Fairclough (1995: 98)

He explains the above graph for CDA in three points (ibid: 97-98):

- (1) Texts with heterogeneous and contradictory features;
- (2) A complex relationship between discourse practice (text production) and discourse conventions; one could show a similarly complex relationship between text interpretation and conventions, but I shall not do so here;
- (3) A relationship between such heterogeneous textual features and such complexity of discourse processes, and processes of sociocultural changes.

Thus, to do CDA, we need firstly look at the text, including the vocabulary, grammar, cohesion, and text structure (Fairclough, 1992: 75-78); and then think about the discursive practice of the discourse, including the processes of text production, distribution, and consumption, and notice that the nature of these processes varies between different types of discourse according to social factors. Then, finally, we go to a more abstract level to explore how social structures determine properties of discourse, and how discourse in turn determines social structures. During this process, we always need to pay attention to the

‘background knowledge’, ‘speaker-goal’ or ‘the neglect power’ (ibid: 27). To be highlighted, regarding the step of analysing discursive practice, Fairclough quotes Goffman (1981: 144) who suggests a distinction between ‘animator’, the person who actually makes the sounds, or the maker on paper, ‘author’, the one who puts the words together and is responsible for the wording, and ‘principal’, the one whose position is represented by the words.

Using CDA for the analysis of both published and unpublished texts in this research can stimulate more understanding of the language used by specific institutions and their power relationships. It is a method suitable for this research, as there are many organisational and governmental reports to be analysed, and not only their contents, but also the language they used. This is especially true with the policy documents, since they ‘do not have a single authoritative meaning’ (Codd, 1988: 244). Thus, CDA appears most useful for policy text (including newspaper articles) analysis, as it emphasises the relationship between discourses, ideology and power.

Despite some mixed analysis of interview data and documents data in Part two of this study, there is a case study conducted through CDA. It is about the short term trainings by China. The analysis documents are the training reports from 2004-2006 by Zhejiang Normal University (ZJNU), based on their training courses/workshops for African university leaders. Different from the listing of some policy items and reports content in Part one, the CDA in the next chapters focuses particularly on the language/texts reports are using, and the potential voice or power relations within and behind them. The analysis of the training reports aims for details on the specific practice by China; what China claims; the responsibilities of different roles involved, and their motives. These analyses are integrated into the whole framework of Part Two in order to make the main aim more clear, rather than let CDA be a separated part.

Finally, there is an additional question for this research: can we use CDA for Chinese texts and Chinese language? With increasing literature talking about CDA in China, and since some Chinese studies have been done by using Fairclough’s theories, it is possible and suitable to use CDA approaches to explore Chinese



documents. There are many interests addressing media discourse in China using CDA, for example Ji (2001: 153) mentioned a comparison between some news agencies in Hong Kong and Mainland China on a report of Clinton's statements. However Chinese literature is still focusing on the introduction of CDA, rather than empirically using CDA. Therefore it remains a challenge for me to analyse Chinese texts, and even compare them with English policies. As the ZJNU's training reports are in Chinese, therefore the words and sentences shown in this thesis are translated into English, but the analysis will be based on the original Chinese words when written styles and genres needed to be considered.

### **3. Critical review**

#### **3.1 Validity and reliability**

Reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions (Hammersley, 1992: 67). Validity refers to the truth interpreted, as the extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers (Hammersley, 1990: 57).

Reliability can mean 'sustainable' and validity can mean 'well grounded' in qualitative research (Lewis and Ritchie, 2003: 270). In terms of the reliability, since it is not easy to make replicability, my aim is to make the fieldwork consistent, allowing the respondents sufficient opportunities to talk about their experience, to allow the analysis to be carried out systematically and comprehensively, and to make interpretation well supported by the evidence (ibid: 272).

As Silverman (1993: 156) suggests, two forms of validation can be used for the logic of qualitative research. Firstly, comparing different kinds of data (e.g. quantitative and qualitative) and different methods (e.g. observation and interviews) to see whether they corroborate one another, called triangulation, derives from navigation, where different bearings give the correct position of an

object. Secondly, one can take findings back to the subjects being studied. Here, to ensure the research is more valid, a triangulation of the diverse methods and data types is important. According to Yeung (1997: 65), 'the practical adequacy of causal mechanisms is likely to be better established through triangulation if the methods used are all consistent with realist ontology and epistemology. What is necessary in the process of triangulation is to compare and contrast different sources of findings if they are addressing the same phenomenon.' As I mentioned before, the methods included both document analysis as well as fieldwork data by semi-structured interview. On the other hand, triangulation may also bring the contradiction between the different sources. But these contradictions can offer some reflective thinking of what we have examined.

Humanistic approaches favour 'depth interviews' in which interviewee and interviewer become 'peers' or even 'companions' (Reason and Rowan, 1981: 205). In this humanistic version of the interview, both the type of knowledge gained and the validity of the analysis are based on 'deep' understanding. This is because the 'humanistic framework' supports 'meaningful understanding of the person...and wholeness in human inquiry' (Silverman, 1993: 206).

It is important to mention 'triangulation' here in this qualitative and comparative study, as triangulation is seen as a strategy for corroborating findings and as a test for the validity of the research (Mathison, 1988:13). Moreover according to Olsen (2004), it is not aimed merely at validation, but at deepening and widening one's understanding. So it is important to use triangulation in this study to avoid limitations by field work in one African country (Tanzania in this case), and to avoid the limitation by people's bias in the interview.

Denzin (1978: 294-307) identifies four types of triangulation: data, investigator, theory and methodological. In the following Part two, all of the knowledge obtained through the methods mentioned in this chapter will be triangulated critically to address our main problem; data triangulation and methods triangulation will especially be used. This means the interview and textual data which are collected in different ways (for the same main questions) will be used in a combined way to capture the social reality and allow me interpret it. The



interview data source can be obtained from different groups of people, both donors and recipients, and the documentary data can include various types of paper work, from governmental policies to institutional reports. Therefore we will obtain the findings and conclusions from both field work and paper work, from the voices of diverse people (donor side and recipient side, individually and institutionally, officially and privately), and from at least two analytical methods (interview analysis and critical discourse analysis), all to show how China is using its own way to support African educational development.

### 3.2 Ethics

The research was conducted according to the Ethical Guidelines of the British Educational Research Association (BERA) (BERA, 2004):

‘conducted within an ethic of respect for persons, respect for knowledge, respect for democratic values and respect for the quality of educational research’ as well as with appropriate sensitivity towards ‘cultural, religious, gendered and other significant differences within the research population’.

In order to operate within an ethic of respect for every participant involved directly or indirectly in my research, the consent forms (attached in Appendix 3) were delivered before the research study began. The informants were told about the aim and brief content of the study, asked if they would agree to be involved in the research, and if they feel alright with a recorder. If the informants refused to be recorded, the interview was recorded just by notes.

To respect the informants’ will, it was very important to not put personal bias and pressure on them, especially when the interviewer, me, is a Chinese doing a China-Africa study. Thus I tried to encourage them to say something critical or to tell two sides (disadvantage and advantage) to me in order to make the asking and talking based on a neutral perspective. Since the questions seldom related with very intimate problems, the informants were willing to tell their experience. It is also important to create a tolerant and relaxed atmosphere, to let the informants

feel at ease.

Moreover, pseudonymous names are used in final data analysis, to fully respect informants' privacy, especially for people who are working in the government.

### **3.3 Potential problems**

The first problem is the difference between the theoretical plan and the practice. It is a research project developing with every step. This ethnographic character let me face some challenges, and make some improvements, depending on the situation and practicalities. For instance, how could I get access to the governmental office of the aid program in another country? How could I resolve the culture conflicts friendly? How could I communicate well with the official people and get trust from African people? Those all have to be considered. There also needs to be some flexibility during the data collection and analysis practice.

In Tanzania, the process was more successful than we had hoped. The Chinese and Tanzanian officials were kind to accept interviews. But the access was sometime time consuming. Quite a few informants were developed during the field work process by introducing from one to another, for example the DIT focus group and the visit to Mkapa High School, and those interviews were even more interesting and important than what was planned. On the other hand it was very challenging. You should prepare different questions for every emerging situation, and catch every opportunity to extend the key informants list, as well as think about the changes in the whole idea and theoretical framework.

Moreover, as already mentioned, the African continent has a number of diverse countries, which cannot be covered in entirety in the research. The research can, however, focus on general information from academic and official documents, gain perceptions from the diverse people working for or receiving aid, and carry out fieldwork focusing on one country in Africa.

Another problem is the value of the research. If this research cannot be repeated



easily or cannot represent a large number of people who are involved in the aid program in Africa, then what is the value of this qualitative research? The most important meaning for qualitative research is not just to extend the result to a larger sample, or even the whole population, but 'its ability to explore issues in depth and from the perspective of different participants, with concepts, meanings and explanations developed inductively from the data' (Lewis and Ritchie, 2003: 267). It is a critical understanding of some mechanisms behind the phenomena, rather than being concerned with applying the results into a further setting.

## **Introduction to Part Two**

Part One (Chapters 2-5) of this study looked at both orthodox and emerging donors, especially through the comparison of donors' intervention in the global political economy and the concept of development. The next step is to examine donors' action empirically. Part One addressed the following question: is there any difference in the logic of intervention between China (as an emerging donor) and the orthodox/dominant Western donors, and if so, what are these differences? Theoretically we explored the changing motives and discourses of international aid. The conclusion reached from Part One was that there are some differences in conceptions of development, historical relations, discourses, motives, approaches as well as aid amount between the Chinese and Western model of educational aid; in different conceptions we highlighted the importance of aid to Africa. Yet these answers are literature based and need to be examined empirically. Therefore, in Chapter Five – the methodology of the study – we addressed the specific research questions and research design, highlighting that we will explore these questions through a qualitative approach using field interviews and discourse analysis.

Building on these foundations, Part Two, or the next three chapters, tries to understand donor's logic of educational aid in practice (i.e. how China as a donor, or as a partner, describes itself and how the recipients describe the aid practice). Based on the theories from Part One, Part Two mainly focuses on two questions: (1) given that we theoretically perceive some difference between the Western and Chinese aid, is there any difference in practice, and are they recognised as such (e.g. can people, either in donor or recipient groups, distinguish it)? (2) How do Tanzanian people view China-Africa relations, and how do Tanzanian people perceive China's help from an individual perspective?

The fieldwork in Tanzania and China, conducted mainly by semi-structured interview, will tell us how people belonging to different groups view Chinese action in Africa. Assuming that the theoretical difference can be reflected in some particularities by China, Part Two includes two sections: Chapter 6 is talking mainly about the historical particularities of China-Tanzania, from the previous



‘brothers’ relation’ to the current partnership under a ‘cultural agreement’; Chapter 7 and 8 discuss about the particularities of China’s current practice which focuses mainly on higher education, vocational education and short-term training. Chapter 8 also reveals that China’s conception of educational aid includes not only formal education, but also other types for transforming practical skills and cultural influence. The focus in Chapter 6 is on the bilateral relationship and related policies between China and Tanzania, and how people see this relationship; however focus on the latter two chapters are more on specific types of practice.

In terms of people’s perception on these particularities/differences, Chapter 6 seeks to understand how these special links between the two countries are recognised, which includes (a) my personal changing perception during the field study; (b) Chinese and Tanzanian officials’ knowledge and understanding/interpretation of this bilateral relation; (c) Officials’ viewpoints of different donors in the new era.

Based on the knowledge obtained in fieldwork, Chapters 7 and 8 look at people’s understanding of, and comments on, China’s current action more specifically; these ‘recognitions’ are both from field interview talks or papers obtained from fieldwork. Some special cases are included in these two chapters, including: Tanzania’s Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT) and its agreement with China on teachers training through Chinese scholarships; China’s short term training yearly reports from Zhejiang Normal University (ZJNU); and a ‘Chinese Culture Centre’ built in Mkapa High School in Dar es Salaam by China. DIT is a representative of China’s support of student scholarship, especially on postgraduate study; ZJNU is a successful example for offering short-term training to African university leaders in China; and Mkapa’s Chinese Culture Centre unique in that it is a small work which has a big name in the Chinese media. This research raises the question, how do people see these practice in/or for Africa? Chapter Eight explores this question by looking at people’s perception from the two sides, Tanzanian institutional principal and returning students. Chapter 8 explores the discourse and perceptions from fieldwork from the perspective of Tanzanian school/institution and Chinese universities.

From the field study, it is found that, in a similar vein to the principles advocated in Chinese policies, rather than making an effort towards UPE (as stressed by the Western practice), Chinese educational aid is directed mainly towards higher education, vocational education, and short-term training, giving support to human resource development in Africa. In terms of people who have jobs related with the aid practice, Tanzanian and Chinese official people seem to be doing well on translating the policies into practice; Chinese universities, authorized by the Chinese Ministry of Education, are actively making their influence/reputation in training African participants, either for long-term or short-term studies. The Tanzanian institutional principals are delivering the information from national ministries to their campuses, and trying to build capacity from diverse foreign aid.

In terms of the recipients, Tanzania, as a national recipient, needs help from both Western donors and China's practical experience; DIT, Mkapa High School and DUCE (Dar es Salaam University College of Education was also visited during fieldwork), as institutional recipients, need any donor who can solve their problems, whether it be a construction need, or a teaching resource need; returning students, as individual recipients, care about the performance of the practice (i.e. to what extent can they solve their urgent problems) rather than talking about the differences between the donors.

To conclude this introduction, it is important to highlight the standpoint of the analysis which will take place in the next chapters. This standpoint is demonstrated in the following words:

Africa's civil society, however, needs to examine how best to react to the challenges presented by China's engagement in Africa and find a tolerable median between uncritical acceptance and knee-jerk rejectionism (Obiorah, 2007: 53).

China wants to pursue policies that are in its best interests and what we have to do in Africa is also to trade and pursue policies that are in our own interests. It's as simple as that – all states do that. ...It is futile for Africans to be pointing fingers whether at the West or at China. Africans



have to organise their side of the story as best as they can in their own interests (Prah, 14/12/2006).

In the long run as Africans transform their societies it will be their task to ensure that the relations between Africa and China do not repeat the centuries of underdevelopment and exploitation....to ensure the old competition of capitalism does not lead to another global war (Campbell, 2008: 104).

The above words are from African perspectives, and while they cannot be generalised, there are nonetheless some key points held in them. We put this in the front of this chapter to show that the key point of this study is not to offer a judgment on who is a better donor, but whether there are differences between different aid models. We are interested in the features, motives and logics each donor has, but we are not interested in 'pointing fingers' at any side. This is the basic rule of my study. This rule was conveyed to my interviewees so the discussion could be more free and easy.

Thus, from the above words, we arrive at this idea: African people care more about what kind of action Africa itself can have, as a response to global competition and global neo-liberal market economy. For African people, they want to find a route without any, either Western or Eastern, exploitation.

## **Chapter Six     Exploring in Tanzania: history and voices ---- From ‘socialist brothers’ to ‘market and mutual benefit’?**

### **Introduction**

As indicated in the methodology chapter, this study seeks to explore different voices and attitudes towards China’s action in Africa. To examine this as closely as possible during field work interviews with officials, educators, students and other relevant people in the aid practice, we ask what they perceive about Chinese educational aid. Tanzania ultimately proved to be an appropriate choice for both theoretical and practical reasons. Therefore, this chapter begins to explore the picture of China-Tanzania relations, how Tanzania has a special historical relationship with China, and how people in Tanzania, as well as myself, perceive China-Tanzania relations.

There are five parts in this chapter.

Firstly, I include my own perception of my fieldwork, as the changing opinions and experience I had during my time in Tanzania helps explain how China and Chinese people are integrated into a local African area. Thus the chapter will start with my own experience during fieldwork. My changing perceptions resulted from informal talk, daily life, and observation in the field. This helped me build my own understanding of China’s practice, and set a basis for my further analysis. Based on this, the chapter focuses on the special China-Tanzania relationship (which is different from West-Tanzania historically and politically) and how this relationship is being discussed by people, and how it relates with aid practices.

The second part is a review of history through current people’s comments. As introduced, Tanzania is one of the largest recipient countries of foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa, receiving help from both developed and developing countries.<sup>65</sup> The donor-recipient relationship is also changing in accordance with the global changes in the aid agenda. Since the independence of the country,

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<sup>65</sup> see the website of the Development Partners Group in Tanzania (DPG):  
<http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/external/dpg-tanzania/overview-of-aid-in-tanzania.html>



Tanzania featured an aid seeking attitude by joining the World Bank Group. Tanzania had some economic growth but it was not very efficient until the aid framework was reformed. Under the wave of aiming for poverty reduction in the post-Washington Consensus era, Tanzania goals for long-term development (national vision 2025 and Zanzibar vision 2020) were linked closely with MDGs. Collaborating with their development partners (DPs), one of Tanzania's key papers is the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST), considered their Bible, for constructing a relationship between Tanzanian ministries and an alignment of DPs; it is hoped to help offer more ownership for the recipient country.

The education development in Tanzania has also experienced changes under the general aid situation. From the colonial education system to the low development of education after independence, the country has been looking for a solution with their donors to promote better management of funding and educational resources, and thus put education at the central position of MKUKUTA. The Western aid in Tanzania is moving from the project aid to the budget support, although within this process there are diversities – some of them did 'pool funding' to primary education, while some of them directly financed national budget. In a process of aid harmonisation and with the country's urgent needs, Tanzanian officials in the Ministry of Education indicated that they would like to hear any suggestions for educational development, including advice from both developed and developing countries, and specifically their invitation to China.

The third and fourth parts of this chapter review China-Tanzania stories. In this sense, the history between the two countries is reviewed firstly, and then some key issues in the relationship are explored. China is not a new actor in Tanzania and has stayed in the country for a long time; having said that its aid practice in Tanzania is unique. The China-Tanzania relationship is a representative one within the larger context of China-Africa history. The historical link between the two countries, which made China unique when compared to Western donors, can be traced back to their socialism brothers' time. The Nyerere-Mao time built the friendship among older generations of Tanzanian and Chinese. The TAZARA railway is a monument for the two countries. The Cultural Agreement from 90s builds upon this history to establish a systematic framework of cultural exchange

and educational cooperation between them.

How are these facts and relationships recognised in the field? The fifth part of the chapter examines people's perception of the China-Tanzania relationship and the changes from the past to this new global era. The history is well known to officials and even for some local people, especially the older generations. For Tanzanian officials, the previous friendship between the two sides may help promote the current work (for getting aid from China); for Chinese officials, the government has noticed their changing donor-recipient relationship (as a special and impressive donor to a donor with business rather than political issues, and one offering a small amount of aid when compared to the West). Both of the sides seem to recognise the changing global environment and want to build their aid relationship based on the historical link, while still recognizing the new atmosphere (for example not only concentrating on construction, but also human resource support). Although historically different, China and other Western donors are encouraged by the Tanzanian officials at 'one table' for discussing issues collaboratively. It seems they are going to be considered as one group, in the contemporary era of economic globalisation.

### **1. Before and within the field work: a personal 'ethnographic' perception**

As field work can offer us a 'broad version of theory' which is more than 'a relationship between variables' (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983:20), this section will explain what I have seen and felt on ground, rather than simply offering my interview data.

In Chapter Five we mentioned that the field interview would be conducted in a critical ethnographic way, meaning that the task was not only about collecting interview data, but also about the entire circumstance which I found myself in. According to (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 96), from an ethnographic view 'one form of the data is researchers' descriptions of people's behaviour, of what they do and say in various circumstances, and of their own experience of participation in settings'; equally important 'are the accounts that people in the



setting provide, while being observed or in interviews.’ Although not systematically an ethnographic work, here we tried a thinking ‘style’ of critical ethnography (ibid: 96).

### **1.1 Before and after arrival- from imagination to the reality**

There are some rules I gave myself before and during the fieldwork; the first being to adopt a neutral attitude, despite the fact that social science is always characterized by a degree of personal value. Moreover, as I was afraid that people would be reluctant to criticize the Chinese approach when they replied to a Chinese researcher, a second rule was required, that is, be reflective and critical all the time. Thirdly, my rule was to encourage interviewees and other people, to join in the discussion freely and openly. I hoped that interviewees could provide some critiques on aid practice. Aid itself is ‘help’, which means it should be a positive thing, but we want to know how it is that it cannot be equal and free in a political economic process. Therefore I prefer to hear complaints rather than praises, and sought to create rules to facilitate this.

Another consideration for me was how to deal with a situation when interviewees are difficult to be accessed. Before I went to Tanzania, I could not get any information directly from Tanzanian officials and Chinese officials in Dar es Salaam. What I could do was complete the application for a research permit from Tanzanian ministries, yet only the first half of the application could be done before my arrival. That meant that with only some ‘psychological’ preparation and the application form for a research permit I sent technically and with nearly ‘zero’ interviewee information, I went to Tanzania alone and started my work as soon as I arrived.

From the time of my arrival my worries about looking for interviewees began to be released. With the help of many people, I finally obtained access to both Tanzanian and Chinese people. Most of the access were admission to official departments, in the first two weeks. Many of my concerns of interviewees’ attitudes solved well, as they went better than expected. The talks with Tanzanians

were free and open, and deepened some key points which followed my research questions. People there were happy to share their personal and/or official information with me, even when I went back to them again for further questions. The meetings with Chinese officials (for which I was worried they may not want to meet me, or could not talk with me in a critical way, but rather in official language echoing the Chinese media resource) were also easier than I imagined. There was a good deal of officials' reflexive thinking about personal opinions and reviews of official practice. Helpfully, every interviewee also gave me information for my next interview, in this way resembling a snow-ball sampling process as participants in the study were recommended one by one. Generally the interview was held in a friendly and peaceful atmosphere, and I did try to encourage people to make more reflexive and critical comments on my questions. With these results, I felt more and more confident and active while the fieldwork proceeded. My changing perception may also be valuable for a support of the later analysis of interview data.

During the stay I had the opportunities to visit two cities of Tanzania- Dar es Salaam and Arusha, with most of time being spent in Dar es Salaam.<sup>66</sup> As a capital city, Dar es Salaam is quite big, with a remarkable amount of construction going on in the city, especially the main roads and the beautiful seashore scenery along the Indian Ocean. As the Chinese ambassador said to me: 'you could see the country is growing up, and maybe in ten years you may see a totally different and new capital city of Tanzania'. I also had a strong feeling while visiting the city, namely that the country wanted to make changes for itself urgently. There was a road outside of the university campus under construction by a Chinese project and other roads were also built by China the more places I visited; I saw construction projects such as national stadium, hospital, and I also saw the train station which was the eastern starting point of TAZARA rail way which was built between 1970-1975, the largest foreign-aid project ever undertaken by China (this will be talked later in this chapter). It seemed that the city had many connections with China, historically and contemporaneously.

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<sup>66</sup> There was only one interview did in Arusha, introduced by a Chinese engineer working in Dar es Salaam. The interviewee in Arusha is working in a transformer company. He did his undergraduate study in China.



From only imaging to travelling, visiting and viewing the reality of this Eastern African country, I felt it was a good choice for fieldwork. The reasons were simple: only seeing the reality allowed me to see the difference between words on paper and actives in life, and also to recognize the difference between how the West and local people view China. Without talking to the recipients themselves, I would never know what they care and think about.

## **1.2 Talking and living with local people**

Mainly in English and sometimes with a little Swahili, I tried to talk with local people and get some images of China from them. This included talking to interviewees I had planned or found in the process of ‘snowball sampling’, and also, talking to people living or working around me or those I met occasionally.

I was living in a lecturer’s house in the University of Dar es Salaam. I still remembered my landlord, Frida, a lecturer in Department of Education, told me her opinion about ‘choosing friends’. She told me, everybody has the right to choose friend, and also as a country, you can choose which partner you want, no matter a Western country, or China. That means that an aid partner is a decision for an African country itself, which cannot be imposed by any others. My landlord told me this on just the second day after my arrival, and the comment stimulated me to begin to enquiry about more issues related the authority of recipient countries and how important the recipients see their rights or ownerships in the aid practice.

The attitudes from Tanzanians towards Chinese people and China were more positive than I supposed. However there is always a difference for me between viewpoints towards Chinese people and towards the Chinese government, anywhere in the world. China for Tanzania was not a new thing, and people would say ‘China, China’ (pronounced in Swahili) on the way when they met you. They basically were happy with the Chinese aid, as the officer Maggie in the Ministry of Education said, ‘we welcome help from different donors, for supporting our urgent needs’. People also talked about the disadvantage of Chinese aid, such as

the limited donation (by the Mkapa School principal), the cheap price but poor quality of fake mobile phones made in China (although this has little link with educational aid, it was mentioned at least twice by interviewees), the degree length and money amount of the Chinese scholarship, and so on. However most of them gave me a feeling that they wanted to learn something from China and/or Chinese people, and/or wanted to work in China or a Chinese company; it seemed that Chinese hard-working characteristics were rooted in Tanzania. After spending a while in Tanzania, my perception was changed in some way from the images I got in UK. The negative words from Africans were not as copious as in Western papers.

Actually, the most distinctive difference between how Western discourse discussing China and the recipients' words was not about negatives or positives, but was talking about the same thing from different perspectives and subjects. For some Tanzanian people, the donors are not different too much from each other, and for some others, the West reminds them of colonial history.

Living with local people, I found they were very easy-going. You can easily talk, dance, or sing with them. The institutional principals were well educated, and spoke English well. The governmental officials were also easily accessed with the research permit I applied, however sometimes the efficiency was a problem. You could feel the governmental function still needed to be improved.

I also felt a large gap between educated and un-educated people, rich people and poor people. Most of my Tanzanian friends who at least had university degrees in the country and stable jobs (such as a lecturer) had a house and car, as well as air conditioners which were quite useful in the hot weather in the offices. Some of my Tanzanian and Chinese friends in Dar es Salaam even had their own security guard, family servant and catering people. However beside the university campus and ministry buildings, or a little off the main roads in the city, you would see many poor houses with much lower living conditions.

This inspired me to do some critical thinking: as most of the interviewees in my study were educated well with good positions in the country, there was in fact a



question which arose: can China really benefit the local poor people? (Or only people with a good network, a richer background, or a good education?) As I was told during the interviews, some of the official people have their children studying in China with the scholarships. It may not be because they use their position to help their children, but these children certainly have better primary and high school education. One of the Tanzanian official's daughter was going to study in China at that time, had already got her undergraduate degree in US. In the next chapter, people in Chinese embassy and Tanzanian ministry will tell us how they select the applicants to try to make it equal.

### **1.3 Chinese people in Dar es Salaam**

A section of this thesis dealing with the Chinese in Dar es Salaam is necessary, firstly because I was helped a lot by some Chinese engineers in Tanzania without which I could not have gotten access to both official and local people; and secondly the Chinese I met, with different jobs in Dar es Salaam, gave me a lot of useful clues and knowledge about China-Africa relations.

The most 'useful' Chinese people I met were two engineers from China National Electric Wire and Cable Import/Export Corporation. My meeting them was by accident when I was searching a blog about Chinese in Africa, and after my arrival, they drove me to the Chinese embassy and various ministers for my first few days; this saved me a lot of time. From talking with them, I also got to know the Chinese working life in Africa. As they told, some of their projects won the bidding even against famous world companies because of the hard-working Chinese ethic and the more efficient output with less budget. I have seen some of their engineers working on the project site, and most of them already recovered from malaria once or twice. The working conditions were not good, but they were cooking and having lunch together happily. One of them had just got married in China, and another had a one-year-old baby in China. Both of them obviously were missing family a lot, but tried to seek work and to earn more with these 'China trends' in Africa.

Chinese officials in the embassy gave me a good impression, which was actually much better than I supposed. Because I could not get in contact with the embassy by email before I arrived, the interview for Chinese embassy in Tanzania was an aspect of the fieldwork which was full of suspense. In China, high level officials gave an image that they could be difficult to be accessed. Therefore when I first entered into the embassy yard and then talked with the secretary of the Cultural Counsellor, I felt very lucky. After that I went to embassy several times, and managed to meet and talk, even have dinner with, the Cultural Counsellor Sun and his wife Zhang. They acted very friendly and kindly to me, a student they never known before. One day I was informed through a phone call that the ambassador wanted to arrange a meeting with me. The talk with the ambassador Liu, accompanied by Cultural Counsellor and his secretary, was successful; it resembled a lecture by Chinese officials who had considerable African information and experience, as opposed to a governmental-trained speech.

Through my Chinese engineer friends I also got to know some Chinese with other job including a 28 year old man, a restaurant manager who followed his parents to settle down in Dar es Salaam and operates Beijing style restaurant. There were also some elder restaurant managers, with decades of experience in Tanzania who spoke fluent Swahili and had a broad network which included Chinese and local officials. While these business people were not direct interviewees, knowing them helped me understand real Chinese people's lives in Africa.

Based upon these on-the-ground experiences, I got closer to Tanzania and its people. Without so many small stories in the 'discursive world' (Burawoy, 1998), I was not able to 'extract' the non-discursive logics and theories for an academic study. Thus the following parts will talk about Tanzania and its relation with China in a more 'non-discursive' way, one based on my empirical work.



## **2. Different donor, one meeting table**

### **2.1 Tanzania: a recipient country in new era**

#### **2.1.1 Highly aid-dependent country: a historical development with foreign aid**

Tanzania is one of the largest recipient's countries of foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa. The country has a population of about 43 million in 2009 (World Bank, 2011). Aid contributes a significant share of the national budget by complementing domestic resource mobilization and capacity development in Tanzania. Approximately 35% of government spending is dependent on foreign aid (Fiscal Year 2008/2009). For fiscal year (FY) 2007/2008, total ODA to Tanzania, provided by 40 Development Partners, amounted to approximately 2 billion USD. This includes assistance in the form of grants, concessional loans and debt relief. Aid management in Tanzania is guided by the Joint Assistance Strategy (JAST) jointly developed by the government and development partners in order to enhance aid effectiveness at country level (DPG Tanzania).<sup>67</sup>

Tanzania became independent in 1961 and was led by Julius Nyerere. Nyerere believed that Western-style economic policies were unsuited for Tanzania. He drew from the ancient African tradition of sharing in an effort to create what he saw as a special African socialism, and he wanted to develop Tanzania without depending heavily on Western assistance (Ungar, 1986). From the 60s to 70s, Tanzania experienced a period of socialist development. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, external events, including oil price shocks, the collapse of the East African Community in 1977, a war with Uganda, and drought aggravated domestic economic problems caused by inefficient domestic economic policies (Bureau of Public Affairs of Tanzania, 1992).

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<sup>67</sup> See website of Development Partners Group (DPG) in Tanzania, <http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/external/dpg-tanzania/overview-of-aid-in-tanzania.html>. There will be more talk on DPG later in this chapter. This website gives information on Tanzania's aid relation with its multilateral and bilateral donors (development partners, DPs) including the engagement with China. The general situation about aid flow to Tanzania and aid management was also informed by my interviewee Nancy, who was working at the office for aid management in the Tanzanian Ministry of Finance. JAST will be introduced in details later in the next two sections.

Despite its record of political stability, Tanzania did not get much attention from foreign investment. So the country itself had to turn to seek foreign aid. During the early years of independence, Tanzania established contact with a great number of states, including the Nordic countries, so as to ensure external funding. As some of the earliest donors to Tanzania, Norway and Sweden, reported their first aid disbursements in 1962; they were followed by Denmark in 1965 and Finland in 1971. Since then, Tanzania become one of the, if not the greatest beneficiary, of Nordic aid (Selbervik, 2006). In the early 1970s however, China was the largest single aid donor to Tanzania. Most of China's 400 million USD aid was dedicated to building and equipping the TAZARA Railroad between Dar es Salaam and Zambia's copper belt. The other donors included the World Bank, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

In 1986, the government announced a recovery program which stressed food, shelter, drinking water, education, and health care at the village level. This produced significant increases in agricultural production and financial support from bilateral donors. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have provided funds to rehabilitate the basic economic infrastructure of the country (Bureau of Public Affairs of Tanzania, 1992).

As a recipient country, Tanzania joined the World Bank Group in 1962. Beginning with a credit from the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) for education in 1963, over 5.8 billion USD in credits and 274 million USD in grants have been approved so far to Tanzania (World Bank, 2009).

In Helleiner's Independent Commission Report (1994), the government and its development partners (DPs) agreed to reform Tanzania's aid management framework. By placing national ownership and government leadership at the forefront of the development process, they fostered transparency and accountability in external resource management. The economic growth between 2002 and 2006 showed the positive effect of this reform, and government-donor confidence also remained 'historically high'.<sup>68</sup> However, the government still

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<sup>68</sup> As introduced by Tanzanian MoF data (offered by interviewee Nancy), the real economy has grown an average of 6% between 2002 and 2006, compared to less than 4% in the early 90s. Inflation has sharply fallen



notices that almost 50% of the population living below the national basic needs poverty line. Therefore, more effort is needed to transform the economic gains into wellbeing for millions people, which also requires the government to keep suitable relations with development partners, as well as to encourage collaborative relations among donor countries.

### **2.1.2 Reformed aid relations between Tanzania and the DPs**

After years of changes, the Western donors are transforming their functions from working separately on many single projects and programmes to working together as partners with Tanzania's national development agenda.<sup>69</sup> Essentially there are three modalities used to provide assistance to Tanzania: General Budget support (GBS), Basket Funds (BFs) and direct project funds; GBS is tending to be the preferred mode, since it is consistent with the government's legal framework and processes. In the fiscal year (FY) 2007/8, GBS amounted to 673 million USD compared to 277 million USD in FY 2002/03. Despite GBS being the preferred mode, a large proportion of aid assistance to Tanzania continues to be delivered through project modality which, in many instances, remains off-budget and outside the government system. Through the JAST framework, the country encourages more donors to shift away from the individual programmes and areas, and towards projects which are programme-based and to GBS (DPG Tanzania).<sup>70</sup>

Under JAST framework, there are planned supports to Tanzania from the 35 members of the Tanzania Development Partners Group (DPG, formerly the Tanzania Development Assistance Committee), comprising of 17 bilateral and 5 multilateral agencies working with the government and other domestic

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to an average of 5% since 2000, compared to more than 30% in the mid 90s.

<sup>69</sup> Through past my interviews, there were still some projects and programmes going on in Tanzania. According to the booklet given by Ministry of Education of Tanzania, named 'Education Projects and Programmes' (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training of Tanzania, 2007), there were nine projects and programmes ongoing during 2006 and 2007, funded by different donors or groups of donors. For example, the big project – Secondary Education Development Programme (SEDP) – had been financed by 'the government, communities and the soft loan from the World Bank through IDA (2007: 49); and Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP) was funded by GoT, GPs and communities through direct cash and labour contributions (2007: 23); School Health Programme was funded by some NGOs and UN organisations; Prevention and Awareness in School of HIV and Aids (PASHA Project) was funded by German Ministry of Cooperation through German technical cooperation and implemented by the Swiss Tropical Institute, etc.

<sup>70</sup> See DPG Tanzania website, <http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/external/dpg-tanzania/overview-of-aid-in-tanzania.html>

stakeholders to strengthen development partnerships and the effectiveness of development cooperation (ibid).<sup>71</sup> To be noted, China, although not listed as a member of DPG, was mentioned on the DPG website to have ‘participated in some of the DPG meetings and seminars over the past years’ (ibid).

What, then, kind of national developmental framework are the Tanzanian government and DPs working for? The country’s long-term development goals for Tanzania are laid out in the Nation Vision 2025 and Zanzibar Vision 2020. The medium-term objectives are MKUKUTA and MKUZA. MKUKUTA is the Kiswahili acronym for the Nation Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), and MKUZA is for the Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (ZSGRP).

These strategies, which are very Western donor oriented, are ‘fully linked’ with MDGs and thus call for results-based management, good governance and expect the contributions of all sectors; they examine cross-cutting issues including HIV/AIDS, gender, environment and employment, and growth and poverty reduction. The DPs support MKUKUTA and MKUZA through the national budget which translates their strategies into fundable and implementable activities (ibid).<sup>72</sup>

To this point of the thesis, there have been several mentions of ‘JAST’. It seems contemporary practice, which has been reformed or renewed by Tanzania with its donors, is actively part of JAST content. Indeed, I was also told about JAST when I interviewed aid coordination officials and aid management officials in the Tanzanian Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance. They all emphasised the key role JAST is playing for their renewed ownership in aid practice. Therefore in the following section we specifically discuss JAST and the Tanzanian officials’ comments on it.

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<sup>71</sup> The 17 bilateral members of DPG are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (German Embassy, KfW and GtZ), Ireland, Italy, Japan (Embassy of Japan and JICA), Korea (KOICA and EDCF/Korea Exim Bank), Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK (DFID), USA (USAID and MCC). See DPG Tanzania’s website <http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/>.

<sup>72</sup> This information is also provided by documents from my interviewee Nancy who is working in Ministry of Finance of Tanzania.



## 2.2 JAST - 'It is our Bible'

As noted in chapter two, with the development of aid discourse and practice the logic of aid in the new century is turning to a 'new architecture of aid,' referring to a transformation of aid on conventional investment projects to aid on policy reform (Mosse, 2005a: 3). The Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) is one of the examples within this transformation, as it aims to change the old structure of the aid coordination model.

I was informed about JAST on my first interview with the aid coordination office in the Tanzanian Ministry of Education. Thereafter, I received the governmental documents from Maggie (Ministry of Education) and Nancy (Ministry of Finance) which detailed JAST. JAST includes the developmental cooperation between donors and recipients, and the cooperation among donors themselves. In terms of the first relationship, when I asked about the progress of the donor-recipient relationship, and how to promote the aid practice more effectively, Maggie and Sehe in the office of aid coordination (Ministry of Education) mentioned,

We are dealing with our development partners by the latest JAST which is Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania, a policy framework helping us get more ownership than before...It is our Bible.

Dependence! Dependence! That is the most disadvantage [of the aid relationship]...If we are dealing aid as before by different small projects, it is easily to be helped by conditionalities, but it is changing now. When donors signed our JAST, the conditionalities will no longer be there. Last year there were 14 development partners signed on this.

JAST, in Swahili 'Mkakati wa Pamoja wa Misaada Tanzania' (MPAMITA), is a national medium-term framework for managing development co-operation between the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (Government) and its Development Partners, with the aim to achieve national development and poverty reduction goals. However, it also outlines the role of non-state actors to the extent that they contribute to the successful implementation of the Strategy

(JAST, 2006).

JAST has been formulated in the spirit of national and international commitments and initiatives on aid effectiveness – most notably the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (2002), the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development (2002), the Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonisation (2003), the Marrakech Memorandum on Managing for Results (2004) and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) (JAST, 2006: 1). It spans a renewable cycle of five years and outlines the main objectives, principles and broad arrangements of Tanzania's development partnership. It is complemented by an Action Plan which specifies concrete activities and timeframes for implementing JAST, and a monitoring framework with indicators to measure Government and Development Partner performance (JAST, 2006: 1; JAST Action Plan, 2007).

The background of JAST was a journey of the nation and its DPs' negotiating for better coordination. One major outcome of the process was the establishment of the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS), launched in 2002, which aimed to strengthen aid coordination, harmonisation and alignment, as well as national ownership and Government leadership in the development process.<sup>73</sup> Although the national leadership has been enhanced with this, the aid power has still not been centralized very well. As stated in JAST 2006 documents, the widespread provision of off-budget financing, most notably for projects, has impeded strategic resource allocation in the national budget process as well as transparency and domestic accountability in the utilisation and performance of external resources. Thus, the nation aimed for a more comprehensive plan, the JAST.

The objectives of JAST are as follows:

Strengthening national ownership and Government leadership of the development process;

Aligning DP support to Government priorities, systems, structures and

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<sup>73</sup> A TAS Action Plan, developed during FY 2002/03, set out practical steps for implementing TAS. Actions were grouped in four priority areas, namely (1) increasing the predictability of aid flows, (2) integrating external resources into the Government budget and Exchequer system, (3) harmonising and rationalising processes, and (4) improving national capacities for aid coordination and external resource management. (JAST, 12/2006)




procedures;  
Harmonising Government and DP process;  
Managing resource for achieving development results, in particular  
MKUKUTA/MKUZA;  
Strengthening domestic and mutual accountability (JAST Action Plan,  
2007: 1).

JAST seeks to bring a refreshed aid relationship to Tanzania. The following figure shows clearly this change JAST hopes to achieve. As the figure indicates, this strategy is moving from ‘each development partner with own priorities, requirements, practices, systems, procedures and process’ to ‘alignment of Development Partners’ assistance with national development goals and processes’ (JAST, 2006).

Table 6.1 Alignment of Development Partners’ assistance with national development goals under JAST in Tanzania

Figure 1: Alignment of Development Partners' assistance with national development goals under the JAST



Source: JAST (2006: 2)

Within this 'alignment' mechanism strategy, the government leads, guides and



coordinates dialogue with Development Partners and non-state actors at the respective levels and, moreover, accounts for its decisions and actions, including the use of public funds, the provision of public services, the attainment of development results and outcomes upon implementing JAST to domestic stakeholders. Development Partners will support government efforts to develop sustainable capacity in both the public sector and across society, and will do so by responding to national capacity needs with financial and technical assistance.

In terms of interviewees' (official people) responses, it appeared that they were happy with this new mechanism, and had a good amount of hope in it. The new strategy helped them feel they could develop the country in a more cooperative way (i.e. by recipient-donor and donor cooperation), rather than in accordance with a template (i.e. by each donors' design). Officer Sehe, in Ministry of Education, noted:

'Every organisation has its way of reporting, its reporting format, sometime they give templates...When they come and support you, ok, you should report to them in some kind of format...Sometimes they force, they choose where to go.. They give you conditions. The priority of the country, the urgent need cannot be considered very well because of the conditions. They (donors) want to decide more and more.'

The government had very positive claims about JAST:

As more development partners continue to show interest in the joint development approach, the impact of this cooperation has been felt across key sectors such as health and education, indicating the significant leverage that a well guided aid management system can have (Ministry of Finance of Tanzania).<sup>74</sup>

It has meant to bring together all Development Partners under a single strategic framework that guides their development assistance in line with

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<sup>74</sup> Fieldwork data from Ministry of Finance of Tanzania.

the cluster-based and outcome-oriented NSGRP (or MKUKUTA in Kiswahili) and ZSGRP (or MKUZA in Kiswahili). It has also aimed to fully take into account the international aid effectiveness commitments made in Monterrey, Rome, Marrakech and Paris and to adopt them to the Tanzanian context. (JAST, 2006)

The government needs help, of course, but there is the continuous problem of dealing with ownership and external aid. Under JAST, participants find a solution which can be also agreed by many donors (at least temporarily). JAST actually is making reforms on two relationships therefore: between donor and recipient, and between donors. The role of the recipient country is moving (at least ideally) from being aided, to organizing and cooperating the aid activities. It is as Maggie said, 'they [DPs] are complementing the government's effort'. It also can be seen from this agreement, between some of the DPs and Tanzania government, that some DPs want to make changes to their previous management of aid flows and also reform the previous low effectiveness of aid, so as to not only give more ownership (or subjectivities) to recipient countries, but to cooperate as well.

As Secretary Chen in the Chinese Embassy mentioned, sometimes the donors have competition among themselves. 'For example, people from the Japanese embassy would like to know privately that how many scholarships we offered last year...' Thus an agreement among the donors is also necessary to keep an open and harmonious aid situation.

To create more dialogue, donors within DPG have monthly meetings to address policy issues with 'more technical dialogue at sector and thematic areas with relevant sector ministries'. Consistent with the principle of government leadership, and in light of the proposed domestic dialogue structure, the DPG endeavours to align its own structure (i.e. sector or thematic sub-groups) to a corresponding government-led dialogue structure within the cluster structure of the MKUKUTA and MKUZA (JAST Action Plan, 2007).

The practice of JAST on aid can be seen as one of the national strategies in the PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) era, which transferred from the



previous SAPs era. It is said that the donors are recognizing the importance of the ownership with the principles such as ‘country-driven’, ‘result-oriented’, and ‘partnership-oriented’ (IMF, 2007).

However, the implementation of JAST also brings some risks, including the political risk, fiduciary risk, as well as institutional and operational risk (JAST, 2006). Therefore, whether the strategy can be maintained in a long run and can be realised fully with its aims, and especially avoid the pitfalls brought by SAPs, some still have their doubts. As critically indicated by Zack-Williams and Mohan (2005: 501):

The essence of PRSPs is to give African Governments a say in the choice of policies and a move away from what has been described as the one-size-fits-all approach of SAPs. PRSPs are supposed to facilitate the engagement of civil society... It is increasingly doubtful if PRSPs carry the democratic mantle their proponents claim, since the neo-liberal rejection of any notion of a developmental state has left a political and economic vacuum, which can be filled only by Northern dominated NGOs, donors and the International Financial Institutions (IFI).

**2.3 JAST’s implication for China: opportunity or obstruction?**

As introduced above, although not formally a member in the DPG, China is regularly a development partner providing support for development in Tanzania. We can see China in the following table which lists the Tanzanian government’s aid predictability gaps. Although this is referring to the management of aid flows of Tanzania, we can extract from the table that they take China officially as a development partner, and estimate and manage Chinese aid.

Table 6.2 Trends of projections and actual disbursement by countries for FY 2002/03-2006/07



**Table 1: Trends of Projections and Actual Disbursement by countries for FY 2002/03-2006/07**

Development Partner	2002/2003		2003/2004		2004/2005		2005/2006		2006/2007	
	Budget Estimate	Actual	Budget Estimate	Actual	Budget Estimate	Actual	Budget Estimate	Actual	Budget Estimate	Actual
ACBF	239.0		160.7							
ADB	68,146.6	10,879.2	59,083.8	81,194.0	50,513.4	63,790.4	125,838.2	82,102.3	121,836.6	121,486.1
AXIOS							154.1		153.4	
BADEA		214.7	723.5	94.2	4,594.5	284.4	20,419.6	298.3	6,423.7	2,638.9
Belgium	3,204.5	1,620.2	8,167.8	4,793.0	16,117.2	6,012.3	7,236.0	660.1	14,075.0	20,855.6
Canada	2,658.4	9,576.9	18,554.7	17,375.5	40,460.0	22,292.2	38,417.3	31,865.3	31,157.5	18,900.5
CFC					361.0		277.5		107.0	
China	1,326.8	1,147.5	964.5	17.8	1,918.9				27,094.5	
Denmark	36,953.6	70,125.9	33,436.3	63,061.3	53,203.9	73,719.5	62,386.0	50,677.8	77,527.4	30,315.0
EC	101,296.6	86,567.0	104,299.7	82,945.1	85,483.4	119,569.0	89,173.5	143,859.7	122,388.1	154,274.0
EIB	21,819.9		8,049.5		4,445.6				2,034.6	
Finland	6,201.7	7,332.2	6,884.2	8,170.5	8,130.6	8,574.0	13,351.4	20,927.1	21,139.5	19,971.2
France	1,709.7	1,387.5	1,802.8	5,530.3	10,325.1	4,842.1	2,132.7	1,611.0	3,276.3	1,532.4
GEF										
Germany	10,920.2	26,696.4	20,675.3	38,280.0	32,443.4	31,970.2	18,249.9	39,368.0	34,625.3	64,393.1
Global Fund					3,880.6	26,829.1	17,990.6	53,284.7	32,655	
IFAD	9,054.5	8,596.4	3,423.5	4,349.5	11,555.3	7,354.6	20,999.0	2,238.4	14,335.5	2,350.4
Ireland	15,315.3	25,845.2	20,288.0	24,320.7	26,515.0	17,289.7	23,861.5	22,167.5	38,404.6	27,273.3
Italy	379.1		569.7		393.4					
Japan	12,109.2	36,034.1	8,041.1	958.4	11,903.7	55,760.7	8,271.4	17,988.0	20,228.0	40,842.9
NDF	22,817.6	2,886.3	2,508.2	4,125.0	2,222.8	1,239.9	1,512.7		9,372.1	
Korea					2,026.7		4,849.1		3,588.6	
Kuwait	9,750.3	1,489.6	5,839.7	2,813.2	2,756.7		1,620.5		5,021.8	2,850.1
Mozambique							3,646.1		4,080.4	
Netherlands	52,160.4	62,230.4	46,385.9	51,940.3	56,543.6	55,583.7	50,819.1	62,368.7	137,990.9	62,216.0
Norway	35,036.9	30,850.5	37,776.5	29,765.7	47,209.2	35,395.1	44,326.3	51,958.3	64,862.9	68,055.2
OPEC Fund	11,332.4	2,835.3	6,472.4	3,202.8	12,603.4	219.0	14,916.7		12,629.2	2,242.4
SAUD Fund		66.7			1,956.3		679.0			
Spain							14,798.2		10,071.7	
Sweden	33,358.8	43,743.9	42,984.8	42,238.5	43,656.3	71,730.7	68,143.0	76,965.9	98,201.5	91,942.8
Switzerland	10,425.7	10,624.0	8,694.2	6,491.2	15,658.2	10,236.2	10,607.0	9,656.5	12,002.4	8,189.6
United Kingdom	78,951.8	98,400.2	108,252.4	106,787.1	130,222.8	171,956.2	181,058.7	177,521.6	198,445.3	192,582.1
United Nations	18,083.6	21,788.5	12,288.1	1,971.6	8,539.2	44,881.1	19,031.7	19,600.5	13,866.0	2,332.9
United States	1,274.2	19,173.2	8,623.9	15,821.9	14,807.5	22,983.8	1,081.2	36,979.5	2,748.0	53,564.7
World Bank	287,646.5	253,225.4	348,732.1	212,375.0	452,202.3	465,938.2	455,905.8	274,479.2	495,161.8	379,711.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>852,173.3</b>	<b>833,337.1</b>	<b>923,683.4</b>	<b>808,623</b>	<b>1,151,650</b>	<b>1,318,452</b>	<b>1,321,754</b>	<b>1,176,579</b>	<b>1,635,505</b>	<b>1,368,521</b>

**Source: External Finance Department Database, Tanzania**



Source: External Finance Department of Tanzania (2008)<sup>75</sup>

Therefore, what does JAST mean for China? Can China join together with other donors to fulfil the aims of JAST?

Firstly as the table shown above shows, China's data is sufficient, and the data in 2003/2004 is showing a large gap (also possible a typing mistake?) between expectation and actual disbursement. However, given the unclear data, we can still see an increasing amount of budget from China. So within the framework of JAST, it is perhaps an opportunity for Tanzania to get an easier calculation of China's aid, within a simplified framework of donor-recipient relations.

Secondly, under the JAST framework, there may be some possibilities for China increase collaboration with Western donors in accordance with the JAST aim: being harmonized with other development partners. As we know, the current situation does not show much cooperation between China and Western countries (although official people from Tanzanian ministry of education indicated in my interview that they were going to invite China to join their annual meeting with Western partners for education development, this hasn't happened yet), the future framework may improve a network among these donors which benefits both developing and developed countries.

Thirdly, it may be helpful to China as a sort of building new aid architecture in the recipient country. Since China engaged actively from 2000 in Africa and practised differently from previous China-Africa socialistic relation, China may now play an impressive role and have more influence in the process of building a new aid reality.

However, opportunities always have their obstructions. China's aid reality itself still has significant problems and ambiguities which are not shown clearly in the field work and literatures, and limited to Chinese publications. So China is also under more strict and systematic evaluation mechanism when it is entering the

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<sup>75</sup> The data is from my interviewee Nancy in Tanzanian Ministry of Finance.

world of a group of donors. When China is showing its practical method of aid, it also under the examination from others: whether China is making aid actions more accurate and equal to the public and recipients.

## **2.4 Educational sector of Tanzania**

Education is an important part of Tanzania's urgent needs and as this thesis is mainly concerned with aid practice in educational field. This section will briefly introduce the educational development with foreign aid in Tanzania.

### **2.4.1 A brief history**

With Tanzania's national development at a low level, the education system is also struggling (Kuder, 2004: 31). The colonial history during which Tanzania was occupied by Germany and Britain brought colonial educational development. After World War I, Tanganyika was mandated to be a British protectorate, and the British government deliberately focussed educational provision at the primary level, aiming at mass education for rural development (Cameron and Dodd, 1970). The purpose was to impart literacy skills so that Africans could read bibles and hymnals. Once educated, Africans could then receive theological training so that they could take on the important work of conversion (ibid). 'From a mission point of view, however, the most important function of the 'school station' was to create an isolated haven of security that demonstrated and offered a complete, modern, Western way of life as a civilized Christian alternative to African ways' (Kuder, 2004: 36). For example, once a German administration had been established in Tanganyika, missionaries actively worked to strengthen the 'national colonial programme' and 'to establish German culture and German thought in the colonies' (Mbilinyi, 1979: 77).

According to Wedgwood (2005: 7), in the years immediately following independence in 1961, secondary education expansion continued to be prioritized. As she stated (ibid),



The new government desperately needed educated Tanzanians to take up jobs previously filled by Europeans. Education was seen as an instrument for modernisation, by providing high level manpower that would drive top-down development. With the support of the World Bank, Tanzania focused its resources on expanding both secondary and higher education, consciously eschewing the resolutions of the UNESCO conferences of Karachi (1960) and Addis Ababa (1961) which set a target for achieving UPE by 1980 (Samoff and Carrol, 2003:9). In 1967 President Julius Nyerere made mass primary education a priority again through his version of socialism, as outlined in the Arusha Declaration.<sup>76</sup>

After 1967, guided by Nyerere's 'Education for Self Reliance' (Nyerere, 1967a), Tanzania had a strong focus on primary education. At that time education was intended to equip Tanzanians with self reliance rather than as a preparation for further academic aims. This led to a weak post-primary education in the country, with some of the lowest secondary enrolment ratios in the world (Wedgwood, 2005: 8). Post-primary education was intended to produce only enough graduates to supply the projected skilled manpower needs of the country.

After the achievements in primary education during the 1970s to early 1980s, the situation in the education sector in Tanzania constantly declined both in terms of quality and enrolment.<sup>77</sup> In the mid-nineties, the condition of education was in a deep crisis. In 1995 the government of Tanzania decided to develop a new Education and Training Policy (ETP), in which the urgent need to improve the quality of, and to ensure access to, education was recognised. Following the ETP, the Education and Training Sector Development Programme (ESDP) as a strategy towards a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) to education development was initiated in 1997 and revised in 2001 (Basic Education Development Committee, 2006: 4).<sup>78</sup> ESDP focused on basic education, was developed by the Ministry of

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<sup>76</sup> The Arusha Declaration was made by Julius Nyerere on 5 February 1967, outlining the principles of Ujamaa (Nyerere's vision of socialism) to develop the nation's economy. The declaration called for an overhaul of the economic system, through African socialism and self-reliance in locally administered villages through a villagization program.

<sup>77</sup> As shown by Wedgwood (2005: 7), 'the statistics for primary enrolment and adult literacy in the early eighties are very impressive; the gross enrolment ratio (GER) for 1980 was 98% and compared well with those of other Sub-Saharan countries'.

<sup>78</sup> The SWAp was mentioned in Chapter two.

Education and Culture together with other Ministries and institutions involved in education, as well as the bilateral and multilateral donors.<sup>79</sup>

In terms of the development of higher education, it can be seen from Wedgwood (2005: 8) the University of Dar es Salaam played an important role within this process. As she said, 'higher education in Tanzania during the last century was predominantly provided by the University of Dar es Salaam. This was established as a college of the University of London in 1961, and it later became a part of the University of East Africa'. The development also slowed down since 1980s. 'The 80s and early 90s were a period of decline for the university with enrolments stagnating and spending per student falling dramatically' (ibid).

Thus, within this educational development process, how did Tanzania deal with the external donors? And how did Tanzania develop education in the 21<sup>st</sup> century within the agenda by MDGs? The next section will explore issues of Western aid and the related projects.

#### **2.4.2 Western educational aid to Tanzania**

Development of Tanzania has often taken the form of joint intervention of the state and the external donors, particularly since 1970s. The total external assistance to Tanzania increased from 51 million USD in 1970 to around 700 million USD in 1981. Within this amount Nordic countries provided an important share (Havnevik, 1993: 21). The bilateral co-operation in the educational field for Tanzania began in the early 1970s with a wide range of projects, such as Folk Development Colleges, Vocational Training Centres, volunteers, teacher training, and the importation of printers and paper for production of schoolbooks (Embassy of Sweden in Dar es Salaam, n.d.). In 1970 under the national self-reliance policy context, Tanzania/ UNICEF/ UNESCO/ Primary Education Reform Project (Mpango wa Tanzania/ UNICEF/ UNESCO (MTUU)) was launched in order to reform primary education in accordance with the newly stipulated national

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<sup>79</sup> See website of Embassy of Sweden in Dar es Salaam, [http://www.swedenabroad.com/Page\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_10788.aspx](http://www.swedenabroad.com/Page_____10788.aspx)

The information in this paragraph was also offered by my interviewee Nancy in Tanzanian Ministry of Finance.



policies. The reform project was executed by the Tanzania government and combined the expertise of UNESCO with the financial, technical, professional and other assistance of UNICEF. MTUU and its pilot project ‘Kwamsisi’ aimed at building schools in communities and an integration of school education and community life (Buchert, 1994: 130). However the community school experiments died out after 1975 due to ‘the lack of cooperative spirit in the village’ (ibid: 131). In the 1980s educational development in Tanzania was influenced by the SAPs. Also according to Buchert (1994: 144), while there were some positive indications with respect to economic recovery during the 1980s, the impact of the recession and the SAPs on the social sectors and social equality, including equity in education, was negative. In the early 1990s, the aid programmes were narrowed down to focus on basic education in the areas of education materials, pre-service and in-service training of teachers, and training of tutors (Embassy of Sweden in Dar es Salaam, n.d.).

Today, when the latest EFA global monitoring report indicates that ‘donors are not on track to meet aid commitments for 2010’ (UNESCO, 2011: 107), the aid situation in Tanzania is also not very optimistic. The table below is from the OECD International Development Statistics (IDS) databases which record information provided annually by all member countries of DAC, showing the ODA to Tanzania from 2007 to 2009 and the top ten donors of gross ODA in 2008-2009. Another chart is the bilateral ODA by sector in the year 2008-2009 and from the chart we can see the first one (the black one) is the sector of education which occupies about 5% of ODA.

Table 6.3: Aid at a glance chart - Tanzania




## Tanzania

Receipts	2007	2008	2009
Net ODA (USD million)	2 820	2 331	2 936
Bilateral share (gross ODA)	65%	59%	48%
Net ODA / GNI	16.8%	11.3%	13.6%
Net Private flows (USD million)	- 444	122	190

For reference	2007	2008	2009
Population (million)	41.3	42.5	43.7
GNI per capita (Atlas USD)	410	460	500

Top Ten Donors of gross ODA (2008-09 average) (USD m)	
1 IDA	525
2 United States	265
3 United Kingdom	236
4 AfDF	169
5 EU Institutions	162
6 IMF (SAF,ESAF,PRGF)	153
7 Global Fund	139
8 Norway	122
9 Denmark	113
10 Sweden	111

Bilateral ODA by Sector (2008-09)



Sources: OECD, World Bank.

Source: OECD, n.d.

More details in the educational field can be seen from EFA global monitoring report 2011 (UNESCO, 2011: 358). According to the report these data are derived from Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of OECD's IDS. The CRS's aid activity data come from donors including the 22 member countries of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the European Commission and other international organisations (OECD, n.d.). The table shows a declining trend of aid to education as well as aid to basic education in Tanzania.

Table 6.4: Aid to education and aid to basic education in Tanzania



UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	<i>Total aid to education</i>	<i>Total aid to basic education</i>	<i>Direct aid to education</i>	<i>Direct aid to basic education</i> <sup>80</sup>
	Constant 2008 US\$ millions			
<i>2002-2003 annual average</i>	277	216	215	176
<i>2007</i>	259	121	146	61
<i>2008</i>	204	93	110	34

Source: UNESCO, 2011: 358

After showing this overall picture of Western aid to education in Tanzania, it is necessary to look at the development of Western aid since 1990s more specifically, in order to see how donors changed their aid forms and mechanisms in Tanzania to improve aid performance and how Tanzania itself collaborated with it, and from which we may summarise some changing modalities and features of the Western aid.

#### 2.4.2.1 SWAp in Tanzania and PEDP

In terms of SWAp, it emerged as a new modality of Western aid in 1995 when the traditional aid approach, in the form of self-contained projects by each donor, was being criticised for its donor driven nature and its consequences of fragmentation and duplication, and is now being developed in different sectors, including the educational sector. The aim of a SWAp is that donors within the same sector form a group and work together in the support of policies, strategies and plans for each sub-sector of a Ministry. This is instead of supporting isolated projects bilaterally, in order to make the donors promote greater local involvement, accountability and capacity in partner countries (DFID, 2006a).<sup>81</sup> Donors such as the World Bank, Canadian International Development Agency, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, British DFID, Danish DANIDA, Ireland Aid, and the

<sup>80</sup> As explained by the report, direct aid to education is the total of four subcategories: aid to basic, secondary and postsecondary education and 'level unspecified'. Total aid to education = direct aid to education + 20% of general budget support. Total aid to basic education = direct aid to basic education + 10% of general budget support + 50% of 'level unspecified' aid to education (UNESCO, 2011: 347).

<sup>81</sup> The information of SWAp is also offered by interviewee Nancy in Tanzanian Ministry of Finance.

Netherlands have all joined to integrate education support into the SWAp (Kuder, 2004: 56). It was claimed that this produced a well functioning donor co-ordination based on the DAC principles for harmonization of procedures (Kuder, 2007: 39). The modality of having a SWAp, where GoT cooperates with a donor group instead of individual donors, was intended, in the long run, to considerably reduce transaction costs on both sides. As the World Health Organization states, 'a SWAp calls for a partnership in which government and development agencies change their relationships (to clearer government leadership); They interact more together in the formulation of policy, and less on the details of its implementation'.<sup>82</sup> However, can SWAp turn the donor-recipient relationship towards a kind of 'interaction' or 'cooperation' within a 'harmonisation'? Does this plan give the recipient country more ownership and more equalities within the aid relationship? Although it was said that 'SWAps typically have a joint review mechanism and performance monitoring system relying on the government's own performance assessment framework' (DFID, 2006a), such a shift of donors' attention and influence on recipient countries' national policy formulation still have shortcomings from the recipients' perspectives, as Kuder (2004: 56) argued,

It appears as though donors are replicating the state's central co-ordinating role, but on a global level, co-ordinating a global policy network across a range of developing countries. ... they [donors] are now limiting their influence to 'getting the policy right' and withdrawing from implementation phases, delegating or contracting those responsibilities to sub-national actors... There are two problems with this approach. First, it automatically conflates donors with national governments in the central policy-coordination role – within country... Second, it overlooks the well-known capacity issues that prevail in developing countries whenever policy reaches the stages of implementation (Brinkerhoff, 1999).

With SWAp in educational sector, one of the earliest achievements within the ESDP, was the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP). Based on the EFA

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<sup>82</sup> See World Health Organization website, <http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story081/en/>



and MDGs' idea, to promote the access to quality education for all children, Tanzania in July 2001, launched the PEDP, which was financed jointly by the Government of Tanzania (GoT), the World Bank and other DPs. The Plan started in January 2002, was a five year plan, with the goals of 'improving education quality at school level; improving retention and completion of the seven years of primary education cycle for all children; providing equitable access to all children, and building capacity at school, community, district and central government levels' (World Bank, n.d.).<sup>83</sup>

However, 'the process was delayed because the basket donors were not fully prepared to harmonise. Instead most of their conditions and monitoring instruments were added to each other, which would have increased rather than reduced the transaction costs for all' (Odén and Tinnes, 2003: 20). To consider a 'harmonised' aid with less transaction costs, DPs and the government of Tanzania agreed on a mechanism for financial resource allocation, for the management of funds, and for the implementation of PEDP, which is detailed in a Memorandum of Understanding concerning 'the Pooled Funding of PEDP' (as a Basket fund) in 2003. International donors joining in the PEDP 'pooled fund' included eight bilateral donors - Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Netherlands, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Ireland, Finland, Belgium, France, and the European Union. By contrast, the British DFID is using another modality - 'by providing direct budget support to the Ministry of Finance, it supports PRSP priority areas including basic education' (Yamada, 2005: 3).<sup>84</sup> The pooled fund mechanism was aligned with the principles of JAST. Within this collaboration on PEDP, the World Bank's domination both in the formation of the PEDP and the SWAp generated critique among other aid agencies (Odén and Tinnes, 2003: 20). Another important contradiction is, while the Ministry of Finance strongly argues for budget support, the line ministries are more interested in sector basket funding and even project support (ibid: 18).

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<sup>83</sup> See World Bank website, <http://go.worldbank.org/U1Q0BYXKW0>

<sup>84</sup> In 2009-2010, UK bilateral aid spending in Tanzania was 143.6 million GBP, in which 18% was funded on education sector (DFID, 2010).

The 'main harmonised aid arrangements' including SWAp for PEDP are summarised by Odén and Tinnes (2003: 19) in the table as below.

Table 6.5 Main harmonised aid arrangements in Tanzania

Arrangement	Sector	Participating donors
Budget Support	National budget	(PRBS): Canada, Denmark, EU, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK, Switzerland. Co-ordination with World Bank PRSC.
SWAp	Health	Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, World Bank (Norway until 2002).
SWAp	Primary Education (PEDP)	(Pooled fund): Belgium, Canada, EU Commission, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden. (Direct budget support): World Bank
SWAp	Local Government Reform, LGRP	Denmark, EU, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UNDP, UK
Emerging SWAp	Agriculture	Japan (lead), Denmark, EU, Ireland, World Bank. Sector working group exists. Programme draft being appraised. Earmarking or basket not yet decided.
Sector Dev. Programmes	Tax Admin. Programme	World Bank (lead), Denmark, EU, Finland, GTZ, Sweden, UNDP, UK, USA.
Sub-sector pools between donors	Public Finance Management Reform	Updating in progress based on CFAA. World Bank, EU, UK, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway.
	Legal Sector Quick Start Programme	Canada (lead), Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden
	PER Basket	Denmark, Norway, Sweden, UNDP, UNICEF
	Poverty Monitoring System	Denmark, DFID, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, UNDP, UNICEF, USAID
	Independent Monitoring Group	UNDP (lead), UNICEF, Denmark, Ireland, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, USA
Diagnostic Work in Zanzibar		UNDP (lead), World Bank. ADF, DFID, Sweden.
Implementation of Mwafaka agreement		Canada, Denmark, EU Commission, Finland Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK, UNDP.

Source: Odén and Tinnes (2003: 19)



Under PEDP, Tanzania achieved positive progress in primary education: The GER and NER improved from 84% and 65.5% in 2001 to 112.7% and 96.1% in 2006 respectively; the number of primary schools increased from 11,873 in 2001 to 14,700 in 2006; the transition rate from primary to secondary school increased from 22.4% in 2001 to 49.3% in 2005, etc. (Basic Education Development Committee of Tanzania, 2006).

#### 2.4.2.2 PEDP II and the trend for GBS

Following this, another five-year extension, PEDP II (2007-2011), continued to take primary education as its priorities, and aimed to strengthen linkages within basic education and the education sector in general (ibid, 2006: 1-2). It also focuses on enrolment, quality, capacities, as well as three extra focuses: cross-cutting issues (such as HIV and AIDS, environmental education and gender equality), educational research, educational monitoring and evaluation (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training of Tanzania, 2008: 5). The whole commitment is still around EFA, MDGs and UPE. The important transformation of PEDP II is a move of the funding modalities from Basket towards General Budget Support (GBS) which is what the State prefers. According to the government report, 'contrary to PEDP I which was funded through a basket fund mechanism which came to an end in June 2006, PEDP II will be mainly funded through the National Budget' (ibid, 2006: 39).

Donors work on GBS through the Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS), coordinated with the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSC).<sup>85</sup> The donors with PRBS can be seen in the above table by Odén and Tinnes (2003: 19), including Canada, Denmark, EU, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK, and Switzerland. PRBS is a platform, in which 11 donors provide grant money and other support, such as policy suggestions.

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<sup>85</sup> PRSC is a loan scheme of the World Bank, which is, in Tanzania, co-financed by Germany and African Development Bank (AfDB) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2006: 9).

Today, with these changes and reforms of donor activities and the improvements of their effectiveness, Tanzania itself is also increasingly putting education in an important position. Pursuing the MDGs within the PRSP agenda, Tanzania is one of the African countries making effort to fulfil the UN's aim of 'poverty reduction' and UPE. As the World Bank shows, Tanzania has put education at the centre of its National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, known as MKUKUTA (2005-2010), with the aim of ensuring equitable access to quality primary and secondary education for boys and girls, universal literacy among women and men, and the expansion of higher, technical and vocation education (World Bank, n.d.).<sup>86</sup>

As the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) reported:<sup>87</sup>

Tanzania is clearly on track to achieving the MDGs related to primary education, child mortality, gender equality, and access to improved sanitation, but is lagging behind in other MDGs (UNDP Tanzania, n.d.).

It is important to recognise that, Tanzania also had national strategies for secondary and adult education. These included according to Yamada (2005: 3), 'another sub-sector program - the Secondary Education Development Program (SEDP) (2004-2009)'. The World Bank has been supported SEDP with US\$124 million credit and an IDA grant of US\$24 million to support in 2004 (World Bank, 2010: 4). The 2009 government report on SEDP still showed some positive progress in educational access, equity, quality, sex parity in secondary education in Tanzania (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training of Tanzania, 2010: 6). Followed the first phase, SEDP II (2010-2015) is the natural continuation of the previous one (ibid: 14). No clear donor list is contained in the SEDP II (2010-2015) report by the Tanzanian government, but just a short description of DPs' responsibilities (ibid: 50). Compared with the 'satisfactory' evaluation to PEDP (World Bank, 2010: 29), the outcome of SEDP overall was rated as 'moderately unsatisfactory' by the World Bank (ibid: 32). According to the government, 'the secondary education has been able to triple enrolments in a span

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<sup>86</sup> See <http://go.worldbank.org/U1Q0BYXKW0>

<sup>87</sup> See UNDP website, [http://www.tz.undp.org/mdgs\\_progress.html](http://www.tz.undp.org/mdgs_progress.html)



of four years, from 432,599 in 2004 to 1,466,402 in 2009', and 'the number of secondary schools (both Government and Non Government) has also increased from 1,291 in 2004 to 4,102 in 2009' (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training of Tanzania, 2010: 17); however these increasing numbers also created 'bigger constraint' on the quality of education (ibid: 18).

Finally some key points can be summarised from above reviews, as follows:

Firstly, while Tanzania has historically placed a greater emphasis on its primary education and got positive progress, the country also made efforts on secondary and higher education. However, the post-primary education still has much lower enrolment compared with primary sector: transition rate from primary to secondary education improved from 36.1% in 2004 to 51.6% in 2009 and the government set a target of 50% by 2010 (ibid, 2010: 7).

Secondly, the efforts for educational achievements were made by both national ministries and international (bilateral and multilateral aid) partners/donors. Within a process of seeking aid harmonisation (among donors and between donors and GoT) and reduction of the transaction costs (increasing aid effectiveness) and replication of policies, the aid modalities of Western donors have been moving from project funding to basket funding, and more recently, towards the direct budget support. This is also under the principles of JAST.

Thirdly, there are diverse donors in Tanzania, and they are mainly Western bilateral and multilateral donors. Although there are common trends in their aid modalities on general budget support, each donor has their own plans on aid strategy (for instance, when pooled fund was established, DFID had already started general budget). There is diversity even within the same modality in terms of the details of the conditionality and accountability (Ohno and Niiya, 2004: 4).

Therefore, a harmonised commitment among donors with budget support is an important issue which potentially needs continuing progress (Odén and Tinnes, 2003: 27). The dominant role of the World Bank also caused some critique in the donor group, however, the coordination between PRBS and PPSC perhaps can be a good example of harmonising of these instruments (Odén and Tinnes, 2003: 27;

DFID, 2006b).

### **2.4.3 Contemporary need in education and an invitation for China**

With the country's effort and the external aid, progress is still necessary for reaching a quality education level for the whole nation. The country still faces difficulties in contemporary educational practice. What are the urgent needs of the country in the educational field, then? I asked the educational officials in the Tanzanian Ministry of education. At the moment, as Maggie and Sehe (Office of aid coordination, Ministry of Education) said, the urgent needs for education in Tanzania can be summarised in four points:

‘There are four priorities: First is the construction of teachers' houses/accommodations especially the rural areas. The houses are for both primary and secondary education. The second one is teaching materials especially the science and math and language books, for all levels. We also have to train science and language teachers (means teaching English). And the fourth is the scholarship for the students from poor families and those who have special needs. These scholarships are for both higher education and secondary education.’

The country is dealing with the external aid through both Ministry of Finance, which is accountable for financial issues and managing the money flow, and the Ministry of Education, which is coordinating with donors, discussing educational difficulties and situations, and looking for solutions. During the interview with Maggie and Sehe, they confirmed the jobs of the two ministries, and said that they were holding an ‘education review meeting’ every year, with invited donors:

‘We have meetings with donors. All of the donors including NGOs are sitting together with us, then we talk about the educational development in Tanzania. But we are not dealing with financial things which are solved by the other sectors such as Ministry of Finance. So we never touch the money. We have the education sector review. The supporters



come and see what we are doing, and discuss and give suggestions to our performance in a year. It is open for them.'

'It is an open discussion. Sometimes professors from University of Dar es Salaam come and present to them. For example, this year we have two presentations on the meeting. The one is financing of education in Tanzania, related with foreign aid, and the other one is about quality of education, about how we achieving the MDGs. Professors from department of education, University of Dar es Salaam, will come and give the performance report.'

They mentioned both developed and developing countries as their donors. China is also invited to attend the yearly review meeting.

'This review is held every year, with different partners. We wish Asian countries can come, such as Japan, China and India. We welcome them to come. They are supporting us a lot.... China is also one the supporters of the review. But they could not come last year, which made us very disappointed. So we will invite China again this year, and hope that they can come. Normally they come.... We do appreciate the support from other countries, and we really want to learn some experience in China.'

The comments by two official people in the Ministry of Education gives an idea that, firstly, they are dealing with donors worldwide in both the North and South; and secondly, they need help from the rising Asian countries including China, even if the main donors are still Western countries. They showed their sincerity by inviting countries such as China because these developing countries probably can give more practical developing experience. 'We are sitting by one table... discussing our problems, and giving suggestions...', as they said. So it is possible to predict, if actively present, that China could quickly become to be one of the members on this table and give advice and support to Tanzanian education development. However, on the other side, it is still a question as to whether China can sit and talk with other Western donors together on one table. 'Probably because of the critics from West, China was afraid to come...Last year they did

not come, but this year we wish they can'... Even though Maggie made this like a joke, we still can read into some disharmony between the West and China on African issues.

Overall, the history that Tanzania developed is also a history of changing relation between Tanzania and its external donors. The Western strategy of international aid to Tanzania is part of the global agenda of aid (as mentioned in Part One, from the time from Washington Consensus to the Post Washington Consensus and the PRSP) – a reflection of the traditional model of Western donor and recipient logic, to a reformed relationship with increased focus on the outcome and recipient-driven mechanism. For Tanzania, the current solution for overcoming previous foreign aid problems is their beloved JAST. However how many donors will go on to sign on JAST, and how will it affect the future, we still don't know the answer. On the other hand, China's influence on a table for donors is being felt. From the interview information we know that, from the Tanzanian government's perspective, China's experience of development and support on educational development are welcomed. It is also in Tanzania's interest that China can join in Tanzania education review meeting in the ministry, together with Western donors, to discuss foreign aid. However, we don't know if Chinese embassy will dispatch someone to attend.

It can be seen that an overall trend that Tanzania is in reform on aid relation in this post- Washington Consensus era. At this time, can China bring a new atmosphere to Tanzania? A historical fact is that Chinese have been in Africa for many years, but how do Africans see China as donor? Although Chinese people are not new to Tanzania, and currently China is attractive for Tanzania, China is no longer in their previous socialism era with Tanzania. Let's firstly have a review of the China-Tanzania relation, and see a series of stories which may be different from the West-Tanzania relationships from past through to today.

### **3. A distinctive historical link between China and Tanzania**

What we want to discuss next is the special relationship between China and Tanzania. Although Tanzania is only one case in a wide range of African countries,



the distinctive history between the two countries, and the influence of this historical tie, has given the contemporary China-Tanzania relationship a different view from the West.

China began its relationship with Tanzania from 1961. China established diplomatic relations with Tanganyika and Zanzibar on December 9, 1961 and December 11, 1963 respectively; Tanganyika and Zanzibar were united and became Tanzania on April 26, 1964, and China took the Union day as the date of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United Republic of Tanzania (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 12/08/2010). We can see the relationship developed in the field of politics, economy and culture and education; the table below demonstrates that the political and economic relationship was far earlier than the educational link.

Table 6.6 A brief historical review of political, economic and cultural/educational relation between China and Tanzania

	Political	Economic	Cultural and Educational
<b>1961-1963</b>	China established diplomatic relations with Tanganyika (09/12/1961) and Zanzibar (11/12/1963) respectively		Agreement of Cultural Cooperation signed between China and Tanganyika in 1962
<b>1964</b>	China took the union day as the date of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United Republic of Tanzania; 26/04/1964	Various assistance started from China to Tanzania (railway, factories, etc.); China-Tanzanian joint venture cooperation started in the 1960s	China started to gradually accept Tanzanian students in 60s
<b>1964-1985</b>	Nyerere visited China five times as President		
<b>1964-</b>		A series of bilateral agreement were signed <sup>88</sup>	

<sup>88</sup> According to the website of the embassy of China in Tanzania, from 1964, for example, the Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the United Republic of Tanzania (June 1964); The Trade Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the United Republic of Tanzania (February 1965); The Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Government of Republic of Zambia on the

<b>1970-1976</b>		TAZARA railway construction	
<b>1971</b>	At the 26th General Assembly of the UN, Tanzania was among the sponsoring countries of the resolution supporting the restoration of all China's legitimate rights in the world body		
<b>1981</b>		China-Tanzanian mutually beneficial cooperation began	
<b>1985-1995</b>	President Ali Hassan Mwinyi continued to pursue a friendly policy towards China and visited China twice		
<b>30/04/1992</b>			Cultural Agreement signed between the two Governments in Dodoma
<b>1995-2005</b>	President Benjamin William Mkapa visited China twice and spoken highly of China's assistance and its independent foreign policy of peace and its experience on the reform and opening-up policy <sup>89</sup>	China Investment and Trade Promotion Center was established in Tanzania in 1997	
<b>2000-2003</b>	First FOCAC in October of		Agreement on

Construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (September 1967); The Barter Trade Protocol between the People's Republic of China and the United Republic of Tanzania (March 1984); The Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania on the Establishment of a Joint Economic and Trade Commission (August 1985); The Framework Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the Provision of an Interest-Subsidized Preferential Credit by China to Tanzania (1996 and 1997) (Embassy of the PRC in the United Republic of Tanzania, 04/04/2008a).

<sup>89</sup> In January 1998, China and Tanzania signed the Agreement between the Government of the PRC and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania on the Establishment of Honorary Consulate by the United Republic of Tanzania in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China.



	2000 and the second one was in December of 2003; <sup>90</sup> the dialogue grows		developing the cooperative project of higher education between two ministries of education in June
2005-2007			Chinese side offered one hundred government full scholarships to Tanzania each year, while Tanzanian side offered China five government scholarships in 2006, and four government scholarships in 2007

As shown in the table, strengthened educational relationship between China and Tanzania started in the 90s and was built on the history of political and economic connections between the two countries. It is claimed by Chinese government that cultural and educational cooperation is key for strengthening the friendly bilateral relation between the two countries, and for making diverse forms of relations. What is making this relationship special, and what are the key factors during the history? Beside the South-South cooperation, which is different from the West (the Northern aid), we cannot avoid talking about a person, a railway, and an agreement in the following section.

<sup>90</sup> In October 2000, President Benjamin William Mkapa led a government delegation to participate in the 2000 ministerial meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing, and made a speech at the opening ceremony.

## **4. Different from the West: from socialism friendship to agreement in the global era**

### **4.1 Nyerere's time and influence**

During interview work in Dar es Salaam, I always heard people mention the first president of the country, Julius Nyerere. Sometimes I could also see his picture in the city. We cannot say Nyerere made the country develop very well in the right direction, but we can feel that his idea of development and his personality influenced the country significantly. Mentioning him here is necessary because this president set a friendly relationship with China in Tanzanian history, and his influence contributed to the country's development.

As the first President of Tanzania and previously Tanganyika, from the country's founding in 1964 until his retirement in 1985, Nyerere introduced a policy known as Ujamaa (meaning 'familyhood'), and community-based farming collectives. BBC (14/10/1999) said: Ten years later, taking stock, President Nyerere issued a remarkably honest booklet which gave as much prominence to the failures as well as the successes (BBC news, 14/10/1999).

As an 'African Socialist', he established close relations with China. During his time as president he visited China five times, and another eight times from 1987-1990 when he was the chairman of South Commission.<sup>91</sup>

During 1960s there was a rapid growth of the Tanzania-China relations, partly due to Nyerere's wish to reduce his country's dependence on British power and to adopt a more non-aligned position in world affairs. A brief review follows (Bailey, 1975: 40-41):

1962 Cultural agreement signed between China and Tanganyika;

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<sup>91</sup> The South Commission was established in 1987. At the Non Aligned Summit Meeting held in Harare in September 1986, Dr. Mahatir Bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, announced the intention to establish the Commission and also made known that Julius Nyerere, had accepted the invitation to be its Chairman. It is an intergovernmental organisation of developing countries established by an Intergovernmental Agreement which came into force on 31 July 1995 with its headquarters in Geneva. Until 15 February, 2008, there were 50 developing countries which signed, ratified, or acceded to the Intergovernmental Agreement. The centre is working for promoting South solidarity, South-South cooperation and other mutual understandings (see South Centre website, [http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=635&Itemid=80](http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=635&Itemid=80)).



1964 Tanzanian Vice-President Kawawa and Babu visited Beijing, signed an agreement for 320 million Shs, of development aid; Tanzanian embassy was opened in Beijing in October;

1965 Nyerere's first visit to China in February and impressed with the achievements the new China made;

1966 A Chinese Economic and Commercial Mission opened in Dar es Salaam, as an evidence of the growing functional ties between the two countries;

1967 Tanzania, Zambia and China signed in September on a tripartite agreement under which the Chinese undertook to finance and build the Tanzam Railway (TAZARA Railway), Chinese largest aid project in the Third World;

1968 Nyerere's second visit to Beijing in June.

This relation continued to grow during the 1970s, when Nyerere went to visit China and received a warm welcome in Beijing. Nyerere showed a keen interest in China's example, which offered an important alternative model of development to that which Africa inherited from the period of European colonialism. Therefore Tanzania learnt from China how to build a socialist society, especially with the focus on self-reliance and development of rural area (ibid: 41).

On April 26, 1965, Nyerere addressed Tanzanians on frugality. He said (Ndaskoi, 2004):

I learned one very important thing. China is a huge country, with a population of more than six hundred million people. And the Chinese Government is one of those which is making money and technicians available to Tanzania to help us with our development plan. But they are able to do this only because they are a frugal people; they husband their resources very carefully indeed, and only spend money on things which are absolutely essential. This is true both of individuals and of the Government. There are hardly any private cars in China; people go to work by bus or on bicycles. The Government officials too, use cars only when it is really necessary for their job-and then the cars are small and cheap ones.

It is always said in Chinese history that Nyerere and Chairman Mao had a good friendship as they were doing similar reforms in their countries, aimed at trying to speed up the social development in a socialism system. We can obtain some idea about how Nyerere considered China's power, and how Mao considered China's support to Tanzania, from the following dialogue between the two: (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 25/03/1974)

Nyerere: If the Third World does not have China, they (the two super powers) will not be afraid of us.

Mao: They will also be afraid.

Nyerere: The Third world without China will be a 'paper tiger'.

Mao: We cannot say this. The solidarity of the Third World will let Japan, Europe and the two super powers pay more attention.

Nyerere: China did a lot to help Africa.

Mao: No, the help is very little.... What we should do, actually is to teach... to teach your doctors, and also to teach you how to build the railway and road, to do the construction... Thus when we leave, you can manage it by yourselves. If not, then our help is not good.

Mao: I heard that some of my people did something wrong there? If you find any problem, please tell our ambassador. That is because we did not educate them very well when people getting more there.

Nyerere: They did not complain with very poor working and living condition.

It is a brief but rational talk between the two presidents. Although both of them did not succeeded in their social reforms, the talk about the South, about aid, and about China's role was understandable and meaningful. Mao did not show a powerful China, but emphasised the powerful South. He did not show a very 'right' Chinese aid, but mentioned their fault during the aid practice. We also found that Mao knew that continuing development did not require Chinese assistant workers in Tanzania, but teaching, which meant providing education to help Tanzanians master the skills, and learn how to develop.



## 4.2 The TAZARA railway

In Tanzania there are currently 40 Chinese companies carrying out labour contract businesses. According to figures released by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, in 2007 bilateral trade volume reached 794 million U.S. dollars, up 48.4% compared with 2006. Goods exported from China to Tanzania include food, vehicles, textiles, light industrial products, chemical products, goods China imported to Tanzania include dried seafood, raw leather, wood, and wood crafts, and blister copper (Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, 2008b). Within all of the Chinese projects in Tanzania, and even those in Africa more generally, the TAZARA railway is probably the most impressive until now.

On the website of 'A 30-Year History: Exhibition on China's Opening Up' (Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, 2008a), China reviewed the important progress in the past 30 years. When the web mentions the China-Tanzania relationship, the Tanzania-Zambia Railway is called 'the China-Africa monument' (Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, 2008b), which shows an idea that the railway is not just represents the relations between the two countries, but China and the continent of Africa.<sup>92</sup> When the ambassador Liu met me in the Chinese embassy in Dar es Salaam, he firstly mentioned the railway:

China has a good relation with Tanzania in history, as we know. Tanzania is the biggest recipient country in Africa from China. The TAZARA railway project probably will be the biggest one in the past and the future.

In China-Africa history, China is not a new county for Tanzania. It started to provide Tanzania with aid projects in 1964, including the TAZARA Railway, Friendship Textile Factory, Mubuhally Farm, Kivienay Coal Mine, Mahongda Sugar-refinery, iz Water-supply Project, and National Stadium (ibid).

'TAZARA', the 1,860-kilometer-long Tanzania-Zambia Railway and known as 'Freedom Railway' amongst local people, runs east from Dar es Salaam through

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<sup>92</sup> The document is from the official website of 'A 30-Year History: Exhibition on China's Opening Up'. This is an exhibition on China's opening up performance in the last 30 years, with thousands pictures, historic artefacts, and models. The content of the exhibition is shown on the website.

to New Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia. The Chinese government has provided tens of millions Yuan in an interest-free loan, and nearly 1 million tons of equipment and materials for building the railway. Large numbers of human resources also were dispatched for the railway construction. About 50,000 engineers and technicians were sent to Dar es Salaam, and 64 Chinese people lost their lives during their work in Tanzania (Embassy of the PRC in the United Republic of Tanzania, 27/10/2009c). In Dar es Salaam, there is still a gravestone commemorating 69 Chinese experts and workers who died in China's aid projects for Tanzanian national constructions. The youngest was only 24 years old when he died (Xinhuanet, 16/02/2009b). As the Chinese official documents said, the railway, as a milestone in the history of Sino-African relations, serves not only as an economic tie between Tanzania and Zambia, but also enhanced and enhances the friendship between China and Africa.

However it was not a one-way contribution, as China eagerly needed support from developing countries at that time (also mentioned in Chapter four about China's changing relation with Africa). The railway was important for Tanzania and Zambia. According to Premier Zhou, 'for Tanzania and Zambia, the railway is not just meaningful in economic development, but also in the field of politics and military. It should be built, by us, or by others' (He, Y., 2009). China took on the project, which was rejected by the Western donors such as the World Bank. On the other hand, Tanzania supported China on the international stage through China's 'one China' issue. At the 26th General Assembly of the UN in 1971, Tanzania was among the sponsoring countries of the resolution supporting the restoration of all China's legitimate rights in the world body. This stands as a good example of China's win-win theory, as the railway was built to benefit the local development of the recipient country, and China got benefit in the long run- a good relationship, political support, and economic cooperation.

Today, TAZARA is still mentioned frequently by the government in the media or during official speeches, and referred to as an impressive example of China-African friendship. As said by Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, when paying his tribute to the cemetery during a 1999 trip to the country: 'The friendship between the two countries, fostered by the late Chinese leaders Mao



Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the late Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, and of course the railway workers, is indeed cemented with blood' (People's Daily, 11/10/2000).

### **4.3 The Cultural Agreement**

In terms of education, it is necessary to say something about the Cultural Agreement between the two countries. Many years ago an agreement, the Agreement of Cultural Cooperation, was reached between the Government of the Republic of Tanganyika and the Government of the People's Republic of China, and signed on December 13 in 1962 (Government of the Republic of Tanganyika and the Government of the PRC, 1992). But the increasing series of cooperation between the two countries has heightened during the last two decades.

As the website of Chinese embassy in Tanzania introduces (and this was also confirmed by Secretary Chen when I did interview in the Embassy), the two countries, with a view to further promote the friendly relations and strengthening of exchanges and cooperation in the field of culture, and in accordance with the Cultural Agreement signed between the two Governments on April 30, 1992 in Dodoma, have agreed on an implementing program (Embassy of the PRC in the United Republic of Tanzania, 04/07/2008b). Based on the agreement, a cooperative project on higher education between the Ministry of Education of PRC and the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education of Tanzania was signed in June of 2000. The Chinese side provided the Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT) with two micro-computer teachers and helped DIT to develop teaching and research in the field of micro-computers, and also trained lecturers and students on micro-computer knowledge so as to develop technology in Tanzania. During the years 2005 to 2007, the Chinese side offered one hundred full government scholarships to Tanzania each year. Tanzania offered China five government scholarships in 2006, and four government scholarships in 2007. The permanent secretary of Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology visited China in September 2007. Qingdao arts group attended the 10th Zanzibar International Film Festival (ZIFF) in June 2007, and a Tanzanian arts group

attended the 7th China International Folk Arts Festival in September (ibid).

Bearing in mind the purpose and provisions of the 1962 agreement, the 1992 Cultural Agreement has made an effort towards cultural cooperation between the two countries, this includes educational cooperation. The agreement declares, 'the two Contracting Parties (PRC and the United Republic of Tanzania) agree, in accordance with the principles of equality and mutual benefit, to promote exchanges and cooperation between the two countries in the fields of culture, education, science, health, sports, publication, the press and broadcasting'. The agreement has set several articles to detail the cooperation in the different fields. For example, in the cultural field, there are some artists and writers exchanges between the two sides; in the sport field, there are some athletes, coaches and sports teams dispatches; in the field of science, there are some exchanges of visits and lectures tours by social scientists and relevant materials; and in the field of media, there are also cooperation in forms of the press, broadcasting, television, the cinema. Another part features important details. It is the Article 3 as follows:

The two Contracting Parties agree to undertake the following program of exchange and cooperation in the field of education:

- (a) Exchange of visits and study and lecture tours by teachers, scholars and specialists;
- (b) Grant scholarship to each other's students according to needs and possibilities;
- (c) Facilitate the establishment of direct contacts and cooperation between institutions of higher learning of the two countries;
- (d) Encourage the exchanges of textbooks and other materials between the educational institutions of the two countries;
- (e) Encourage and facilitate the attendance by scholars or specialists of each other's country at international academic meetings held in the other country;
- (f) Encourage training of technicians (Government of the Republic of Tanganyika and the Government of the PRC, 1992).

The Cultural Agreement is a key point here as the main approaches, such as



Chinese governmental scholarships for Tanzanian students and short term training, are all issued in this agreement. Secretary Chen in the Chinese embassy (the Cultural and educational counsellor) introduced more details under the Cultural Agreement, those of which will be introduced in the next chapter which discusses Chinese scholarships. As Chen said, the Cultural Agreement was for the two countries' cooperation and exchange in the cultural and educational field. For example, official scholarships were offered by the two sides to each other, although the numbers were unbalanced, given that the populations were not equal.<sup>93</sup> There were also some one-way extra scholarships for Tanzania after the 2006 Beijing Summit, but Chen emphasised this was not included in the 100 scholarships signed on Cultural Agreement.

Named as an agreement, the most important thing is the form rather than the content it shows: a mutual engaging activity, an interaction between these two countries, rather than a donor-recipient relationship. China may want to express that an 'agreement' means both parties have the possibility and ability to talk about deals and cooperative action. This can be felt in the confidence of Tanzanian officials when they discussed this.

#### **4.4 New world, new era**

With the history now past, can these people from both donor and recipient countries realise a difference between the past and the present? We notice that, it is different usage of the word 'aid' on Chinese official websites. On the website of the embassy, they still use the word 'assistance', but on the latest very big web exhibition of China's progress of 30 years since opening-up, the word 'aid' has been used. Understanding this as a native Chinese, I think the word 'aid' has more economic meaning, but 'assistance' has more moral feeling of humanistic care, although they are the same words in Chinese: Yuan Zhu. Does this show us a sign that China is going to make a systematical change in its discourse and conceptions of foreign relations and in donor-recipient relations, a shift from the traditional political 'brothers' logic replaced by the economic 'win-win' logic?

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<sup>93</sup> Scholarships will be talked in next chapter.

During the field work, when being asked about the relationship between the two countries, both the people giving aid or receiving aid all knew the history of the railway and about Nyerere's friendly attitude towards China. It was not just known by the donor side. However, people also knew that the time is changing and we are not stopping on the TAZARA time.

During the interview in the Chinese embassy, ambassador Liu talked a lot about the historical transformation of China and Tanzania. What is interesting to me was not telling about the contributions China made for Tanzania or the deep friendship between them, but rather about the change, the difference (from the West) and the impact upon the two-sides (advantage and disadvantages). As the ambassador said:

Tanzania is one of the early independent countries in Africa. It was close to China and Russia during the socialism period. At that time the country was against the West. With the end of Cold War and the wave of promoting democracy by the West, African countries actually got a lot of pressure at that time. Many African countries started to do reforms, including Tanzania. We cannot say it is good or bad. But from the position of Tanzanian people, they got more chances of foreign aid. There are more donors and financial support to them.

He mentioned the situation of changing donors in Tanzania:

China has a good relation with Tanzania in history, as we know. Tanzania is the biggest recipient country in Africa from China. The TAZARA railway project probably will be the biggest one in the past and the future. With the time going on, there are more and more bilateral aid to Tanzania. China has been their socialism brothers, their biggest supporter, but now it is not the only donor country, and far behind the Western countries. We give them aid worth 0.1 billion RMB every year. However, Bush came this February and gave 0.697 billion USD just by once. You can see the difference between us.



When asked about personal perception, Liu talked about his changing opinion towards Chinese aid and Western aid:

Previously I thought the Western aid is not very good, because I thought Chinese aid is unconditional and self-giving. But my opinion is changing. For our aid project, the advantage is, we can control the whole process, such as building the national sport stadium or the hospital or the schools. Tanzanian does not have to control the money so we can use the budget very efficiently. We say we devote 0.1 billion, but the money is in Chinese Ministry of Commerce. We have our own construction team and we give Tanzanian the finished product. Normally our speed is incredible for Tanzanian. And on the other hand, compared with Western team, we have less labour cost. ... But we have some other problems. In very few cases, we built the things they did not need, and another problem is, how to maintain the product. For example, if we build a hospital for them, then do we also need to offer them the medical materials and even doctors? We then may be involved into more and more issues. So the Western donors may have realised the problem during the recent years, and started to give direct financial support. But China will still maintain this approach at the moment, and see if we can make it more scientific. The old 'brothers' relation' will be instead by a new relation with more consideration of the market and mutual benefit.

As Liu said, it is a new century and the Western countries have already been the main donors for Tanzania. It is perhaps good for the recipient country, as there more opportunities. And the Western countries have different approaches from China. The West changed their aid approach with more direct financial support to Tanzania, to let the country itself manage the money for their urgent needs, no matter if that money is spent on AIDS or primary education. All of these changes are giving Tanzania a new atmosphere and a global donor group. Liu said in the meeting with me that:

Africa is developing in the new century and is attractive for the world.

China is also facing a time of 'going out', and Africa obviously is a good choice. Beijing Summit has very good strategic plans in Africa.... Africa also need development, thus it is a win-win process. Win-win, actually it is a kind of mutual need under the new situation. ... After 2006, both Europe and America also put more interest on Africa. Europe even advised to build a triangle relation including Africa, China and Europe, seems excluding USA. It means all of us is getting more and more to view Africa as a hope. Some people say that the 21<sup>st</sup> century is Asian people's century, but I think it may also an African century.

That is why China held the new FOCAC in the new century, setting new policy languages and adding new principles to Africa to make a transformation from a political friendship to a win-win one based on economic cooperation. It is a kind of integration into the global market by the two sides. When Africa can manage its development better, the mutual relationship can have more bidirectional flows and more production on both the spiritual (knowledge) and material level.

## **5. Perceptions of China's motive/logic**

What, then, can we learn about China's changing motives in Tanzania from our field work? Firstly, although written in 1970s, some of the words of Bailey (1975: 50) are still meaningful today, especially his quote of Nyerere's 'unequal equals':

Chinese aid, far from reducing the freedom of Tanzanian decision-makers to pursue their own foreign policy, has in fact increased their scope for manoeuvre in the international arena. Chinese material backing, both for aid projects and the armed forces, has provided the necessary support over issues such as the Southern African liberation struggle, and the most important example of this aid is the Tanzam Railway which plays a vital role in Africa's search for political and economic independence. The growing relationship between Tanzania and China is, as Nyerere once explained, a 'friendship between most unequal equals'.

We can see that, the relationship between China and Tanzania appeared to be very



one-sided. Even today, the cooperation in education is mainly China offering scholarships to Tanzania, while much less are offered from Tanzania to China. What are the motives behind China's active support of Tanzania while they are insisting on a win-win relation?

In fact, except for the official people, most of the other interviewees are not interested in discussing this. For them it is politics, and some student recipients simply told me they did not understand these things. Some of the institutional leaders showed me that they would care about the real practice- i.e. how much support the donors can give- rather than what they are really thinking about. The ones who discussed this more or less expressed the similar idea that the China-Africa relationship is about what you give and I give. We will have more discussion in the next chapter when talk about the historical influence.

Here, it is prudent to look at Ambassador Liu's words, when he talked about the reason of giving aid to Tanzania. Liu mentioned the importance of the country:

Tanzania has relatively stable society and abundant natural resource. The country has never had a very big civil war or social movement. Dar es Salaam is an important port. The country has a good investment environment in Africa. The geographical condition and the political condition are all good for invest. So it is attractive for us. And the country can use the aid resource properly, compared with other countries. It is developing, and we can see some hope of it, just like China's situation during 70s to 80s. If they can maintain this level of development, it may take ten years to get to a better condition.

Tanzanian officials in the Ministry of Education were more likely to tell me what they need, rather than what they think China wants. When asked about the motives of China, one of the officials responded that it was just about doing practical things for Tanzanians. She said:

I will say that it is based on the friendship. Because looking into history, the number is increasing. It is looking what Tanzania needs at present.

From last year, we got postgraduate scholarships from China... It is unlike three years ago when we only mainly had undergraduate scholarships from China. Many students can study in China when we have very limited postgraduate students. It can solve very practical problem in Tanzania, what we need. (Kim)

It is interesting that one of the returning students, now as an official working at the technical office in the Ministry of Education, noted his opinion towards this ‘politics’:

Those are politics. It is cooperation... I get something from you, and you get some from me... (Win-win) Yes win-win. (John)<sup>94</sup>

Of course, in quite different vein from the positive words towards China found in Tanzanian fieldwork, in the academic world there are quite a few African perspectives which worry about what China will bring, for instance the environmental problem (Lemos and Ribeiro, 2007: 63), and whether the relation really will be a win-win one (Karumbidza, 2007: 87). However, we noticed that most of the opinions, both in the field and on paper, were aware that China was opening a new page and would bring new atmosphere into Africa.

## Conclusion

Above all, from my perception to interviewees’ recognition, from historical introduction to field study of current viewpoints, we had an exploration into Tanzania. As we mentioned already, this is China’s biggest recipient country in Africa, and we chose it for both historical and practical reasons. In this chapter, we were trying to see the distinctive China-Tanzania relation and its contemporary situation.

Some points can be summarised:

(1) The Western aid, including educational aid, has been in Tanzania since the end

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<sup>94</sup> Some of his understandings about the West will be shown in the next chapter, when we discuss the historical roots of these returning students’ perceptions.



of colonial times. However, within the changing global discourse and agendas on international aid (as shown in Chapter Two), the aid performance didn't bring an optimistic situation for Tanzanian education. Efforts were made by donors and the Tanzanian government to make reforms on the framework of the aid administration: from previous separate donor-recipient relations, to a donor group-recipient relation. It is claimed to be the beginning for more Tanzanian ownership and better management of aid resources.

(2) As a non-colonising nation, China has a different history with Tanzania from the West. Although time has passed, the Nyerere-Mao friendship is still recognised by many Tanzanians, especially the elders. The TAZARA railway is still used and well talked about by local people, and is known as the biggest project China had in Africa. The workers who died in the construction for Tanzanian national development are buried in Tanzania and still honoured by Chinese officials. It can be seen that these memories can help China and Chinese keep a good image in and a close feeling to, Tanzania.

(3) However, today China is no longer a big donor in Tanzania. How does China stay in Africa together with (or even cooperate with) the Western donors, and how is China perceived in the new era? China nowadays is engaging in Africa with its new version of aid and cooperation (as introduced in Chapter 4), including practice in Tanzania (with China's Cultural Agreement). The Chinese officials also showed their recognition of the changing time – the situation of staying in Tanzania with many big Western donors with more consideration on economic growth. On another hand Tanzania, as a recipient country, realises ownership's importance and is willing to make an effort on solving its urgent needs by itself and with the support from a group of donors, no matter if those countries are developing or developed.

(4) Tanzanian stories may not represent the whole situation of China's action and logic in Africa. But the Tanzanian case can represent that this is an era with critical thinking and reformed ideas regarding the orthodox West-oriented aid. On this point China, with its win-win logic, can easily be seen as one of the alternative solutions for the low performance of Western aid. Meanwhile, China is

clear with its new position in Africa and recognises the competition and cooperation with the Western donors.

Finally, we may not say we have examined the 'real world' as an ethnographer. The people we interviewed were mainly officials and Tanzanians who had proper education and jobs. So we did not grasp whether the poorer Tanzanians could take advantage of these aid opportunities. Thus, in the following chapters we plan to explore the main practice of China in more detail, and find out how people talk about, i.e. mainly on the higher and vocational education level.



## **Chapter Seven      Donor logic in action: a focus on higher education ---- Translating policy words into practice**

### **Introduction**

There are two levels of recognition of donor logic in this study: the theoretical/historical recognition, and the practice recognition. The latter one we examine from the field work in Tanzania and China. Yet sometimes the practice may not be recognised very well as it is stated in theory, and sometimes the practice can be recognised as the policy through someone's translation. Here, 'donor logic in action' means, in the following two chapters, that we are examining the donors' practice on the ground, and analysing the inner logic behind these actions we have directly heard and seen, and finally, seeing whether the logic in these theories can be recognised in action.

In chapters 2-5, we reviewed the changing discourse, aid mechanisms and dynamics of the West and China. We also compared the discourse of policies as well as the related different aims and social relations between the West and China. We reviewed how China changed its policy in Africa, and how it engaged in Africa in the new century since the FOCAC. All of the conclusions and theories found in these chapters are donor logic in words, or on paper. So in the field work, we plan to see how it is practised and perceived (e.g. as donors claimed? as recipients expected? as different as we supposed? etc.).

In the last chapter, after looking at China-Tanzania relations and their historical links, we saw historical differences between the West and China. These differences, and the contemporary situation, were recognised by Chinese officials, and the Chinese historical link also recognised by Tanzanian people. Now we want to know more about China's general educational practice in Africa today. So the next two chapters are about the main action China is performing for African countries to give them educational support. As the study could only take one African country for fieldwork, the next chapters include the analysis results of

fieldwork conducted in three cities in China, especially in Chinese universities.

Through the field interviews, we get more confirmation that the main support approach from China to Tanzania is at the higher educational level, mainly taking the form of scholarships, short term training and culture exchange. There are also some other forms, such as teacher and volunteer dispatch, which also feature 'Chinese characters'. China does not give much direct financial support, just some donations of teaching materials. This chapter analyses the empirical work on student scholarships based on a series of field work conducted in Tanzania. It comprises three parts.

The first part is an overview of China's current educational aid to Tanzania related to FOCAC pledges. This is mainly presented in a table, in order to give an idea of the total aid approaches FOCAC promised, and within these aid practice how much we could find in Tanzania, and how much I discovered in the fieldwork.

Following the overview framework we start to look at the general mechanism of the most important Chinese aid approach – government scholarship. The data here are mainly obtained from interviews with Chinese and Tanzanian officials. The interview results show how the Chinese secretary in the embassy is translating policy words into practice. Without this translation, action carried out by the Chinese government may not be recognised as such by me (and by other people). The Chinese embassy and a department in the Tanzanian Ministry of Education which is working for student scholarships work closely to implement China's action of scholarship offered to Tanzania. It can be seen that training students with university degrees in China (rather than teaching in Africa) is the most important route taken by China. Particularly, the Chinese government tries to demonstrate two-way cooperation through a 'student exchange' agreement, broadly located under their Cultural Agreement.

The third part is a case study at the Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT). Through a review of DIT's establishment and history, we can trace the close historical relationship between this institute and China. Under the agreement between the Chinese embassy and DIT, China currently dispatches teachers



regularly to DIT and also trains DIT lecturers in China with Chinese governmental scholarships. Compared with only two Chinese computer teachers in DIT, the scholarships seem to have more influence. A number of returning students are teaching in DIT with their masters and PhD degrees obtained in China. The interview with the DIT principal shows his positive attitude towards China's support, but also his scepticism about real 'win-win' situation, as well as his concerns about a continuing human capacity growth in DIT, even in Tanzania.

In the fourth part, we look at the perception of study in China from returning students who are now working in the DIT, in government, and in companies in Tanzania. These returning students, in a group interview, revealed their experience in China and issued some critical points regarding Chinese higher education for foreign students. There are some main conclusions to be drawn from their opinion: the double-edged feeling about degree length, funding amount, teaching quality and communication; the difference in the responses of younger generations and the older ones, on their feelings towards China; and the historical influence on the understanding of East and West. Although these ideas may not be generalised given the small sample, the words from these returning students shows us the gap between the past and present, the gap between what China wants to offer and what students want to have, and the gap between what individuals feel and what the researchers describe.

In this structure, we can see both what official people propose and discuss, and also how people who benefited from this feel and perceive it. We also can see how an institutional leader understands this approach (the interview with DIT principal). From diverse perspectives, we will have an understanding about how and why this approach is acceptable, what advantages or disadvantages it has, as well as how people perceive it compared to the Western way.

## **1. Overview of China-Tanzania educational practice under the FOCAC pledges**

The table below shows the general situation of China-Africa educational

cooperation and the overall practice or plan in Tanzania, as well as the practice particularly investigated in my fieldwork. The general aid approaches by China in Africa, as summarised from both documentary resources and my fieldwork data, include (1) government scholarship, (2) short-term training, (3) cultural exchanges, (4) Confucius Institute, (5) school building and donation, (6) teacher secondment, and (7) university cooperation.

Chinese government does not provide details of the financial commitment or amounts it promised to African countries on each of these approaches. This unclarity may be for three reasons. Firstly, as we will show below, China's aid does not come in the form of cash, or cost calculable projects. The dominant aid modality is scholarships and no figures are available on the cost of each scholarship, for instance, university income for overseas scholars. In effect, only the cost of building is easily obtainable, and this is shown in the table below. The second reason is the more general one that Chinese aid delivery channels are fragmented across several government ministries or institutions. The main authority is the Ministry of Commerce, but various other governmental bodies such as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Chinese Embassies, and the State Council are involved in the decision making process (Pehnelt, 2007: 2; Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, 2009: 19). Thirdly, according to Pehnelt (2007: 2), as well as the problem of fragmentation, analyzing the size and quality of China's aid program is not a trivial task because of a fundamental lack of transparency.

In the educational field, aid and cooperation plans are always carried out by Ministry of Education and Ministry of Commerce, in accordance with Chinese Embassies and authorised Chinese universities. The amount budgeted for China-Africa cooperation on higher education and research programmes since 1995, is 10 million RMB (about 1.53 million USD) budget, within which 60%-70% is for staff and 30%-40% for teaching facilities (PKUCAS, 2005: 28). The FOCAC pledges showed the numbers of the commitments, for instance, scholarships and schools that China promises (which can be seen in the following table) but not the financial statistics. In terms of scholarships, figures recently



published by the China Daily show that China increased the total finance of government scholarships to 6.5 billion RMB in 2010 (about 0.99 billion USD) which includes the finance for African students (China Daily, 01/02/2010). Summing the living cost component (the only cash delivered to students) of each scholarship enables us to make a rough calculation of the level of investment involved. The allocations are 1,400 RMB for undergraduate students monthly, 1,700 RMB for master students monthly, and 2,000 RMB for PhD students monthly (ibid). This adds up to about 72,000 RMB (about 11,076 USD) for the living cost of a PhD study and 61,200 RMB (about 9,415 USD) for a Master study (both are 36 months) in China.<sup>95</sup> More specifically, as we see in the Table below, China planned to allocate 72 scholarships to Tanzanian students in 2011. If we assume that the average cost of these may be close to the cost of the Masters support, 1,700 RMB monthly, that adds up to a total of around 1,468,800 RMB (about 225,969 USD) per year for scholarship support to Tanzania.

During my fieldwork, Tanzanian officials showed their increasing interest in Chinese government scholarships, although as I discovered, the Chinese Embassy also made some donation to Mkapa School, and the principal of DUCE also joined into short-term training. Apart from the scholarships offered by diverse Chinese universities, one-to-one university cooperation plays an important part in enlarging China-Tanzania cooperation, and Tanzanian DIT has a long history with Xi'an Jiao Tong University. The practice that happened after my fieldwork also shows a trend of strengthened university cooperation between China and Africa, especially with the involvement of top Chinese university ECNU (collaborating with University of Dar es Salaam, under the 20+20 Plan).

Table 7.1 China's current educational aid to Tanzania related to FOCAC pledges

Aid approaches	General situation (FOCAC pledges)	Tanzanian situation	My fieldwork
<i>Government scholarship</i>	Achieved 4,000 by 2009 (doubling the number of 2006) and aim to 5,500	Main approach, keep 100 Tanzanian students in China every year	In Tanzania, officials from both of Chinese

<sup>95</sup> The tuition fee, accommodation fee and some travel grants are paid by Chinese government. The cash in the above calculation are given to students for living and study.

	by 2012 (FOCAC, 2009c) to African countries; The number of scholarship recipients increased by 700 year-on-year both in 2007 and 2008 and by 600 in 2009 (ibid)	under 'Cultural Agreement' and some extra numbers as a 'follow up of FOCAC 2006'(Embassy of the PRC in the United republic of Tanzania, 2009a); Chinese universities and colleges will enrol 72 Tanzanian students for bachelor, master and doctor degrees in 2011 (Xinhuanet, 2011)	Embassy in Tanzania and Tanzanian Ministry of Education confirmed and introduced this way (as the main approach of Chinese educational aid) and its procedure
<b><i>Short-term training</i></b>	Annual training for educational officials as well as heads and leading teachers of universities, primary, secondary and vocational schools in Africa (FOCAC, 2006b) <sup>96</sup>	Not showed specifically on official documents	This way was also confirmed and introduced by officials in Chinese Embassy. Principal of DUCE talked about her experience in a workshop in China; In China, ZJNU lecturers showed me their three-year training summaries
<b><i>Cultural exchanges (related education)</i></b>	The FOCAC pledges included 'to promote cultural exchanges' (FOCAC, 2006b; 2009b); and planned to hold the FOCAC Culture Forum in	Cultural Agreement between China and Tanzania (the implementation programme has been signed every four years;	The principal and secretary of Mkapa School showed me the room and donated books of Chinese

<sup>96</sup> It was added in the 2009 Action Plan that, there would be 200 middle and high level African administrative personnel on MPA programs in China in three years; China would help African countries train teachers for primary, secondary and vocational schools and train 1,500 school headmasters and teachers over the next three years (FOCAC, 2009b).



	future in 2009 Action Plan	latest one is for 2009-2012); Mkapa Cultural Centre has been reported frequently on Chinese media	Culture Centre
<b><i>Confucius Institute</i></b>	Increase the number of scholarships offered to Chinese language teachers to help them study in China, and double efforts to raise capacity of local African teachers to teach the Chinese language (FOCAC, 2009b); Up to October 2010, there were 21 CIs in 16 African countries, and 5 Confucius Classrooms in 5 African countries (Hanban, 2010b)	Planned but not yet built in Tanzania; Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology (2009) indicated the prospect of establishing CI in University of Dar es Salaam in 2009 <sup>97</sup>	In DUCE, it was confirmed by the principal that a CI plan was in the draft stage between DUCE and Chinese Embassy but not established yet <sup>98</sup>
<b><i>School building and donation</i></b>	Already set up 96 rural schools by 2009 (FOCAC, 2009c); <sup>99</sup> aim to build 50 China-Africa friendship schools by 2012 (FOCAC, 2009b)	Mkapa High School- computers, piano and books donated by China; Msoga Primary School - the first China-aided primary school hailed in Tanzania in January 2011 with total cost of 5 million RMB (about	The principal of Mkapa School talked about donation from China

<sup>97</sup> According to Nanjing University of Information & Technology (31/12/2009), the Secretary of the university signed the Memorandum of Understanding with vice-chancellor of University of Dar es Salaam, Mukandala, on 14<sup>th</sup> December of 2009. The two sides showed the interest on building CI. Chinese ambassador Liu Xinsheng also encouraged the university to enter into Tanzania and establish CI.

<sup>98</sup> This CI should be as same as the one mentioned by Nanjing University of Information & Technology (ibid). DUCE is a constituent college of the University of Dar es Salaam.

<sup>99</sup> The aim was to build 100 rural schools in Africa (Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) (FOCAC, 2006b)). Up to November 2009, according to FOCAC's (2009c) 'Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the Beijing Summit', the teaching equipment for the 30 schools have been delivered and the construction of 91 out of the 96 schools has started, of which 66 have been completed. Construction of the remaining five will start by the end of this year.

		750,000USD) (Xinhuanet, 18/01/2011) <sup>100</sup>	
<b><i>Teachers secondment</i></b>	Mentioned in the book of China-Africa Educational Cooperation but not as a main approach in FOCAC policies	Chinese side provides DIT with two micro-computer teachers (Embassy of the PRC in United Republic of Tanzania, 2008a)	The principal of DIT talked about 4 previous Chinese experts dispatched to DIT, and 2 current Chinese teachers teaching in the institute (but they were absent for vacation during my fieldwork)
<b><i>University cooperation</i></b>	The '20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education' to establish a new type of one-to-one inter-institutional cooperation model between 20 Chinese universities (or vocational colleges) and 20 African universities (or vocational colleges) (FOCAC, 2009b); <sup>101</sup> Two MPA (master of public administration) programs for developing countries in Peking	Agreement on the cooperative project of higher education between the Ministry of Education of PRC and the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education of Tanzania was signed in June, 2000. (Embassy of the PRC in the United Republic of Tanzania, 2008b); University of Dar es Salaam signed MoU with Nanjing University of Information & Technology in	DIT principal spoke about the collaborative project with Xi'an Jiao Tong university on a Highway and Transportation Engineering Laboratory

<sup>100</sup> According to Xinhuanet (18/01/2011), the school was constructed by the Beijing Construction Engineering Group Co. Ltd. Msoga Primary School is one of the three primary schools China promised to build in Tanzania under the action plan of the Beijing Summit.

<sup>101</sup> It was also emphasised in 2009 Action Plan that 'the two sides proposed to implement a China-Africa joint research and exchange plan to strengthen cooperation and exchanges between scholars and think tanks of the two sides through a variety of ways, such as seminars, mutual academic visits, and joint research projects.' (FOCAC, 2009b)



	University and Tsinghua University with the participation of 42 students from 16 African countries in 2009	December 2009; East China Normal University (ECNU) signed cooperation MoU with 3 Tanzanian universities: Nelson Mandela University of Science and Engineering (in Arusha), Tanzanian National Education Research Institute and University of Dar es Salaam in March 2010 (ECNU, 05/03/2010); ECNU and University of Dar es Salaam built one-to-one cooperation under 20+20 plan (Xinhuanet, 28/06/2010)	
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It can be seen from the above table that, China is trying to achieve its declared aims on FOCAC in Tanzania. However, what about Tanzanian people's perception of these in practice, and how do official people in Chinese Embassy talk about them? Therefore, this and the next chapter will explore those 'Chinese actions' in Tanzania, mainly based on my fieldwork data. The Chinese government scholarship, as introduced in Part One, has a long history in the educational cooperation between China and Africa. Also as shown in the table, this approach has been promised by China in FOCAC with increasing numbers, and the 2006 Beijing Summit promise also was achieved by 2009. The scholarship approach was mentioned often by my interviewees in Tanzania. It is an important modality of Chinese educational aid, perhaps the most important one. The exploration of the situation of Chinese government scholarship in Tanzania starts from enquiries at the Chinese embassy, as the embassies play a key role in China's foreign aid policy. They are the main channel of providing aid - embassy staffs negotiate with recipient governments, define the specific requirements, and frequently implement

the projects (Pehnelt, 2007: 2). It is meaningful to look at what people in embassy say and what practice they are planning in the recipient country.

## **2. General situation of Chinese government scholarship: A translation of rhetoric into practice**

Just as the beginning of this chapter's introduction, sometimes the practice may be recognised as the policy through someone's translation. Can these rhetoric of policy, or of theory, be put into practice (i.e. from policy discourse to reality), and can Tanzanian people recognize those Chinese aid theories/logics? The job the Chinese embassy is doing, with the collaboration of the Tanzanian Ministry of Education, is about translating the rhetoric into practice. In this part, we can listen to what they claim and explain about China's 'win-win' theory in the educational (especially higher educational) field, taking the form of student scholarship.

Both of the officials from the Chinese embassy and Tanzanian ministry discussed the general situation of the two sides' policy and practice. Both of them talked about student scholarships and gave a similar illustration. It seems official people from the two sides have made a clear agreement about educational cooperation.

According to the information both from Secretary Chen of Chinese embassy in Tanzania and the documents, in a difference from the Western countries' focus mainly on primary education, China is giving its support to the higher education level. I asked Chen the reason and the advantage of this HE focus. He said,

Indeed we did much less on the level of primary education, but mainly on higher education. This can be seen as a kind of the Chinese distinctiveness. It is practical and pragmatic for both of us. We are approaching this way also because we are good at this. We want to use our strong points. For Tanzania, they also need development on higher education, and need human resource with high skills and management abilities. Tanzania is starting to devote more and more on education and the human recourse with higher quality.



I got an idea from the interview with Chinese embassy officials that the scholarship mechanism contains two parts: one is ‘under’ the Cultural Agreement between Tanzania and China, which, as the policy says, is a two way student exchange with 100 Chinese governmental scholarship and a small number Tanzanian governmental scholarships every year; and another part, added after the Beijing Summit, which is more flexible and ‘outside’ of the Cultural Agreement, promising that China can give extra scholarship opportunities. We can see this in the following talk by Secretary Chen.

In the Chinese embassy, I was told that the situation of bilateral cooperation in the field of education is changing year by year, and especially after the Beijing Summit, during which the relationship got closer. Therefore Secretary Chen answered questions about the latest progress and the latest agreement:

China at the moment thinks a lot about the educational intercommunication. For example in Tanzania, in the field of Chinese educational aid, China and Tanzania have a Cultural Agreement which is a main framework. Under this framework, the two countries sign details every three years and carry out the plans, for instance, from 2005 to 2007, and from 2008 to 2010. With the development of the world’s and two countries’ situation, the two countries can enrich the agreement gradually. Under the agreement, we give ‘100’ scholarships to Tanzania every year. However it means, if we offer 100, then next year there are 60 graduated from Chinese universities, thus we will add 60 more into Chinese universities. So we maintain 100 students studying in China every year.

The Chinese government will pay their tuition fee, living fee and accommodation fee, as well as the ticket back to Tanzania.

There are over 200 universities accepting African students with this Chinese government scholarship. These universities are in the different cities, for instance, Shandong University, Zhongnan University, University of International Business and Economics, China University of

Geosciences, Wuhan University of Technology. The subjects include agriculture, information industry, electronic communication, computer science, management, economic, environment, geology, animal, life science and so on, within a large range.

Similarly, Kim, from Tanzanian Ministry of Education said:

That is in the Cultural Agreement between two countries. In that agreement, China will train 100 students a year, normally in the science fields. We are given the number. The subjects are given by the country's need. Engineering, agriculture, medicine, management, business, and a few social science are provided. Sometimes there are workshops and seminars in China, maybe traditional medicine, ICT, educational administrate, agriculture, for 3-4 weeks. It is a long history. I cannot remember when it started. Just after independence there were already some students went to China for medicine, I think.

Chen mentioned especially that the educational aid from China is focusing on the higher level of university education:

Those scholarships include undergraduate students, master and Ph.D students, in different levels. That is the character of Chinese educational support. Chinese government always insists to train more students in the higher education field, especially the post-graduate students.

Besides the 100 student scholarships under the Culture Agreement, there are also some other chances for Tanzanian students, as Chen introduced:

The other part of the scholarship has been decided after Beijing Summit. It is called Chinese one-side scholarship. This scholarship is more flexible in the number, and it is only one way. The Cultural Agreement emphasises the exchange, so under the agreement we offer 100 and Tanzania also offer 5 student scholarship every year. There are 30 one-side scholarships this year, and this is unconditional by Chinese



government. The content of the scholarship is as same as the scholarship under Culture Agreement, also including undergraduate, master and doctoral levels. It is issued because of the enlarge aid to Africa since Beijing Summit.

Highlighting the procedure of selecting students is important to show the equity in the process. There are few documentary introductions to the process of student selection, so Chen was asked to give me some more details. He introduced:<sup>102</sup>

The scholarships under Cultural Agreement will be firstly informed to Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Then the Ministry of Education will be informed. You know, the two countries' issues always go through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but carried out by Ministry of Education. The details of the scholarships, including the numbers and majors, will be advertised on the local newspaper, both Swahili and English newspaper. Both of the newspapers have the most circulation in Tanzania. The English one is Daily News, and the other one is in Swahili. The universities are also informed by the scholarship information, and they can organise and recommend some excellent students to apply for the scholarship. So there are individual applications, and universities organised application. For example, University of Dar es Salaam selects and recommends students to us every year.

Kim also explained her job during the process of scholarship selection:

My job is the communication of the scholarship: Embassy of China sends the letter to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and they hand it to Ministry of Education, after that the information will be public published. Sometimes we deal with it to fast track it and coordinate to the office from the Embassy of China. We want to make it fair so we advertise it on newspaper or website then they can apply. Then there is a committee to select – it is called sub-advisory committee for higher education and

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<sup>102</sup> The selection of the students has been confirmed again by Kim, and also by some individual interviewees.

training. The chairmanship is in this ministry, but we have members from Zanzibar and in other ministries such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zanzibar coordinating office, civil service department and director of higher education (of Zanzibar). So this committee will sit down and discuss the scholarships.

Chen added some more points about how they tried to make this scholarship procedure more equal and efficient:

In terms of one-side scholarship, we need to discuss with Tanzanian side, considering more aspects. For example, the scholarship information is easily to be spread in Tanzania but not in Zanzibar. So when the Ministry of Education can not send the information to Zanzibar on time, we will help to give some additional scholarship to Zanzibar by the one-side scholarship. We also give this scholarship to some students who cannot get the opportunities from the Agreement scholarship. This year there is a student who is the daughter of the general secretary of Tanzanian Olympic Games committee. She is also an excellent student, and just finished her study in USA. But she needs the same procedure as the others. We also checked her study performance and interviewed her.

It is also interesting for us to know if the Tanzanian side wishes to have the Chinese offer, even though the offer is not large. As Chen felt, the Tanzanian government feels very happy to have this kind of Chinese support. They feel happy to communicate with Chinese officials, as the negotiation is always in a harmonious atmosphere. Chen said, although China is not giving a lot of financial aid compared with the much bigger Western donors, Tanzanian people still take the Chinese support. This attitude also proved by Kim and her colleagues.

Why not give higher education funding directly to the Tanzanian government? Different from Western reformed strategies which are now focused on direct financing, China's support is still at the project level. When considering aid via project or direct financial funding, both Chen and Ambassador Liu showed their worries of how Tanzania can manage money if giving direct financial support.



Chen said,

They may not manage the money very well. How to deal with the money in the real practice is a problem. Therefore if we aid in the project, it will be direct and easy to conduct for us.

As Chen felt, the main problem is the efficiency of the Tanzanian government as the procedure of selection is slow.

## **2.1 Summary**

It is getting clearer how the practice is on the ground, as it is described by officials. Despite the rhetoric they want to emphasise, some facts we get from these interviews can be interpreted in the following points:

- (1) The most notable characteristic of Chinese educational support for Tanzania, as is claimed by both officials, is aid in higher education. The main approach for Tanzanian higher education is not dispatching teachers or giving equipment (although these have been done in a small amount), but training African students in China with Chinese governmental scholarships. Students get degrees, especially higher degrees in China, and then go back to their home countries.
- (2) In terms of these scholarship policies, China is trying to making a two-way atmosphere by showing exchange. Chinese policies emphasise how much benefits the two sides give each other. In fact it is hard to be called 'aid' because China likes to call it 'student exchanges' (Li, 2008: 28) rather than 'offering' or 'giving' scholarships.
- (3) It is claimed that the selection of the student scholarship is made as equal as possible, and the Chinese embassy tries to make the information delivered fast to further areas in Tanzania. However, the extra number of scholarships which is 'outside' the Cultural Agreement is much more flexible, so we are not sure

if this is also processed in the same way as the one ‘inside’ the Cultural Agreement.

Overall, it can be seen that, giving governmental scholarships is both China’s preference and what Tanzanians need. Moreover, based on an increasing number of African students in China, documents, and information provided by interviewees, this will probably be a long run project for China.

Specifically, in the fieldwork in Tanzania, I had the chance (also introduced by officials in the Tanzanian MoE) to visit the Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT) several times. This is an example of the scholarship agreement between China and Tanzania. Therefore, after we get the general image of the scholarship approach, the following part will conduct a study of the DIT and its leader, as well as lecturers, in order to see how they understand China’s support.

### **3. The case of DIT**

Located in the Dar es Salaam city centre, the Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT) is an accredited institution by the National Council for Technical Education (NACTE). It was established in 1997, and now offers full-time, part-time and professional engineering qualifications and courses. The institutional history dates back to 1957 when its predecessor, the Dar es Salaam Technical Institute, was established with the main aim of providing vocational training. The Institute later expanded to offer technical secondary school courses and training for Technical Assistants; it was upgraded in 1962 to become the Dar es Salaam Technical College (DTC), the first formal technical training institution in the country. The position of DTC in the area of higher technical education was consolidated in 1991, when the Advanced Diploma in Engineering (ADE) programmes replaced the Diploma in Engineering (DE) courses. With the increasing competition in new technology, and the supply of quality products such as technical education and services, the position of DTC was changed as the DIT was established in 1997. The new institution not only provided quality technical training, but also applied research and expertise services to the community (DIT,



n.d.).<sup>103</sup>

The cooperation between the institute and Chinese embassy started from 1990s. Under the agreement between the PRC and the United Republic of Tanzania in 1991, a collaborative project between Xian Highway University (Xi'an Jiao Tong University, China) and Dar es Salaam Technical College (currently DIT) was set up to develop a Highway and Transportation Engineering Laboratory. In 1993, the laboratory was established through 'generous assistance' from China.<sup>104</sup> The main objective of this project was to strengthen the DIT's highway section by providing equipment, experts and training staff in the field of Highway and Transportation Engineering. Four experts from China were dispatched to DIT to assist their counterparts in technology transfer.<sup>105</sup> The experts helped manage to install equipment in the lab and to teach in the highway engineering field.

Also under the China-Tanzania agreement of 1991, there were opportunities for human resource development through which some personnel from the former DTC were trained in various fields in China. Most of them were trained in Xian Highway University (e.g. Dr. Urio Erick S, Dr. Simon Simeon J.B., as shown on the document). It is noteworthy that they obtained a high degree in China- mainly PhDs. They went back to DIT after graduation and now teach and research at DIT. Over years, the institute has been able to build its human resource capacity.

However, even though China has donated some equipment to the DIT, the institute still 'has not been successful in acquiring more facilities to supplement, complement or replace those donated by Chinese government'.<sup>106</sup>

This support (e.g. labs, equipment, experts and training) is continuing in other fields at the DIT by the Chinese government. Besides the cooperation the field of Highway engineering, the Chinese government began to target the computer science department in the DIT. In June 2000, China entered an agreement to

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<sup>103</sup> See DIT's website, <http://www.dit.ac.tz/about.php>

<sup>104</sup> This historical information is from the document given to me by the vice principal of DIT. The document's title is Support to DIT extended by the Peoples Republic of China to DIT since 2002'.

<sup>105</sup> The four Chinese experts were Yang, Han, Qin, and Lei.

<sup>106</sup> This is from interview with the DIT principal.

develop a Computer Laboratory at DIT. Under the agreement, the Chinese government provided the necessary teaching facilities to set up a laboratory with fifty micro-computers, provided experts to train in computer applications, and offered opportunities to train in China. The project lasted for two years, from December 2001.

Following successes in implementing the project, it was extended for another two more years following the signing of a memorandum of understanding on 11<sup>th</sup> December 2003. During 2004-2005, China offered 12 short and long term scholarships; currently, there are 3 DIT staff studying at master's level in Computer related subjects in China. Also, the DIT has received three Chinese experts, two of them are still at the institute at the time my interview was conducted, supporting teaching and research.<sup>107</sup>

### **3.1 Interview with vice principal of DIT**

The interview with the vice principal of the DIT, professor Seka (who has been the vice principal since mid-2000), showed a two-sided opinion regarding the Chinese support.

In his opinion, China provides a good example which can help Tanzania catch up with the world speed. When asked if Chinese support to the DIT is helpful, he conveyed his positive opinion of learning in China, and the importance of educational practice (aid):

Yes of course it is helpful. It is simple and can solve our problems. Not long ago, China was not that much developed, but now it is developing very fast. But Africa is walking backwards. I think we have to reverse it and try to develop. China has invested a lot in education. For those reasons and also for China has managed a lot of technologies, we think that this way is proper.

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<sup>107</sup> The ir names are Mr. Liu Yong, Mr. Song Jinpang, and Mr. Du Xiaocheng.



...we are catching up... so why not going there to study...then we can jump.

Not only in the field of technical science, in other fields, we are also trying to learn from abroad...Especially the area of research... We are not producing, but we are consuming. If we can not buy, we can not consume. We have to produce something, and we need the ability of producing. A good quality education is needed, and more opening up for education is needed. The best investment is educating people.

However, the principal seems have more expectation for the Chinese support. Just as the officials hoped in the Ministry of Education, the professor also expected more support from China. He particularly stressed wanting 'more senior people' from China:

It is good opportunity for learning capacity and some training for our people. But I know it is not easy. It is also good to have more experience from Chinese working here. But we need more good professors here from China. I hope they maybe can stay here working 1-2 years, which is better than we have our teachers study in China. All of our departments will be benefit from those professors. I mean they are senior academic people, and now we don't get the senior ones, because they want to go to UK or America.

Then Dr. Seka discussed more forms of collaboration between potential companies and the institute:

I hope some Chinese company would like to work with us. Such as Huawei, they only choose some graduates but not collaborate with us. They are not cooperating with us at all.<sup>108</sup> We hope we can work together. We can do some research or even invest money together. If we just

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<sup>108</sup> Huawei is one of the biggest Chinese telecom companies. Their products and solutions have been deployed in over 100 countries all over the world. Huawei entered African market in 1997 (HUAWEI, 27/10/2009).

receive 50 computers, it is good but it is not sustainable. The capacity is most important.

But he also realised that cooperation should be built on an equal basis, and this kind of relationship between Chinese and Tanzanians is within a process of learning, not cooperating. When I asked about China's 'win-win', he responded that, if we call the Chinese support a kind of 'win-win cooperation', then a key point is how to be a proper partner.

It can be mutual beneficial if Tanzania has capacity to be partner. When we have this opportunity- one thing, we also need capacity- it is another thing. That is the question. When you have equal capacity then you can have equal cooperation and partners, but at the moment we cannot be equal partners.

The principal is generally satisfied with his teachers who studied in China, but was also a bit sceptical towards some Chinese universities.

Some of the teachers working very well and most of them contributed a lot to our teaching and research, but some Chinese universities are not very good. As I know some of the Chinese universities are very high in their quality but not all of them. I think some of them do not have experience with foreigners.

Yet what about Chinese teachers in DIT, and their difference from the teachers from other countries? Seka, in his interview with me, praised the performance of Chinese teachers and showed his wishes for more communication with them. He said:

The Chinese teachers are teaching in English language, and the students are from whole country and few foreigners. We also have some Swedish, Japanese, and now we have some Korean teachers. The difference among teachers is not depending on the country, but the university, and also the people themselves. But I have seen some engineer who has studied in



China and is really good! You cannot believe it! For example this excellent Chinese man was in China for master study, and now is doing quite good in Tanzania as an engineer.

Chinese teachers cooperate with institute very well. Most of them are very serious but there are cultural problems. Sometimes I want to talk to them and share some experience with them but they don't feel very comfortable. Sometimes I want to talk to them directly, not through the head of the department. But they prefer to talk to the head. They should be more open. (Are they young?) Some came firstly were very young but now, they are middle age. They are doing their teaching well and they do not complain. (DIT, Seka)

It seems, then, that the situation is firstly that China wants to say it is mutual beneficial in a long run, but in fact, at the moment it is only one-way support from China to this institute. There is no academic flow to China from the DIT.

Secondly, even though there are two types of help, Chinese teachers dispatched in the DIT and scholarships for the DIT staff, it is more about training staff in China than training students locally. The staff members returning from China are working as main powers in the DIT, and they are not in small number. On another hand, only 1-2 Chinese lectures work at the DIT every year, although teaching is no problem and welcomed, the problem of communication with administrators appears to some extent.

From recipients' perception, it seems the support is welcomed and they are trying to be cordial on the basis of friendship. However the recipients have more expectations, such as higher quality capacity building, as they are eager to develop and catch up. Another potential point is that when the recipients demand better support, they should also develop themselves efficiently and independently. The principal realised this when he talked how to be mutual beneficial partner, and he worried about the slow development of Tanzania and about the complexity in the DIT. Those things made him feel anxious for the continued development of his institution in the future.

#### **4. Students feeling**

With the rising of China, Chinese student scholarships have become very popular in Tanzania, just as the deputy principal of the Dar es Salaam University College of Education (DUCE) said, ‘I will say that the relationship is growing, I mean, more Tanzanians are going to China. The image of Chinese university is changing. Because at some point people think going to China is very different from to Western countries, but now is also good.’ Thus, the students’ perceptions should be representative and be meaningful to listen to.

As stated in the methodology chapter, this research tried to gather opinions from different types of people who studied in China with Chinese scholarships. They are now working as government officials, teachers, or in national companies. After listened to their feelings and conversing face to face or in groups’ discussion, some key points can be highlighted as follows.

Obviously, the logic of donors and recipients are quite different. Especially for the individual recipients, as they seem to not care about the politics of aid at all. Some of the young students do not understand the so called ‘win-win’, however, when talking about China and the West, they would respond ‘oh that is the politics’. What they care about is their real life in China, about if they can get enough funding, about if they can get a good opportunity for themselves, and about if they can get a nice job after they abroad study. Let us dig deeper into their perception and their direct feeling towards Chinese higher education.

##### **4.1 An ambivalent feeling about the degree length, funding amount, teaching quality and communication**

When talking about the advantages and disadvantages of the study in China, former students showed their happiness about their opportunity to go to China, and expressed that they are willing of going again for higher degree such as PhD; they would even send their children in future. When asked about the importance



of this degree in China, they all gave positive answers.

TOGETHER (answered by DIT staff members): Yes. Definitely.

Sanga: You can see we are here now. So you can know the importance. We are doing our job here, trying to contribute to our institute, so it is very important.

Georgia: We learnt a lot in China and from China, now it is very important that we using what we learnt to teach and research.

Yes we always ask, why China can do successfully in this era, so it is important to study in China. Tanzania is learning China that how to develop the country, and Chinese are hardworking people.

Amble: You see, many Chinese companies are now in this country. Most of them are engineering companies. The parliament building is built by Chinese company. So maybe for us it is good chance to study there and the government opens a lot of business and receives things such as this scholarship agreement from China. Now we have relations in many fields.

But this does not mean study in China has no problems. What they are not so satisfied with always covered degree length, the funding amount, teaching quality and communication. Firstly, three years master degrees (even though a small number of universities started two year programs) made them feel a kind of contradiction- a good chance for more research, but too long for a masters.

Sanga: For the advantages and disadvantages, I would like to say yes and no. The disadvantage is, the master in China is too long. You know masters in UK only take you one year. But in China some of us even need to take one year to study Chinese, and 3 years for a master degree. It together will take 3-4 years for us.

Simon: Yes, it is good to study one year master, however, three years is

too long but one year is too short. In the Western countries they cover a lot in undergraduate so they have only one year master. That means if you go to the West for one year master, it is better to study there for undergraduate. I think 2 years is acceptable. But for three years the ad is you will have more time to do your own research. You have time to explore your subject more.

Amble: Yes it is true for doing research. Research takes some time. In the Western countries they just choose a topic and write your master thesis. But in China you must do something such as publications. It is good because then you know how to publish articles. You have much more experience than study for one year. ...Some universities changed their length of degree when I was leaving Wuhan. They changed it into two years degree. That is good.

The language seems to be the second problem. Compared with the Western education, lectures are not good at speaking English, and the communication with other Chinese in the university is also a problem. One of the results is that the Tanzanian students wanted to learn more, but the university sometimes treated them as foreigners and required less from them. When asked about the difference between the West and the East, Georgia raised the language problem, and the three other DIT staff members noted:

Georgia: Actually for me the same level degrees from the West and the East are just the same, but the problem is language. The teaching and study is ok, but the only problem is language. When you have difficulties or problems you do not understand, and you come to someone work with you, but he or she can not explain it to you very well.

Sanga: According to my experience, language has caused some problems. When the teachers are going to teach the foreign students, they are a kind of shy, with not very much confidence. They know very much how to teach.... The evaluation is also different. Because you are a foreigner, they will just say, ok. But when you are a Chinese, the teacher will be



stricter. They will say, it doesn't matter he is a foreigner. Then the Chinese students can get more knowledge from the teachers because the teachers know what they are planning and doing and the problems. That is much easier to them.

Amble: They will think you are a foreigner so you do not need to know this. So we can not get the knowledge at the same level as Chinese students.

The two young ladies, Kath and Race, in another interview also raised similar points about language and communication:

I think it is because of the language. Many books are in Chinese.. sometimes you can not go deep. Things from class is not enough. There are a lot of self study.

(Do you have communication with your Chinese friends in your daily life?) Yes of course. (Are you living with them?) No just foreign students. But usually we have some Chinese friends. You have to learn some Chinese. Some of them they can speak English but they are shy.

To be treated as a foreigner seems brings both advantages and disadvantages. As I mentioned, the universities have festivals for foreign students and let them show their diverse culture through traditional dressing and food. But in daily life and study, they want to be integrated into normal campus life.

In terms of funding amount, the two young girls who do not have their own family (children and husband) did not see this as a problem, but the DIT members did:

Amble: They fund us, but not enough. DIT pays part, such as the flight for going. We should come back after study. I think that is how the two sides agree. Even though I wish I can bring my family.

Georgia: For example in our university even you have husband but you

have to pay for his accommodation, even he stay in your room.

#### **4.2 A different feeling between older and younger graduates**

It is quite interesting that after meeting some of the older Tanzanian graduates, we found they seldom complained of any disadvantage of their experience in China. They did not feel unsatisfied with the money, with the language, and with the lecturers. They conveyed more positive feeling when they talked about their life in China.

In a bit different fashion from the younger interviewees, those graduates did not feel language was a problem, and they were integrated more with the Chinese students. Older Tanzanians had to study Chinese when they were studying in China, but when more and more foreign students began to attend Chinese universities, the Chinese government began to let universities teach foreign students in English. However, the English level of Chinese lectures has not been improved enough, and the English teaching led some students to feel study difficulties. For older graduates – John who studied in the 90s (he is now in MoE), Robert who studied in the 60's (now a dock worker), Moti who studied in the 70s (now a manager in the transformer factory) – they seem to feel good with their communication in China, and with Chinese.

Robert: Probably I was in the earliest group to study in China, and we learnt Chinese very well. At least I learnt very good Chinese, but that was long time ago.

Moti: I got a scholarship in 1977 when I finished my high school in Tanzania, and I was chosen by MoE to go to China. I went to Beijing and studied Chinese for one year, until 1978. After one year, I was chosen to go to Shanghai, studying electrical engineering in Shanghai GongYe Daxue. I studied there for undergraduate, 5 years together, then I came back....Yes the university was all in Chinese. It is difficult but we had language course in language school. Then in the university we also had a



little bit language study in the first year. And, we had room-mate who was also Chinese. So it was like one foreigner, one Chinese, one foreigner, one Chinese... So you could get help.... For us it was so integrated. It was not difficult because we were living together. In classroom, maybe we had 24 Chinese students, and 1-2 foreign students.

Moti: For me it was a good opportunity to see. I was able to go to China, and was able to learn its culture, was able to know a lot of things about China. During holiday the university would arrange trips. We went to Dalian.. The university paid about 80%, and we just paid a little, all foreign students. We paid very small amount of money but we visited a lot of place. The scholarship paid everything. It was enough for us. I think we were total 30 students, 10 of us and some went to there before us. ...I was very happy with my study in China. I didn't see any disadvantage there.

John studied in China for his masters degree in a top Chinese university (Qinghua University) from 1996 to 1999, and now is an official working in the Ministry of Communication, Science and Technology. He was very excited when talking about his experience in China:

John: I had very good experience there, fascinating!... (He talked in both English and Chinese) Initially we studied with foreign students only Ghana, Nigeria, Mexico, Kenya and many other countries in the world... but in the second year we were put together. So we can work with Chinese students together. We studied and even lived together. The dormitories are separate but we have meals together. They are very friendly, very friendly.. And foreign students also had to behave to show an image of their country. So no fighting no contradiction...no drink too much...The social life there was very good. You can have Chinese friend. I went to Chinese home!

However, age alone is not sufficient for saying the previous was better. Although

the number of people in the interview is not enough to make any generalisations, the information they gave reflected some realities: there were a smaller number of African students in China and they studied Chinese; and it seems that they have more affection towards China than the young Tanzanians. This means the younger generation, which grew up in this economically globalised world and seeing how many Chinese companies are in Africa doing business, cannot recognize a passionate link between the two countries in the same degree their elders did. For China, it could be a danger that if more African students come into Chinese universities while they want to make the training/teaching more globalised (i.e. in English, not in Chinese so as to make teaching to foreign students easier), more foreign students cannot find the inclusive feeling they should.

#### **4.3 A historical influence on the understanding about East and West**

Although the Western donors have been changing their image in African people's eyes by changing the conditionalities and making aid harmonization, the history still seems to be influencing Tanzanian perception, especially when we talked about 'motives' of donors. They prefer to use the word 'take' when describing the Western donors. They also expressed their opinion of win-win.

John: Those are politics. It is cooperation.. I get something from you, and you get some from me... Yes it is win-win. Colonial time, they (the West) come and take a lot of materials and resource. They were not helping us. But China wants to help you. They are not capitalism previously, but socialism. That policy is still there until today. They want to help Africa. They gave us technology and skill, of course they can also take some resources minerals, mine...which is for exchange. That is win-win, and it is ok! But in the colonial times, they used to take everything. It was not equal. When they came and invested, they made agreement to take more, and they gave a little. They made you not independent. They made you become more and more depend on them. It is not good. They give you some conditions, conditionalities... So I am not happy with that.



Sanga: I have been in Sweden for months, I could see the way Western people see us. They won't stay in Africa. Even they come, they are coming to take something and leave. The media things do not tell people the truth. They will say in Africa there are a lot of wars and a lot of hunger, even in China people said 'but we hear that in Africa there are a lot of wars'. It is something implanted. That is Western countries think what Africa is, but when Chinese stay here and go back they tell others it is not really like what we have been hearing.

Tanzanian is maybe the most diplomatic people in this planet... because we are mixed up by different cultures. It is always that poor people speak the truth, but the rich ones like to create some things. There are a lot of politics. ....

When you are poor, you need to receive donations and help, and also need to accept some conditions, but now China is getting up, becoming independent, saying to the world it is China. So why not love your country!

Georgia: We are getting something from China, and China is also getting something from me.

Another thing is, there are two kinds of history here, West and Africa, and China and Africa. West colonised the continent so they know Africa much more than Chinese. China knows us because of friendship, or we can say international policy, so it is different from Western countries. Now they come and help, and also they get something from us because we have a lot of natural resource.

Oh that is the politics. I am not politician but they know what they are saying, when you see your neighbor is becoming better and better than you and with less assistant from you. For example I don't believe my country is poor, and it is just said by those things imposed to the continent.

The relation Africa has with West, is different from the relation Africa has with east, because of the colonial time. Without us the West cannot survive. (Amble: They took a lot.) Even now. China does not have colonial relationship with us. We are getting a win-win situation. So that

is why Chinese are more welcomed.

Amble: For the West, they are also doing donations, but the point is, they take more than what they give. Our president Nyerere was a very good friend with Chairman Mao. When president have meeting in USA, American wanted to donate to Tanzania and saying because you are poor and something like that, he said, you were not donating, you just want to continuing to take things from us.

I never heard complains about Chinese company and Chinese government that they are taking something for granted. But we always heard the Western countries taking minerals. It is the Western countries. China takes a lot of contracts of constructions.

The colonial time affected the Tanzanians generation through generation. For them, the biggest difference between China and West is colonial history. They do not take China as some great donor who gives them help for nothing. They are clear about exchange, about win-win, even though they did not talk about it in an academic way. For them the relation between Africa and the West is always unequal, for example their sceptical opinion about the percentage the West paid for their natural resource. Although they did not suffer anything from the West and even wanted to have a scholarship in the Western countries, they cannot forget the history.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has mainly been about China's action in higher educational support for Africa, and the form of giving governmental scholarships. From the interview with both Chinese and Tanzanian officials, we obtained information about the practice of Chinese governmental scholarships, which was increasingly become the most important way of Chinese educational aid. The information about the scholarship types-- 'under' or 'outside' of the Cultural Agreement, the number of scholarships, the main subjects and degree levels, the advertisement approaches, as well as the student selection methods -- showed us that: Chinese officials are



trying to make the practice reflect its policy texts; the government wants to make it look like a cooperation or an exchange, rather than a type of aid; meanwhile, Tanzanian officials also cooperate and gave confirmation of what was said by Chinese officials, this indicated a growingly closer relationship between the two sides.

The Tanzanian DIT, as a impressive case of China's educational aid in our field study, has its own agreement with the Chinese government, including Chinese governmental scholarships and Chinese teacher dispatched. Two interviews were made with the principal of the DIT, who expressed his opinion towards China's help and China's rising-up. He talked about their motives of learning from China, the benefits of learning from China, and his feeling of satisfaction with Chinese teachers who were working in the DIT. He also gave his suggestion for future cooperation with China, especially the local Chinese companies. It was evident that the principal had a great hope on the DIT and even his country, and learning the Chinese experience of development was a possible way for strengthening Tanzania. Therefore, training DIT's teachers in China would be an ideal way for him, as capacity building can be a long-run beneficial project for his institute and his country.

Not only were DIT's teachers who were returning students from China in our interviews, but there were also other individual Tanzanians who studied in China with the scholarships. So in the last part of this chapter, we summarised their opinions and experience, including detailed things such as the degree length, lecturer's language, living costs, university activities, and more. It is interesting that elder returning students seems more satisfied and to have more passion than the younger ones, perhaps based on a fact that China has increased the number of scholarships and tried to make a more globalised teaching and learning form; evidently some of the improvements did not work well. It is also noticeable that the historical impact of colonialism still has roots in African's hearts, however the young people seems to be uninterested in talking politics (i.e. the difference between donors' action and logic). One of the biggest differences of aid from China and from the West, for them, is the colonial past which has instilled a hierarchical feeling in them.

Above all it can be argued that in terms of China's action in the field of higher education in Tanzania, it is recognised as either positive or negative by both officials and individual recipients, and as an important way for the development of human resources in Tanzania. From their recognition, we can see how the logic in theories and Chinese policy texts translated, and how China's logic is implemented; we can also see how the logic of China is understood by recipients. We can see in this chapter that different people present information in different ways. Secretary Chen is translating policy words into practice – negotiating with the Tanzanian side and answering questions from outside, my interviews for instance. On the other hand, returning Tanzanian students and educational staff present in a different way – more like telling stories--- and show us vividly about Chinese scholarships. Both of their words show some effect and the increasing influence China has had on Tanzania and Tanzanians. It can be predicted that this approach will go on for the long run, to help China build an image for training Tanzania's future human resource, and to help Tanzania have quicker growth of central capacities, which are the key for developing stably in this 'knowledge economy' age.

Following this main approach of supporting higher education support, the next chapter will talk about more types of China-Africa educational cooperation. We will focus on short term training by China to Africa, and the related Chinese universities. Some conclusions will be drawn regarding the 'culture route' by China, such as building cultural centres in African schools or establishing Confucius Institutes.



## **Chapter Eight     Donor logic in action: transforming experience and cultural heritage**

### **Introduction**

As stated in the last chapter, aid for higher education with scholarship projects is the main approach by China. Beside the scholarship approach, there are other types of practice by China in Africa. As human resources are becoming increasingly important in this era of a knowledge economy, transforming skills and experience by either long term study for degrees or a short-term workshop are both practical and important for African people. As mentioned in Part One, short term training is another part of China's educational cooperation with Africa. Every year China's Ministry of Education and Ministry of Commerce launch courses and training for African teachers, university administrators, engineers, and other professionals. There are also some other approaches China has developed, including the Confucius Institute and the Chinese Cultural Centre.

In China, the Ministry of Education usually authorizes tasks to the local universities and allows these institutions to organise and arrange the specific practice with African participants. Thus the notice of training is delivered to the African side in a diplomatic way (as Secretary Chen said, it was affair between two countries), then the training activities are conducted by the universities. In terms of educational cooperation with Africa, these universities also have the chance to educate African students who received Chinese scholarships, and to establish Confucius Institutes in African countries, though this depends on the main subjects of the university and its reputation and performance. Universities such as Jilin University, China Agriculture University, Zhejiang Normal University, Tianjin University of Technology and Education (which, although not the best universities in China, still have good prestige) are designated by ministries to do the workshops and seminars for Africa. In 2005, during which the Educational minister forum (mentioned in Part One) was held, there were eleven universities entrusted by the Ministry of Education to run 12 courses and seminars

on higher education management, long-distance education, and vocational technical education; these were mainly for African peoples (Li, 2006b).

The Confucius Institute (CI) is another way to cooperate with African countries in China's broad 'cultural and human resource' field, although CI itself is not specially designed for Africa. However through a cultural and language bridge, both the Chinese universities and African higher institutions seek to find a beneficial way for themselves.

Thus, in order to show China's logic of having universities expand influence on transferring Chinese experience to Africa, and the universities' perspective of 'win-win', three Chinese universities are introduced firstly in the beginning in this chapter. Field interviews have been done with university staff who led or work within the job for holding courses or building CI in certain African countries. Through talking with them, we seek to obtain more information about these approaches and the motives of the universities.

Following the three university cases, there will be a part talking specific about short-term training, which will also provide some Tanzanian voices from higher institutional leaders. We are especially interested to find out the deeper 'logic' behind the training performance- based upon a CDA study on ZJNU's training reports from 2004 to 2006. By looking at the university's official discourses, we may reveal what kind of practice they are aiming for, what they want to claim, who the participants and leaders of the practice are, and what social relations and beneficial sides these words reflect.

Finally there will be a shorter part about a 'cultural route' from China to Africa. It is principally about my visit to Mkapa High School in Dar es Salaam. The Chinese culture centre in their school will be an interesting example of this politics through culture. After that, there will be a discussion on the CI and Tanzanian's plan regarding the CI, as we got information in the field study that Tanzania DUCE would like to establish a CI together with a Chinese university. Although it was in the planning stage, we saw the active motives of African higher educational leaders.



While training people, teaching language and making a cultural influence are also normal for the West in Africa, the biggest difference is that China and Africa are more related and in pursuit of common aims. The ambition for an economic rise ties them together, and the African people, including university leaders, want to learn and understand why China can develop so quickly through a different route and ideology from the Western strategy, as Africans have used this approach for many years but it has performed not very well. The short-term training has this attractiveness, as well as the Confucius Institute. They all offer an opportunity for African people to learn from China, not with degree knowledge, but with basic and practical skills and experience.

In a word, this chapter is about how China transfers its experience, skills and cultural heritages to Africa; it is also about the voice from Chinese and Tanzanian institutions. It can be argued that the Chinese conception of educational assistance is broader than 'the education system' which is the normal target for Western aid. In this Chapter, analysis of Chinese short term training and language study is about these extended conceptions of China's educational aid. With these diverse types of higher and vocational education with different length of study, Chinese universities also get an opportunity to show their capacities internationally. However, it is always an issue to make sure what kind of aid Africans need urgently.

### **1. Three cases of Chinese higher institutions affording educational support to Africa**

The three universities introduced in this section, are all authorized universities by Ministry of Education of PRC to offer higher education for African students with Chinese governmental scholarships, or establishing CI in Africa, or doing research on African vocational education, or holding trainings for African university leaders, and so on. They are not the only universities authorized by Ministry of Education, but each of them is famous for and outstanding in doing certain educational activities for China-Africa educational cooperation. They got some 'first's in the area of China-Africa educational relationships, for example: Tianjin

Normal University established the first CI in Africa; Zhejiang Normal University build the first Centre for African Education Studies in China; and Tianjin University of Technology and Education was the first educational foreign aid base of Ministry of Education.<sup>109</sup> As universities which have less prestige in China than the top universities such as Beijing University and Tsinghua University which are more comprehensive and have already established some international reputation, these universities aim to build their specialities in enrolling international students, in Africa study, in CI, or in training for African administrators. Thus on one hand these universities became to be the key bases for educational cooperation by Chinese government, and on another hand the activities helped them build an increasing influence in both domestic and international wide.

There were also practical reasons for choosing these universities for my fieldwork places. I got some contact information when I attended the conference on comparative education in Beijing Normal University in 2008. Some lecturers who were from these universities also contacted me after the conference. With their help, I got the opportunities to do interviews in these three universities in Tianjin and Zhejiang.

### 1.1 Tianjin Normal University

First founded in 1958, Tianjin Normal University (TJNU), the Key Research Base for Humanities Studies funded by the Ministry of Education, is one of the sixteen universities hosting the HSK (Chinese Proficiency Test) in China, and has set up two CI in Kenya (at Nairobi University) and in Thailand (at Bansomdejchaopraya Rajabhat University). There are more than 1700 foreign students studying in the university now.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> According to the website of Ministry of Education of the PRC, since 2000 Ministry of Education has established 10 bases for educational aid to foreign countries. These 10 bases are all universities, and they are Tianjin University of Technology and Education, Zhejiang Normal University, Jilin University, Northeast Normal University, Nanjing Agricultural University, Tianjin University of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Southern Medical University, Guizhou University, Qiongzhou University, and Yunnan University. The task of these bases are: foreign aid trainings, African study programmes, and teacher secondment for foreign aid (Ministry of Education of the PRC, n.d.). (See <http://202.205.177.9/edoas/website18/53/info1243992823587253.htm>)

<sup>110</sup> Beside the information accessed on the university website, some supplement documents were given by



The agreement of establishing the Confucius Institute at University of Nairobi was signed by Zhou Ji, the Minister of the Ministry of Education in China, and George Saitoti, the Minister of Education, Science and Technology of Kenya. It was approved by the Office of Chinese Language Council International, the 'first-ever' Confucius Institute in Africa was set up by Tianjin Normal University (TJNU) and University of Nairobi on 19 December 2005. As TJNU introduced the phenomenon 'its birth is hailed as a milestone of education cooperation between China and Kenya'. The previous president of TJNU, Runcheng Jin said in an interview in 2005 that, 'culture and education is the "soft power" of a country, so it is meaningful to strengthen the Chinese language education abroad; Nairobi is a better developed place in Africa, and our CI is the first one in Africa, so we can say we are going to "occupy" the "commanding height" for Chinese language teaching in Africa' (China Education and Research Network, 28/07/2005).

When I interviewed Yan, the director of the international cooperation office at TJNU, she introduced the general situation behind their work on CI, and their international programmes. At the moment, TJNU have three types of African students: firstly, the students with Chinese government scholarships; secondly, students with Huawei scholarship; and thirdly, African self funding individuals.<sup>111</sup>

She emphasised that the establishment of CI in Nairobi, and in other developing countries such as Thailand, all have good reputations and that this is very good for TJNU's future development. As they have already devoted significant resources to CI projects, they would like to have long term cooperation with those partner universities. She hopes in the future the CI in Africa can train local teachers.

## 1.2 Zhejiang Normal University

Zhejiang Normal University (ZJNU) is one of the Chinese universities which started cooperation with African countries in the 90s, specifically from 1996. At

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the president of TJNU.

<sup>111</sup> Scholarships established by Huawei, to 'motivate outstanding engineering students to further their college studies' (Huawei, 27/10/2009).

that time, the university set up the Chinese Language Training Center in Cameroon to teach Chinese language and culture to students in Central and Western Africa. After the first team of teachers fulfilled their mission, the second and third were sent in 1998 and 2001 respectively, and the fourth has taken over the job recently. The Cameroon centre has trained over 380 masters and diplomats in more than 10 African countries, as well as more than 400 Chinese learners.

From 2002, under the framework of the China-Africa Forum- FOCAC, ZJNU began to take human resource projects by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce, and invited African educational administrators and universities chancellors to come to China for training. In 2004, ZJNU became one of the four educational assistance bases to Africa in China. Most of those African administrators are high level officials.

To promote educational cooperation and exchange, the Center for African Education Studies (CAES), which is the first of its kind in China, was founded at ZJNU on April 7, 2003. What is more, in 2006 the university held the first 'Sino - Africa University President Forum' authorized by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce. Thirty university presidents from 14 African countries, and tens of university presidents in China, attended the forum.

According to the analysis by professor Gu, the vice dean of CAES in ZJNU, there are three key points regarding the educational cooperation with Africa:<sup>112</sup>

Firstly, ZJNU is located in the Western area of Zhejiang province, a small city called Jinhua. Compared with the top university, such as Zhejiang University in the provincial capital city (and also international tourism city) Hangzhou, ZJNU does not have any advantage on location nor the reputation. But as a university focusing on educational subjects and especially educational administration and teacher education, the university can have the strength to develop a route for educational assistance to Africa. Moreover, the university also has advantages in language teaching. So this is the basis for developing Chinese centres in Africa, by sending staff and facilities from ZJNU.

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<sup>112</sup> The following points are summarized from the interview with Gu.



Secondly, for the university educational aid is firstly a political issue, with the aim of strengthening cooperation and exchange between China and Africa. All of the university activities for Africa will be based on this central political point. The training and other activities they hold are under the close charge by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce. This political emphasis is very different from the Western educational aid practice.

Thirdly, the training for high level officials from Africa is also an opportunity for the university to learn from others. Some of the African administrators have studied well in Western countries, and they also can discuss with Chinese university or school leaders about their development goals on education. It is a process of exchanging ideas, rather than just training African people. During the training, over 20 universities signed universities agreements with ZJNU for more educational and cultural cooperation in the future.

### **1.3 Tianjin University of Technology and Education**

Tianjin University of Technology and Education (TUTE) is the 98th Chinese university that receives foreign students with Chinese government scholarship, from countries such as Ukraine, Mongolia, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Vietnam. As the first educational foreign aid base of China's Ministry of Education, it has actively launched teaching staff training for 87 education officials of developing countries, including Mr. Jamah A. Barco, the Assistant of the education minister of Liberia. It has trained two hundred and fifty-one vocational teaching staff for thirty-four developing countries in Africa, South-Asia, East-Europe, and appointed eighty-nine teachers to Ethiopia and Yemen to train more than 8000 students. TUTE also established the first research center of African Vocational Education in China to carry out the systematic study of the African Vocational Education. Mr. Mulatu Teshome, Speaker of the House of Federation of Ethiopia, and Mr. Wondwosen Kiflu, the State Minister were appointed as specially hired professors in the research center of African Vocational Education of the university

(TUTE, n.d.).<sup>113</sup>

The university offers undergraduate and master degrees with an emphasis on engineering and education, and combining science, liberal arts, economics, and management. It provides support for Africa through vocational education. The university has dispatched 104 lectures to African countries such as Tanzania, Egypt and Ethiopia. In 2008, according to the agreement by the Ministries of Education of China and Ethiopia, the first Confucius Institute in Ethiopia was established.

Wang and Xie, who I interviewed in TUTE, talked about their jobs, which are similar to TJNU, and include teacher dispatch and short term training. Xie is the director of their office for international exchange which has ten staff working there. Wang is one of them and is responsible for organizing training, including solving accommodation and language issues for African participants. She confirmed the cooperation between the university and some African countries since FOCAC was held, and highlighted the close link with Ethiopia. The Educational minister of Ethiopia is an honorary professor in TUTE. The notable opinion from Wang is that she thought Africa should get more support from China, rather than from developed countries.

As I know there are 17 German universities have educational aid to Ethiopia, and there are some British and international organisations giving educational aid to the country. However I think Ethiopia may prefer China's support, as China has more similar experience. They can share these experience..... On the other hand, Chinese people are well known of their hard-working, even within the adverse circumstance. This is also what African people can learn from us.

Wang organised several training programmes for African administrators, and she said that two to three weeks is a short time, and maybe African administrators cannot learn deeply during the training. However, she said their progress can be

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<sup>113</sup> See university website, <http://www.tute.edu.cn/english/linshi/About-Tute.html>



seen, even in the small things such as their daily life. Now she herself begins to understand more about Africa, beyond the ideas of disease, poverty and war. After all, she thought it could be very valuable to hold this short training between China and Africa.

Above all, two interesting points of contrast from my interviews in these universities showing that, firstly, in the West, universities are ‘driven’ to international initiatives because their government have taken funding from them, whereas in China they do it because their government gives them funding to do so. Although the universities also devoted much staff and finance into their ‘Africa action’, the arrangement and authorization by the government are powerful to promote all those activities, especially let those activities be part of a country’s action; secondly, it is also interesting that, cooperation with/ involvement in Africa is good for universities’ reputation rather than income.

## **2. Practical idea: Short term training**

### **2.1 General situation**

When asked about the other types of cooperation between the two countries, secretary Chen in Chinese embassy in Tanzania talked about training and teacher dispatch.

In terms of teacher dispatch, Chen told me that in the Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology, there are 2 Chinese teachers teaching computer science every year. The tenure of the teachers is normally two years, and afterwards new teachers were dispatched from China. Unfortunately the two teachers were back in China during my staying in Tanzania. However, according to embassy staff information and some investigation at the DIT, it was found that there were very few Chinese teachers in Tanzania. The job of Chinese teachers is teaching and directing, but as communication is difficult with local staff and institute heads the influence of them is very limited. It is still difficult to move human resources into Africa. Instead, another way perhaps is to do training in China.

As Chen said, the Ministry of Education in China is planning to hold training every year in Chinese cities for African people. China pays for the entire process of journey and training, including the ticket and accommodation, as well as setting up the staff and the lectures. The fields of training cover computer science, agriculture, medicine, and educational management. The term of the training normally is two weeks. The Chinese embassy will inform the Tanzanian government about the training information, and then the Tanzanian government will recommend the group of people to the Chinese embassy. The embassy then checks the materials of the training objects and sends formal offers. In the field of educational training, the Ministry of Education organizes most of the activities. Yet there are also other training plans conducted by the Ministry of Commerce.

In a two to three weeks' workshop, the African school or university administrators have an opportunity to get some experience of how China developed their education system. The principal of DUCE, Misa, talked about her three week experience in China during training in Zhejiang,

I visited China last year. It was an invitation to our Ministry of Education, about some workshop in China. Zhejiang Normal University organised everything. MoE in China contacted our MoE. Then our MoE sent invitations to us. There were people from different African countries in the training. We visited 3-4 universities. It was in August. I spent 3 weeks there. We got to know more about educational development in China.

Generally we were informed educational systems, the changes taken place in China and other information about the educational development of China, such as how the enrollment has been increasing. .. I got some information from that visit in China, and some cooperation. I also got information that China is offering student scholarship to Tanzania. One of our staff went to China last year, for PhD with the scholarship.

This is a process of viewing and learning from successful experience directly. For African people, they all know the quality educational system in the Western countries, but they want to know more about how a developing country develops



its educational system. The Chinese experience for them is more pragmatic, and they may find out some similarities. As Misa told,

Yes it is useful. It is good to know what others are doing. We learn from others, sharing opinions. It is helpful for you to shift your own programs. For example we learnt some foreign language programs which I was also thinking to do. It is about introducing some second foreign language programs. I can also introduce that to our college. So we need cooperation with Chinese universities, and we need to learn from them.

From the TUTE interview we received some course names from the lecturer Wang: they have been offering training course in vocational education to African institutional administrators. The seminar topics of the training include the following: 'curriculum and teaching reforms of vocational education: based on a direction of employment', 'vocational education in developing countries: a comparative view', 'Educational development in China', 'vocational skill certification in China', 'administration models of vocational institutions in China', and 'developing vocational education in China'. In addition, there are some visiting activities to historical places and to primary/secondary/vocational schools in China.

It is revealed to us that China is 'sharing experience to let you learn', a method which is significantly different from the Western way of 'giving direction to let you catch up'. China does not criticize or comment as to how African people have done, but rather shares opinions and experience with them on the basis of South-South cooperation and within a field of the developing world. Western donors do not have this basis because they have developed much faster than Africa and even colonised them, thus psychologically they cannot sit on the same level.

## **2.2 The case of ZJNU's short term training**

Before starting discussion of the ZJNU case on short term training, we may look

at some points Chinese and African university chancellors issued during the 1<sup>st</sup> China-Africa university president forum, held at ZJNU in October 2006:<sup>114</sup>

The developing countries which have less developed higher education should get more cooperation in this field, promoting national higher education quality, and more competitive human resource internationally'. ---The chancellor of Nanjing University which is one of the top universities in China, Yongzhong Song

International cooperation could be one of the key points for the capacity building and reforms of higher education in developing countries. ---Vice chancellor of Western University College of Science and Technology (WEUCO) in Kenya

The cooperation between Chinese and African universities is based on equity, friendship, mutual respect, mutual needs and mutual benefits, which is different from the higher education relationship between Africa and their Western colonists. ---Chancellor of University of Namibia (UNAM)

Zhejiang Normal University will make a special funding for inviting African scholars coming to China for lecturing, visiting and other academic work. ---Chancellor of ZJNU, Xinlin Mei

We wish the cooperation in the fields of technology research, adult education, teacher education, postgraduate education, scholarships exchange and degree certification. ---Dean of the Open University of Tanzania

The words show the willingness for cooperation by African and Chinese educational administrators; for what reason do they have passion towards, and feel more equal with, China, rather than the Western donors? And how do Chinese university organize and declare these activities? The President Forum followed the third year's training for African university chancellors by ZJNU. A series of short

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<sup>114</sup> These viewpoints are from the training reports by ZJNU, which were offered to me by the dean of the African centre while I was doing my interview there.



term training sessions by ZJNU have already transferred a broad range of basic knowledge about China and the Chinese educational situation to African trainees, and also created a harmonized relationship between Chinese and African educational leaders. Let’s examine some details of this training, and have some critical analysis on how the organizers describe the training.

The trainings held in ZJNU have been formed regularly and systematically. The information of three training sessions held in ZJNU in recent years can be seen in the following table, and highlights that the university is accelerating on this kind of cooperation with Africa and building stable relationship with Africa through this channel.<sup>115</sup>

Table 8.1 Three training sessions held in ZJNU in 2004-2006

Year	2004	2005	2006
<i>Participants from Africa</i>	19 participants from 13 African countries including university chancellor and vice chancellors	11 participants from 7 African countries including university chancellors, deans, officials from MoE	20 participants including chancellors, vice chancellors and deans
<i>Participants from China</i>	ZJNU chancellor and lecturers, scholars from top Chinese universities, officials in educational sections		
<i>Schedule</i>	12/08-14/08 Shanghai, arriving; 15/08-19/08 ZJNU in Jinhua, seminars and workshops; 20/08-22/08 Hangzhou, seminars from officials and scholar outside of ZJNU; 23/08-26/08 Beijing, visiting Beijing University and Tsinghua University	01/12-08/12 ZJNU, seminars, workshops, visiting and culture saloon; 09/12-15/12 in Wuhu and Hangzhou, Anhui Normal University etc. and other colleges for professional education, seminars and visiting in 5 institutes in two cities; 16/12-19/12 finishing	15/09-25/09 ZJNU, seminars, workshops, visiting and culture saloon; 26/09-01/10 in Shaoxing and Hangzhou, seminars and visiting in 4 institutes in two cities; 02/10-05/10 Forum of China-Africa university Presidents; 06/10-08/10 finishing

<sup>115</sup> The training documents were obtained from my field interview at ZJNU.

<i>performance</i>	A good connection between practice and theories; promoting long term cooperation; enhancing the image of China.	Three modules training: background module, professional module and expansion module; <sup>116</sup> Very good interaction between participants, managers and lecturers; 'Cooperation Memorandums' signed. <sup>117</sup>	Based on the previous experience, more diverse activities and higher quality of lecturers team; The 1 <sup>st</sup> China-African University President Forum.
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It may be concluded that the case of short term training held by ZJNU showed some progress and provided good experience for this approach by the Chinese government. It is a practical idea that the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce authorize universities to do the training, as it is easier to organise teaching team and space, and also a provides a good opportunity to advertise these universities internationally. Some of the universities began to build regular cooperation with African universities. Within several years of the development of the training, it is more synthetic in content and there are more universities and colleges joining the training. Universities work collaboratively with the hosting university to hold seminars and workshops, as well as to show their research performance, such as some Africa research centres.

**3. CDA of four pieces of ‘Work summary of training for university presidents’ by ZJNU: a statement rather than technical report**

In this section, we use CDA to look at the words and language used in discussing educational cooperation between China and Africa. The typical case, short term training, which is featured as ‘practical’ and a ‘connection between theory and educational reality’ for African higher educators, can be set as the analysis basis.

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<sup>116</sup> The background module includes an introduction of the educational development situation in China and education in Zhejiang province, where ZJNU is. The professional module includes topics of higher education in China, such as the system, the policies, teaching and curriculum, enrolment, postgraduate education, logistics socialization, etc. The expansion module is about the prospects of the internationalization of higher education.

<sup>117</sup> The ‘Cooperation Memorandums’ is for more cooperation and exchange between Chinese and African universities in the future. It includes collaborated research, academic meetings and conferences, cooperated education, academic resource exchange, short term training, teacher and student exchange, short term course, etc. There were seven chancellors signed the memorandum with ZJNU by the end of the training 2005.



Following Fairclough (1989;1992: 73; 1995: 98) there are three dimensions of critical discourse analysis - description (text analysis), interpretation (processing analysis) and explanation (social analysis). In this analysis, there will be three parts which are 'the text of the summary', 'the roles in the summary', and 'the social relation within the summary'. Through this analysis on text, we can see that, while the texts may be not too different from how Western courses might describe their activities and their performance, CDA enables us to see 'behind' the words, into a bigger context of broader social/power relations of the Chinese aid practice, and through this to demonstrate a different logic behind the courses in China.

### 3.1 Text (style, genre)

The four pieces of work summarised include three pieces from 'Training for university presidents in African English speaking countries' and one summary of 'Training for university presidents in African French speaking countries'. There is not much difference between the two types of training, except for the different groups of African countries. The schedules and lecturers are similar. So we will not discuss them separately. Three training sessions from 2004 to 2006 for African English speaking countries were summarised in the table above. Every summary includes the following parts: (a) basic information about the number of participants and their nationalities, as well as the schedule of the training (i.e. stages in different cities and activities); (b) the performance of the training; (c) the experience and implications.

The language used in the summary moves between formal and informal. As a formal report of the schedule and activities, the summaries state the schedule of each time of training in a neutral way, noting the date and the content of the training (such as the titles of the seminars and the place names they visited). These features have been listed in the above table. However, in terms of some specific places and activities, a few descriptive words which expressed some 'feeling' about the training were used:

Pleasant and exciting description---

‘In the evening, the participants visited the beautiful night view of The Bund (Waitan) in Shanghai.’ (2004 summary)

‘The participants are keeping great interest consistently towards to the visiting and seminars.’ (2004 summary)

‘The beautiful West Lake in Hangzhou’ (in every summary)

‘The local place with very rich local characters’ (in every summary)

Describing the practice they joined-

‘During the intense study we arranged the visiting to the beautiful West Lake’

‘A fully reinforced teaching team with educational experts in and out ZJNU’ (similar words in every summary)

‘At the moment our chancellor exchanging gifts with African participants, the prolonged applause foreshowing the long vitality of the China and Africa educational cooperation’ (Nov. 2005 summary)

‘The participants visited Qinghua University, and received kindly by the vice chancellor’ (2004 summary)

‘The seminar proceeded in a very warm atmosphere... they discussed the experience and methods as well as the difficulties very deeply’ (2004 summary)

‘The study and visiting in China let them keenly aware of China as the rising eastern big country and its full power and grandeur...’

An African participant’s words has been quoted-

‘A participant from Morocco sent email to us after he went back, saying, China is the real friendly country for Africa. They are warm-hearted and hospitable. The staffs from Ministry of Commerce and ZJNU are so friendly and served us well. They have given us the best arrangement, which let us feel like at home! We want to thank you very much again!’ (2005 summary)

Some specific examples added-

‘A lady from Republic of Djibouti got sick in the night. The Chinese staff sent her to the hospital as soon as possible during the night and watched her until the next day. Then the staff started to watch her by turn until she got well and left hospital. During the visit in Jiangxi province, in order to look after her well, there was a female staff joining temporarily in the trip. After that, the lady has being getting



better and better.’

‘During the daily life in China, in order to respect fully everyone’s religion, the university emphasised again and again at the scheduled dining places about what kind of food they can supply, and checked the menu carefully. There were two participants from Morocco in the Ramadan time which means they can only eat in the very early morning. So the organizer served them separately of their meals.’

All of the discourse about the trainings emphasised: the well-organised arrangement, the strong lecturing team, the diverse activities and the good feedback, this shows a feeling of friendliness and cooperation between African participants and Chinese organisers. Not only were the diverse activities and seminars in a wide range of topics which they enjoyed, but they also were very well looked after during daily life in China. This is what the summaries have described to us.

Another feeling expressed by the texts is ‘win-win’. It is not discussing about how China is giving a beneficial opportunity to African universities, but highlights a sharing opportunity for both sides. The texts use words which are not like voice from a higher level to a lower level. The terms ‘discussion’, ‘communication’, ‘international exchange’ are used frequently.

‘The two-sides discussed deeply according to each side’s experience, methods and difficulties of administration.’ (2004 summary)

‘This has promoted the future cooperation in the educational field for China and Africa two sides.’ (2004 summary)

‘Our university exchanged the educational documents with the African participants during the training.’ (2005 summary)

‘We discussed the higher education issues together.’

‘We combine the seminar, visiting, exchange activities together to achieve a best effect of the training.’ (2006 summary)

‘We arranged the face-to-face communication between our university students and the African participants- the Cultural Saloon which let the participants be integrated into the atmosphere of Chinese university culture... is getting to be a bridge for China and African young people’s life.’ (2006 summary)

This shows the Chinese style of talking about the relationship between them and their developing partners. It is in the context of equals, exchange, communication and friendship. This is found from the political discourse in speeches by the president to the small summaries for practice, and thus we can see this style in many situations.

Most of the texts are positive, and seldom are critical and reflective thinking to be found. However, the language being used is changing through time. Note that although the frameworks look similar for all of the summaries (i.e. with a kind of fixed outline), the language used and the expression have some changes. There are more specific examples, and fewer high-sounding words used in the latter summaries. It seems the summary writers have also begun paying attention to the style, so as to make the summaries more technical and less emotional. In the last summary, an additional suggestion part with some specific future plans on the training was added.

### **3.2 Roles- discursive practice of discourse**

The summaries are made by the Foreign Affairs Division of ZJNU. As discussed above, the writers are responsible for the summaries to three level bodies, the university, the local educational departments and the Ministries.

According to the paragraphs talking specifically about the ‘support of ministry’, we can firstly interpret from the text the important role of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce, as well as Education Department in Zhejiang Province.

‘The training is highly valued by the leadership of International Department, Ministry of Education, and supported a lot by the departments in charge. All of these are the preconditions and important guarantee of the training....During the training time, the Education Department of Zhejiang province has been supporting a lot to us, especially the session in Hangzhou. We can not separate our success



from their help.' (2004 summary)

'Ministry of Education highly valued the training and held the Forum of China-African University Presidents, concerning and directing us a lot in many aspects. The vice-department chief of International Cooperation and Exchanges, Baoli Liu not only directed us very carefully in the first-phase preparation of the training and the forum, but also gave a lot of constructive suggestions and attended all of the sessions of the forum.' (2006 summary)

'Executive Bureau of International Economic Cooperation of Ministry of Commerce highly valued assisting Africa by this kind of training, and concerned a lot in many aspects. The executive bureau did a lot of efforts on the enrolment of the training, and devoted a lot on the training contents and schedules, issued very clear requirements. The bureau concerned the participants' arrival information all the time before the training, and always inquired about the situation on the phone. All of these are strong guarantee of our success.' (2005 summary- French speaking African country training)

The text actually shows a political system among the host university (ZJNU), the local educational department and the central ministries. All of the educational cooperation practices are directed by the central government, which indicate that the practice is educational as well as political. The power relations among these institutions have an influence on the language of the summaries.

It can be seen from the content that both ministries have been mentioned frequently in the texts, which in turn means the leadership of the ministries. The two ministries, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce, are the driver of the practice and also the audience of these summaries.

Another role is ZJNU itself, as the producer of the summaries and the organiser of the training. The summaries are all showing us that the university, in this practice, has done a good job and devoted human and material resources to it. Thus the objectivities could be a consideration when people are reading these words, as it actually showing ZJNU's capacity.

So it can be seen that the reports are also intended to be an advertisement for ZJNU. The description about the well organised training and the quotes featuring good feedback are very persuasive and show the ability and performance of this university. The implications and future suggestions indicate that the university is thinking to improve this practice. That is why some interviewees told me that it has been a good chance to advertise universities' (especially these 'second line universities') special characters (such as African study centre), as well as promote themselves internationally.

Under the big picture of the China-Africa relationship, which seems to be getting closer, it is obviously a good idea to develop educational practice in Africa, especially one authorized by the central government. For ZJNU, the benefits are multidimensional: helping the win-win China and Africa relationship, helping higher education cooperation between itself and other national and international universities, and helping its own research development.

Therefore, from the texts of these training summaries/ reports, we can get an idea that, the texts tend: To show how successful the training is, which has taken the forms of the visiting, seminars, workshops and cultural saloons, and how welcome the training is by African participants;

To show a special kind of cooperation between Chinese and African universities, as well as a cooperation among the Chinese educational institutions and educational administrative organisations;

With the performance described in the texts, from the political perspective we can see the goals the texts producer wants:

To get a positive evaluation from the higher educational departments (which is good for the university in the long run);

To create a positive image of the university itself (to let the wider audience, other universities in Africa and even all over the world, know about its success).



### 3.3 Social relations

Fairclough (1995: 38) says, a social institution is (amongst other things) an apparatus of verbal interaction, or an 'order of discourse'; thus an institution can be regarded as a sort of 'speech community' with its own particular repertoire of speech events, its own differentiated settings and scenes, its cast of participants, and its own norms for their combination. The institution provides these with a frame for action, without which they cannot act; it thereby constrains them to act within that frame, however.

Here the discourse of the summaries is under two types of institutional frameworks: one is the administration within university, which means the summaries are reports of work for university level eyes to see whether the staff organise the activities successfully; another is the administration within the educational system, from local to central government, which means the summaries are reports for higher educational managers to evaluate their practice, especially for the manager who gives the funding- the ministry. Thus the summaries should be like working reports, yet within a more political atmosphere. This is why the summaries are not technical but instead show a 'colourful picture' of Chinese and African educational cooperation.

This picture is a representation of the distinctive style of China-Africa cooperation in the field of higher education. It shows how China wants its educational assistance to be understood and presented.

It could be argued that the summaries are not just summaries, meaning that the summaries are more than technical reports which describe the process, progress, and results of technical or scientific research, or the state of a technical or scientific research problem (Online Technical Writing, n.d.).<sup>118</sup> It is not just talking about the aims, content and main performance of the training in a technical way. The content listed in the table above cannot cover all the meaning in the whole discourse. For instance those 'exciting' words have been used to imply a

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<sup>118</sup> See explanation of a 'technical report' on the website of 'Online Technical Writing', <http://www.io.com/~hcexres/textbook/techreps.html>.

very important and meaningful intention.

It is more than a report, it can be seen more as a statement. In logic a statement is a declarative sentence. These summaries are statements about China, about Chinese intentions towards Africa, and about Chinese equal relations with Africa. They are not only talking about how the training is going, but also about how the organisers have not wasted the time, resources and the government funding - an effective work, about how the training has been successful for both sides - a win-win process, about how this kind of Chinese educational aid has formed an impressive approach of aid which is welcomed by African people. The statement actually is that by short term training, China is successfully exchanged the higher education knowledge, experience, and resources with African universities in a friendly, practical and efficient manner.

#### **4. Cultural route: culture centre and Confucius Institute**

Beside the aid approaches in higher and vocational education, China has other types of action in Africa. However these activities were not recognised as main approaches in my field work, and some of these activities seemed to be unpopular for Tanzanians. As the ambassador told, sometimes what we gave was not what they wanted. Here, the Cultural Centre in Mkapa High School in Dar es Salaam could be an example which shows a gap between the donor's aim and the recipient's urgent needs. The idea of the centre sounds a good idea to build a cultural 'bridge' between middle school students in China and Tanzania, however it is better known to China's media, but not outside.

As we indicated in the introduction, China had an extension on the conception of education. Training seems like an acceptable way, both practically and politically, to build the China-Africa relationship, and to transfer Chinese developmental experience to Africa, and also to establish a reputation for Chinese universities. Not only this, but in Chinese discourse the term 'education' is always associated with the term 'culture' (as in Tanzania all of the cooperation is mainly in the Cultural Agreement), this therefore transforms Chinese culture through education



while it is also claimed by China as a way to support African education. It is a cultural route for promoting a political relationship and a friendly atmosphere. Thus, how about the field scene and the school/institutional leaders' feelings?

#### **4.1 Chinese Cultural Centre in Mkapa High School: a small place with a big name**

Benjamin Mkapa High School, which honours Tanzanian's third president Benjamin William Mkapa, was introduced by the school principal and his secretary as the biggest one in the country with more than three thousand students. If you check the information on Chinese news website, you can read news about a Chinese Cultural Centre in this school, which was built by the Chinese government in 2005. On 27 May 2005, the opening ceremony of this centre was held in the school with the two sides' officials in attendance. As Chinese news introduced:

This is the first Chinese cultural-educational base for Tanzanian high school students. Chinese government donated more than 400 books and CDs about China (in English language), TV and DVD, 20 computers which are value to 20,000 USD to Mkapa School. Therefore the school established an exhibition room for 'Chinese Cultural Centre', and let the 2000 students get to know the Chinese history and current situation as well as cultures and arts at any time. (FOCAC, 31/05/2005)

The Chinese news motivated me to arrange a visit to the school when I arrived in Dar es Salaam. I was lucky to meet the school principal, Mero, as soon as I reached the school. Mero and his secretary accepted my interview request and introduced me to the school:

I am not very precise but I think we were looking for various organisations and assistance for our school, Japan, China...and fortunately we got Japanese embassy to help to do some constructions, building these rooms, and the teaching materials were mainly from

Chinese embassy, in terms of computers...and to make sure this friendship goes on, they use one of the rooms for the cultural centre. The materials there can be read by both of teachers and students. They helped build some sort of library, basically some educational materials, newspapers and so on. (Principal, Mero)

The basic fact seemed to be the same as what the Chinese media described. As the secretary said:

Sometimes Chinese come and visit the school. They came twice. They firstly donated some computers and piano, and some sort of materials such as books and pictures, posters. (Secretary of the principal)

When asked about what they thought about the motives of these donations, the principal said:

Well...Chinese and Tanzanian, diverse cultures, relationships...because of that... There are some Chinese pictures, including Chinese and Tanzanian presidents Mao and Nyerere... (Mero)

It is obvious that the donation and the Cultural Centre are all for building a relationship between China and Tanzania. The principal talked about the Cultural Centre:

It is open. And some teachers they can seek materials for teaching. But it is not directly related with the teaching, and some of them are in Chinese...Anyway it is helping us, and you can see our students are happy with that when they use the TV which is available there...And the cultural centre, because of that, we feel our friendship is still growing.

After that, we had a look at the Chinese cultural centre in the school. On the way to the Cultural Centre I could see part of the school was still under construction. Actually the construction was suspended because of a lack of money, as the principal told me. Thus I felt that it is good to let students know more about



another continent, however the urgent needs of students must not be Chinese culture.

The information, when compared to pictures I got from Chinese media, is not too different from the reality. However, the media likes to use some 'big words' to describe the project. Does this centre represent such a big value as the media expressed, one for 'bridging two countries friendship' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC; Ministry of Culture of PRC, 2005)? In fact when I reached the centre, it seemed to represent a kind of loneliness. It was also possible that students were in class, so not many people were there. The centre was just a room, not big, but full of books and pictures. Some of the books were very good for learning Chinese history and geography, and there were posters showing typical Chinese scenes. The room was decorated with Chinese red lanterns, on each of the lanterns there were Chinese characters. It could be attractive for students, but I was not sure how big an influence it could make.

On the other hand, as Mkapa School is quite well known in the country, I sometimes talked about this with local students. A Tanzanian PhD student, who was also working on aid research and did fieldwork in Mkapa School, told me that the school's management capacity was a problem. As she said, 'the school is just a normal school, but so many political things are related with it because of the school's name. If the school gets several small amount donations from diverse donors, then they should collect them together and organize them well in use' (reference). It seems that from a Tanzanian researcher's perspective, not only the donor, but also the school leaders, should work better and be responsible for the school's future.

## **4.2 Confucius Institute (CI)**

If we say in most of the areas the so called 'cooperation' between China and Tanzania is more like one-way assistance (i.e. offering teaching materials, teacher dispatch or student scholarships), then the development of a Confucius Institute (CI), claimed as a non-profit education organisation promoting Chinese language

and culture in the world, could be one of the educational and cultural ‘co-operations’ between China and Africa in the new era.

It is important to mention Hanban (the Confucius Institute Headquarters), which is ‘the executive body of the Chinese Language Council International, a non-governmental and non-profit organisation affiliated to the Ministry of Education of China’. Hanban is the body governing the CIs, leading and supervising all of the CIs around the world.

The number of the CIs and the Confucius Classrooms is increasing, according to Hanban’s data:

In the period up to October 2009, a total of 523 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms have been established in 87 countries and regions over the world; among which 282 are Confucius Institutes in 84 countries..... 21 in 15 African countries, 94 in 29 European countries... (Hanban, 2009)<sup>119</sup>

By the end of 2010, there have been 322 Confucius Institutes and 369 Confucius Classrooms (total number 691) established in 96 countries. In addition, some 250 institutions from over 50 countries have expressed requirements for establishing Confucius Institutes/Classrooms, amongst them some of the world's top universities (Hanban, 2010a).

Among these 322 CIs in 91 countries, according to data by October 2010, there are 81 CIs in 30 Asian countries, 21 CIs in 16 African countries, 105 CIs in 31 European countries, 103 CIs in 12 American countries, and 12 CIs in 2 Oceania countries (Hanban, 2010b).

The aim of CI, as stated in Hanban’s ‘Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes’, is very inspiring:

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<sup>119</sup> See from H anban’s website, <http://english.hanban.org/>. This was expired when new data came out in 2010.



Confucius Institutes devote themselves to satisfying the demands of people from different countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese language, to enhancing understanding of the Chinese language and culture by these peoples, to strengthening educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other countries, to deepening friendly relationships with other nations, to promoting the development of multi-culturalism, and to construct a harmonious world (Hanban, n.d.).

Also stated in the by-law, the services provided by the Confucius Institute include: Chinese language teaching; training Chinese language instructors and providing Chinese language teaching resources; holding the HSK examination (Chinese Proficiency Test) and tests for the Certification of the Chinese Language Teachers; providing information and consultative services concerning China's education, culture, and so forth; and conducting language and cultural exchange activities between China and other countries (Hanban, n.d.).<sup>120</sup>

Yet there hasn't been much separate introduction about Confucius Classrooms on Hanban's website, however, there are separate procedures for applying CIs and Confucius Classrooms, based on the same by-laws (Hanban, n.d.).<sup>121</sup>

The principal of DUCE also was asked to talk about the aim of CI. She said:

Spreading Chinese language, Chinese culture in the world... It is more about learning Chinese and culture, not for business profit. Chinese language also comes international. That is possible. One of the criteria for setting CI is the demanding for Chinese language and culture. When we sign the agreement of establishment, as they say, we need to cooperate the Chinese language education and promote culture exchange, and increase mutual understanding between two countries. I think these are the major objectives. (Misa)

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<sup>120</sup> See [http://english.hanban.org/node\\_7880.htm](http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm)

<sup>121</sup> See [http://english.hanban.org/node\\_7879.htm](http://english.hanban.org/node_7879.htm)

It should be additionally noted that the CI is claimed to be a type of cultural and educational cooperation between China and Africa (and with other continents), and that this 'cooperation' and 'exchange' means that the Africa side also needs to contribute. We noticed that in the Funding Chapter of the 'Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes', both sides have to provide funds to maintain the CI.

A newly established Confucius Institute will receive aid to its initial operation in the form of a set amount of funds provided by the Chinese Parties. The funds for its annual projects shall be raised by individual Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Parties together in a ratio of approximately 1:1 commitment in general. (Chapter 5: Funds)

From this aspect we cannot say it is just 'aid', and as CIs are built all over the world, African people feel that they are joining a global project and probably, that they need Chinese language more than people in other countries. Thus they would like to apply for this project, as a type of university cooperation with China.

Perhaps the CI will remind people of the British Council. Both of the CIs (by Hanban) and British Council, as government's international cultural relation body, show people the soft power and the importance of 'culture'. Comparatively, the British Council has more diverse activities in more areas in the world, and is more mature. Besides the funding from the government, British Council earns more income from its 'commercial businesses', while Chinese Hanban still define CIs as 'non-profit'.<sup>122</sup> However in this study, we focus on the CI's meaning for China in Africa, and it may be explained as follows:

Firstly, CIs in the Western countries service Chinese lovers more than Chinese 'demanders', but in Africa with more and more Chinese business and Chinese scholarship opportunities, there are increasing number of peoples need who need

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<sup>122</sup> British Council expresses their funding system in three parts: government grants, further sources and financial memorandum; the 'further sources' refers to their commercial businesses, principally 'teaching English, administering examinations and managing international contracts on behalf of clients.' As they say, 'for every £1 of government grant we receive, we earn £2.50 from other sources' (British Council, 2010).



the CI as a kind of instrument for life. For example, five of the students in the Nairobi CI have been employed by Chinese invested cooperation in Kenya. Just as the principal of DUCE said:

We wish to teach Chinese here, because there are quite a number of people I am sure who have an interest to learn Chinese here. Then when they go to China to do business or whatever, they can communicate with Chinese well.... It is just about teaching Chinese. I believe more and more people want to learn it and I have introduced it to my students already. Our students are interested in that. They want to learn a second foreign language. (Misa)

Secondly, it is a cultural route for developing a China-Africa relationship through cooperation in the educational field. Through learning about Chinese Wushu (martial art), calligraphy, paper-cuts, and ancient poems, the students have become more and more interested in Chinese culture. Yet it is for more than education and learning Chinese, it is for political and business aims as well. As TJNU introduced, there are a series of officials visiting the CI in Kenya, even President Hu. The speeches discuss the 'memorable meeting with President Hu', 'the first lecture by the Chinese ambassador', and the '2008 Beijing Olympics'. They started to be friendlier to the Chinese officials and moreover, the students with good performance in their Chinese learning have the opportunity to work in Chinese institutes or companies. So the CIs produce students who are close to China and even work for Chinese businesses in Africa.

Thirdly, while the CI cannot bring much business for the Chinese university which operates it, it can bring reputation. As Yan (TJNU) said, 'it is also a good practice for advising our universities. We are not the most famous university in China but we can develop our institution by some creation and some contribution to the field such as educational cooperation with developing countries and spreading Chinese learning in the world, in order to be more competitive'. On the other hand, there is the same effect on African universities which have CIs.

## Conclusion

This chapter featured analysis and findings regarding China's training and cultural approaches on educational aid. In addition to formal higher education by which the Chinese government cooperates with Africa there are other forms. This is what we talked about in this chapter, specifically short term training or Confucius Institute. We also did discourse analysis on the training reports in order to see the motives and the social relations of the Chinese institutions and ministries.

Within this chapter, the introduction and visits to three Chinese universities gave some information about individual universities' jobs and roles in the action for Africa. These universities are the main power of human resource support to African countries, and these practice, such as training African students, officials or administrators, also help the universities have higher international prestige and more funding from the Chinese government; a type of 'win-win'.

In terms of the short term training, we reviewed ZJNU's three years' reports on training for university presidents in Africa. The texts in the reports revealed that the organizer- Chinese ministries and the university- both wanted to emphasise their positive performance as recognised by African participants, which were presented through a series of words and sentences, as well as through specific examples. Thus we prefer to call it a statement rather than a report, as the texts produced a vivid picture of China and Chinese universities' interest and intention towards Africa.

Moreover, China has an extension of the conception of education so that Chinese texts include both formal education and short term training as 'educational cooperation'. In addition to this, the cultural route is also conducted by contemporary China. The Confucius Institute has trained more and more foreign people who like Chinese language. One of the big differences between the CI in developed countries and in Africa is that the CI in Africa can help a number of African applicants obtain jobs in Chinese companies. Another case was the Cultural Centre in Mkapa School, which was successfully in its political aims rather than solving urgent educational needs in the school. The Centre was also



a Chinese style of logic in practice – focusing more on an image it can build.

In terms of the difference between these Chinese approaches and the Western approaches (i.e. a comparison with British Council), we actually cannot distinguish them too much at the mechanism level – on strengthening a country's 'soft power' by doing cultural activities and language education (though with longer history, British Council is more comprehensive and systematical than Hanban). However, the most important characteristic China has, which is also recognised by the participants/recipients, is that there are more common goals between Africa and China. This is China's active strategy at the moment. There are advantages of doing this: China's experience and culture, quite different from the Western developmental history, are attractive to African people. The experience is pragmatic for African people, as they can learn how a developing country achieves fast economic growth. Learning Chinese culture and language will be interesting and helpful for African people, as more and more Chinese economic powers will engage with Africa. Educational institutes, in this process, are the provider and organizer for delivering knowledge and directing people towards knowledge in an efficient way.

This logic of 'sharing experience' within developing countries is increasingly recognised by not only African people but also Western donors. The World Bank has noticed 'Africa seeks to replicate China's success' (Kleine and Xie, 2008), and according to president of the World Bank Group,

'... new partners are contributing not only aid, but more importantly are becoming major trading partners and sources of investment and know-how....This is particularly true in the case of China's engagement with Africa. African countries want to learn about China's development experience, particularly about overcoming poverty and sustaining economic growth.... Development is no longer a North-South transfer. It is South-South, even South-North, with lessons for all with open minds.' (Zoellick, 2010).

We can see a trend: China is establishing its image in Africa, including a Chinese

style of development, and how it has changed. This forms a comparison with the image of 'the West'. The Cold War gave the world an impression of 'the West' as a distinct entity (Vlahos, 1991: 60), and politically, the socialist side, including China, represented an opposite meaning and style. However with the disappearance of the two super powers and with economic globalisation, we are wondering whether there will be a 'Southern picture', or an Orientalism, which is not Western oriented. China is doing, in transforming its own style through formal higher education, short term training, school exhibition, or language study, expanding an influence different from the classical Western model.



## **Conclusion of Part Two**

### **1. Summary**

In Part One, we have already discussed the logic that all countries could become ‘modern’ and ‘catch up’ with the West if they followed the same stages as the West did; this was seen as both a theory and a prescription (Dale, 1982) and set the basis for the Western model of development. Rather than giving a standard prescription or defining conditions to the recipients, China claims a ‘win-win’ (mutually beneficial) route (FOCAC, 2006a). Different from the Western logic of building a framework for modernisation or promoting an economic/political adjustment, China is working for building bilateral relations rather than framing a global structure (although the influence seems to be increasingly global). According to ‘win-win’ rules, China is gaining broader political and economic relations through this human resource transformation.

Therefore, Part Two examined these features on the texts/ in the discourse, looked at whether there were differences and whether people recognised these differences. Through field work in Tanzania and China in different social departments and with diverse people, Part Two found more details of the Chinese aid and more of voice about China’s practice. By visiting Tanzanian ministries, institutions, high schools and individuals, we arrived at some answers regarding the distinctiveness of Chinese aid:

Firstly, China is very clear about providing educational aid through offering human resource – with the main way of training African people in China being long term for degrees or short term for skills and experience. For example, China does not finance the Tanzanian Ministry of Education or give big amount money to the schools directly. This is very different from the Western way – a turning from project supported to budget support– as China does not like ‘cash aid’. This is also indicated by Brautigam (2009: 124):

... a growing trend in the West, where donors have begun to believe that a relatively well-governed country should be able to make its own

decisions about how to use foreign assistance. Although the Chinese are aware of this trend, they are not following it. They rarely give cash aid in any significant amount.

And as she says, don't mistake the cash aid to be a donation. China also likes donating some goods to schools (such as they did to Mkapa School with the computers and books, etc.). According to Brautigam (2009: 125), the difference is a normal grant-in-kind with a value in Chinese currency, while a cash grant will normally be announced with a value in US dollars. Moreover, donations also make for good pictures in the media, which build a nice image of China in Africa (just as the Cultural Centre and the donated pictures and books do).

So when China is not planning to provide a big amount of money, one of the best choices for China is educational aid and offering human resource support. Providing assistance in higher education for Africa's urgent needs, and carrying out technological training, may be seen as one way of saving African people from the low effectiveness of some foreign aid. The Chinese media likes to use a proverb from Lao-Tzu to describe China's logic of educational assistance for Africa: 'Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach him how to fish and you feed him for a lifetime'. Moreover, when both parties depend on the fish, the 'teaching' approach seems more meaningful.

Secondly, the help for human resource development in Africa is recognised as an important approach by our interviewees. We can see the Chinese scholarships are acceptable, and we also can see a number of returning students who obtained degrees in China now working at a good job in Tanzania. We can see the Tanzanian principals are applying to build a Confucius Institute, which proves to us the need (maybe rather the desire) for Chinese language learning in local areas. However, there are both positive and negative opinions on the details of the practice, which shows that China still needs to improve its practice. Instead of building a friendly image for African people, it is better to work on their urgent needs in education, either the needs for school teaching or construction, or the needs for more communication and strict evaluation in higher education from the African students in China.



A final point is the recognition of the difference between China and the West. It can be seen that the Chinese officials translate their policy claims into practice, and the Chinese can also point to their good performance in the training of African University administrators. Both of these show China providing unconditional and equal support for African countries. However, while the older generation seems to have more passion in their Chinese friendships through the historical link, the younger generation may not be interested in any political comparison of different donors. Even some current institutional leaders also noted that they would accept any donation from any type of donor, when the resource could be of help. So it can be argued that the difference of donor logic is not recognised very clearly among the recipients, as most of the interviewees are not keen on talking about politics even though they know why they choose to study in China or why they want to learn Chinese, or why they feel happy with the workshops taken in China. The answer is they feel related with Chinese – within the activities organised by China, they can get what they are interested in, but maybe cannot easily obtain these things from the West: (a) some feeling of sharing experience and ideas for development; (b) some activities which are more like exchange rather than help; (c) some practical skills which are related to, and helpful for, their future careers.

## **2. An important part of 'donor logic': understanding modality differences**

We pointed out in the Introduction that one of the main elements of 'donor logic', is what was referred to as the 'aid modality' the means and mechanisms by which aid is provided, and how funds and knowledge are transmitted to recipient countries (Ohno and Niiya, 2004: 3). Having described the detail of Chinese aid in Part Two, it is appropriate to return to this broader question now.

In terms of the Western context, according to Ohno and Niiya (2004: 7), there have been three shifts towards to a new aid modality. The first shift is from 'stand-alone' projects to project 'clustering', often in the form of pooling funds. The second shift is from structural adjustment operations to GBS under the PRSP

agenda. Third, some donors, particularly DFID, have moved from SWAp to GBS, based on the view that GBS is a ‘preferred’ or more ‘progressive’ aid modality. It is interesting to summarise China’s position and aid modality features within the process of these shifts.

The exploration of the fieldwork data helped us find out more about how aid has been and is provided by Western and Chinese donors. The main differentiating characteristics of China’s aid modality are as follows:

1. China does not ‘do’ ‘professional aid’. As mentioned in the Introduction, China does not distribute aid through bureaucratised specialists or agencies, as China is not keen on direct finance and hence not so concerned with evaluating how recipient countries manage the money. Therefore there is no ‘accounting’ of the money and much less accountabilities of recipients. There is no central foreign-aid agency (an institute such as DFID), although there is a Department of Aid to Foreign Countries under Ministry of Commerce of the PRC. Beijing often designates different ministries (or, in some instances, provinces) to tackle different projects in different countries (Davis and Woetzel, 2010).

2. There is not yet any evidence of China joining in the trend of moving to ‘new aid modalities’ such as GBS with the Western donors. In the primary educational field, despite some donation of teaching facilities we examined in Tanzania, it seems China still focuses on building schools – from rural schools to friendship schools, which it also constructs itself; in the higher educational field, China focuses on government scholarship and university cooperation. Again it gives the completed project, not ‘money’ and ‘assistance’. The government is not interested in becoming involved in managing aid flows, but in building a good image of China and a long term relationship with Africa through human resource development support.

3. One feature of Chinese aid modality is a trend towards building one-to-one relationships between universities, either by organising short-term training, or by establishing CIs. The 20+20 Plan in 2009 FOCAC documents particularly emphasised this again. King (2010) exactly pointed out this distinctive



modality:

A further distinguishing modality of the Confucius Institute and Classroom is that each of these bodies overseas is formally linked to an appropriate university or secondary school in China. This partnership then provides the source of the Chinese co-director of the Confucius Institutes in Africa as well as of the regular and volunteer teachers of Chinese to go to the African university. The Chinese partner can also become the host for the different scholarship and other language visitors to China (King, 2010: 82).

4. While building schools and offering scholarships are not in themselves special forms of aid approaches (they also can be seen in Western aid), in terms of Chinese aid, these forms are related not with accountabilities but with reciprocities. It is hard to define Chinese schools or scholarships as a kind of project aid, as in the Western idea of project aid, in the sense that 'the project approach is based on the identification of a specific area of intervention for donor involvement, and the targeted use of funds for specific activities for which the objectives, outputs and inputs required to achieve them have been defined' (Ohno and Niiya, 2004: 3). China carries out the education and training but does not intervene to evaluate how well they have been implemented. Individual recipients are evaluated by the university educational system when they are in China, but are not required to show they have used scholarships properly to any aid agency in China. The point/motive of China is creating a basis for long term trade and other exchanges.

5. Finally, although on the basis of the main arguments of this study, we have been able to show that China's aid modality may have some differences from the Western aid, this conclusion is reached on the basis of an assumption of the 'normality' of the Western framework/logic of aid. It is very hard to frame China into any Western modality type, as Chinese aid is not about doing stand-alone projects or directly financing in order to reduce transaction costs, nor about giving more or less ownership to recipient countries, or whether they should intervene into African countries' governance issues. It is even not just about promoting

educational development. As King (2010: 86) concluded, ‘ultimately all the many elements of China’s cooperation with Africa are inseparable from the political, economic and trade engagements with Africa’. This may remind us that it may not be appropriate to put China into any category of ‘aid modality’, because it is not like Western ‘aid’ from the beginning. This blended model of aid, investment, trade, and technology as levers for development, while less common in Western approaches, embeds education into the wider and more complex political economic context.



## **Chapter Nine      Conclusion**

This study draws on a theoretical and empirical exploration of different ‘donor logics’ by examining two sets of essential elements of aid practices and policies between Western aid and Chinese aid to Africa – what is given/ aid approaches; why aid/ aid motives; any condition attached (economic or political); how aid/ Logic of intervention/ aid modalities/ aid paradigms; technocratic frame of aid practice; and aid relationships (donor and recipient). Bringing together these elements, enabled the work of seeking differences of ‘donor logics’ to be researchable and structured. It was realised through the following process:

- The Western context of aid, including the history of changing forms of donor logic, key mechanisms and logic of intervention, as well as the dominant aid features in the current global political economy (in Part one);
- The Chinese conception of development, international relations and educational development; the Chinese logic of intervention and donor logic in its relation with Africa, especially its strategies from politically based to economically based, as well as the Chinese model in different eyes- international and national (in Part one);
- Empirical studies, mainly conducted through the field interview in Tanzania and China, supplemented with critical discourse analysis of Chinese training reports in order to test how Tanzanian people perceive Chinese aid and if the Chinese model and logic is recognised differently (in Part two).

In this concluding chapter, we want to review the theoretical arguments, and empirical findings, in order to assess the contribution and limitations of the study.

### **1. A summary of the findings**

Firstly, let us examine briefly some arguments that can be drawn theoretically from Part one of the thesis. These can be summarised in the following points:

- (a) Under Western context, ‘aid’ has not been a neutral term since it emerged in

the last century, because it is fundamentally based on a donor logic of ‘helping’ developing countries achieve economic growth through entry into the world of capitalist economic system, so that they may someday ‘catch up’ with developed countries. The specific motives of foreign aid also depend on different international relations and situations. Aid was a weapon during the Cold War; aid can help security in the post-September 11<sup>th</sup> period; and aid is aiming at ‘poverty reduction’ at the moment.

- (b) ‘Educational aid’, under the rules of general ‘aid’, is first and foremost about developing human capital in order to promote faster economic growth to achieve modernisation. It is an era of ‘education for the knowledge economy’ (EKE). This is very much dominated by the Western donors (e.g. the biggest donor, the World Bank). Current donor logics of educational aid are largely related to the global political economy.
- (c) ‘Aid’ has not been very successful via the logics of intervention used by the Western donors (e.g. in Africa), especially compared with the amount of money the donors contributed. From Washington Consensus to Post-Washington Consensus, from SAPs to PRSPs, although more consideration on governance and more effective approaches and measurements have been introduced into aid practices, the performance of aid has not shown much improvement. The problem lies not with one side or the other, but in the problematic aid relationship itself, and further, within the particular aid logic.
- (d) Most of the aid money ultimately comes from Western taxpayers, and to a certain extent NGOs and private foundations, though this is changing as countries such as China get involved (Roughneen, 27/04/2010).
- (e) The difference China brings is not just its role as a developing country, but a different development theory and a different ‘donor logic’. . This is based on a different historical link, and China’s ‘pragmatism’. China’s increasingly ‘hot’ relations with African countries stimulate us to examine how this can be realised on the ground.



Therefore, secondly, let us look back again at what we learned from the ground, namely, the empirical studies:

- (a) According to the investigation in Tanzania, we can see that, firstly, Chinese educational practice, from donation to schools, to governmental scholarships, has its own impact on the local people, especially the higher educational groups. But compared to traditional Western donors, Chinese approaches still comprise only a small part of total ‘aid’ to Tanzania. Secondly, although there were some complaints in specific areas, the general attitudes towards the Chinese contribution are positive. The government has realised the importance of its ownership within the aid practice, and this may give China a good opportunity to show its different relations to Africa. Individual students have an interest in studying in China, since China is offering more and more opportunities, and also because of Chinese economic development.
- (b) According to the investigation in China, it can be seen that higher education and cultural dissemination are the main routes for Chinese educational practice in Africa, in the forms of student scholarships and short term training, as well as the CIs. The short term training and the establishment of CIs are conducted and arranged by a few Chinese universities authorised by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce. Therefore, a kind of win-win cooperation may be appearing: African people can get opportunities to study or being trained in China, and Chinese higher institutions get more famous and more chances to show their educational quality on an international platform.
- (c) According to the discourse of one particular aid action (the training reports), we can see how Chinese practitioners show and declare their performance regarding the educational assistance for Africa. The CDA analysis, enable us to look deeper into the broader context behind the Chinese texts – a ‘sharing/exchanging’ platform built by China, advertising Chinese experience to Africa. On the other hand, this could lead us to think that Chinese discourse, although highly self-praising, has not made much impact on Africa.

Comparatively, it is noticeable that in talking with Tanzanian officials, they use Western discourse to describe their problems and solutions.

- (d) In terms of the 'Chinese model' mentioned frequently in this study, from the data we collected it is clear that although people are not very interested in distinguishing the Chinese and the Western model of aid, the Chinese model is recognised from a practical perspective: for individuals Chinese education is beneficial for their future career, and for institutions, Chinese assistance can give useful and related developmental experience.

The Chinese model for African education has its own basis. It is based on China's own discourse and experience of foreign relations and economic development, and also on China's domestic educational development. As Professor Liu of the Institute of African Studies at ZJNU said, 'China developed a lot for its higher education in the recent 20 years, and joined a lot into the global trend. The progress of domestic higher education development provided China with the basis for supporting Africa. The 30 years of economic development since opening-up policy, brought China's achievements to the attention of the Western world. The developmental experience is valuable for African countries'.

In addition, although is not among my main empirical findings, from talking with some Chinese scholars, I developed the impression that the researchers in the field of African studies are forming a rising group in current Chinese society, not only in academia, but also in helping to promote the China-Africa business/ trade activities. Most of them also agree that the key point of the Chinese model is a different aid theory or logic.

Thus, what we get from this study is: under globalisation, educational development is increasingly important to the economic development of every country and also strongly influenced by the political economy nationally and internationally. International aid to education, as one of the aid forms, is an important force for the development of African countries which are still struggling with poverty. The Chinese model, which calls for 'educational cooperation' and



‘cultural exchange’ rather than ‘educational aid’, is based on a ‘win-win’ and ‘mutual beneficial’ logic rather than giving structural/governance consultants to achieve certain donor-oriented goals, and is thus gradually and increasingly showing a new trend of South-South relations and a new understanding of ‘aid’; to put it another way, a shock to the orthodox conception of ‘international aid’ or ‘international assistance’.

The empirical work tested China’s logic and related action through people’s perception. We can see that within the process of globalisation with many things stimulating, shocking or motivating us, people’s perception of ‘aid’ has already been altered or given some new ideas. Through the field work and the documentary analysis, I have increasingly begun to feel that multiple changes are taking place around the idea of ‘international aid’. These include: Chinese people’s understanding about the Western aid and about its own aid to Africa, Western people’s understanding about the Chinese model, and Tanzanian people’s perception of China and the West. These complexities might be expected to make some impact on the dominant donors, and their logic.

## **2. A different logic in a set of dimensions**

‘Difference’ is one of the main themes of this study, so we need to emphasise where we have found the distinctiveness of the Chinese model. From the theoretical exploration, we have set six dimensions of ‘donor logic’ and assumed that China has different characteristics in these elements. In contrast to the Western model which is still the main resource of financial aid, with changing forms of conditionality, paternal and hierarchical relations (instructional and ‘top-down’ structured), and fundamentally ‘catching-up’ logic based, the Chinese model focuses on construction, donation and ‘teaching people’ rather than giving direct finance, unconditional, historically fraternal and emphasising equality (claiming ‘cooperation’ and ‘exchange’), and based on a self-help and reciprocal logic. Based on this, education is one of the best ways to help ‘enabling’ people in a long time, just as Confucius said: ‘if you plan for a year, plant a seed. If for a hundred years, teach the people. When you sow a seed, you will reap a single

harvest. When you teach the people, you will reap a hundred harvests' (Brautigam, 2009: 119).

By analysing the interviews and reports from the ground, most of the differences in these elements became more evident. We can see recipients want to move away from the paternal attitude they associate with Western donors; and at this point Chinese action has satisfied them- people like Chinese aid because it is based on trade, practical and more related to recipients' reality. The criticisms of China come more from the Western scholars than from the local people who have received help. These distinct Chinese logics of intervention and related mechanisms include:

*--A political basis to guide educational practice-* educational cooperation is under the framework of diplomatic relations and related foreign policies between China and African countries; it is mainly a national activity, which means it has very clear political goals, and sometimes the political demands are on top of the educational demands.

*--An economic orientation in the aid action-* although the recipient countries have been under a series of economic suggestions from the West since 'aid' emerged, this 'economic orientation' of the Chinese model means linking bilateral relations through business and trade activities, and setting economic growth as a common aim for both recipients and China itself.

*--A practical way of transferring knowledge-* such as short term training, which is very practical for transferring and sharing developmental experience; despite some approaches on primary education, such as donating to schools and constructing school buildings, it is mainly focusing on a higher level of education, including university education and vocational education.

*--A series of discourses about 'equity' and 'cooperation' instead of 'giving aid'-* actually the word 'aid' also appears in China's translated official documents, but more frequently used are terms which can be interpreted as a two-way action (e.g. the FOCAC's slogans frequently use 'cooperation' and 'win-win'). All of the



textual resources gives the world an image of an un-conditional, non-colonial tied, friendship based, and mutual beneficial oriented China-Africa relation.

These differences may offer some new possibilities, or promote more consideration into, the traditional aid system built after the Second World War, to Western capitalism and its aim of modernisation, as well as to the language/discourse system set by the World Bank and other dominant donors. Just as King (2007: 346) concluded, 'this need not take China into a Western or Japanese style donor, but if China is to continue to be true to the Eight Principles of Foreign Aid, there may well be ways in which its aid pledges can be implemented which build upon those foundations of mutuality, equal benefit and self-reliant development, and avoid the many pitfalls of traditional donor-recipient relations'.

### **3. What China is thinking?**

Above all we now may give an extended summary of China's 'donor logic', especially from thinking about the motives of action in the educational field. The fundamental thinking of China is, actually, that it does not regard itself as a donor (which does not have the same meaning as it does in the case of the Western donors). This logic, partly self-set, partly formulated by history, led to a main rule of building non-hierarchical relations with African countries, but based on mutual benefits, namely, win-win. This is different from the 'catching up' logic and any of the related structural adjustment or governance intervention logic. Let's paint this logic in more detail from reviewing China's motives:

(1) The first and the most basic thinking: you are helped not so that you can 'catch up' with us, but so that we can exchange and share something and develop together.

Ambassador Liu gave an important opinion about how different the Western aid is from the Chinese aid. As he explained, there is a basic difference in aid logic. In terms of the Western logic of aid, there is an emphasis on planning and evaluating,

and they have very clear standards and targets. So, they monitor the flow of the money and hold meetings to supervise how it is being used. This kind of aid system leads to Tanzanian people feel pressured and uncomfortable.

China's advantage is its role as a developing country and never having been a colonist (not hierarchical). China's disadvantage is also the role as a developing country, as it still needs domestic development which restricts China's ability and competitiveness of being a donor. Therefore it is better to find another way rather than staying in a Western oriented model. This is the 'win-win' logic.

As Liu said,

China is facing a period of 'going out', when Africa is in a continuing development and being increasing attractive for the world. We are all giving rising investment to Africa. Where should we be going to? Africa is an aim, and the Beijing Summit is of very strategic importance. On the other hand, Africa also needs opening-up. We are win-win. This win-win is a kind of mutual needs under the new situation.... It is not the same brother relation as before, but more economic benefits and market plans being added.

For Liu, the old brother relation may have focused more on political support, but the new win-win relation put the economic development on the first line. Also for Liu, even though China has a different attitude to the Sino-African relationship, the traditional emotion is still there: 'Chinese leaders can backslap African leaders and say we are brothers, which is much less likely to happen with the Western people. This is our best advantage, although we also need reflective thinking on it'.

(2) The second thinking: through education, which means not only formal school and university study, but also vocational training, we can provide a kind of assistance for Africa by transferring our experience; this may be pragmatic for both of us, and is an 'enabling' way of intervention.



It is significant that it is 'aid through education' rather than 'educational aid'. Following on from the first logic, we can see education is an important strategy in the larger framework of China-Africa 'win-win' cooperation, and it is also good for China itself. This means, for China, that doing educational aid is not directly aiming to build hegemony, but it is either directly aiming to improve the education of people in Africa or gaining closer bilateral, especially trade, relationships. China's logic interprets 'education' in a broader range within which China and Africa share the developing experience and become closely related with each other.

Compared with direct donation to schools (e.g. to Mkapa High School), China is making an increasing effort towards scholarship offerings and short term training. We can see that, compared with Mkapa School, DIT is in a much better situation. DIT lecturers who have recently returned from China with Master and PhD degrees actually become main powers for the institute, and perhaps even in the country in the long run.

(3) The third thinking is: it is practical politically to let Africans who are in administration/ institutional leader positions come and learn Chinese experience and knowledge, which will effectively help the two areas relations.

Based on the second thinking, if the point is gaining a beneficial relationship, then the objectives of education could be important. Thus in addition to normal selection of student scholarships under the Culture Agreement, there are a few additional 'flexible' scholarships 'outside' of the agreement, though nonetheless official; there are also trainings/workshops for university presidents.

(4) The fourth thinking is: although this is different from the Western model, the Chinese model is not contradictory to the West's new role in Africa. However in the new era, China can work together with the West in Africa.

Premier Wen emphasised history during the recent 4<sup>th</sup> China-Africa Ministerial Conference in Egypt in 2009:

The rapidly growing relations and cooperation between China and Africa have attracted the world's attention in recent years. I would like to point out that it was not just a few years ago that China suddenly started its presence in Africa or Africa started its support for China. As early as in the 1950s and '60s, China and Africa fought shoulder to shoulder in the historic struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemony and worked side by side in the hard endeavour to revive our respective national economies.... (Wen, 08/11/2009)

However when history passed from the post-colonial time and the Cold War into the current period, China now does not want to be in opposition to the West:

Even though we do not have the kind of 'brothers' relationship we had before and there may be a bit more distance between us, I think we are still closer than the West and Africa. Our basis of assistance is not easily understood by the Western countries, but I think African countries may need diverse help from both of us (Liu, interview in Chinese embassy).

China welcomes the active involvement of other countries and international organisations in Africa's development so that we can jointly promote peace, development and progress in Africa (Wen, 08/11/2009).

Finally, there is also a point that: from a win-win point of view, China invented some new meanings for aid logic; however, China cannot avoid some of the pitfalls because the logic is still a donor's logic. This means: sometimes, as the Ambassador in the interview told me, some aid practice was set up from what the donor was willing to offer rather than by carefully thinking about the recipient's situation and urgent needs. The Chinese Culture Centre in Mkapu School is a case of this.

#### **4. Contribution and Limitations**

The main job of this study is to introduce and analyse the 'Chinese model' and its



distinctiveness from a comparative perspective. It is not only introduced as ‘what it looks like’ and ‘how it works’, but also explained ‘why it is like that’ and explored ‘how it is recognised’. The comparison is not only about how it works differently in the contemporary world, but its theoretical and historical roots. In this vein, the most important contribution of this study is the rethinking, from a perspective of ‘logic’, of the emerging Chinese action in Africa, especially as it compares with the Western ‘donor logic’ and related logic of intervention and aid mechanisms.

Within this study the first and the most challenging job is the empirical work of the China-Africa educational cooperation, which was based on a series of field work in Tanzania and China by myself. In the Chinese context, there is an absence of systematic empirical work on this topic, and only a few papers based on literature studies of China-Africa educational cooperation exist. Even in the Western academic world, although African study has developed a long history, the research on China and Africa in the field of education is still very new, though nonetheless attractive. My field interview experience was very valuable for my own academic life. The second challenging, but valuable, job in this study is the analysis through a combination of languages, particularly the critical discourse analysis of Chinese texts. As a Chinese person, I have an advantage in this work, and this permitted increased insights into how the Chinese model is described by China itself and by Chinese scholars, and commented on by the West and the Western scholars.

However, as the study covers the field work from Tanzania to China, as well as the analysis work in UK, the data collection has been a hard job for one person who has never been to an African country. If the study could be done by a team of researchers, the data collected could be more diverse and more representative. For instance, getting opinions from Chinese official departments has been a problem, because of the difficulty of access. Even though I made many phone calls, the answers were not as helpful as I had hoped. The work in Tanzania also had a time limitation, as well as the limits set by living and research expenses.

Another difficulty of this study is that its ‘moving’ target. At the beginning of this

study, it was hard to find articles on the topic of 'Chinese aid' or 'China as a donor', but this has changed greatly during the past four years. The literatures are increasing rapidly, much more than I expected. So the study has had to be updated all the time. On another hand, the China-Africa relationship has been developing across these years (from the 2006 Beijing Summit- the 3<sup>rd</sup> FOCAC, to the 4<sup>th</sup> FOCAC in 2009), and this 'unlimited situation' also requires me to update the materials and statements. At the same time, international cooperation on education is also changing over time. If there were another chance to research a similar topic in the next 3-4 years, a very interesting comparison could be made with this study.

However, China as a donor in educational practice has not been discussed as much as the general aid and trade issues in the academic world. Therefore, it is hoped that this study may stimulate some new ideas- as education develops within the framework of global political economy, and new models of educational aid are emerging, based on a different donor logic from the traditional ones. But in this limited study we cannot describe very much in details about what is happening in many specific African countries, and we cannot predict very well the direction the new model is going to take, and we cannot answer fully how much influence this South-South cooperation can make on the Western model.

It is to be hoped that, in future studies, there could be more field work done in different African context to provide a basis for generalisation from this research. China is dealing with relationships in many African countries, so it would be interesting to see whether there is a different focus of aid in different African countries. It would also be better if more Chinese official informants could be accessed. The study of Africa is getting more and more attractive in China, so it is very likely that in the future increasing numbers of people will involve themselves in research related to this topic. Furthermore, there is also some speculation about whether this Chinese model can represent any Asian alternative, or even just a Chinese one (Sørensen, 2010: 18). We cannot say this Chinese model can be generalised as an Asian model, but there will be more possible to find out some similarities among China and other developing countries, such as 'BRIC'



countries.<sup>123</sup>

Ferguson (2005: 176) argues, 'location in the hierarchy no longer indexes a stage of advancement, but simply a rank in a global political economic order...Ranks become not stages to be passed through, but nonserialized statuses, separated from each other by exclusionary walls, rather than developmental stairways. Modernity in this sense comes to appear as a standard of living, a status, not a telos'. This gives us an incentive to look at diverse situations in the global era. A Chinese model of educational aid not focusing on pursuing Western development goals by the Western way, but giving more possibilities of 'helping' shows that the Western orthodox way is no longer the only way of aid, the West is no longer the only donor. On the other hand, China's motives in developing a new model are not based on ideology, but on trade, cooperation and mutual benefit.

Globalisation has brought about significant changes to our perceptions of the world, and also brought about the globalisation of knowledge, as well as the close combination of knowledge and economy. The dominant elements of economic development are more able to dominate the discourse of knowledge. When the world experiences unequal economic development, aid can be a way to promote global equity and peace, and to help the distribution of the public goods more equally. But aid can also easily be used to promote the dominant ideology and be used for political aims. It is not easy to justify which approach or strategy is right or wrong, but the most important point is to let aid face urgent needs, in other words, the aims of aid should not be separated from aid realities. The recipients are trying to gain independence and equalities in the aid relationships, which is a hard process for themselves, and this also requires their own effort.

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<sup>123</sup> BRIC countries, refers to the countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China that are at a similar stage of newly advanced economic development and are considered to be the dominant economic power of the world by 2050. (Goldman Sachs, 04/12/2009)

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## **Appendix 1     Key interviews**

### *Fieldwork in Tanzania*

1. Chinese embassy: Cultural Counsellor (a brief introduction of their work for the cultural and educational cooperation in Tanzania)
2. Chinese embassy: the secretary of Cultural Counsellor (details about the work in the educational field, policies, new trends, practice in China especially the cooperation on higher education level/ training/ Chinese teachers in Tanzania, the attitude from Tanzanian, difficulties and comparisons)
3. Vice principal of Benjamin Mkapa High School, Mero, and his two colleagues (history of the material support to the school from Chinese government and their opinions on this kind of aid, showed me the Chinese Culture Centre in the school)
4. Ambassador of the Chinese embassy (general cooperation between China and Tanzania, advantage and disadvantage of the different aid approaches, discussion about the contemporary situation of the Chinese support to Tanzania)
5. Kim: principal education officer of higher education department (three times talks to her; the scholarship offered by Chinese government and the implement of the selection and the students feedback from China)
6. John: officer of higher education department, experience studying in one of the top Chinese university (his experience in China and his work at the moment)
7. Maggie: head of aid coordinator office in ministry (ministry's function for asking for the educational cooperation and aid by the other countries, Tanzania's most urgent development goal for education, their hope and suggestion to Chinese government, the experience and lessons from the past aid practice )
8. Seka: vice principal of Dar es Salaam institute of technology (DIT) (three times meeting; the practice between the institute and Chinese government and their

agreements, and why they choose China, his own opinion on the aid cooperation and African development of education)

9. Focus group in DIT (Tanzanian teachers in DIT who studied in China with the scholarship offered by Chinese government, their experience and opinion)
10. Deputy principal of Dar es salaam university College of education (DUCE) (general introduction of the cooperation with different countries/organisations by the institute, and the difference and similarities)
11. Principal of DUCE, Misa (more in details about the institute practice, the plan about building Confucius Institute collaboratively, her own experience in China for official training)
12. Nancy: from the department of aid administration, Ministry of Finance (introduction of main aid resource to Tanzania and how they manage the financial flow; the procedure, and the new policy which is the JAST)
13. Moti: from Tanelec company in Arusha, studied in China before (his experience in China and opinion)
14. Kath and Race: two Tanzanian girls who have just come back to Tz from China, studied in China with the Chinese governmental scholarships (their experience and opinion, talking about the advantage and disadvantage of the Chinese aid to them)
15. Robert: a worker at the harbor, studied in China at very early year when the official scholarship for Tz just started (experience and opinions)
16. A lecturer in University of Dar es Salaam, studied in China before (experience and opinions)

### *Fieldwork in China*

17. Zeng: the deputy dean, department of education, Beijing Normal Univerwsity, her husband is working in Ministry of Commerce (introduction about the general ministries which are doing the job in China, especially talking about the



motives of the international engagement of China and other Asian countries, personal opinions on the China's different role and approach)

18. Zhang: dean of the department of education (general discussion about the research and his opinion)
19. Chen and Wang: administrators from the international cooperation office in BNU (University's assistance with Ministry for receiving African students, stories and experience, students situation and responds, practice)
20. Hong: dean of Institute of educational administration, Beijing Normal University (general discussion about the China-Africa cooperation philosophically, brief introduction about the different ministries function on this topic)
21. Wu: Section chief of Asian and Africa section, International cooperation department, Ministry of education (brief introduction about official progress Chinese government has made to African areas and roles of different sections/departments)
22. Yan: deputy director and vice dean, office of international programs, Tianjin Normal University (the cooperative programs, including Confucius Institute between TJNU and African countries, the very outstanding of what TJNU has made for the China-Africa educational cooperation, the details of how select and dispatch teachers and receive students, the motives of the university for these practice, future plan...)
23. Wang: associate professor, International exchange office, Centre for African vocational education studies, Tianjin University of Technology and Education (personal experience of dealing with African students and training African officers and school administrators, the exact relationship between the university and Ethiopia, the detailed program of the training courses, the function of the centre and some of her own suggestion for the future support to Africa)
24. Zhou and Chang: lecturers in Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University (discussion about the China-Africa relationship and their work on the issue, personal opinion)

25. Liu: vice dean of Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University (talking about this topic theoretically, historically and philosophically, Chinese history of development and the cultural/education engagement in the global world, how to explain the particularities of the rising Chinese model, importance of understanding the term 'exchange and cooperation', the context of the global political economy)
26. Jian: dean of Institute of African Studies, ZJNU, but just has changed his job (the characteristics of the Chinese model, the progress China has made since the Forum, how the western people look at the Chinese approach, and the philosophical and theoretical differences between China and the West, the importance of the Conceptualising 'aid', the practice of ZJNU since 90's and their cooperation with ministry of education and ministry of commerce, and other institutions)



## **Appendix 2      Field work interview questions by groups**

### **1. For institutions**

- (1) Have you ever heard about any educational cooperation between China and Tanzania, in any educational fields? If yes, what type?**
- (2) Does your department (Faculty of education) or university (University of Dar es Salaam) have any relationship with some Chinese programs?**
- (3) Does your department or university have any information of certain Chinese educational programs? For instance any advertisement?**
- (4) Are these educational practice from China in Tanzania normally for aid purpose, or for business?**
- (5) Does your department or university receive any educational aid from the western institutions such as the British DFID? Could you give some introduction about it if yes?**
- (6) What do you think about the aid programs from western organisations? Is it working well as you know? (good performance and disadvantages)**
- (7) Compared with the western aid, what do you think about the Chinese approaches as you know? As we know it is probably a small part compared with a lot of western agendas, so do you think it is useful in Africa area? For what motives?**

### **2. For Chinese officials**

- (1) Does China have a long history with Tanzania in the educational field, in addition to the other parts cooperation?**
- (2) What did China help Tanzania with their education? Could you give some examples of some programs/projects?**
- (3) Generally, what kinds of approaches China is giving educational aid to Tanzania, or in another word, educational cooperation?**
- (4) Does Chinese government have regularly meeting with Tanzania within the education cooperation? Official visiting? Scholarship? Training?**
- (5) Which ministries in China (Education? Foreign affairs?) conduct the practice with Tanzania and, is it with the ministry of education here? How does Chinese embassy do this with Tanzania ministry?**
- (6) Currently as you know what projects China is offering to Tanzania? Could you introduce it a little more in details?**
- (7) What are the procedures of the some specific aid programs, for instance the Chinese scholarship? And is it offered annually? How much? and for how many students?**
- (8) In terms of some training offered by China in Tanzania as part of the aid, what kinds of subjects they cover? How long of the training normally? How often?**

- (9) What is the main practice do you think at the moment? As we know the big donors are all from western countries, so what is the distinct characteristic of the Chinese practice? Do you think it is opening a different way to help the educational development in Tanzania?
- (10) What are the main problems do you think of the Chinese practice? And what the main difficulties it is facing nowadays?
- (11) As you know until now has there any good progress in this educational aid by China in Tanzania?
- (12) What is the main aim of the Chinese aid practice? For what purpose? (further cooperation in other fields? economic development?)
- (13) Have you ever met any difficulty/conflict (with African or Western people) during your work? or any encouragement from them?
- (14) Does China have any cooperation with the western organisations for offering aid collaboratively?
- (15) Any changes during these years, and in the future, any new plan?
- (16) Do you have any contact with the people who has experience studying in China before, or people who are now studying in China? Then I can ask them for some more information if they would like.

### 3. For Tanzanian officials

- (1) Does Tanzania have any cooperation in the educational field with China? Could you give a brief introduction of this history?
- (2) Currently how is the cooperation with Chinese government for education development? Through Chinese embassy? With which ministries of China?
- (3) What types of the educational help/aid China gives? Mainly on what level? (primary, higher?)
- (4) What is the procedure for the main aid programs from China? Such as scholarship.
- (5) How to select recipients for the study in China or some training in Tanzania? Any standard?
- (6) Is there any progress China has been making for educational development in Tanzania? Example?
- (7) Does Chinese government claim any conditions for your country's educational practice performance when they give help?
- (8) Totally what are the main educational aid projects in Tanzania currently? And are they mostly from western donors? Do you think Chinese way is making some efforts/ effects?
- (9) Do you think the educational help from China is different from the western model? Explain more please.
- (10) What do you think the motives of both sides within the educational cooperation?
- (11) What kind of influence the donors give to Tanzania? (what did you learn from western



educational system? From Chinese skill training?) What kind of image you have for these donors? Any difference?

(12) Do you have any personal information to give me for further investigation if it is allowed and possible?

#### 4. For returning students

(1). When did you study in China? Major? Which level (undergraduate or postgraduate)

(2). Was it through the help of Chinese government? How did you get this opportunity? At that time what was your situation? (as a student or having a job)

(3). Is your study in China important for your work in your country after you came back?

(4). Was there any other African student go with you at that time? Do you have any contact with them now? What are you doing now?

(5). Was there any requirement from the Chinese government?

(6). How do think about the reason of giving scholarship to Tanzania from China? And what was the motive of you to go to China at that time?

(7). Was it an important way for African student (going abroad to some developing countries)? Is it easier to go to China than to go to some western countries? Is there any other opportunities to go to Europe or USA?

(8). As we know Chinese government is still giving scholarships to Tanzania, do you think it is increasingly important to Tanzania, or not as important as before?

(9). As you know, people from China back to Tanzania or other African countries, are they all doing some very professional jobs such as professors, lectures or working in government? Do they contribute to the relationship between the two countries?

(10). What do you think about the advantages and the disadvantages of the Chinese help to Tanzania by this way (some trainings and offering scholarships)? Is it an effective way for the improvement of Tanzanian educational development? Other suggestions for the Chinese cooperation/support?

### Appendix 3      Consent letter

Dear sir or madam,

Thank you for taking time to read this letter. It sets out the nature of my research and seeks your consent to participate in an interview for about an hour. In some cases I might request a further interview.

I am a PhD student at Graduate School of Education in University of Bristol (UK). I am researching into China's educational aid to Africa. Specifically, the research asks people from both donor and recipient sides about their perception of China's action. Although it is overt research, in that it is intended that it will be published as a doctoral thesis and in academic journals, the anonymity of all participants and institutions will be preserved. I will record our interview and show your name in my thesis only when you permit.

My supervisor at the University of Bristol is Professor Roger Dale (r.dale@bristol.ac.uk). My supervisor at the University of Dar es Salaam is Dr. Hillary Dachi (dachi@edu.udcm.ac.tz).

Please feel free to ask any questions about the nature of the research. If you agree to participate I would ask you to sign this letter below, acknowledging that you have understood the intentions of the research.

Yours sincerely,

Tingting Yuan                      Tingting.Yuan@bristol.ac.uk  
0044-780-9216699 (UK)      0714-670-150 (Tanzania)

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***I have understood the nature of the research outlined above and agree to participate. I understand that everything I say will be treated confidentially, I may withdraw from the research and I may see a copy of the transcript of any interview/s in which I am involved.***

I agree to have my interview audio recorded.

☐ YES    ☐ NO

I agree that you use a pseudonym name instead of my real name in your thesis.

☐ YES    ☐ NO

***Signed:***

***Date:***



## Appendix 4      Research clearance letters

THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING

Cable: "ELIMU" DAR ES SALAAM  
Telex: 41742 Elimu Tz.  
Telephone: 2121287, 2110146  
Fax: 2127763



Post Office Box 9121  
DAR ES SALAAM

In reply please quote:

Ref. ED/EP/ERC/VOLI/ 108

Date: Wednesday, August 20<sup>th</sup>, 2008

The Director,  
Department of Higher Education-MoEVT

**RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE FOR MS. TINGTING YUAN:**

The captioned matter above refers. The mentioned is bonafide PhD student of the University of Dar es Salaam, she is conducting research on the topic titled "Education Aid under Globalization and a China-Africa Model: Features, Dynamics and Mechanism" as part of her Doctoral dissertation in PhD (Educational Planning and Administration) programme.

The researcher needs to collect data and necessary information from your office which related to Chinese educational cooperation with Tanzania.

In line with the above information you are being requested to provide the needed assistance that will enable her to complete this study successfully.

The period by which this permission has been granted is from 20<sup>th</sup> August, 2008 to 31<sup>st</sup> September, 2008.

By copy of this letter, Ms. Tingting Yuan is required to submit a copy of the report (or part of it) to the *Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education and Vocational Training* for documentation and reference.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Ngodu'.

Abdallah S. Ngodu  
For Permanent Secretary

CC: Ms. Tingting Yuan

THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING

Cable: "ELIMU" DAR ES SALAAM  
Telex: 41742 Elimu Tz.  
Telephone: 2121287, 2110146  
Fax: 2127763



Post Office Box 9121  
DAR ES SALAAM

In reply please quote:

Ref. ED/EP/ERC/VOLI/ 108

Date: Wednesday, August 20<sup>th</sup>, 2008

The Director,  
Department of Policy and Planning-MoEVT

ATT: Head of subsection-External Aid Coordination

**RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE FOR MS. TINGTING YUAN:**

The captioned matter above refers. The mentioned is bonafide PhD student of the University of Dar es Salaam, she is conducting research on the topic titled "Education Aid under Globalization and a China-Africa Model: Features, Dynamics and Mechanism" as part of her Doctoral dissertation in PhD (Educational Planning and Administration) programme.

The researcher needs to collect data and necessary information from your office which related to Chinese educational cooperation with Tanzania.

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The period by which this permission has been granted is from 20<sup>th</sup> August, 2008 to 31<sup>st</sup> September, 2008.

By copy of this letter, Ms. Tingting Yuan is required to submit a copy of the report (or part of it) to the *Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education and Vocational Training* for documentation and reference.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Abdallah S. Ngodu'.

Abdallah S. Ngodu  
For Permanent Secretary

CC: Ms. Tingting Yuan



THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA  
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING

Cable: "ELIMU" DAR ES SALAAM  
Telex: 41742 Elimu Tz.  
Telephone: 2121287, 2110146  
Fax: 2127763



Post Office Box 9121  
DAR ES SALAAM

In reply please quote:

Ref. ED/EP/ERC/VOLI/ 108

Date: Wednesday, August 20<sup>th</sup>, 2008

The Permanent Secretary  
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs  
P. O. Box 9111  
Dar es Salaam

ATT: Commissioner, External Finance.

**RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE FOR MS. TINGTING YUAN:**

The captioned matter above refers. The mentioned is bonafide PhD student of the University of Dar es Salaam, she is conducting research on the topic titled "Education Aid under Globalization and a China-Africa Model: Features, Dynamics and Mechanism" as part of her Doctoral dissertation in PhD (Educational Planning and Administration) programme.

The researcher needs to collect data and necessary information from your Ministry which related to Chinese educational cooperation with Tanzania.

In line with the above information you are being requested to provide the needed assistance that will enable her to complete this study successfully.

The period by which this permission has been granted is from 20<sup>th</sup> August, 2008 to 31<sup>st</sup> September, 2008.

By copy of this letter, Ms. Tingting Yuan is required to submit a copy of the report (or part of it) to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education and Vocational Training for documentation and reference.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Abdallah S. Ngodu'.

Abdallah S. Ngodu  
For Permanent Secretary

CC: Ms. Tingting Yuan

**UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM**  
**Faculty of Education**  
**Department of Educational Planning and Administration**

Tel 022-2410594;0784513439  
E-mail: epa@edu.udsm.ac.tz

*Our Ref: EPA/23*

*Your Ref:*



PO Box 35048  
Dar es Salaam  
Tanzania  
Date: August 27, 2007

Principal,  
Dar es Salaam University College of Education,  
P.O Box 2329,  
Dar es Salaam.

**RE: YUAN TING TING**

The above captioned matter refers.

This is to introduce to you the above named who is currently a PhD student in the Department of Educational Planning and Administration.

The student's area of academic interest is, "Educational Aid under Globalization and A China - Africa Model: Features, Dynamics and Mechanisms" and would like to have an appointment with you to learn more about the Chinese Aid to education in Tanzania.

Thanking you in advance for your support,

Yours Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'H.A. Dachi'.

Dr. H.A. Dachi,  
Head,  
Department of Educational Planning and Administration.

c.c.      PF